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“YOU WANT INSURANCE WITH THAT?” USING 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 
FROM ADD-ON INSURANCE PRODUCTS 
 
TOM BAKER* 
PETER SIEGELMAN∗ 
 
*** 
 
Persistently high profits on “insurance” for small value losses sold as an 
add-on to other products or services (such as extended warranties sold 
with consumer electronics, loss damage waivers sold with a car rental, and 
credit life insurance sold with a loan) pose a twofold challenge to the 
standard economic analysis of insurance.  First, expected utility theory 
teaches that people should not buy insurance for small value losses.  
Second, the market should not in the long run permit sellers to charge 
prices that greatly exceed the cost of providing the insurance.  Combining 
the insights of the Gabaix and Laibson shrouded pricing model with the 
behavioral economics of insurance, this article explains why high profits 
for add-on insurance persist and describes the negative distributional and 
welfare consequences of an unregulated market for such insurance.  The 
article explores four potential regulatory responses: enhanced disclosure, 
a ban on the point of sale offer of add-on insurance, price regulation, and 
the creation of a new, on-line market.  Drawing on theoretical, empirical, 
and comparative law sources, the article explains why enhanced disclosure 
will not work, the circumstances under which a point of sale ban is 
desirable, and why a new, on-line market is preferable to price regulation 
in circumstances in which a point of sale ban is undesirable. 
 
 
*William Maul Measey Professor of Law and Health Sciences, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, and Roger Sherman Professor, University of 
Connecticut School of Law. Thank you to Ian Ayres, Lynn Baker, Gene Bardach, 
Caroline Bradley, William Bratton, Sergio Campos, Alan Cooper, Steven Halpert, 
Peter Kochenburger, James Kwak, Peter Molk, Gideon Parchomovsky, Philip 
Siegelman, Rick Swedloff, James Tierney, and Tess Wilkinson-Ryan for 
comments on earlier drafts, to Pranav Jindal and Josh Teitelbaum for helpful 
discussions, and to Bill Draper and Yan Hong for assistance with the research.  
Special thanks to Patricia McCoy for extensive and extremely helpful comments.  
In addition, our analysis benefited from comments received at presentations at the 
University of Miami, Rutgers (Camden), Columbia, University of Southern 
California, and Pennsylvania Law Schools. Research for this article was supported 
by the Working Group on Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Retail 
Financial Markets of the Alfred P. Sloan and Russell Sage Foundations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Informed observers of insurance markets have long marveled at the 
high prices charged for a wide variety of low value insurance products sold 
as “add-ons” to consumers buying other products and services.  Examples 
include the extended warranties sold with electronics and home appliances, 
the credit life insurance and identity theft protection sold with mortgages, 
auto loans, and credit cards, and the collision damage waivers and short 
term liability insurance sold with car rentals.  Unlike iPhones or Gucci 
bags, there is nothing obviously cool or distinctive about add-on insurance 
products.  They are just contingent claims on money – often small amounts 
of money – that, like other forms of insurance, protect consumers from 
losses that are easy to predict in the aggregate and should, in theory, sell at 
prices that are close to insurers’ predicted costs.  Yet sellers are able to 
charge prices for add-on insurance products that consistently and greatly 
exceed the cost of providing the insurance, well beyond what is possible in 
other parts of the consumer insurance market.  These excess profits have 
negative distributional consequences and lead to substantial efficiency 
losses. 
Insurance regulators have long suspected that these high profits 
reveal that there is something awry in the sale of insurance add-ons.  
Investigations of credit life insurance in the 1950s,1 collision damage 
 
1 See, e.g., Sunderland v. Day, 145 N.E.2d 39, 39 (Ill. 1957) (interpreting Ill. 
Small Loans Act to forbid a lender from requiring – as was apparently common – 
that borrower purchase credit life insurance as a condition precedent to the making 
of a loan); Leland J. Gordon, Book Review, 25 J. INS. 77 (1958) (discussing a 
finding of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly that 
significant “abuses in the consumer credit insurance business[,] which included 
sales of credit insurance far in excess of money loaned, failure to deliver the policy 
to the borrower, payment of excessive commissions, pyramiding of policies by 
requiring the borrower to purchase a second policy upon refinancing his loan 
without cancellation of the first policy, and failure to make a refund of unearned 
premiums”); NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, A BACKGROUND STUDY OF THE 
REGULATION OF CREDIT LIFE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE 39-51 (1970) (chapter 
entitled “Credit Insurance Abuses”). Interestingly, the volume of scholarly 
literature on credit life seems to have peaked in the 1960s, and relatively little has 
been written about it since then; Philip H. Peters, How Should Credit Life 
Insurance be Regulated, 1958 INS. L. J. 529 (1958) (suggesting problems were 
widespread); William T. Beadles, Control of Abuses Under Credit Life and Health 
Insurance, 26 J. INS. 1 (1959) (detailing a litany of abuses and suggesting 
regulations to counter them). 
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waivers in the 1980s,2 and extended warranties in recent years3 have 
documented the excess profits earned on the sale of these insurance 
products, along with the abusive sales practices that such profits induce.  
Yet, regulators have struggled to identify how these excess profits are 
sustained.  Indeed, an otherwise impressive study by the Competition 
Commission of the United Kingdom in 2003 attributes excess profits 
earned on the sale of extended warranties for consumer electronics to an ill-
defined “complex monopoly situation” that the study never really explains.4 
Not surprisingly, the Commission’s solution – a set of information forcing 
measures adopted in 2005 – has not worked.5 
The conceptual problem for the Competition Commission, state 
insurance departments, and most other consumer protection agencies that 
have examined add-on insurance markets can be traced to the economic 
model they use.  The add-on insurance product market quite literally “does 
not compute” within the standard Insurance Economics 101 framework that 
 
2 See, e.g., Iowa Dep’t of Ins., Proposal to the Market Conduct of Consumer 
Affairs (EX3) Subcommittee re: Proposed Model Statute on Collision Damage 
Waivers, 1 NAIC Proc. 173 (1985). 
3 COMPETITION COMM’N, A REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF EXTENDED 
WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC [HOUSEHOLD] ELECTRICAL GOODS WITHIN THE UK, 
2003, 1, at 3 available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www. 
competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2003/485xwars.htm#summary. In 
the US, a 1985 lawsuit by Maine Attorney General James Tierney alleged that 
retailer Sears, Roebuck used unfair and deceptive trade practices to sell extended 
warranties. See State v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. CV-84-133, 1985 LEXIS 239, 
at *44 (Me. Super. Aug. 29, 1985). These allegedly included: (a) selling coverage 
that duplicated manufacturers’ express warranties that were already included in the 
purchase price, and (b) after the consumer had made the decision to purchase the 
product, overstating the need for warranties by exaggerating the probability that a 
product would fail. Id. While noting that extended warranties were “highly 
profitable” for Sears, id. at *51, the court concluded that there were no deceptive 
trade practices involved because “the State . . . failed to demonstrate that Sears 
misleads customers when it sells maintenance agreements by making them believe 
that they must purchase, either through maintenance agreements or through 
prospective repair costs, what the law gives them for free.” Id. at *76. 
4 COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 3, at 6. 
5 Recently, the U.K. Office of Fair Trading – which has shown an appreciation 
for behavioral economics – has taken a fresh look at extended warranties, finding 
that the extended warranty market remains “unfair and uncompetitive” and 
proposing a new round of reforms. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, EXTENDED 
WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL GOODS, 2012, 1403 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/markets-work/OFT1403.pdf. For the OFT’s 
interest in behavioral economics, see, e.g., OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, WHAT DOES 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS MEAN FOR COMPETITION POLICY?, 2010, 1224 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/oft1224.pdf. 
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has informed insurance regulation, leaving regulators without a reliable 
guide to action.  Regulators’ intuition and common sense tell them that 
consumers are being exploited, but the dominant conceptual framework in 
their field cannot tell them how or why, or what to do to prevent that 
exploitation.  
When they do try to address the perceived exploitation – as the 
Competition Commission did for extended warranties in 2005 – regulators 
understandably lack the confidence to go beyond non-controversial 
strategies, such as mandatory disclosure or other information-forcing 
mechanisms.  Disclosure rarely improves consumer markets in any 
context,6 and, as the Competition Commission experience demonstrates, 
does not provide meaningful protection to consumers purchasing add-on 
insurance products.  In the end, regulators typically give up.  This explains 
why, for example, many of the credit life insurance abuses identified in the 
1950s and rental car insurance abuses identified in the 1980s persist today.7 
The persistence of large profits in add-on insurance products poses 
two main conceptual problems for the standard economic analysis 
employed in insurance regulation.  First, according to that analysis, there 
should not even be a robust market for most of these kinds of insurance 
products.  The expected utility theory that lies at the core of the economic 
analysis of insurance teaches, unequivocally, that people should not buy 
insurance for low value losses.8 The whole point of insurance under 
expected utility theory is to shift money from states of the world in which 
people do not need their last dollar very much (their marginal utility of 
money is low) to states of the world in which they could put that dollar to 
much better use (their marginal utility of money is high).  The amounts of 
money at stake in most add-on insurance products are simply too small for 
that difference in marginal utility to explain consumer behavior.  Moreover, 
whatever slight difference there may be in the marginal utility of money 
between the time a person buys the insurance and the time when she 
collects on it is more than offset by the transaction costs involved (even 
leaving aside the excess profits).  This is Insurance Economics 101.9 
 
6 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schnieder, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011). 
7 See infra text accompanying note 119. 
8 See SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT 
AND INSURANCE 176, 188 (2nd ed. 2004); Matthew Rabin & Richard H. Thaler, 
Anomalies: Risk Aversion, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 219 (2001); KENNETH J. 
ARROW, The Theory of Risk Aversion, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 
(1971); John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, 32 
ECONOMETRICA 122 (1964). 
9 Harrington & Niehaus, supra note 8; infra text accompanying Figure 1. 
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Second, even if it did make sense for people to buy add-on 
insurance products, the market should not in the long run permit sellers to 
charge prices that greatly exceed the cost of providing the insurance.  
Excess profits should bring new competitors into the market.  Even if most 
people are not careful shoppers, some are.  Their careful shopping should 
benefit all consumers, as sellers compete for the careful shoppers by 
reducing prices for the add-on insurance products.10  This is 
Microeconomics 101 applied to insurance markets. 
As we will explain, the problem is not with economics, per se, but 
rather with the failure of insurance law and regulation to move beyond 
Economics 101.  Behavioral economic analysis has addressed both of the 
conceptual problems presented by the 101-level analyses.  First, borrowing 
from psychological research, behavioral economics provides a compelling 
explanation for why people choose to insure against small losses, even at 
prices that greatly exceed the cost of providing the insurance.11 Second, 
using a simple (in retrospect) equilibrium model, behavioral economics 
provides a compelling explanation of why prices for add-on insurance so 
often greatly exceed cost, even when sellers operate in a competitive 
market for the primary product or service to which the insurance products 
are add-ons.12 
Of the two parts to this behavioral economic explanation, the 
second is decidedly more important for improving insurance law and 
regulation.  The first part simply puts more rigorous science behind what 
regulators, marketers, and ordinary people already knew: people are willing 
to pay for “peace of mind” to an extent that goes well beyond what 
expected utility theory would predict, especially when they are buying a 
 
10 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the 
Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 630, 638 (1979) (concluding that “the presence of at least some consumer 
search in a market creates the possibility of a ‘pecuniary externality’: persons who 
search sometimes protect nonsearchers from overreaching firms.”).  Moreover, in 
their model, if at least one-third of consumers undertake comparison shopping, the 
market price will be close to the competitive price in market where all consumers 
are informed. Id. at 655. 
11 See, e.g., Eric Johnson, John Hershey, Jacqueline Meszaros & Howard 
Kunreuther, Framing, Probability Distortions and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK 
& UNCERTAINTY 35, 42 (1993); Paul J. H. Shoemaker & Howard C. Kunreuther, 
An Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions, 46 J.  RISK & INS. 603 (1979). For 
an extended treatment, see HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER, MARK V. PAULY  & STACEY 
MCMORROW, INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
IN THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY (2013). 
12 See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer 
Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 
505 (2006). 
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product or service that puts their peace of mind in question.  Indeed, taken 
all by itself, this first part could do more harm than good, at least in relation 
to the regulation of add-on insurance products.  It is a short step from a 
better understanding of why people like peace of mind insurance to the 
claim that there is no need to do anything to protect consumers, other than 
perhaps mandating certain disclosures, because sellers are simply satisfying 
consumers’ legitimate preferences.  Some recent writing by highly 
regarded law and economics scholars points in that direction, using the 
language of consumer sovereignty.13 
The second part of the behavioral economic analysis reveals the 
existence of heretofore unappreciated “situational monopolies”14 that 
require – and hence authorize the use of – more powerful regulatory tools 
than mere disclosure to fix.  This second part has not yet been taken into 
account in the law and economic analysis of insurance.  Thus, there is 
reason to believe that scholars using consumer sovereignty to support a 
light touch to the regulation of peace of mind insurance products might 
reconsider their analysis, at least in the context of add-on insurance 
products.  
It is important to emphasize that we are not merely adding together 
two disparate strands of behavioral economics.  The combination of the 
shrouded pricing/situational monopoly model with the behavioral 
economics of low-value insurance yields a key insight into the welfare 
analysis of this market that is not present in either story by itself.  As we 
spell-out in more detail below, the shrouded pricing model explains in 
general terms how supra-competitive prices for second-stage or 
supplemental products (e.g., razor blades, toner cartridges for laser printers) 
can be maintained in equilibrium.  In these cases, the second stage product 
is an appropriate – or even necessary – complement to the first stage 
product: razor blades and toner cartridges have finite lives, and razors or 
printers are useless without them.  Consumers may have a choice among 
 
13 See, e.g., Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted 
O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral 
Economics and the Case for 'Asymmetric Paternalism,’ 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 
(2003); Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Consumer Demand in Insurance Markets, 3 
ERASMUS L. REV. 23 (2010). 
14 The term “situational monopoly” has appeared in the law and economics 
literature in the analysis of secured transactions and the application of the contract 
doctrine of duress.  See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured 
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167-71 (1978-
1979) on secured financing and the competitive advantage that a creditor with a 
security interest in after-acquired property enjoys over other lenders and MICHAEL 
J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 78 - 101 (1993) on duress. 
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competing second-stage products, but they cannot avoid purchasing any 
second-stage product at all. 
That is decidedly not the case when the second-stage product is 
add-on insurance, the purchase of which is irrational to begin with.  The 
option not to buy at all is not only real, it is compelling (at least to rational 
consumers).  That, in turn, means that sellers must undertake efforts to 
convince customers to buy the add-on insurance product.  Moreover, such 
efforts are highly profitable because of the supra-competitive prices 
charged for add-ons, which implies that all kinds of hard-sell tactics are 
virtually compulsory because the marginal return to a dollar spent on 
inducing a customer to purchase add-on insurance is high.  
The efficiency consequences of such hard-sell practices are not 
trivial.  Such tactics are deployed against all buyers (whether they actually 
purchase the add-on insurance or not), and are properly counted as a waste 
of customer and seller time, a real welfare loss that is not present in the 
original shrouding model.15 In our view, “merely” protecting 
unsophisticated consumers from tactics that redistribute wealth to 
sophisticated consumers is a worthy goal in itself, and one that is shared by 
most insurance regulators.  But the shrouded pricing of small-loss 
insurance has efficiency consequences as well, as we discuss below. 
This Article is organized as follows.  In Part I we describe three 
examples of add-on insurance products – extended warranties for consumer 
products, loss damage waivers for rental cars, and credit life insurance – 
and discuss the irrationality of purchasing these products under a standard 
expected utility approach.  In Part II we develop a behavioral economic 
analysis of these products that helps explain why people buy them and, 
more importantly, why competition fails to reduce their prices to something 
approaching their cost.  In Part III we discuss the implications of this 
analysis for insurance regulation, exploring four possible strategies: 
improved disclosure of the terms of add-on insurance products, a ban on 
the sale of the products as an add-on, price regulation, and the use of 
information technology to create a robust market at the point of sale.  
Drawing from recent U.K. experience, we recommend a mixed approach 
for the three specific products we examine: a ban on the sale of credit life 
insurance and extended warranties as add-ons and a new, on-line market 
for car rental insurance that customers can access at the car rental desk.  
Ours is a more activist and decidedly old school approach – with a 
high tech twist for car rental insurance – than forward thinking insurance 
regulators have entertained in recent years, but there is new science and a 
 
15 For example, East Coast readers may reflect on the need to check a box on 
the Amtrak website indicating that, no, you do not want to buy the $10 travel 
insurance on a $60 train ticket. 
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new regulatory environment behind our proposal.  The new science is 
behavioral economics.  The new regulatory environment is developing in 
response to the financial crisis of 2008.  In the legislative process leading to 
the enactment of the Dodd-Frank financial reform statute, state insurance 
regulators successfully argued for the exemption of insurance products 
from the jurisdiction of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, on 
the grounds that state insurance regulation was already looking out for 
consumers and that state-based regulation allowed for innovation and 
experimentation.  Add-on insurance products present an excellent 
opportunity to test that claim. 
 
II.  THREE EXAMPLES OF ADD-ON INSURANCE 
 
In this part, we analyze three common forms of add-on insurance: 
extended warranties for consumer products, the loss or collision damage 
waivers sold with rental cars, and credit life insurance.  Extended 
warranties – and, in most cases, damage waivers – have negative value in 
expected utility terms because the losses they protect against are small and 
the price charged for the insurance is high relative to the expected value.  
Rational expected utility maximizers should not be risk averse at all over 
such small stakes.  Credit life insurance and, in some situations, damage 
waivers are a bad deal for slightly different reasons: The stakes can 
sometimes be high, and thus might be worth insuring; just not when the 
cost is so high relative to the expected value.  
 
A. EXTENDED WARRANTIES FOR CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
 
An extended warranty is an optional contract that provides the 
purchaser with a longer period of protection from the failure of a specific 
product than the standard warranty offered by the manufacturer.16 Extended 
warranties differ fundamentally from the manufacturer’s warranties that 
are included in the price of a consumer product.  Manufacturers’ warranties 
 
16 There are allegations that some major retailers push extended warranties on 
products such as power tools that already come with manufacturer’s lifetime 
warranties. For example, Home Depot’s Ridgid Power tools come with a lifetime 
warranty from the manufacturer, yet some customers complain that they were 
nevertheless sold an extended warranty on the item. See, e.g., Scam Man, Rigid 
Extended Warranty Scam (Jun. 2, 2012, 2:06 AM), http://www.home 
depotsucks.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=11532#p13442 (last visited Jan. 29, 
2013) (“[m]ost of these ridged [sic] products are not eligible for an extended 
warranty because [sic] they have lifetime service agreement. yet home depot has 
the cashiers promp  [sic] you to buy them. shows you the greed of home depot and 
that is just one scam they do”). 
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do have the potential to provide substantial value, but not primarily because 
of their insurance function.  Rather, the primary value of a manufacturer’s 
warranty lies in the quality signal it sends.  Consumers rationally conclude 
that the manufacturer would not offer a generous warranty if the product 
regularly failed within the warranty period and, thus, consumers 
appropriately prefer a product with a better manufacturer’s warranty.17  
An optional extended warranty, sold at an additional cost, does not 
signal high quality.  Indeed, our personal shopping experience suggests the 
opposite.  We have found that, once we have decided to buy a particular 
TV/refrigerator/washing machine/sound system at a retail establishment, 
the sales person who earnestly persuaded us of the high quality of the 
selected item disappears, and a “customer assistant” arrives with news of 
other disappointed customers whose very same TV/refrigerator/washing 
machine/sound system stopped working shortly after they bought them.  
Because the TV/refrigerator/washing machine/sound system might not 
actually be as good as it is supposed to be, the customer assistant explains, 
the store has arranged for an extended warranty that is available, at a small 
additional charge, to protect us from such disappointment.18 This extended 
warranty is pure insurance (and almost pure profit for the store).  For 
example, Business Week reported that extended warranties were 
responsible for 50% of Best Buy’s profits and almost 100% of Circuit 
City’s profits.19 
Data on extended warranties are difficult to come by.  As a result, 
there is very little empirical social science literature describing their 
workings, despite the frequent criticism of extended warranties by 
economists and consumer advocates.20 One recent estimate put the size of 
 
17 See generally George Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Warranty, 90 YALE 
L. J. 1297 (1981); Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure 
and Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977).. 
18 This practice turns out to be so well documented in the extended warranty 
context that it has a name, at least in the UK: “double hitting.” Retailers “stressed 
to [the U.K. Competition Commission] the action they take to stop unacceptable 
selling practices, which they have told [the U.K.C.C.] would alienate customers.” 
COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 3, at 40.  The “unacceptable selling practices” 
include “double hitting,” providing “misleading information,” and “persisting in 
trying to sell an EW when the customer has declined the offer.” Id. 
19 Tao Chen, Ayay Kalra & Baohon Sun, Why Do Consumers Buy Extended 
Service Contracts?, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 611, 615 (2009) (using 2003 data from a 
large retailer in an expected utility framework that assumes that demographic and 
product characteristics affect the purchase of warranties through differences in risk 
aversion between consumers). 
20 For exceptions, see Pranav Jindal, Risk Preferences and Demand Drivers of 
Extended Warranties (Dec. 2012) (working paper) (on file with Smeal College of 
Business, Pennsylvania State University), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
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this market at $16 billion,21 but that appears to be a largely impressionistic 
number, with no derivation given.  Better estimates are available for the 
UK – at least, for the consumer electric goods market – thanks to an 
investigation by the Competition Commission, which found that on total 
electric goods sales of £15-20 Billion in 2001, “18.5 million E[xtended] 
W[arrantie]s were supplied . . . .with a total value of nearly £900 million 
(including a valuation of free EWs), about 5% of total sales.”22  EWs were 
purchased by about one-third of all consumers who bought an electric good 
worth more than £50.23  Extrapolating those figures to the US yields a 
rough estimate of about $30 billion in electric goods sales in 2010, and 
about $1.4 billion in extended warranties sold for these types of products.24  
Extended warranties are also sold as add-ons to other products.  For 
example, the website Warranty Week estimated that the market for 
automobile extended warranties in the US represents another $11.2 
billion.25 
 
2196033 (using experimental data to decompose demand for extended warranties 
on washing machines as a function of risk, and loss, aversion); Chen, Kalra & Sun, 
supra note 19. Some economic theorists have modeled the market for extended 
warranties. See, e.g., Aidan Hollis, Extended Warranties, Adverse Selection, and 
Aftermarkets, 66 J. RISK & INS. 321 (1999) (surveying theoretical literature, and 
arguing on the basis of an adverse selection model that sellers of primary goods 
should not be able to exclude third-party extended warranties). At least in some 
contexts, extended warranties can be used to price-discriminate among consumers, 
even when buyers are rational, by increasing switching costs. See Edward 
Iacobucci, A Switching Costs Explanation of Tying and Warranties, 37 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 431 (2008). 
21 See Extended Warranties, WARRANTY WEEK, Nov. 21, 2006, available at 
http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20061121.html (suggesting that the 
total extended warranty market was worth $16 Billion, but not specifying whether 
this is a stock measure of the value of warranties in force or an annualized flow). 
22 See COMPETITION COMM’N, EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC 
ELECTRICAL GOODS, 2003, at vol. 1. p. 3 (U.K.). The OFT recently estimated the 
total value of the same market as about £1 billion. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, 
EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL GOODS, supra note 5, at 24. 
23 COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 21, at 4. 
24See generally, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 2.4.5. Personal 
Consumption Expenditures by Type of Product (2013), available at 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=70&Freq=Y
ear&FirstYear=2008&LastYear=2009.  There is no precise US equivalent to the 
U.K. definition of household electric goods. We used Bureau of Economic 
Analysis Table 2.4.5, and included the categories Small Electric Household 
Appliances, Video & Audio Equipment, and Information Processing Equipment.  
See id.      
25 Vehicle Service Contract Administrators, Warranty Week (Sept. 9, 2010), 
http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20100909.html. 
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Extended warranties sold as an add-on to the purchase of a 
consumer product are, in expected utility terms, the paradigmatic bad 
insurance deal.26  They do not provide protection against any level of loss 
for which insurance at the prevailing price makes sense for a rational, 
expected-utility-maximizing individual.27  The reason is simple: a rational 
consumer cannot be risk-averse for losses that are so “small” relative to her 
overall wealth.  Classical risk-aversion only applies to large losses, those 
big enough to change the marginal utility of wealth.  And for almost 
anyone buying a $200 CD player or even a $1,000 TV set, the amount of 
potential loss – the replacement cost of the item in question – is likely to be 
quite small in relation to assets or lifetime wealth.  Even risk-averse 
consumers should be essentially risk-neutral for small-stakes gambles,28 
and recent survey research suggests that consumers in fact are risk neutral 
when it comes to extended warranties.29 
Consider a consumer who purchases a Sony 55" Class Bravia® 
EX620- Series LED LCD HDTV sold by Sears on line for $1619.99.30  
According to the Sears website, the extended warranty on this item – 
 
26 See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to 
Meet the Practice of Insurance, in Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial 
Services 1, 25-28 (Robert Liton & Richard Herring eds., 2004); Schwarcz, supra 
note 13; Rabin & Thaler, supra note 8. 
27 Except, possibly, for a purchaser who knows that she or he will use the 
product in an unusual manner that poses a high risk of product failure (but which is 
not considered misuse, voiding the warranty). The ability of such an individual to 
buy the warranty at the regular price represents a market failure, not a justification 
for the market. As the OFT observed, some have suggested that extended 
warranties may make more sense for liquidity constrained consumers, but there is 
no evidence that the purchase of extended warranties correlates with liquidity 
constraint. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC 
ELECTRICAL GOODS, supra note 5, at 35. 
28 John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, 32 
Econometrica 122, 122 (1964); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Risk Aversion, 
Essays in The Theory of Risk Bearing, 90, 90-91 (1971); Rabin & Thaler, supra 
note 8.. 
29 See Jindal, supra note 20 (experimentally examining demand for extended 
warranties on washing machines and concluding that loss aversion, not risk 
aversion, explained the demand). 
30 See SEARS, http://www.sears.com/shc/s/p_10153_12605_05771742000P? 
blockNo=3&blockType=G3&prdNo=3&i_cntr=1314814734858 (last visited Aug. 
31, 2011). Sears does note that the price includes a manufacturer’s warranty for 
“Service & Support: Limited warranty - parts and labor - 1 year.”  Id. (Source 
shows a 3-yr warranty). 
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dubbed the “3 Year In-Home Master Protection Agreement” – costs an 
additional $39.31  
Table 1 evaluates the cost/benefit calculations for the extended 
warranty.  On reasonable assumptions about frequency and cost of repair, 
the warranty costs ten times more than its expected monetary value.  This 
calculation is conservative for at least two reasons.  First, we ignore 
discounting, meaning that we treat a dollar paid in the future identically to 
a dollar paid today (despite the fact that we know that people greatly prefer 
dollars today over dollars in the future).  Second, as Cutler & Zeckhauser 
point out, electronic goods tend to fall in price and increase in quality over 
time over time, with the result that the option to repair the product rather 
than junk it in favor of a better/cheaper model becomes increasingly less 
valuable.32 
  
 
31 No information about any warranty is available on the main web page 
described above. See id.  Only after you have “checked out” (clicked the button 
signifying that you wish to purchase the TV), are you informed about the 
possibility of an extended warranty.  See id.  This certainly constitutes an example 
of “shrouded” pricing.  Moreover, although you can choose not to buy the 
extended warranty, the default is that it is included; you have to check a “decline 
warranty” box to avoid paying for it. See id. Here is how Sears describes the 
warranty:  
 
Our coverage goes well beyond the original manufacturer’s 
warranty. No extra charge for covered repairs includes all parts 
and labor. Cosmetic defects are covered for the first 3 years. 
Schedule service day or night by calling 1-800-4-MY-HOME. 
Repairs are done by a force of more than 10,000 Authorized 
Sears Service Technicians, which means someone you can trust 
will be working on your products. Fast Help by Phone - we call 
it Rapid Resolution - provides you with non-technical and 
instructional assistance. Think of it as a talking owner's manual. 
It also includes rental reimbursement and a 25% discount on the 
purchase of consumable parts like filters and blades ordered from 
Sear Parts Direct (1-800-252-1698). An annual Preventive 
Maintenance check can be scheduled at the customer's request. 
The No Lemon Guarantee and Product Replacement includes 
delivery and installation if applicable. Coverage can be renewed 
and is transferable. 
 
 Id.  The “5 year in-home master protection Agreement” costs $519 (almost 1/3 the 
value of the TV set itself).  Id. 
32 Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 27. 
2013     BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS  13 
 
 
Table 1: Extended Warranty Calculations 
Assumptions 
TV Lifetime 5 years
Lifetime probability of repair33 20%
Annual probability of repair 1 - (1-.2)1/5 = 4.3% 
Prob. of repair in 2 out-years  
(not covered by manufacturer’s warranty) 1 - (1-0.43)2 = 8.5% 
Cost of Repair34 $400 
Results 
Expected Value of Warranty 0.085×$400 = $34.16 
Cost of 3 year Warranty $349 
Cost/Expected Monetary Value ≈ 10/1 
 
 
B.  LOSS DAMAGE WAIVERS (LDWS) IN RENTAL CAR INSURANCE 
 
Insurance against damage to a rented car is a complex maze of 
overlapping contracts, state-by-state regulation (or lack thereof) and 
insurance law doctrines (subrogation, primary vs. secondary coverage, 
etc.).  The analytic problems are made worse by the absence of any 
consistent data on coverage or pricing.  Since Collision and Loss Damage 
Waivers are not considered insurance for purposes of insurance regulation 
(wrongly in our view), they are regulated separately if at all, and there 
appear to be no systematic data on terms or prices.35 
Under both CDWs and LDWs, the car owner (the car rental 
company) contracts with the renter to waive its right to be reimbursed for 
certain kinds of losses suffered while the renter has possession of the 
vehicle.  CDWs traditionally covered damage from collision only,36 while 
 
33Id. at Table 5. 
34 This is a guess. Doubling the guess would reduce the cost/expected value 
ratio to 5:1, exactly the same as that for the low deductible in the homeowners’ 
policy that Sydnor investigated. Recall that the risk aversion needed to explain that 
choice in expected utility terms would imply that the person would be unwilling to 
pay $1000 for a 50% chance to win $1 trillion. 
35 California, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada and New York regulate C/LDWs by 
statute, apart from the ordinary insurance regulation mechanisms. 
36 LDW has been described as a descendant of CDW, which was “A more 
restrictive in that it waived the renter’s responsibility for vehicle damage only when 
the damage resulted from a collision with another vehicle or object. The broader LDW 
option relieves the renter from responsibility for damage that results from virtually 
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LDWs covered, in addition, damage from such things as vandalism or theft. 
But the terms now appear to be used somewhat loosely.37  For simplicity’s 
sake, we will refer to all such agreements as LDWs.  In essence, what the 
consumer buys with an LDW is the right to be free from any liability to the 
rental car company for any damage to the rented vehicle.  From the 
customer’s perspective this certainly feels like insurance, whether 
insurance law treats it as insurance as a technical matter or not. 
LDWs are typical add-on insurance products.  They are always 
priced separately from the car rental fee, and are presented to the customer 
after the baseline rental price has been announced.38  When shopping on-
line, for example, a typical setup is that the customer first inputs his or her 
rental location and dates.  A second screen then allows for a choice of 
vehicle, and a third screen gives a list of options, including the LDW and 
other add-ons such as a booster seat or GPS device.  In person, the 
transaction is typically structured much the same way – a baseline price is 
quoted, and once the renter has agreed to that price, she is then asked if she 
wants to “decline” the LDW by checking a box or series of boxes.39 
In part because LDWs are not sold or regulated as insurance, they are 
apparently only loosely-based on actuarial principles.40  Rental car companies 
 
any cause, including vandalism, theft, and glass breakage.” DENNIS STUTH, RENTAL 
CAR DECISIONS: WHAT YOU DON’T KNOW CAN HURT YOU 125 (2005). 
37 For example, Alamo’s self-described “Collision Damage Waiver” covers more 
than just collision damages. In it, Alamo agrees “to contractually waive [renter's] 
responsibility for all or part of the cost of damage to, loss or theft of the vehicle.”  See 
ALAMO, https://www.alamo.com/en_US/car-rental/reservation/start Reservation.html 
(complete online rental form filling in location as “Bradley Intl Arpt (BDL)”, date of 
trip, renters age as “25 and up,” then click “continue.”  On the next screen select a 
rental car by clicking “Add” next to one of the rental vehicles.  This will then bring 
you to a screen with available “Add-On” features which include a category called 
“Protection Products.”  Under the “Protection Products” category click the words 
“Collision Damage Waiver.”) (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
38 “It is a well-established sales principle that an individual is most susceptible 
to . . . upsell efforts [inducements to purchase add-ons] immediately after making 
the basic purchase decision.” STUTH, supra note 37, at 30. 
39 The purchase of the LDW, while optional, is structured as the default 
transaction, so that the renter has to make an affirmative choice not to buy the 
coverage. The renter is not asked whether she wishes to buy the LDW, but whether 
she wishes to “decline” it by checking a box to that effect. In that sense, the LDW 
is more “default-y” than an extended warranty, in which the consumer is asked to 
“buy,” rather than to “decline.” On the other hand, the initial quoted price does not 
include the LDW, which would give the LDW even more of a default structure. 
40 “In contrast to physical damage coverage . . . provided under a personal auto 
policy, the LDW daily rate is typically not actuarially based.” STUTH, supra note 
37, at 129. 
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obviously need to charge a rate that covers their average loss, but beyond that, 
the rate charged for a LDW is highly dependent on competitive factors.  It is 
not uncommon to find most car rental companies charging nearly the same 
LDW rate in a particular location.41  It is therefore difficult to arrive at a 
typical cost for LDWs sold nationwide.  Writing in 2005, industry insider 
Dennis Stuth suggested that rates ranged from $5 to $18 per day.42  That 
seems much too low in today’s market, however.  Using examples from 3 
cities and 3 different rental companies for a Toyota Corolla or similar car (see 
Table 2), we found prices for LDWs were in the range of $22-$28 per day, 
with an average of roughly $27.  Of course, this was a small and non-random 
sample (we were unable to uncover any systematic data on pricing), but a 
price of $25 per day seems like a reasonable estimate. 
 
Table 2: LDW & Car Rental Rates at Selected Airport Locations, June 26, 2012 
Car Rental  
Dates 
Location  
(Airport) 
Rental  
Company 
LDW 
Cost,  
per day 
Car Rental  
Base Rate 
Per day  
Midsize 6/26 - 7/1 Hartford Avis $27.99 $67 
Corolla 6/26 - 7/1 Hartford Hertz $28.99 $69 
Corolla 6/26 - 7/1 Hartford Alamo $22.99 $66 
Midsize 6/26 - 7/1 Dallas Avis $27.99 $40 
Corolla 6/26 - 7/1 Dallas Hertz $28.99 $39 
Corolla 6/26 - 7/1 Dallas Alamo $22.99 $31 
Midsize 7/3 - 7/8* Minneapolis Avis $27.99 $52 
Corolla 6/26 - 7/1 Minneapolis Hertz $28.99 $54 
Corolla 6/26 - 7/1 Minneapolis Alamo $24.99 $56 
  Average:    $26.88 $52.56 
  Std. Dev.:   $2.38 $12.89         
Source: Rental company websites, visited 6/25/2012 
*No availability for 6/26-7/1; dates are 7/3-7/8  
Memo Item: MSRP for new Corolla = $17,980. 
 
How much should someone be willing to pay for a LDW? This is a 
difficult question to answer because it depends on a great many 
idiosyncratic factors, including the extent of coverage under the renter’s 
 
41Id. 
42Id.  
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own personal auto policy 43 and the credit card used to pay for the rental car 
in question.44  Some renters are already covered for some or all of the 
losses covered by a CDW.  For them, there is little or no point in buying 
additional coverage that duplicates what they already have.  At most, the 
LDW will function to reduce their effective deductible to zero.45  
Suppose, conservatively, that the renter has no prior coverage that 
would make the LDW unnecessary.  The renter would then be buying 
coverage for an otherwise uncovered loss, at the rate of $25 per day.  This 
works out to roughly $9,000 per year – far too much for a rational risk 
averse consumer to pay for coverage against harm to the vehicle.  
One way to see why the LDW is overpriced is to compare its cost 
with ordinary automobile insurance.  Typical automobile insurance covers 
vastly more than the LDW does (including, of course, liability to third 
parties, which could easily run many times the value of the insured vehicle 
itself), for far less money.  For example, the first author’s family auto 
policy, which covers three automobiles (including a 2013 Audi A6) and 
three adult drivers (one who is under 25), costs about $3,000 per year.  Of 
that total premium, the first party property insurance coverage costs only 
$1100.  By this metric, the LDW looks to be a very bad deal, since it covers 
less liability at many times the cost.46  
 
 43 Damage to a car rented by the policyholder is not covered under the 
standard Insurance Services Office PAP form, but some companies in some states 
do provide such coverage, which would make the C/LDW (almost) completely 
unnecessary. Even when damage to one’s rented car is already covered, there 
might be a small side benefit to buying an LDW; since the rental company’s loss 
would be waived, the renter would not need to turn to her or his insurer to cover it 
and would not risk an increased premium for having filed a claim. 
44 Some premium credit cards cover some kinds of losses (usually up to a 
relatively low limit) when a cardholder uses the card to rent a car. 
45 Even if someone is already covered by his or her own auto policy, STUTH, 
supra note 37, at 129, suggests that there might nevertheless be some reasons to 
purchase an LDW. These include: (a) Additional drivers: the renter’s own 
insurance might not cover a driver who is nevertheless authorized under the LDW; 
and (b) Subrogation hassles: When the renter relies on his or her own insurer to 
cover any losses, the car rental company typically charges the renter for the losses, 
and then forces the renter to collect from his or her insurer. See id. at 130-31. This 
may involve considerable time and expense that would be saved by purchasing a 
LDW. Although they are not zero, these benefits seem very small for the typical 
rental car customer, and we ignore them. 
46 The moral hazard resulting from the LDW might lead rental drivers to 
behave more dangerously and get into more accidents than they would when 
driving their own cars. In turn, this might conceivably drive up the cost of the 
LDW relative to ordinary insurance on an owned vehicle. But it is difficult to 
imagine that rental drivers are so much more reckless than drivers of their own 
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A more standard way to think about the attractiveness of a LDW is 
to compare its cost to its expected payout (as we did in Table 1).  
Estimating the expected payout of a LDW is complicated, however, absent 
data on loss amounts and probabilities.  Table 3 presents some back-of-the-
envelope calculations.  We assume that loss amounts are uniformly 
distributed in various ranges or “bins,” and somewhat arbitrarily assign 
probabilities to each range.  
 
Table 3: Back-of-the-Envelope Estimate for Expected Annual Loss, Corolla LDW 
Loss Amount Loss Probability Expected Loss 
$0-$100 52.0% $26 
$101-$500 26.0% $78 
$501-$1,000 13.0% $98 
$1001-$10,000 6.5% $358 
$10,001-$18,000 2.5% $238 
TOTAL 100.0% $797 
Cost of LDW $9000 
Ratio: Cost/Expected Benefit  11.3:1 
 
Despite its crudity, the estimated expected loss in Table 3 is an 
order of magnitude smaller than the annual cost of a LDW, even with 
conservative (i.e., generous) assumptions about loss probabilities.  As with 
the extended warranty, a LDW looks to be a very bad deal for the 
consumer.  Expedia’s alternative loss damage waiver plan starts at $9 per 
day; that’s still not worth buying in expected utility terms, but it is less than 
half the price of the rental car companies’ LDW.47 
However, the calculations here are somewhat more complicated 
than in the case of the extended warranty.  The reason is that although the 
expected loss in this context is, at about $800, arguably quite small, there is 
 
cars, especially since so many renters have coverage for their own vehicles that 
largely mimics that of the LDW. 
47 Car Rental Insurance, EXPEDIA, http://www.expedia.com/daily/promos/ 
travel_protection_plans/car_rental.asp?opt=1_7 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). The 
program was designed and administered for Expedia, Inc.’s clients by Berkely and 
is underwritten by Stonebridge Casualty Insurance Company. Id. In California, 
Berkely is a service mark of Aon Direct Insurance Administrators; in all other 
states Berkely is a division of Affinity Insurance Services, Inc. except AIS Affinity 
Insurance Agency, Inc. in Minnesota and Oklahoma, and AIS Affinity Insurance 
Agency in New York. Id. The website is interactive, but will not give you a quote 
unless you actually rent a car. 
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some chance of a much larger loss.  If an $18,000 loss represents a non-
trivial fraction of lifetime wealth, then risk aversion may come into play, 
and the cost/benefit analysis needs to take account of the gains from 
substituting a certain payment for an uncertain loss amount.  Such 
calculations were per se unnecessary in the case of extended warranties 
covering small losses. 
So, could risk aversion be enough to justify the high premiums 
charged for a LDW? The short answer is “No.”  We can reframe the issue 
of whether the LDW is overpriced by asking how much more than the 
actuarially fair value of the loss a risk averse consumer would be willing to 
pay as insurance against that loss, given assumptions about her wealth, the 
probability and size of the loss, and her degree of risk aversion.48  This 
“excess premium” can then be compared to the actual premium charged for 
the LDW.  We assume utility has the widely-used Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA) form.49  
Kenneth Arrow has argued that on theoretical grounds a CRRA 
coefficient of about 1.0 (logarithmic utility) should be reasonable; a 
coefficient of 50 is extraordinarily risk averse.  Yet as the last row of Table 
4 reveals, even an absurdly risk averse individual, with a coefficient of 
relative risk aversion of 50, should at most be willing to pay only $1,000 
more than the fair premium (of $2,000) to insure against a 10% chance of a 
$20,000 loss.  That is, the most such an individual should be willing to pay 
for insurance against this loss is about $3000, since anything more than this 
would make going uninsured the more attractive option.  For more 
reasonable levels of risk aversion, the maximum premium is between 
$2,036 and $2,330.  Of course, these are all far less than the roughly $9,000 
premium charged for a LDW by rental car companies and less than the 
$4,300 premium charged through Expedia. 
 
 
48 To do this, we find the expected utility of the consumer who purchases no 
insurance and faces an uncertain prospect – a gamble. We then determine the 
certainty equivalent wealth – defined as the wealth (held with certainty) that gives 
the same utility as the gamble does. 
49 We use the standard CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility function 
of the form ሺܹሻ ൌ ௐభషഐଵିఘ  , the limit of which, as ρ approaches 1, is U(W) = ln(W). 
According to Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, Modeling Competition 
and Market Equilibrium in Insurance: Empirical Issues, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 146, 
147,(May 2008), “constant relative risk aversion provides a reasonably good 
approximation of individual attitude toward risk, at least in an expected utility 
setting.”  Somewhat arbitrarily, we set wealth equal to $500,000. 
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Table 4: Maximum Willingness to Pay for a LDW as function of Risk Aversion 
Assumptions 
Wealth, W $500,000
Probability of Loss, p 10%
Loss Amount, L $20,000
Fair Premium $2,000
 Coefficient of Constant Relative Risk Aversion, ρ 
 1* 2 10 50 
Certainty Equivalent 
Wealth50 $481,963 $481,925 $481,668 $480,885 
Maximum Excess 
Premium $36.54 $75.00 $332.00 $1,115.00 
*The CRRA utility function is defined as ln(W) when ρ = 1. 
 
These results make it all the more surprising that, according to one 
rental car insurance expert, 19% of renters always bought an LDW and 
another 19% sometimes did.51 
 
C. CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE 
 
Arthur Morris invented the modern version of credit life insurance 
in the US in 1917.52  Borrowers purchase credit life insurance to guarantee 
 
50 The certainty equivalent wealth is the amount of risk-free wealth that 
provides the same utility as the expected utility resulting from the gamble under 
consideration. In this context, the gamble consists of wealth of $500,000, a loss of 
$10,000, a probability of loss of 10%, and utility function characterized by a given 
degree of risk aversion.  Since the individual dislikes risk, he is willing to pay 
more than the $1,000 expected loss to avoid it.  The difference between 
($500,0000 minus the certainty equivalent) and $1,000 represents the maximum 
excess premium the individual would be willing to pay, and this amount rises as 
risk aversion increases. 
51 STUTH, supra note 37, at 132 (quoting a 2002 survey performed by the 
Progressive group of insurance companies). Of those who bought, 63% said they 
did so because they wanted extra protection, but 24% said they bought because 
they weren’t sure whether their PAPs covered the loss and 8% said they bought 
because the agent pressured them into doing so.  Id.  
52 Arthur J. Morris, The Origins of Credit Life Insurance, 1957 INS. L.J. 329, 
329; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that 
Morris’ purpose was to allow the extension of credit to workers with no security or 
collateral). It’s worth noting that the practice of buying life insurance to benefit 
creditors is much older than this. See generally GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON 
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that if they die before repaying a particular outstanding debt (e.g., a 
mortgage or a car loan), the insurer will repay the lender.  Closely related 
products such as credit health or credit disability work in much the same 
way, except that they are triggered by an event other than the death of the 
insured.  The volume of credit life insurance sold in the US was about $770 
million in 2010; credit accident and health insurance amounted to an 
additional $875 million.53  Credit life is typically sold as an add-on to the 
financing of a primary purchase (a house, car, or other substantial 
consumer durable), by the entity making (or financing) the original sale – 
the car dealership, retailer, etc.54  
The first thing to note about credit life insurance is that it does not 
directly protect the borrower, her estate, or her heirs.  The primary 
beneficiary (in a legal and economic sense) is the lender, who is protected 
 
LIVES (1999) (describing the culture of life insurance in England from 1695 to 
1775).  Morris’s innovation was extending the link between credit and life 
insurance to a mass market in a context in which the creditor did not require the 
debtor to purchase the insurance. 
53 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE AND CREDIT 
ACCIDENT & HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIENCE 2006-2010, 4 (2011).  The roughly 
30% drop in the volume of net written premiums between 2008 and 2010 
presumably reflects the effects of the recession and the decline in overall 
consumption expenditures. Somewhat surprisingly, however, there has been a clear 
downward trend in the volume of both credit life and credit accident/health since 
2001, with a drop-off of 62% over this period.  Id.  Patricia McCoy points out to us 
that under the National Bank Act, national banks are authorized to underwrite and 
sell insurance substitutes called “debt cancellation contracts” and “debt suspension 
agreements.”  12 C.F.R. § 37.1(a) (2013).  It is possible that the drop in credit life 
and credit accident insurance reflects a growth in the market for close substitutes – 
debt cancellation/suspension contracts.  See Barnett, Sivon & Natter, P.C. and 
McIntyre & Lemon, P.L.L.C., Debt Cancellation Contracts and Debt Suspension 
Agreements, AM. BANKERS ASS’N (May 23, 2012), http://www.aba.com/ABIA/ 
Documents/36a3b8296aef4474b90d3e3f9a8896feGAODebtCancellationCoalition
Final2810conformed.pdf, for an overview of these contracts from the perspective 
of the Debt Cancellation Coalition, of which the American Bankers Insurance 
Association is an ex officio participant. 
54 We lack data for the US, but a UK Competition Commission report suggests 
that stand-alone sales of Protection Payment Insurance (PPI) “are very small 
compared to the total number of PPI policies sold by distributors . . . . [T]he stand-
alone market accounts for less than 0.5 per cent of total P[ersonal]L[oan]PPI sales, 
and less than 0.1 per cent of total C[redit]C[ard]PPI sales. . . . [Even at] a little 
under 9 per cent…, the extent of M[ortgage]PPI policies sold on a stand-alone 
basis is still very small.” Market Investigation into Payment Protection Insurance, 
COMPETITION COMM’N, 56-57 (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2009/fulltext/542.pdf. We strongly suspect the 
same is true for the US. 
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from the risk that the debtor dies before repaying the loan and the estate 
cannot repay it.55  It is true, however, that the purchase of credit life 
insurance does reduce or eliminate the risk of foreclosure if the 
borrower/insured dies.  Some borrowers may want to leave the asset free 
and clear to their heirs, or may worry that the heirs can’t afford the 
remaining obligations under the loan and would be forced to give up the 
asset whose purchase the loan originally financed.  
Thus, there are circumstances under which credit life insurance 
may provide benefits for the purchaser.  Suppose the wage-earning spouse 
buys a car for $15,000, financing it with a loan secured by the car.  If the 
borrower dies before the car loan has been repaid and the surviving spouse 
cannot make the remaining payments, the lender can take back the car; and 
if the remaining debt is less than the car’s resale value, the lender can come 
after the estate for the rest of what’s owed.  Thus, there is a risk that one’s 
survivor will have to repay the loan, and this risk does impinge on the 
utility of the person buying the insurance, thereby providing at least a 
superficially plausible motivation for buying credit life insurance.  Credit 
life replaces the payments remaining at the time of the borrower’s death, 
eliminating the risk that the deceased’s estate will have to make those 
payments. 
Credit life insurance is thus different from extended warranties and 
many LDWs for two reasons.  First, the amounts at stake in credit life 
insurance can sometimes be large enough relative to overall wealth that a 
rational consumer might conceivably find insuring these risks attractive.  
That is generally not the case with extended warranties and LDWs 
(especially for a renter who has a personal auto policy with collision 
coverage), where the size of the risks involved is so much smaller.  Second, 
the value of credit life depends not only on the insured’s risk aversion, but 
also on his altruistic concern for the welfare of his beneficiaries, which 
 
55 The lender has many other ways of protecting against this risk, of course, 
beginning with charging a higher interest rate to reflect the risk that the borrower 
would die before the loan was repaid. Note that the moral hazard problem with 
higher interest rates – that they induce borrowers to take on riskier projects – does 
not seem applicable in the context of credit life insurance. See Joseph E. Stiglitz & 
Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. 
ECON. REV. 393, 401 (June 1981) (suggesting that when lenders can’t observe 
borrower behavior, higher interest rates will lead buyers to substitute towards 
riskier projects).  Indeed, one plausible explanation for the existence of credit life 
insurance is that it offers a legal way to charge risky borrowers a higher interest 
rate, without running afoul of usury laws.  Lenders often require collateral as an 
additional means of protection. 
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makes it more difficult for an outside observer to be certain when credit life 
insurance is a bad deal for an individual purchaser.56  
Under ideal circumstances, credit life offers a way for borrowers to 
protect their survivors against the risk of having the borrower’s estate 
drained by paying off a loan after the borrower dies.  As many have noted, 
credit life is not a particularly good way to manage this risk – ordinary life 
insurance, if it is available, is typically both dramatically cheaper and more 
flexible, since proceeds are not dedicated to repayment of a particular 
loan.57  This flexibility is especially valuable when the deceased borrower’s 
estate is insolvent or if the loan is non-recourse.  In either case, the debtor’s 
family or other chosen beneficiary, not the creditor, gets the money, surely 
the result that is more consistent with the altruistic justification for the 
purchase of life insurance. 
Moreover, some versions of credit life are even less defensible. For 
instance, many subprime mortgages were sold with so-called “Single 
Premium Credit Life,” in which the total premium for the life of the policy 
is rolled into the initial mortgage.  This meant that:  
 
The borrower then pa[id] interest on this amount for the 
life of the loan and typically ha[d] not even begun reducing 
the loan’s principal balance by the time the five-year credit 
life insurance coverage period expire[d]. Consequently, 
when a borrower move[d] or refinance[d] out of a 
subprime loan after five years, all of the premiums for the 
 
56 That is, credit life – and indeed all life insurance – does not pay the insured, 
but rather his or her beneficiaries.  Their utility matters to the insured, but only 
indirectly.  Thus, although we can place plausible bounds on risk aversion, we 
cannot as readily put bounds on altruism (as measured by sources outside of 
insurance demand).  For an attempt to do so using insurance data, see B. Douglas 
Bernheim, How Strong are Bequest Motives? Evidence Based on Estimates of the 
Demand for Life Insurance and Annuities, 99 J. POL. ECON. 899, 900 (1991), 
concluding that “most individuals are in part motivated by a desire to leave 
bequests.” 
57 Many sources note that if it’s available, ordinary life insurance is typically a 
much cheaper way to cover the risk that credit life also insures against.  See, e.g., 
Credit Insurance, WIS. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., http://www.wdfi.org/ymm/brochures/ 
credit/credit_insurance.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2013) (suggesting that “credit 
insurance is expensive in comparison to other forms of insurance” and offering a 
chart showing that a typical policyholder, age 30 and in good health, could expect 
to pay $342 per year for $50,000 of credit life insurance, while the same amount of 
term life – which of course pays cash, and is not restricted to the repayment of a 
particular debt – would cost only $70, only one-fifth as much).  
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terminated insurance [were] . . . stripped directly out of the 
borrower’s home equity.58 
 
Financing the entire credit life premium, rather than paying it month-by-
month, thus worked out to be a very poor deal for virtually every consumer.  
Many other credit life practices have been highly criticized for over 
50 years.  Among the abuses discussed in a report by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners report in 197059 were: excessive 
coverage (selling coverage for more than the amount borrowed), failure to 
refund unearned premiums when the debt was paid earlier than required, 
coercive selling practices, bad faith claims-adjusting, failures to inform the 
policyholder of coverage,60 overcharging, and a host of other practices. 
While regulatory changes beginning in the 1960s attempted to restrict the 
most blatant of these abuses,61 their efficacy is unclear, and at least some of 
these practices continue in some jurisdictions. 
Rather than focusing on the worst practices, however, it’s better to 
consider a typical policy. Unfortunately, data on a “typical” product are not 
easy to come by,62 but the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions 
furnishes the details of one assertedly representative example.63  Using this 
example, supplemented by some actuarial data, we can do a very 
conservative back-of-the-envelope calculation on the payback from an 
average credit life insurance policy, as summarized in Table 5.  
 
 
58 ERIC STEIN, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF PREDATORY LENDING 
5 (2001), available at http://www.selegal.org/Cost%20of%20Predatory%20 
Lending.pdf.  Under bans from state regulators and pressure from public opinion, 
the worst of these practices were abandoned by most sub-prime lenders in the mid-
2000’s. 
59 For an extensive discussion, see NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra 
note 1, at 39-52. 
60 Borrowers were sometimes sold policies bundled with the primary loan, 
and were not even informed that they were being charged for coverage. In such 
cases, the estate of a borrower who died would not know to make a claim on the 
insurer. 
61 NAT’L ASSOC. OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 1, at 52-87. 
62 This in itself is interesting. Much as Daniel Schwarcz found with home 
insurance, it appears to be very difficult to shop for credit life insurance on-line, 
see Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1263 (2011): we were not able to uncover any recent rate quotes or sample 
policies. 
63 WIS. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 57.   
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Table 5: Hypothetical Credit Life Valuation 
Assumptions: 
Male, 35  Sex, Age 
$15,000  Amount of car loan 
4  Years to repay 
$2,917  Interest/finance charges64 
$265  Cost of credit life 
$8,172  Average Balance owed at death, if death occurs65 
0.00175  Annual probability of death66 
0.0072  Total probability of death during 4 year life of loan 
Results: 
$58.84  Expected balance owed at death 
$20.98  Expected interest/finance charge67 
$79.82  Total Expected Payout from Credit Life 
 Ratio: Premium Cost/Expected Payout = 3.3:168 
 
Suppose a 35-year-old male in average health borrows $15,000 to 
purchase a car, with no down payment.  According to the Wisconsin 
Department of Financial Institutions, a typical credit life insurance policy 
costs the borrower $265.  That amount protects an average balance owed – 
 
64 Wisconsin DFI apparently assumes an effective annual interest rate of 9.4%. 
65 Assumes that if the borrower dies, on average, it will be at month 24, 
halfway through the life of the loan.  (We inflate the value of credit life insurance 
by not discounting future cash flows to present value. Were this amount to be 
discounted to its present value – as seems appropriate – it would be 20 percent 
smaller.) 
66 Source: http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html for annual death 
probabilities.  
67 Wisconsin DFI apparently assumes that the entire stream of interest 
payments are protected by credit life, which implies that the appropriate number is 
$2,917 x 0.0072 = $20.98. But this is clearly conservative.  A borrower who dies at 
month 24 owes only the interest on the remaining balance outstanding, which is 
roughly one-half of the total interest.  (Again, since the interest would have been 
paid over the 24 months following the borrower’s death, the present value of the 
remaining interest payments, as of the date of death is only $797.80, when 
discounted at the borrowing rate of 9.4 percent. That amount discounted to the date 
the loan is signed is only $667). 
68 With appropriate discounting of principal and interest payments insured by 
credit life, this ratio would be about 5:1. 
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over the 48-month life of the loan – of $8,170.  The average 35-year-old 
male stands a 0.72% (0.0072) chance of dying before age 39.  Even 
assuming that the entire interest and finance charges would still be owed if 
the borrower died, the purchase of credit life insurance would prevent an 
expected monetary loss of only $79.82.  Of course, one should not expect 
that premiums would be equal to the expected payout, since such 
actuarially-fair pricing could not cover any of the other costs associated 
with running the insurance company.  But at just over three to one, the ratio 
of expected payout to premium cost is extraordinarily low: not as low as 
the ten to one ratios for extended and damage waivers but still much too 
low to result from anything approaching rational behavior.  Only someone 
who assigns astronomically high value to the wealth or consumption of his 
heirs should find this kind of ratio appealing.  Even then, as noted earlier, 
there are typically much cheaper ways to protect against this kind of risk 
than through credit life.  
Further proof of the problematic nature of credit life comes from 
data on industry loss ratios, which are calculated by dividing incurred 
losses by earned premiums.69  According to state-by-state data compiled by 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in 2009, the 
loss ratio on credit life insurance averaged 44.1% for the US as a whole in 
the period 2003-2007.70  Louisiana, Nebraska, South Dakota and Nevada 
all had loss ratios below 33%, and even the best states – Virginia, New 
York and Vermont – had loss ratios of only about 55%.  Compared with a 
loss ratio of over 90% for group life insurance,71 it’s pretty clear that credit 
life purchasers are not getting a good return for the premiums they pay.  
These low loss ratios continue, despite the NAIC’s proclamation, in 1959, 
of a resolution that “provided that any loss ratio for credit life insurance 
 
69 If a credit life insurer pays out $100 in losses in a given year and collects 
$150 in premiums, its loss ratio is 2/3.  From a consumer’s perspective, the higher 
the loss ratio, the better, other things equal.  Low loss ratios suggest that the 
premiums consumers pay are too high relative to the coverage they receive for 
incurred losses.  (An actuarially-fair product would have a loss ratio of 1, which 
would of course leave no room to cover expenses.) 
70 This is the weighted five-year aggregated loss ratio, using states’ credit life 
losses as weights and was computed from data in NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 
supra note 52.  Using a shorter 3-year window does not make a substantial 
difference. The standard deviation of the loss ratio across states was 8.6%. 
71 The highly profitable nature of credit life is underscored by the virtual 
absence of any underwriting requirements for such policies.  See, e.g., 
UsLifeCredit Life Ins. Co. v. McAfee, 630 P.2d 450 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) 
(failing to ask about policyholder’s medical history did not bar recovery by 
insured’s estate, even though policyholder knew she had cancer when she applied 
for credit life policies). 
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below 50 percent would be considered to produce an excessive rate,”72 and 
despite many attempts to enforce such a minimum over the succeeding 50 
years. 
To recap: credit life looks to be a bad deal for consumers for 
several reasons.  First, even in principle, it’s not clear why borrowers 
should want it, although a strong bequest motive could explain some of the 
demand for credit life.  Second, there are often substantially cheaper ways 
of covering the same risks covered by credit life.  Third, the worst versions 
of credit life are virtually certain losers for the insured, and even average 
policies look to be a bad deal, unless consumers place extraordinarily high 
value on protecting their heirs.  Finally, the very low ratio of claims paid to 
premiums collected implies that consumers are not getting enough back for 
their premium dollars, especially as compared to widely available 
alternatives.  
 
III. THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF ADD-ON INSURANCE 
PRODUCTS 
 
The add-on insurance market poses two challenges to the standard 
economic analysis of insurance markets.  First, the add-on insurance 
market largely consists of expensive insurance against relatively small 
losses, a combination that is unequivocally bad for consumers in expected 
utility terms.  Second, sellers are able to sell the insurance at prices that far 
exceed the cost, notwithstanding what appears to be a robustly competitive 
market for the product or service to which the insurance is connected.  
Extended warranties clearly pose both of these challenges.  The 
damage waiver and credit life insurance situations are a bit more 
complicated.  For a car renter with a personal auto insurance policy that 
includes collision coverage, a damage waiver functions simply to reduce 
the collision deductible to zero and, thus, is economically equivalent to an 
extended warranty – providing high cost insurance for small losses.  But a 
car renter who does not have other collision coverage does face a small risk 
of a modest loss.  Similarly, credit life insurance benefits can easily pay off 
in amounts that represent real money.  These kinds of losses might barely 
be worth insuring, just not at the prices prevailing in the add-on insurance 
context. 
In this Part we set out the behavioral economic explanation of why 
consumers like these products and why sellers can charge such high prices 
for the insurance, even in what appears to be a competitive market.  We 
note that scholars and regulators have been skeptical about credit life for 
 
72 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 1, at 69. 
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similar reasons since at least the 1950s,73 so the behavioral critique is not 
new in spirit, even if some of the substance is novel.   
 
A.  THE APPEAL OF INSURANCE AGAINST SMALL LOSSES 
 
We begin by reviewing why insurance against small losses is 
generally a bad deal in expected utility terms.74  The explanation begins by 
assuming that people are risk averse and that it is this risk aversion that 
motivates insurance.75   Risk aversion can be understood as a consequence 
of the declining marginal utility of money (meaning that people derive less 
benefit from each additional dollar that they possess).  Insurance reduces 
financial risk by taking money from people, in the form of premiums, 
during times when the marginal utility of that money is comparatively low 
(they need it less, because they have more of it) and giving them money, in 
the form of claim payments, at times when their marginal utility for that 
money is high (they need it more because they have less of it, owing to the 
loss).  Thus, a rational, risk-averse person should be willing to pay more 
than the expected value of a future financial loss to prevent that loss from 
occurring.  
In a world of perfect information and no transaction costs, people 
would completely insure against all risks for which they could purchase 
fairly-priced insurance.  Of course the real world is very different. For 
present purposes, the key difference is transaction costs.  Insurers have to 
charge customers more than the present value of the expected loss, because 
insurers have to pay their employees, the rent on their headquarters, and so 
forth.  
Insurance is a good deal in expected utility terms when the 
additional utility attributable to risk aversion exceeds the transaction costs 
and profits embedded in the insurance premiums.  Other things equal, 
insurance that protects people from losses that are large in relation to their 
income and other assets is more valuable than insurance against small 
losses, because insurance against large losses provides a bigger marginal 
 
73 See sources cited supra note 1.  
74 The uselessness of insurance for small losses is analyzed in detail in the 
sources cited supra note 8.  
75 There might be other motivations for purchasing insurance aside from 
classical risk aversion.  For an extended treatment, see HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER 
ET AL., INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE 
MOST MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY (2013).  For a brief survey, see, e.g., TOM 
BAKER & PETER SIEGELMAN, Behavioral Economics and Insurance Law: The 
Importance of Equilibrium Analysis, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir eds.) (forthcoming 
2014). 
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utility boost.  Conversely, higher transaction costs or profits make 
insurance less valuable, because less of the premiums go to pay loss costs.  
Most add-on insurance products are a bad deal on both of these dimensions.  
The losses covered by add-on insurance tend to be small in relation to 
consumer assets.  Moreover, the extra amount that consumers pay for the 
risk spreading services provided by add-on insurance is very high in 
relation to other kinds of insurance.76  
Consider, as a useful point of comparison, the choice of deductible 
in homeowners’ insurance. Should a consumer choose a policy with a $250 
deductible, a $500 deductible, or a $1000 deductible?  Choosing a low 
deductible in a homeowners’ insurance policy is, from an expected utility 
perspective, similar to buying an add-on insurance product that provides a 
comparable amount of financial protection.  (That is, choosing the $250 
deductible instead of the $500 deductible is just buying an additional 
insurance policy that covers losses in the range of $250-$500, at a cost 
given by the difference between the two coverage plans.)  Recent excellent 
research by Justin Sydnor precisely identifies the cost and expected benefit 
of different deductibles in the homeowners’ insurance context, 
demonstrating that expected utility theory cannot explain why consumers 
choose low deductibles.77  This analysis is directly applicable to add-on 
insurance products.  
Importantly, however, the institutional context in which consumers 
choose the size of their insurance deductible differs significantly from that 
in which consumers choose whether to buy an add-on insurance product.  
As we will see, this difference in context nicely sets up the behavioral 
economic explanation for sustained high profits in add-on insurance (and 
the absence of such excess profits in low deductible insurance). 
Sydnor uses data from a large homeowners’ insurer to demonstrate 
that a substantial majority of consumers choose a deductible that is 
dramatically too small to be justified by any reasonable level of risk 
aversion or future expected claims.  For example, many consumers choose 
a $500 deductible, rather than the $1,000 deductible they might have 
picked instead.  The $500 deductible policy costs about $100 more than the 
$1000 deductible policy.  Given typical claiming rates, the average 
expected monetary benefit from the additional coverage is about $20.  This 
means that consumers pay $100 to receive an expected $20 monetary 
 
76 Strictly speaking, not all that extra amount is a “transaction cost” as that 
term is used in economics.  A significant amount is profit.  For present purposes, 
this detail does not matter. 
77 Justin Snydor, (Over)insuring Modest Risks, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., 
Oct. 2010, at 177, 178 (showing that among the consumers insured by the 
company that provided the data, 83% choose a deductible that was too low). 
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benefit.78  That is not as bad as the ten to one ratio we found in extended 
warranties and damage waivers, but it is worse than the three to one ratio in 
credit life insurance.79   
To justify the lower deductible on risk aversion grounds, a rational 
consumer would need to have a utility function that was so astronomically 
risk-averse that she or he would almost-literally never be able to get out of 
bed.80  As we discussed earlier, risk aversion varies across individuals, and 
depends – somewhat loosely speaking and in very abstract terms – on the 
curvature of the individual’s utility function in wealth/utility space, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Risk Aversion and Risk Neutrality 
 
 
 
A highly risk averse person such as A (represented by the solid 
curve) has a marginal utility of wealth that declines very rapidly as her 
wealth increases (a highly-bowed utility function in wealth/utility space).  
Conversely, someone such as person C, who is completely risk neutral, has 
 
78 Id. at 196.  
79 Recall that using more realistic assumptions produced a 5:1 ratio for credit 
life insurance, right in line with Sydnor’s 5:1 ratio for the low deductible.  See 
supra text accompanying note 67. 
80 Rabin and Thaler, supra note 8, at 226-27. 
Flat Slope = Low Marginal 
Utility of Wealth 
Steep Slope = High Marginal 
Utility of Wealth 
Wealth
Utility A’s Utility 
 
B’s Utility 
C’s Utility 
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a constant marginal utility of wealth (a straight-line utility function 
represented by the dotted line in Figure 1).   Person B (represented by the 
dashed curve) is more risk averse than C, but less-so than A, since B’s 
marginal utility declines more slowly than A’s as wealth increases.  
 As we explained, economists use a quantitative measure, called 
the “coefficient of risk aversion” to estimate the curvature of the utility 
function and hence, to measure an individual’s degree of risk aversion.81  
Empirical studies estimate plausible values for the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion to be in the single digit range, i.e. from 0 (risk neutral) to 9.82  
Buying the lower deductible is a rational economic decision only if one’s 
coefficient of relative risk aversion is implausibly (and astoundingly) high: 
between 1,840 and 5,064.  Someone with a coefficient of relative risk 
aversion of 5000 would turn down a bet that offered a 50/50 chance of 
either losing $1,000 or gaining any amount of money (including, say 
$1,000,000,000,0000).83  
Why do so many people – for example, about 25% of the 
purchasers of consumer electronics in the UK84 and 19% of car renters in 
the US85 – buy something that is such a bad deal in expected utility terms?  
Camerer et al. describe one hypothesis in evocative terms. People who buy 
extended warranties are cognitively challenged “Homer Simpsons,” who 
mistakenly think the warranties are a good deal, perhaps because they 
overestimate the cost of a repair or the frequency with which products fail 
and misunderstand the value of insurance against such relatively small 
losses.86  We will call this the “mistaken calculator” hypothesis.  The 
 
81 The coefficient of relative risk aversion is defined as െܹܷ′′ሺܹሻ/ܷ′ሺܹሻ, 
where U″ is the second derivative of the utility function and U′ is the first 
derivative, evaluated at some given wealth level W.  This is the so-called 
“Arrow/Pratt” measure of risk aversion.  See Arrow, supra note 8, at 94-95; Pratt, 
supra note 8, at 123, 135-36.  Informed readers will realize that we are finessing a 
conceptually important issue, since risk aversion is measured only at a given point 
along an individual’s utility function. 
82 Syndnor, supra note 77 at 178. 
83 Id. at 190, Table 3. 
84 See U.K. Competition Comm’n, supra note 3, at 4; Chen et al., supra note 
19, at 615 (explaining that 31% of consumers in their data purchased an extended 
warranty during their observation period at one U.S. retailer and that extended 
warranties “constitute approximately 33% of all purchase occasions,” suggesting 
that some people bought more than one). 
85 Stuth, supra n. 37 at 132. 
86 See Camerer et al., supra note 13, at 1254 n.144, writes that, 
 
[I]n a classic Simpsons episode, Homer was having a crayon 
hammered into his nose to lower his I.Q. (Don't ask.) The writers 
indicated the lowering of his I.Q. by having Homer make ever 
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behavioral decision research suggests a second hypothesis, under which 
consumers buy the warranties as an emotional risk management device that 
reflects their (irrational but real) aversion to both loss and regret, and their 
mental accounting.  
 
1. Emotional Risk Management 
 
Behavioral economics offers a variety of potential explanations for 
preferring low deductibles and other forms of excessive insurance.  We 
begin with regret aversion, which involves the present recognition that we 
will in the future evaluate our past decisions based on what actually 
happened, rather than (as in the expected utility analysis) based exclusively 
on what it was possible for us to know at the moment a decision is made.87  
Michael Braun and Alexander Muermann developed a model for insurance 
demand that adds regret aversion to the expected utility calculation and 
conclude that regret aversion leads otherwise rational actors to “hedge their 
bets” by buying insurance for low value losses.88  
Regret aversion interacts with “mental accounting” – putting 
money into different mental categories with different emotional or other 
values – when people buy insurance against small losses, especially when 
that purchase is combined with another purchase, sometimes called 
“reference pricing.”89  The add-on insurance premium is categorized as an 
 
stupider statements. The surgeon knew the operation was 
complete when Homer finally exclaimed: “Extended Warranty! 
How can I lose?” 
 
Several readers pointed out that there is no need to put “cognitively challenged” in 
front of “Homer Simpson,” but we are aware that not all readers are as familiar 
with Homer Simpson. 
87 Following a classic article, regret is associated with having made a choice 
that works out badly.  In their terms, “compare the sensation of losing £100 as a 
result of an increase in income tax rates, which you could have done nothing to 
prevent, with the sensation of losing £100 on a bet on a horse race.”  Graham 
Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational 
Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805, 808 (1982). 
88 See Michael Braun & Alexander Muermann, The Impact of Regret on the 
Demand for Insurance, 71 J. RISK & INS. 737 (2004).  Although this is not relevant 
to the present analysis, regret aversion leads people to buy less insurance than they 
should for severe but infrequent losses. 
89 See Pranav Jindal, supra note 20 at 6, 16 (providing an explanation and test 
for “reference pricing” in the extended warranty context); Richard H. Thaler, 
Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCIENCE 199 (1985).  
See also Viviana Zelizer, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1995).  Our favorite 
example is Orly Ashenfelter’s explanation of how to use mental accounting to 
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increase in “cost” rather than as a “loss,” making the premium payment less 
painful.  By contrast, the financial consequences of the potentially 
insurable future event are categorized as a loss and over-weighted because 
of the emotional distress associated with loss.90  
As Eric Johnson and his collaborators first fully explained in the 
insurance context in 1993, people experience gains and losses from a 
reference point.  People value the first dollar of a gain the most and each 
additional dollar of gain less.  At the same time, people hate the first dollar 
of a loss more than any additional dollar.  In other words, they have a 
declining marginal disutility of loss that mirrors their declining marginal 
utility of gains.  That means that people often will pay dearly to avoid a 
small “loss.”  In the add-on insurance context, they pay what feels like a 
small additional cost to avoid the emotional distress associated with a 
larger future loss. 
Behavioral economics offers several other explanations for add-on 
insurance products.  The availability heuristic – judging an event’s 
probability by a particularly vivid example of that event – surely affects the 
purchase of all three of our examples.91  The endowment effect – loosely, 
the tendency of people to prefer what they “have” just because they have it 
– likely impacts the purchase of extended warranties, and may explain why 
people buy the warranty once they bought the product, even though they 
 
drink great wine for nothing: buy cases as an “investment” and then pay nothing 
when you later drink a bottle.  
90 Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 42. 
91 JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 153 (4th ed. 2007). See 
generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Availability: A Heuristic for 
Judging Frequency and Probability, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1973).  In 
the add-on insurance context, the availability heuristic could lead purchases to 
generalize from the examples of product failure, accidents, or death provided by 
the salesman to conclude that the likelihood of those events occurring was much 
larger than they, in fact are.  In comments, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan (personal 
communication) put the point this way:  
 
Dropping your iPhone, toppling your television, spilling water 
on your laptop – these are events that are really easy to imagine. 
Furthermore, when the salesperson asks, "Would you like to pay 
for insurance against theft, breakage, hardware malfunctions, 
software malfunctions, lightning strikes, etc.?" it becomes very 
easy to call to mind ways in which your iPhone might meet its 
demise. 
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did not plan to buy the warranty before.92  The availability of the insurance 
(which as a general category is something that responsible people buy93), 
together with the salesman’s helpful explanation of the benefits and the 
satisfied people who have bought it, can make purchasing the add-on 
insurance seem like the right thing to do.94  
These heuristics work together to make purchasing the insurance 
feel like the right thing to do.  As a result, many consumers are willing to 
pay a small additional “cost” to protect themselves against the negative 
emotions associated with a future “loss” that looms larger than it rationally 
should.  While this process could be described in terms of mistakes about 
probabilities, we think that it is better understood as emotional risk 
management: paying for peace of mind 
 
2.  Tests of the mistaken calculator vs. emotional risk 
management explanations 
 
A recent article by Marieke Huysentruyt and Daniel Read (H&R) 
reports the results of survey research into the purchase of extended 
warranties that provides some support for both the mistaken calculator and 
the emotional risk management hypotheses, while concluding that 
emotional risk management offers the better explanation.95  Using 
convenience samples that were weighted toward people with a greater 
immediate need for money and, thus, more disinclined than usual to spend 
 
92 Jonathan Baron explains that the endowment effect is a kind of status quo 
bias, in which “people are unwilling to give up their endowment, which they now 
‘have,’ for what they would otherwise prefer to it.”  Baron, supra note 91, at 297. 
93 See TOM BAKER, Risk, Insurance and the Social Construction of 
Responsibility, EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 33, 38 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002). 
94 In comments, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan also offered a useful description of this 
point: 
 
[S]ometimes an apparently neutral question or offer actually 
conveys some normative expectations. This is true for trivial 
questions like, "Would you like to wash your hands before we 
eat?" to the more serious: "Would you like to preserve your 
infant's cord blood?" People are being offered these weird 
insurance products and don't know what the prudent or 
responsible choice is. The limited information they have based 
on the offer is that apparently a market for these products exists. 
 
95 See Marieke Huysentruyt & Daniel Read, How do People Value Extended 
Warranties? Evidence from Two Field Surveys, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 197, 
215 (2010). 
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money today to buy future protection, H&R asked people to imagine 
buying a washing machine.  They then asked two sets of questions that 
were directly related to an extended warranty offered in connection with 
that purchase.  One set of questions elicited their evaluation of the expected 
financial value of the extended warranty.96  A second set of questions 
elicited their assessment of the emotional benefits from purchasing the 
warranty.97  They also asked a third, unrelated, set of questions that 
measured the cognitive capacities of the participants.98  
The answers to all three sets of questions were correlated with the 
participants’ predicted likelihood of buying the extended warranty.  People 
who placed a higher financial value on the extended warranty were more 
likely to say they would buy it.99  People who scored higher on the 
cognitive tests placed lower (but still inflated) financial values on the 
extended warranty and, thus, were less likely to say they would buy it.  
People who highly valued the emotional benefits were more likely to say 
that they would buy it.  The first two correlations support the mistaken 
calculator hypothesis; the third supports the emotional risk management 
 
96 These questions inquired into the fair price was for the warranty, the market 
price for the warranty, how often the washing machine would break down during 
the extended warranty period, and how much it would cost to repair the machine if 
it broke down.  Id. at 203-04.  
97  Using a seven point Likert-scale, they asked participants to agree or 
disagree with six statements about the warranty: 
 
1. It would give me peace of mind. 
2. If I didn’t buy it and the washing machine broke down, I 
would feel a  
 lot of regret. 
3. It would be comforting to have the protection of the 
warranty. 
4. Even without the warranty I would not worry about repair 
costs. 
5. I would feel more stress without the warranty. 
6. Hopefully I won’t need a repair, but I would rather not take 
the risk. 
 
Id. at 207. 
98 They used the Cognitive Reflection Test discussed in detail in Shane 
Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
25, 26-29 (2005). 
99 It was the predicted cost of the breakdown that most strongly affected the 
perceived financial value, rather than the predicted frequency of the breakdown. 
This is an example of probability neglect.  See Huysentruyt & Read, supra note 95, 
at 208 (showing how participants generally overestimated the cost of repair and 
consequently overestimated the actuarial value). 
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hypothesis. Among these correlations, however, the emotional benefit 
assessment was by far the strongest.  
Notably, the relationship between the emotional benefits reported 
by the individuals and their responses to the other two sets of questions was 
independent.  In other words, the perceived emotional benefits strongly 
affected the willingness to buy the extended warranty, without affecting the 
expected financial value of the warranty.  This same result holds true for 
participants with higher cognitive capacities.  Higher cognitive functioning 
participants were less likely to buy the warranty, but that effect came 
entirely through their lower estimates of the expected financial value of the 
warranty, not through their emotional benefit score.  Put another way, even 
the higher cognitive functioning people had heterogeneous assessments of 
the emotional benefits of an extended warranty, and the differences in those 
assessments strongly affected their reported willingness to buy the 
warranty.  
Taken as a whole, the H&R result supports the emotional risk 
management hypothesis more strongly than the mistaken calculator 
hypothesis as an explanation for the demand for extended warranties.  
Some people were willing to buy extended warranties because they greatly 
exaggerated the costs of repairs, but more people – including the 
cognitively advantaged – were willing to buy the warranties because they 
highly valued the “peace of mind” the warranties provide.  The logical 
extension of this finding is that, to at least some degree, people already 
know that the price for extended warranties significantly exceeds the 
expected cost for the company selling the warranty.  People are willing to 
pay that (high) price because they value the emotional benefits the 
insurance provides.  
A very recent working paper by Pranav Jindal provides some 
additional support for the emotional risk management explanation.100  
Jindal used conjoint analysis, a survey and statistical technique in which 
subjects choose among different combinations of features that are presented 
in a manner that allows the researcher to determine the relative importance 
of those features to the subjects.101  
Jindal presented his subjects – executive and full time MBA 
students – with choices of washers and optional extended warranties. 
 
100 See Jindal, supra note 20. 
101 The idea is similar to hedonic pricing models in economics.  In both, the 
goal is to uncover valuations for individual attributes of a complex product.  For 
example, new car buyers assign different weights to speed, looks, mileage, 
reliability, and so on, and the methods allow researchers to discern (average) 
valuations attached to each attribute. See generally Paul E. Green & V. Srinivasan, 
Conjoint Analysis in Consumer Research: Issues and Outlook, 5 J. CONS. RES. 103 
(1978). 
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Importantly, he informed these, presumably numerate, subjects about the 
frequency and cost of the repairs that would be covered by the extended 
warranties, thereby reducing the likelihood that they would be “mistaken 
calculators.”   He varied the choices presented to the subjects along a 
variety of dimensions, including the price of the washer, the price of the 
extended warranty, the probability of washer failure, and the cost of the 
repair.  Using the resulting data Jindal then applied logistic regression and 
Bayesian modeling techniques to evaluate how subjects weighted the 
different features and to develop different models of the choices.102 
Consistent with past experience (over half had previously 
purchased an extended warranty),103 the subjects frequently chose the 
extended warranties offered in the surveys.  Significantly, they were more 
likely to choose the warranty if they had already chosen to buy the washing 
machine than if they were offered the washing machine and warranty as a 
package, suggesting an endowment effect.104  As with Sydnor’s 
homeowners insurance, ordinary expected utility analysis did a poor job of 
explaining the choices, requiring implausibly high levels of risk aversion.  
Allowing for loss aversion and mental accounting significantly improved 
Jindal’s ability to estimate a model that closely predicted the actual 
choices.105  
While the details of Jindal’s analysis are complex, the bottom line 
is that incorporating loss aversion and mental accounting into the model led 
to a better alignment with choices, and more plausible estimates of risk 
aversion, than taking a pure expected utility, Economics 101 approach. 
While Jindal’s research cannot rule out the mistaken calculator hypothesis, 
the fact that there was significant variation in the preferences of his “good 
calculator” subjects and that this variation can be explained in good 
measure by differences in loss aversion lends support to the conclusions we 
reached on the basis of with the H&R results.  People who are more loss 
averse place a higher value on the peace of mind that the warranties 
provide. 
 
 
102 Consistent with standard practice in Bayesian modeling, Jindal selected a 
random set of cases to hold out of the models and then used the models to predict 
the choices made in those cases as a measure of the predictive quality of the 
models. Jindal, supra note 20, at 26. 
103 Id. at 15. 
104 Id. at 20 (“The two stage choices in the sequential survey could lead to a 
sense of ownership of the washer in the second stage, which manifests itself in a 
higher willingness to pay for the warranty”); Id. at 22 (“[S]ubjects are slightly 
more loss averse and have a higher intrinsic preference for warranties in the 
sequential study”). 
105 Id. at 35-36. 
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3.  An important equilibrium point 
 
As a result of these behavioral regularities, “Humans” (real people 
subject to ordinary behavioral biases) sometimes pay a great deal more for 
their insurance than would “Econs” (imaginary people who always behave 
as strictly rational expected utility maximizers).106  Sydnor estimates, for 
instance, that other things equal, “homeowners could expect to save 
roughly $4.8 billion per year by holding the highest available deductible”107 
instead of buying more expensive coverage.  
As Sydnor points out, however, estimates of this sort can be 
seriously misleading as a guide for regulation, because they ignore the way 
markets equilibrate.  Indeed, Sydnor concluded that the insurer he studied 
did not earn excess profits on its low-deductible policies, even though 
consumers “overpaid” for these policies relative to the expected value of 
the low deductible.  That’s because low-deductible consumers had higher 
claim rates, presumably due to the presence of adverse selection.  The low-
deductible consumers, who had private information about their own 
elevated likelihood of making a claim, chose policies that reflected this 
information.  In fact, those with a $500 deductible had about a 50 percent 
higher claim rate than those with a $1000 deductible, by various measures 
that controlled for the fact that people with a $1000 deductible cannot make 
a claim for a $900 loss.108  
I may be able to get a better view at the ball game if I stand up, but 
this does not imply that everyone can simultaneously get a better view if we 
all do so. Similarly, Sydnor concludes that “[i]ndividual customers could 
benefit financially by avoiding over-insuring modest risk.  However, if all 
homeowners changed their behavior, the company would likely need to 
raise insurance costs or create a new higher deductible in order to separate 
the more and less risky customers . . . . [I]f all customers had standard risk 
preferences, the new market equilibrium would not necessarily be welfare-
improving for the customers.”109  
 
106 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008). 
107 Sydnor, supra note 77, at 187. 
108 Roughly 3-3.5% for the $500 deductible, vs roughly 2% for the higher 
deductible. Id. at 198.  It is important to control for the fact that those with a lower 
deductible can make claims (e.g., for between $500 and $1000) that those with a 
higher deductible cannot; thus, it is appropriate to use the rate of claims in excess 
of the higher deductible for this comparison.  Some of the increased claiming may 
be the result of moral hazard.  Teasing out which is a complex matter that was not 
necessary for Sydnor’s purposes.   Cf. Liran Einav et al., Selection on Moral 
Hazard in Health Insurance, (NBER, Working Paper No. 16969, Apr. 2011), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16969. 
109 Sydnor, supra note 77, at 198.  
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To this point in the analysis, it is easy to see the appeal of 
insurance against small losses and, by extension, the appeal of the 
consumer sovereignty defense of a light touch to the regulation of that 
insurance.  Colin Camerer and colleagues and Daniel Schwarcz follow this 
line of reasoning in arguing that mistakes can and should be corrected by 
disclosure, but that if consumers are buying, for example, extended 
warranties because of loss or regret aversion, or as relief for “anxiety,” they 
should be free to do so, because restricting their ability to make such 
decisions would leave them (subjectively) worse off. 110 
What the consumer sovereignty defense misses, however, is the 
institutional context.  When insurance is sold as an add-on, the resulting 
equilibrium can, in effect, require the seller to exploit vulnerable 
consumers in order to compete in the market for the base product to which 
the add-on insurance is attached.  Understood in this way, regulation 
protecting consumers from sellers pushing add-on insurance also frees up 
sellers to compete on the basis of what everyone understands to be their 
core function: selling the base product.  We explain this institutional 
context and the equilibrium effects next, before turning to the distributional 
and efficiency benefits to be gained from regulating add-on insurance. 
 
B.  EXPLAINING THE HIGH PRICES CHARGED FOR ADD-ON INSURANCE 
 
We begin with the “shrouding” model of two-stage or ‘tied’ 
purchases developed by Gabaix and Laibson.111  We summarize that model 
here, stressing its prediction that when some actors are subject to a 
plausible behavioral anomaly – an anomaly that is consistent with observed 
behavior in the add-on insurance market – inefficient and discriminatory 
 
110 Camerer et al., supra note 13, at 1253-54, noting that consumers purchase 
what seem to be extravagantly over-priced extended warranties and suggesting that 
the problem could be solved by disclosing the true frequency of repair because:  
“[i]f disclosure reduces warranty purchases by reminding consumers of the low 
chance of product breakage, then purchasing the warranty would have been a 
mistake rather than a preference. If informed consumers continue to purchase the 
warranties, then it is quite possible that they have good reason to do so, however 
unfathomable that decision may seem to an economist.”; Schwarcz, supra note 13, 
at 31, “[A]rgues that the insurance demand anomalies . . . can plausibly be 
explained as sophisticated consumer behavior to manage emotions such as anxiety, 
regret, and loss aversion. Moreover, the capacity of insurance to address these 
negative emotions is not necessarily an artifact of manipulative insurance sales or 
marketing. Rather, it may be a sophisticated and informed strategy on the part of 
consumers to manage emotions that exist independently of insurers’ (and their 
agents’) sales efforts.” 
111 Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 12, at 505–07. 
2013     BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS  39 
 
terms can survive in equilibrium even if a substantial portion of consumers 
are careful shoppers.112  
The shrouding model imagines a two-step purchase process of 
exactly the sort that takes place with add-on insurance products. In the first 
step, a consumer purchases a base good or service, and then in the second 
step optionally makes a secondary purchase that is somehow tied to the 
first. Gabaix and Laibson use examples such as a laser printer and 
replacement cartridges, a hotel room and telephone charges, and a car 
rental and a pre-paid tank of gas. 
In constructing their model, Gabaix and Laibson recognize that 
consumers are not all alike in their shopping behavior.  To simplify, they 
divide consumers into just two types: “myopes,” who don’t think about the 
possibility of future “add-ons” when they make their initial purchase, and 
“sophisticates,” who do.  Consumers make the initial purchase in a 
competitive market, in which the prices charged by all sellers for the base 
product are completely observable.  That first purchase then exposes the 
buyer to an optional add-on purchase from the same seller, in a market in 
which the price for the second purchase is unobservable at the time the 
initial purchase is made (unless one inquires about it).  We think it is 
helpful to think of the second stage purchase as taking place in a 
“situational monopoly” in which the seller has a captive market for that 
purchase.113  As Gabaix and Laibson observe, the second stage price – for 
the cartridge, the telephone charges, or the add-on insurance – typically is 
significantly above the marginal cost of providing the good or service.  One 
could presumably buy an extended warranty separately from the primary 
purchase, but this turns out to be rare in practice,114 with the result that 
 
112 By contrast, models with heterogeneously informed consumers but no 
behavioral anomaly suggest that inefficient pricing is unlikely to survive an 
equilibrium.  Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 10, at 638 conclude that “[t]he 
presence of at least some consumer search in a market creates the possibility of a 
‘pecuniary externality’: persons who search sometimes protect nonsearchers from 
overreaching firms.”  Moreover, in their model, if at least one third of consumers 
undertake comparison shopping, the market price will be close to the competitive 
price in a market where all consumers are informed.  See id. at 653.  But there are 
grounds to be skeptical about this dynamic.  See Ben-Shahar & Snyder, supra note 
6, at 742-49 (concluding that the empirical history of mandated disclosure has 
shown that there has been a history of failure in employing mandated disclosure to 
assist consumers in making choices in the market). 
113 See supra, n. 14. 
114 OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 5, at 87 (indicating that 69% of 
extended warranties were purchased from the retailer/shop that consumers 
purchased the insured product from).  Patricia McCoy (personal correspondence) 
points out to us that after she refinanced her own mortgage, she received numerous 
unsolicited offers for credit life insurance from insurers that were unaffiliated with 
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most extended warranties are sold at decidedly supra-competitive, 
monopoly-like prices. Their shrouded pricing model provides an 
explanation for why.  
The explanation begins with the observation that in a competitive 
market, sellers must earn zero profit on the combination of TV set and 
extended warranty.  Since the second stage monopoly allows the seller to 
extract supra-competitive prices for the extended warranty, the prices on 
TV sets must therefore be lower than they would be if they were sold on 
their own. Suppose now that a firm tries to compete by offering a lower 
second-stage price – e.g., on extended warranties – than its rival, and by 
alerting potential customers to the fact that its rivals charge more (“Come 
buy from us – we charge less for our extended warranties”).  Doing so has 
two consequences. First, it educates the rival’s sophisticated consumers that 
the rival is using high profits on the add-on to subsidize low prices for the 
TV.  The sophisticates will thus prefer to buy the TV from the rival (at the 
cross-subsidized price) and avoid the rival’s high add-on charges.  They 
can do this by substituting a competitively-supplied extended warranty for 
that offered by the seller or, better yet, by not buying one at all and relying 
instead on savings or a credit card to replace the product if it breaks.     
Importantly, however, this advertising will have no effect on the rival’s 
myopic consumers, who aren’t paying attention to the second-stage 
transaction at all.115  Thus, competitive attempts to unmask a rival’s high 
add-on prices will only succeed in driving sophisticated customers to the 
rival, and will not do anything for the firm providing the educational 
information. Hence, there will be no reason for any firm to try to unmask 
its rivals’ high add-on fees, which can then persist in equilibrium. 
To bring this point home, try shopping for a rental car using 
Expedia or other web-based travel sites.  All show a “total price” that is the 
base charge in Gaibaix and Laibson’s terms.  None show the price for the 
collision damage waiver or supplemental liability insurance in any easily 
comparable way.  If you spend enough time on the website you can find 
that information, but nowhere is it combined and presented in a table for 
 
her lender.  She suggests that a separate market is possible (at least for those who 
do not purchase insurance from the lender at the time of borrowing), but that the 
disorganized state of the market and the inability of consumers to make 
comparisons creates a somewhat similar situational monopoly, if perhaps for 
different reasons. 
115 Consistent with the shrouded pricing model, the U.K. Office of Fair 
Trading reports that more than half of the people who purchase extended 
warranties had not considered purchasing an extended warranty before purchasing 
the covered product.  See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 5, at 36 (only 39% 
of extended warranty holders agreed that they had intended to take out an extended 
warranty before purchasing the insured product).   
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easy comparison.  Interestingly, Expedia offers a collision damage waiver 
that can be used at any car rental agency and that is much less expensive 
than those sold by the rental car companies.116  If the market for collision 
damage waivers was competitive, rental car companies would not be able 
to charge so much more than Expedia.  A “sophisticate” who wants a 
collision damage waiver will buy it from Expedia and rent the car from the 
company with the cheapest base charge.  
We take some comfort from the fact that the existence of 
situational monopolies has been understood for a long time.  Writing in 
1958, Philip H. Peters, a Vice President at John Hancock Life Insurance, 
diagnosed the problem in credit life insurance as follows: 
 
[A]buses [of consumers] are possible because borrowers 
who take out personal loans or who buy on time are a 
captive insurance market.  Their lack of knowledge, their 
need or their diffidence makes them receptive when the 
lender or dealer suggests that the loan be insured, and they 
are usually unable to defend themselves against excessive 
charges or other overreaching.  In these circumstances, 
competition among insurance companies does not protect 
the borrower.  Insurers are competing for the lender’s 
patronage, not the borrower’s; the lender is interested in a 
high premium because his commission or dividend will be 
higher if the premium is larger.117 (Emphasis supplied). 
 
The presence of the situational monopoly undercuts the consumer 
sovereignty defense of a light touch, disclosure-only approach to the 
regulation of add-on insurance products.118  Even if consumers are not 
“mistaken” in purchasing add-on insurance and, instead, are motivated to 
purchase that insurance by genuine (albeit irrational) fears or anxieties, it 
does not follow that they should over-pay for the insurance they purchase, 
as the shrouding model predicts and the evidence we reviewed in Part I 
shows to be the case.  Even if the add-on product meets some real need that 
 
116 Expedia, Frequently Asked Questions, EXPEDIA CAR RENTAL INSURANCE, 
http://expediacri.berkelycare.com/product/contact-us/faq.jsf (last visited Sept. 28, 
2013); Expedia, Why Should I buy?, EXPEDIA CAR RENTAL INSURANCE,  
http://expediacri.berkelycare.com/product/home.jsf (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
117 Neither Peters nor the U.K. Competition Commission invoke consumer 
irrationality to explain the absence of competitive pricing in credit life.  Peters, 
supra note 1; U.K. COMPETITION COMMISSION, supra note 3 at 3-10.    
118 See Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 39 (interventions monopolizing genuine 
consumer preferences for the benefit of those consumers are troubling because they 
undermine welfare economics and consumer sovereignty). 
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was not the product of seller-created pressure, framing, or advertising, 
consumers should not have to pay vastly more for such insurance than it 
costs to provide. 
The situational monopoly that Peters identified – and that the 
shrouded pricing model explains – suggests a market failure that regulation 
could potentially address, even if insurance is purchased for “legitimate-
but-non-standard” reasons such as regret- or loss-aversion.  The market 
failure arises not from consumer motivation per se, but from the way such 
motivations shape the resultant market equilibrium and reduce the ability of 
competitive market forces to protect consumers from overpaying.  
In this regard, add-on insurance products present a very different 
case than low deductible homeowner’s insurance.  People who choose the 
low deductible homeowners’ insurance policies might appear to overpay 
for their insurance, because the low deductible is over-priced in relation to 
the expected benefit of the deductible considered in isolation.  Yet, as 
Sydnor’s equilibrium analysis reveals, they do not actually overpay for 
their insurance as a group, because they have higher claim costs. Their 
preference for the low deductible functions as a sorting device that 
identifies them as more costly to insure.119  
Add-on insurance also functions as a sorting device.  But that 
sorting device has little or nothing to do with the cost of providing the add-
on insurance. Instead, it sorts consumers according to their foresight and 
vulnerability to the shrouded pricing dynamic.  The people who buy add-on 
insurance overpay for that insurance, compared to what would be paid in a 
competitive market, because the shrouded pricing dynamic gives the seller 
the ability to charge a situational monopoly price. 120  This price provides 
 
119 Sydnor’s research suggests that the availability of different levels of 
deductibles in homeowners’ insurance facilitate what one of use has called “risk 
classification by design.”  See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and 
Responsibility After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1577, 1588 (2011) (a reduction in plan variation fosters “risk classification by 
design” which is the creation of separate risk pools as individuals self-select into 
different health care products according to their self-assessed health risk status).  
This is, of course, exactly what the famous Rothschild/Stiglitz model shows is the 
only possible (Nash) equilibrium in a world of asymmetric information.  See 
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. OF ECON. 
629, 633 (1976).  The idea is to induce separation (self-selection) by offering a 
menu of policies such that: (i) both policies earn 0 profit, given who buys them and 
(ii) the high-deductible policy is cheaper but excludes just enough risk so that the 
high-risk group prefers the low-deductible policy.  Id. at 636-37, 646. 
120 Huysentruyt & Read, supra note 95, at 217(“The central feature of a 
functioning market is that because providers compete for the business of 
customers, prices are pushed downward, and consumers can get the best deal with 
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ample incentive to push people into buying protection that they don’t really 
need or would be much better off buying somewhere else.  The extra 
profits the retailers earn from that insurance reduces the base price that 
everyone pays for the underlying product or service, meaning that – as in 
the shrouded pricing model – the people who are vulnerable to the 
situational monopoly subsidize those who are not. 
Moreover, if regret-aversion is the motivation for buying an add-on 
insurance product, it is not clear that the product in fact increases welfare in 
the manner that the defenders of consumer sovereignty assert.  If there were 
no extended warranties available, the consumer could not experience regret 
for having failed to purchase one.  Thus, a policy-maker who was 
convinced that regret-aversion was the reason for consumer purchase of 
insurance product could ban the insurance with no loss in welfare.  This is a 
case where supply creates its own demand.  If we think the demand is 
welfare-reducing, we can eliminate the supply and the demand at the same 
time. 
 
1. Efficiency Consequences of Add-on Insurance 
 
Ending the redistribution of wealth from myopes to sophisticates is 
in our minds sufficient justification for regulatory action to eliminate 
situational monopolies.  The justification is strengthened to the extent that 
the demand for add-on insurance products is seller-induced in the first 
place.  But there are efficiency losses associated with add-on insurance as 
well, stemming from a key institutional fact that is not captured in Gaibaix 
and Laibson’s model: the retailer’s sales efforts.  
In the original shrouded pricing story, sellers do not need to induce 
customers to buy the second stage product – if you own a laser printer, you 
can’t use it for long without purchasing replacement toner cartridges.  But 
add-on insurance is qualitatively different, because customers can and often 
do purchase the primary product (TV set, car rental) without ever needing 
to buy the insurance.  We suspect that relatively few consumers would 
independently request extended warranties if they were not urged to buy 
them by sellers (though there may be more people who would continue to 
buy them in the future having first been persuaded to do so).   At a 
minimum, the sellers are taking advantage of the availability heuristic (by 
 
the minimum cognitive effort – they do not have to combine breakdown 
probabilities and repair costs because warranty sellers have done it for them.  To a 
first approximation, all consumers have to do is choose or reject the best deal 
amongst those available.  If a consumer believes that a warranty is worth three 
times its objective value, but finds that she can buy it for one third of that price, she 
will buy it and obtain the benefits from knowing she has obtained a bargain as well 
as the warranty itself.”) 
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highlighting the possibility that the product will fail plus the certainty of 
death), the endowment effect (by selling the extended warranty in a second 
step, after the customer has decided to buy), and regret aversion (by 
causing consumers to imagine a future regret that would not exist absent 
the over-priced insurance).  Quite likely they are doing even more to 
manipulate buyers, as the U.K. Competition Commission reported.121  It 
would be astonishing if they were not, given the truly extraordinary profits 
that sellers earn on add-on insurance. 
Seller efforts to induce consumers to purchase unneeded add-on 
insurance are a waste of salesperson and consumer time: Simply charging a 
higher price for the TV set and abandoning the extended warranty 
altogether would free up resources for more productive uses.  A recent 
story in the New York Times gives a sense of the inefficient practices 
involved.  According to one whistle-blower, Staples (the office products 
store)   
 
[h]as in place a set of incentives that make it unpleasant, to 
put it mildly, for staffers to sell a computer without a 
whole bunch of accessories, particularly a service plan. 
Staples . . . has a system called Market Basket that tracks 
how many dollars’ worth of add-ons each staffer sells.  
[E]ach time you sell a computer, you need to sell, on 
average, $200 worth of other stuff.  And that average is 
carefully tracked.  Sales staffers who aren't meeting their 
goals are coached, and if that doesn't work . . . there will be 
disciplinary action that can lead up to termination; 
underperformers can also end up with lots of night and 
weekends shifts or even a reduction in scheduled hours.122 
 
 
121 Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car 
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 872 (1991) long ago pointed out that a few 
“home run” sales (those with extraordinary markups) accounted for a significant 
proportion of a new car dealers’ profits.  The pursuit of such large markups 
plausibly drives much of the hard sell behavior for which car sales are well-known, 
and an analogous set of incentives operates in the add-on insurance market.  See 
also U.K. COMPETITION COMMISSION, supra note 3, at app. 2.1 (list of 
unacceptable practices). 
122 Moreover, store managers who can’t keep their storewide “Market Basket” 
numbers up face “conference calls with district managers” and other discipline.   
One store manager was told: “‘If you can’t do the job, you can go sell fries at 
McDonald’s.’”  David Segal, Selling It With Extras, or Not at All, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/your-money/sales-incentives-
atstap les-draw-complaints-the-haggler.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&emc=eta1. 
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As a result, sales personnel seeking to keep their Market Basket 
average high will actually refuse to sell a computer to a customer who 
declines to purchase the extended warranty.  This practice is common 
enough to have a name: “Walking the customer,” “because consumers are 
essentially shooed out the door empty-handed” if they want to buy a 
computer without the warranty.123  While it is difficult to quantify the time 
and hassle consumed by such hard-sell tactics, anyone reading the customer 
complaints about these practices would recognize that they generate 
considerable frustration. 
These last observations suggest a possible role for regulation that 
would attempt to make extended warranties and other forms of add-on 
insurance a better deal for consumers by addressing the market failure 
attributable to the situational monopoly enjoyed by the product retailer.  
 
IV. REGULATORY STRATEGIES 
 
There are four potential regulatory strategies to address the 
situational monopoly prices charged for add-on insurance: mandating 
enhanced disclosure, banning the sale of the insurance as an add-on, 
regulating the price of the insurance, and using information technology to 
eliminate the situational monopoly.  Enhanced disclosure has been tried 
many times, including in the add-on insurance context, and the evidence 
shows that disclosure does not work, at least not for add-on insurance 
products.  By contrast, banning the sale of the insurance as an add-on 
works well, perhaps even too well in some contexts.  We recommend 
banning insurance add-on sales when consumers do not really need to 
purchase insurance together with the primary product or service, such as 
extended warranties and credit life insurance.  But a ban goes too far when 
some consumers need to be able to buy the insurance as an add-on.  The 
one example we have identified is when a consumer without a personal 
auto policy rents a car, but there may be other examples that have not 
 
123 David Segal, A Hard Sell on the Extras, Revisited, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/your-money/another-look-at-a-hard-
sell -on-extras-at-staples-stores.html?emc=eta1.  For another recent example, 
consider the practice of overbilling for collision damage waivers.  Tara Siegel 
Bernard, A Quick Electronic Signature at the Car Rental Office, and Then Trouble, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/06/your-money/for-
car-renters-signing-on-the-electronic-tablet-may-mean-trouble.html?emc=eta1.  
According to one source, Dollar Rent a Car charged at least 100 consumers for 
collision damage waivers that they had explicitly denied to purchase by checking a 
box on an electronic data entry form.  Whether this kind of overbilling represents a 
deliberate policy or simply a computer glitch, it is clear that the profitability of 
CDW’s drastically reduces the incentives to correct this problem. 
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occurred to us.  Price regulation could help protect consumers from the 
situational monopoly pricing in such situations.  We greatly prefer the 
fourth strategy, however: using information technology to eliminate the 
situational monopoly.  There is some precedent for this approach.  The 
Office of Fair Trading in the UK is in the process of implementing an 
information technology solution as a result of their investigation into why 
the Competition Commission’s disclosure strategy for extended warranties 
didn’t work.  This part briefly describes these four strategies and explains 
our recommendations among them. 
 
A. ENHANCED DISCLOSURE 
 
Historically, enhanced disclosure has been the preferred free 
market regulatory strategy, including for add-on insurance.124  Omri Ben-
Shahar and Carl Schneider have recently described in great detail the 
failure of disclosure as a regulatory strategy.125  One need not endorse their 
across-the-board rejection of disclosure to agree with their conclusions in 
the add-on insurance context.  The shrouded pricing model fits the add-on 
insurance product too well to expect disclosure to work. This conclusion is 
borne out by the available evidence.  A highly regarded U.K. government 
agency – the Competition Commission – recently tried a well-calibrated 
enhanced disclosure approach for extended warranties.  It failed. 
The Competition Commission conducted an investigation of 
extended warranties sold in connection with consumer electronics, 
producing an impressive and extensive report that we have relied upon for 
some of our empirical assertions about extended warranties.126  The 
Commission’s principle recommendation was to mandate advertising of the 
extended warranty price along with the price of the covered product, 
thereby allowing consumers to shop on the basis of the combined price.127  
The Commission also proposed three reforms designed to reduce the 
likelihood of the customer being pressured into buying the extended 
warranty: (1) obligating the retailer to provide an offer of an extended 
warranty that could be accepted at any time during the first 30 days after 
the purchase (so the consumer could think about it); (2) requiring the 
warranties to be cancellable with full refund rights for the first 30 days and 
on a pro rata basis for the life of the warranty; and (3) obligating the retailer 
to provide an informational booklet at the time of the sale that would 
explain to the consumer how to get an extended warranty from an 
 
124 See Camerer, et al., supra note 13, at 1254; Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 42. 
125 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 6, at 742-43.   
126 See U.K. COMPETITION COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 15-16 (summary of 
the study). 
127 Id. at 10. 
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independent third party provider.128  All four reforms were adopted by 
regulation, effective April 2005.129 
Taken together, these reforms reflected the Commission’s 
conclusion at the time that the excess profits from extended warranties 
resulted from a combination of (a) collusion among retailers to refrain from 
advertising the extended warranty prices and (b) improper selling practices.  
Because retailers know that they can make so much money from pressuring 
customers into buying overpriced extended warranties, the retailers collude 
to preserve their collective ability to charge excessive prices, or so the 
Commission seemed to suggest.  
We are skeptical that retailers could successfully collude in this 
manner, however.  There are hundreds (maybe even thousands) of retailers 
offering extended warranties, and it seems highly implausible that they 
could collusively agree to maintain high prices without chiseling.  If 
making the price of the extended warranty more transparent would actually 
change the behavior of consumers, such that they would prefer to buy the 
product from the seller with the cheapest price for both the product and the 
warranty, then some retailer in the crowded and, to our eyes, intensely 
competitive consumer electronic product market would at least try 
competing on that basis.   
The behaviorally-informed shrouded pricing model offers a much 
more compelling story about how supra-competitive pricing could be 
sustained in equilibrium, without any resort to implausible assumptions 
about collusion.  The shrouding model accepts the behavioral decision 
research finding that people regularly depart from the rational actor model, 
focuses on the fact that people are not all the same in this regard, and then 
incorporates an equilibrium analysis that takes into account the behavior of 
both buyers and sellers.  Thus, at a minimum, it provides a much more 
compelling explanation for the observed evidence of over-priced extended 
warranties than does the Competition Commission’s story about seller 
collusion.  
Our skepticism is supported by the fact that profits from extended 
warranties on consumer electronic products in the UK continue to be very 
high, despite the reforms, and the U.K. Office of Fair Trading still sees the 
 
128 A minority of the Commission would have limited point of sale extended 
warranties to a maximum of one year. 
129 The regulation as adopted allowed for a 45 day cancellation period. See 
COMPETITION COMMISSION, EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL 
GOODS: A REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC 
ELECTRICAL GOODS WITHIN THE U.K., (December 2003), at 10 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.competitioncommission.org.uk/inquiries/completed/2003/warranty/ind
ex/htm; http://www.legislation.gov.uk.uksi/2005/37/contents/made. 
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market as “unfair and uncompetitive.”130  As the shrouded pricing model 
would predict, disclosure did not work.  The Office of Fair Trading 
conducted a follow-up investigation that concluded in 2011 that disclosure 
is not working and recommended, instead, recommended an information 
technology solution that would eliminate the situational monopoly.  British 
retailers recently accepted that recommendation as an “agreed remedy,” 
perhaps to avoid the ban that we recommend for extended warranties in the 
add-on context.131  We discuss this information technology solution below. 
 
1.  Why more information is unlikely to be effective 
 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider provide an elegant taxonomy of the 
reasons why mandatory disclosure regimes almost never provide much 
protection for those they are designed to benefit.  First, regulators can 
rarely design appropriate disclosure regimes that adequately specify what 
needs to be disclosed and what constitutes sufficient disclosure.  Second, 
even when they want to comply in good faith – and this is only sometimes 
the case – disclosers invariably struggle to interpret the disclosure mandate, 
assemble the required data, and communicate it in meaningful ways.  And 
finally, consumers routinely ignore the information disclosed (i.e., they fail 
to read contract terms, nutrition labels and so on), fail to understand the 
terms, even when they are aware of them, and fail to make appropriate use 
of them, if they’re understood.132  As Ben-Shahar and Schneider put it: 
 
 
130 See Rupert Neate, OFT to look into extended warranties, THE DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 15, 2011, Bus. Section at p. 3 (reporting that the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) is going to examine the £750M market for extended warranties for 
electrical goods again; one in four customers purchase extended warranties; and 
the warranties are still seen by OFT as “unfair and uncompetitive.”).  Prices of 
extended warranties have declined at traditional retailers since the reforms, but that 
appears to be the result of competition from internet retailers and big box stores.  
See Evaluating the Impact of the Supply of Extended Warranties on Domestic 
Electrical Goods Order 2005, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, 5-6, (October 2008), 
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/oft1 
024.pdf. 
131 Market Review of Domestic Electrical Goods, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING 
(June 27, 2012), http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/markets-work/othermarketswork 
/electrical-goods/. 
132 It strikes us as ironic that Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donohue 
and Thaler – all distinguished behavioral economists who have made careers out of 
demonstrating that most of us are less-than-fully rational most of the time – 
suggest disclosure as the preferred regulatory solution for dealing with Homer 
Simpson problems.  See Camerer, et al., supra note 86, at 1254. 
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[M]andated disclosure rests on false assumptions: that 
people want to make all the consequential decisions about 
their lives, and that they want to do so by assembling all 
the relevant information, reviewing all the possible 
outcomes, reviewing all their relevant values, and deciding 
which choice best promotes their preferences.  These 
assumptions so poorly describe how human beings live 
that mandated disclosure cannot reliably improve people’s 
decisions.133 
 
Consider applying this schema to the disclosure of information 
regarding, say, extended warranties.  One might be tempted to imagine that 
the first prong – deciding what needs to be disclosed and how – could be 
satisfied fairly easily (albeit at a non-trivial cost): retailers would need to 
compile and disclose information on the probability and cost of repair for 
each item on which a warranty is offered.  That is, a consumer purchasing 
an extended warranty on the Sony TV discussed earlier134 might be told: 
“This TV has a 2.5 percent chance of needing a repair during the warranty 
period, and that repair costs, on average, $400.”  But characterizing the 
relevant probability of repair is not straightforward, especially for new 
products.  And cost-of-repair data are also probably difficult to describe 
and subject to considerable misrepresentation.  Moreover, disclosure would 
have to be regulated as to its timing in the transaction, its precise wording, 
and so on.  These all pose considerable challenges. 
As to the second prong – implementing the disclosure regime – 
since sellers earn substantial profits from the extended warranties, it seems 
obvious that they would have a strong incentive to manipulate the 
information disclosed in an effort to make the warranty look more 
 
133 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 6, at 705.  Cf. Andrei Shleifer, 
Psychologists at the Gate, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 1080, 1089 (2012) (reviewing DANIEL  
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW): 
 
Faced with bad choices by consumers, such as smoking or 
undersaving, economists as System 2 thinkers tend to focus on 
education as a remedy.  Show people statistics on deaths from 
lung cancer, or graphs of consumption drops after retirement, or 
data on returns on stocks versus bonds, and they will do better. 
As we have come to realize, such education usually fails. 
Kahneman’s book explains why: System 2 might not really 
engage until System 1 processes the message. If the message is 
ignored by System 1, it might never get anywhere. 
 
134 See supra text accompanying notes 30-31. 
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appealing.  One way to do this would be to exaggerate the frequency or 
cost of repairs (but only, of course, after the consumer has agreed to buy 
the TV).   Another would be to focus on other aspects of the warranty – for 
example, stressing the hassle-reducing benefits of the warranty (“we’ll take 
care of everything…”).  Another would be to exaggerate the length and 
complexity of the disclosures, and to offer, helpfully, to summarize or skip 
the disclosure.  “Oh, yes, here’s another one of those corporate forms for 
you to pretend to read and sign.  I hate those things?  Don’t you?”  Still 
another would be to threaten to walk customers out the door if they don’t 
buy the insurance after reading the disclosures.135 
Finally, the third prong – getting consumers to use the information.  
Suppose that consumers were given the relevant data that would allow 
them to compare the expected cost of repair (probability of repair × cost of 
repair) with the cost of the warranty.  And suppose this information were 
displayed prominently and conveyed clearly.  Even so, the consumer’s 
decision problem is a difficult one.  Consumers presumably differ in their 
discount rates, and in their degree of risk aversion.  We suspect that many 
would not even know that paying $349 for a warranty that insures against 
an 8.5 percent chance of a $400 repair is a bad deal, at least not unless the 
disclosure stated: “Only a fool would purchase this product.”136  Even then 
we suspect that there are plenty of salespeople who could still get 
consumers to buy the insurance using the methods we described along with 
others that we are not devious enough to think up. 
 
B. BANNING ADD-ON SALES OF INSURANCE 
 
The simplest, most straightforward way to protect consumers from 
situational monopoly prices in the add-on insurance market is to prohibit 
what the U.K. Competition Commission calls “point of sale purchase” of 
add-on insurance products.137  This is the regulatory strategy we endorse 
for extended warranties, credit life insurance, and any other add-insurance 
product that could easily be purchased elsewhere, and for which immediate 
 
135 See supra text accompanying notes 122-123.  See supra pp. 42-43. 
136 It is well known that many individuals have a very difficult time 
understanding percentages. See Gerd Gigerenzer, How To Make Cognitive 
Illusions Disappear: Beyond Heuristics and Biases, 2 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCH. 83 
(1991). 
137 COMPETITION COMMISSION, MARKET INVESTIGATION INTO PAYMENT 
PROTECTION INSURANCE, Jan. 29, 2009, at 13 (U.K.). Patricia McCoy (personal 
communication) points out that Congress or the Comptroller of the Currency 
would also have to ban debt cancelation/suspension contracts that are very close 
substitutes for credit life insurance.  Otherwise, the possibility for regulatory 
arbitrage would allow the transactions to continue in a new form.   
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coverage is not truly necessary.  If people really want extended warranties 
or other kinds of add-on insurance for emotional risk management 
purposes, they will find that insurance in all the ways that people find other 
things that they want: on the internet, in the yellow pages, or through a 
print or direct mail advertisement.  
Our proposed ban on retailers’ sale of add-on insurance products is 
similar to, but simpler and stronger than, the complex package of reforms 
that the U.K. Competition Commission recommended in 2009 for payment 
protection insurance.138  Payment protection insurance (PPI) is a commonly 
purchased form of insurance in the UK that combines credit life insurance 
with disability and unemployment protection insurance.  Where credit life 
insurance pays the creditor only in the event of the death of the insured, PPI 
pays the creditor in the event of “involuntary unemployment or incapacity 
as a result of accident or sickness.”139  The Commission found that the 
common practice of selling PPI at the point of sale adversely affected 
competition in the PPI market, disadvantaging, in particular, “providers of 
stand-alone PPI.”140  The Commission prohibited the purchase of PPI at the 
point of sale of credit, requiring creditors to wait to sell PPI until seven 
days after issuing credit and mandating competition enhancing disclosures 
to consumers and to a regulatory oversight body in connection with the sale 
of PPI.141  
We recommend a flat prohibition on the sale of most add-on 
insurance by product or service retailers.  We would not allow them to sell 
the insurance after some cooling off window, because there are too many 
ways that retailers can structure the sale of the basic product or service to 
gain advantage in the insurance purchase even after the cooling off period.  
The complexity of the measures that the Competition Commission imposed 
to attempt to reduce this advantage makes our point. A summary 
 
138 Supra note 137 at 13 (concluding that the best approach to regulating credit 
life and similar products is to simply prohibit distributors and intermediaries from 
selling payment protection insurance to their credit customers within seven days of 
a credit sale). 
139 COMPETITION COMMISSION, PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE MARKET 
INVESTIGATION ORDER 2011, 2011, at 8 (defining “PPI”) (U.K). 
140 Id. at 3. 
141 The Commission initially decided to prohibit entirely the purchase of PPI at 
the point of sale of credit, allowing creditors to sell PPI only seven days after 
issuing credit and mandating competition enhancing disclosures in connection with 
the offer of PPI.  After an administrative appeal, the Commission relaxed the 
prohibition slightly, allowing point of sale purchase in connection with certain 
retail credit arrangements (e.g., with a department store), and allowing creditors to 
sell PPI to their customers one day after the credit sale in certain limited 
circumstances. Id. at 2. 
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description of these measures fills one half of the Commission’s Notice of 
making an order, and the measures themselves comprise 80% of the fifty-
five page Order. 142  If product or service retailers were to be permitted to 
sell the insurance after some kind of cooling off period, however, similar 
pro-competition disclosure and reporting requirements would be necessary. 
We would exclude from this prohibition the sale of damage 
waivers and auto liability protection by rental car companies to customers 
who do not have their own auto insurance policies.  Such customers must 
have liability protection from somewhere, and they should also be able to 
purchase auto property damage protection.  Because these customers would 
otherwise remain vulnerable to the shrouded pricing dynamic, however, we 
recommend that insurance commissioners employ the measures described 
in subsection 4 to eliminate the situational monopoly. 
 
C.  PRICE REGULATION 
 
Price regulation is a well-established approach to the monopoly 
pricing problem,143 and has long been used in regulating insurance.  
Situational monopolies for add-on insurance are not classic monopolies like 
public utilities, but they present similar opportunities for monopoly pricing.  
And add-on insurance does bear some resemblance to traditional insurance, 
so regulating it the way we regulate many other forms of insurance might 
seem plausible. We do not advocate price regulation for add-on insurance, 
however, because of the transaction costs involved.  
There is a vast literature critiquing price regulation in insurance.144 
Much of that literature concludes that price regulation does not in fact 
lower insurance prices, because the insurance market would be sufficiently 
competitive in the absence of such regulation.145  That is unlikely to be the 
case here: because of the shrouded pricing dynamic and the resulting 
 
142 COMPETITION COMMISSION, Order, supra note 139, § 2.1 at 8; 
COMPETITION COMMISSION, Notice, supra note 139, at 1-4.   
143 For a survey of regulation of monopolies, see generally Rick Geddes, 
Public Utilities, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS (1999), available at http:// 
encyclo.findlaw.com/5940book.pdf.  
144 See, e.g., Scott E. Harrington, Effects of Prior Approval Regulation in 
Automobile Insurance, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE: 
RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 285 (J. David 
Cummins ed., 2002) (noting that rate regulation fails to reduce average rates in 
competitive markets); Scott E. Harrington, Insurance Rate Regulation in the 20th 
Century, 19 J. OF INS. REG. 204 (2000) (finding that prior approval rate regulation 
failed to lower average rate levels or expand coverage availability in competitive 
markets).. 
145 E.g., Harrington, supra note 144, at 216; Id. at 309-10. 
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situational monopoly, competition clearly does not constrain add-on 
insurance pricing.  That does not mean that price regulation is likely to be 
effective, however. 
In theory, prices should be set at a level that gives sellers of add-on 
insurance a reasonable rate of return.  In other words, regulators would 
ideally set prices at the actuarially fair value plus some markup for 
overhead, marketing, and profit.  But just figuring out the actuarially fair 
price for extended warranties on a constantly changing array of thousands 
of different consumer products sold by hundreds of different retailers is a 
daunting task.  Estimating reasonable markups for overhead and marketing 
costs constitutes another enormous problem, and the result would clearly be 
subject to manipulation by retailers in obvious ways.  Nevertheless, price 
regulation almost certainly would be better than nothing, just not better 
than our preferred alternatives. 
We prefer, instead, a ban on the sale of add-on insurance by 
product and service retailers, except in the limited exception described 
earlier (when a significant number of consumers need immediate 
coverage).  For those situations we prefer eliminating the situational 
monopoly in the manner we describe next.  
 
D.  BUSTING THE SITUATIONAL MONOPOLY 
 
The final strategy is a new regulatory approach made possible by 
information technology.  This strategy would eliminate the situational 
monopoly by obligating the entity providing the core product or service 
(e.g., the car rental) to allow the customer to select a desired insurance 
product through an independently operated website accessed at the point of 
sale.  This website would list the insurance products, features and prices, 
and allow consumers to use a simple comparison tool.  The insurance 
selection feature of the website would be similar to – but much simpler 
than – the insurance selection feature of existing health insurance exchange 
websites.146  For consumers who did not want the hassle of having to 
 
146 The website for the Massachusetts health insurance exchange, known as the 
Massachusetts Connector (which served as the model for the health insurance 
exchange provisions of the Affordable Care Act), can be accessed at 
http://www.mahealthconnector.org. The leading private health insurance exchange 
is ehealth.com. The ehealth.com selection process is much more complicated than 
the Massachusetts Connector process because ehealth.com cannot provide 
consumers with a definitive price, due to the fact that health insurance companies 
are currently authorized to engage in medical underwriting.  See generally Baker, 
supra note 119 (providing an examination of the distribution of health insurance 
risk and responsibility under the Affordable Care Act). For research on the 
complexity of health insurance choice and what to do to make that choice easier, 
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choose, the website could be programmed to provide a default product 
based on the consumer answering a few questions, or even without 
answering any questions other than responding with a “Yes” to “Do you 
want the standard protection for someone who doesn’t have their own auto 
insurance policy?”147  
The company providing the core product or service should be 
permitted to receive a reasonable servicing fee when the customer buys the 
insurance, but this fee should be based on a formula established by the state 
insurance commission.  The company providing the core product or service 
should not be permitted to obtain any other material benefit from the 
purchase of the insurance or from the operator of the independent 
website.148    Otherwise, some or all of the situational monopoly profits will 
continue to flow to the company providing the core product or service.  To 
explain why this is so, we will begin by critiquing a similarly motivated 
regulatory strategy suggested by Huysentruyt and Read, who conducted the 
research on extended warranties that we discussed in Part II.   
Huysentruyt and Read suggested two reforms for the extended 
warranty market that attempt to counteract the situational monopoly that 
results from the shrouded pricing dynamic: (a) requiring retailers to give 
consumers a choice among extended warranty providers at the point of 
sale, and (b) allowing retailers to sell only extended warranties that were 
selected through a competitive bidding process conducted “on behalf of 
consumers.”149  
Although we agree with H&R’s description of the market failure, 
we are skeptical that their proposals would be effective.  Our skepticism is 
easier to explain for the first proposal: requiring retailers to give consumers 
a choice.  As long as the retailer gets to decide which extended warranties 
to offer, obligating the retailer to offer consumers a choice will not reduce 
the situational monopoly prices.  If the retailer gets to decide which choices 
to provide to the consumers, extended warranty providers will have to 
compete to be selected by the retailer.  The way to win that competition is 
by offering the highest commissions to the retailer, not by offering the 
 
see Eric Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The 
Value of Choice Architecture (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law and Econ., 
Working Paper No. 13-28, 2012). 
147 The website could easily be programmed to randomly assign the customer 
to the standard product of one of the insurance sellers, on a turn taking basis, on 
the basis of market share, or any other method that the regulator prescribed. 
148 Note that add-on insurance is “insurance” for regulatory purposes in all 
states when the entity providing the insurance is different than the entity that 
provides the core product or service.  
149 Huystentruyt & Read, supra note 95, at 216. Note that they discuss the 
shrouded pricing model. 
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cheapest price to consumers.150  Consumers may end up with a choice, but 
the choice will be among extended warranties sold at or near the situational 
monopoly price. 
Our skepticism about H&R’s second proposal – competitive 
bidding – takes a bit more work to explain.  Initially, we shared H&R’s 
intuition that a competitive bidding process would drive out the situational 
monopoly prices.  Our intuition shifted, however, when we realized that a 
competitive bidding process would only break through the situational 
monopoly if retailers did not have the ability to influence consumers’ 
choice among extended warranties.   
If the retailer can steer the consumer to the warranty paying the 
higher commission, then a warranty supplier will submit a bid that builds in 
high commissions (so the retailer steers customers to the supplier’s 
extended warranty).  This point is pretty obvious.  What is not as obvious is 
the following: even if all the retailer can do is influence whether the 
consumer buys a warranty (but not which warranty), warranty suppliers 
will submit bids that include high commissions.151  The reason is this: if 
retailers are able to influence whether the consumers buy the extended 
warranties (a reasonable assumption in our view), then the retailers, in 
effect, control access to those consumers who will only buy the warranty if 
the retailer engages in the effort needed to persuade them to buy it.  Even if 
the consumer who decides to buy a warranty always chooses the lowest 
priced warranty available, warranty suppliers will have to build into their 
prices compensation sufficient to motivate the retailer to make the effort 
needed to persuade the marginal consumer.   
It would take a model that we have not created in order to work out 
all of the relationships among these assumptions in order to develop a 
thorough understanding of what will emerge from a competitive bidding 
process for the right to offer extended warranties to consumers.  
 
150 This dynamic explains the very high prices for “forced place” auto and 
homeowners insurance. It also explains the high and discriminatory prices for 
credit paid by buyers of new cars who finance their purchases through the 
dealership that is selling them the car. See, e.g., Coleman v. Gen. Motors 
Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 2002) (class action suit alleging that 
a car dealership’s retail credit pricing system resulted in discrimination against 
African-American buyers); Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A 
Competitive Conduct Standard for Assessing When Disparate Impacts are 
Justified, 95 CAL. L. REV. 669, 692-717 (2007) (analyzing consumer policies in the 
automobile industry that adversely affect minority purchasers). 
151 Note that heterogeneity in susceptibility to retailers’ sales pressure could 
help to explain the shrouded pricing dynamic, if we assume that people either are 
unaware of their susceptibility or mistakenly believe that they will be able to resist 
the pressure this time. 
56 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.1 
 
Nevertheless, we are confident that this price will reflect compensation to 
the retailer for “selling” the extended warranty to consumers who would 
not buy it if the retailer didn’t put forth some costly effort to persuade 
them.  
H&R’s proposed reforms should be rejected for the same reasons 
the retailer’s commission must be fixed by regulation and retailers cannot 
be permitted to obtain any other material benefit from the customer’s 
purchase of the add-on insurance.  A retailer who gets a benefit from the 
purchase of one kind of add-on insurance but not another will have an 
incentive to steer the customer.  And even if the additional benefits are the 
same for all add-on insurance, those additional benefits will motivate sales 
practices that induce customers to buy add-on insurance that they do not 
need. 
These reasons also point to a fatal weakness in the consumer 
sovereignty defense of a light touch, disclosure approach to regulating 
extended warranties.  Recall that the consumer sovereignty challenge was 
based on research supporting the view that buying extended warranties may 
in at least some cases represent “sophisticated consumer behavior to 
manage emotions such as anxiety, regret, and loss aversion” and “a 
sophisticated and informed strategy on the part of consumers to manage 
emotions that exist independently of insurers’ (and their agents’) sales 
efforts.”152  Yet, as long as we accept that retailers have the capacity to 
influence the number of consumers who buy the add-on insurance, we can 
see that the consumer sovereignty justification actually protects (a) sales to 
people who have to be persuaded, (b) a sales context that provides 
significant opportunity to exploit behavioral biases, and (c) a product – 
add-on insurance – that is demonstrably not in the average buyer’s financial 
interest in most situations (even if some buyers can be persuaded that it will 
make them feel better). Separating the buying from the selling, and the 
selling from the swindling is almost certainly an impossible task.153  The 
U.K. Competition Commission’s reforms did not work in this regard, and 
we doubt that any real world regulator can do a better job.154  Moreover, the 
shrouded pricing model demonstrates that, even if consumers value 
extended warranties for legitimate, if non-standard, reasons, the market can 
still be distorted in a way that leads them to pay far more than the cost of 
 
152 Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 31. 
153 See generally ARTHUR LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING (1976). 
154 See LECG, Ltd., Evaluating the Impact of the Supply of Extended 
Warranties on Domestic Electrical Goods Order 2005, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING 7 
(Oct. 2008), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-
OFTs-work/oft1024.pdf (finding spotty compliance with the disclosure 
requirements, misinformation regarding consumer rights, and other sales practices 
inconsistent with legal requirements). 
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providing the warranties in question.  It is hard to imagine a “sovereign” 
consumer who would prefer that situation. 
The U.K. Office of Fair Trading has recently imposed a similar, 
situational monopoly-busting reform of the consumer electronic extended 
warranty market in the UK. Like the Competition Commission’s reform of 
the PPI market, however, the OFT’s reform of the extended warranty 
market contains some loopholes that significantly increase the complexity 
of the regulatory apparatus.155  Simpler is better in our view. If our 
situational monopoly busting reform for auto rental insurance were to be 
subject to the same kinds of exceptions as the extended warranties in the 
U.K. context, however, some of same kinds of regulatory complexities 
would be needed to prevent the re-emergence of situational monopoly 
pricing.  
 
E.  EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
 
Under any of the approaches that would actually work – a ban, 
price regulation, or busting the situational monopoly – there would be 
general equilibrium effects of the sort that Justin Sydnor explored in the 
homeowners’ insurance deductible context.  The list prices for some 
products and services would likely increase, Gabaix and Laibson’s 
“sophisticates” would receive smaller subsidies from the “myopes,” and 
core product sellers who depend disproportionately on profits from add-on 
insurance would suffer in relation to sellers who do not.  One result may be 
to increase the share of internet commerce, as the British experience 
suggests that traditional retailers depend more on profits from extended 
warranties than internet sellers.156  This latter possibility, together with the 
political clout of the numerous, geographically distributed traditional retail 
establishments (and their employees and suppliers) may provide the best 
explanation for why the Competition Commission failed to propose a ban 
on retailers’ sale of extended warranties in 2005, and why the OFT watered 
down its situational monopoly busting reform of the extended warranty 
market in 2012. 
Some readers – and some of the literature on extended warranties – 
suggest that the resulting equilibrium might be welfare reducing, if retailers 
are using the add-on insurance to engage in (welfare-enhancing) price 
discrimination.157  The idea is that the excess profits from the add-on 
 
155 See supra note 5. 
156 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 5, at 26. 
157 By extending the size of the market via selective discounts, price 
discrimination reduces deadweight loss. Suppose a monopolist’s profit-maximizing 
single price for a movie ticket is $8. There are some older customers with 
reservation prices of $5 who do not find it worthwhile to purchase a ticket at that 
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insurance allow retailers to lower the price of the core product.  This in turn 
permits some additional sales to customers who would not buy at the 
higher price that would result if our proposal were adopted.  It might 
ultimately be the case that the loss in welfare to those priced out of the 
market for TV sets exceeds the gain in welfare to those who no longer buy 
add-on insurance they don’t need (or who buy it at a discount).158  This is, 
of course, an empirical question, and different people will have different 
intuitions about the welfare analysis.  Our intuition is that the savings to 
everyone from not being “nudged,” or worse, to buy the add-on insurance, 
plus the large savings to the people who don’t buy or don’t overpay for the 
add-on insurance outweigh the loss in welfare from those priced out of the 
market by the higher price for the base product or service.  But we freely 
admit that the alternative is possible (albeit unlikely in our view).  
This empirical question raises the important normative question of 
what we think about price discrimination based on heterogeneity in 
violations of rationality, especially those that encourage sellers to exploit 
cognitive and other limitations.  At least in the realm of insurance, where 
expected utility theory offers a powerful guide to value and society is 
already committed to strong consumer protection, we are troubled by such 
price discrimination, and we expect that insurance regulators are as well.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
We have focused on one kind of insurance that people often buy, 
even though a reasonably informed, rational person would not buy it 
(extended warranties) and two other kinds of insurance that makes sense 
for only some of the people who buy them (rental car damage waivers and 
credit life insurance) and which are just as over-priced as the first.  Many of 
the behavioral explanations for the gap between expected utility theory and 
 
price. Since the marginal cost of showing the movie is zero, it is inefficient for the 
older customers to be priced out of seeing it. So if the monopolist can selectively 
lower the price for older customers without reducing the price it charges everyone 
else, then it will earn higher revenue, the older customers will see the movie, and 
other customers will be unaffected, leaving everyone better off. 
158 For a basic reference, see Walter Y. Oi, A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part 
Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly, 85 Q. J. ECON. 77 (1971) (explaining how 
charging a flat fee plus a per-unit charge allows for greater extraction of consumer 
surplus while simultaneously reducing deadweight loss). In the extended warranty 
context; see Jindal, supra note 20 (raising this possibility in the context of results 
that do not allow him to determine whether this is the case); Junhong Chu and 
Pradeep K. Chintagunta, Quantifying the Economic Value of Warranties in the 
U.S. Server Market, 28 MARKETING SCI. 99 (2009) (analyzing extended warranties 
as a means of facilitating price discrimination in the U.S. server market and 
estimating their price discrimination value).  
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insurance purchasing practice make some sense in terms of emotional risk 
management.  On this view, buying these kinds of insurance comes to look 
more like a conscious, understandable choice to buy something with real 
value, and less like a cognitive processing mistake that we should de-bias 
or ignore.  If correct, this emotional risk management explanation could be 
understood to support a consumer sovereignty justification for these forms 
of insurance that leads directly to a light touch, disclosure approach to their 
regulation. 
We conclude that this line of reasoning is wrong, at least in the 
case of these kinds of insurance.  It fails to take into account the 
equilibrium analysis of the shrouded pricing model, the supply-induced 
nature of demand for these products, and the practical difficulties inherent 
in the choice/mistake distinction upon which the reasoning depends.  
Behavioral (and other) research has not been kind to the proposition that 
disclosure corrects decisional errors.159  Precisely because consumers who 
buy add-on insurance are not fully rational, frequency-of-repair statistics 
and other forms of “de-biasing” education will be difficult for them to 
process. Behavioral research might help to make disclosure more 
effective,160 but we see no reason to be optimistic that disclosure can fully 
overcome even the most minimal behavioral impediments to appropriate 
decision-making.  This in turn implies that the distinction between mistakes 
(based on incorrect information) and non-standard preferences as motives 
for insurance purchases does not provide a solid basis for regulatory policy.  
Unless we define “mistakes” tautologically (as those decisions that can be 
altered by disclosure), effectively correcting mistakes will often require 
 
159 See generally, e.g., Ben-Shahar and Schnieder, supra note 6 (general 
literature on de-biasing, w/spotty results).  Nor is financial education likely to 
improve consumer decision-making.  See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against 
Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197 (2008) (arguing that financial 
education actually leads to worse consumer decisions).   
160 See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Economics Behaving Badly, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion/ 
15loewenstein.html, who write:  
 
Behavioral economics should complement, not substitute for, 
more substantive economic interventions. If traditional 
economics suggests that we should have a larger price difference 
between sugar-free and sugared drinks, behavioral economics 
could suggest whether consumers would respond better to a 
subsidy on unsweetened drinks or a tax on sugary drinks. But 
that’s the most it can do. For all of its insights, behavioral 
economics alone is not a viable alternative to the kinds of far-
reaching policies we need to tackle our nation’s challenges. 
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something more than disclosure, and thus entails making it difficult or 
impossible for consumers to do what they “want.”  
The shrouding model we have relied on so heavily in this article 
offers several important insights for the application of behavioral 
economics to the regulation of consumer products and services more 
broadly.  Most significantly, it shows that behavioral “flaws” don’t just 
influence the consumer’s decision about what/how much to buy.  These 
flaws also shape the structure of competition between firms and the 
resultant market equilibrium.  An analysis that focuses only on consumers’ 
deviations from perfect rationality (or non-standard preferences) will miss 
important properties of this equilibrium.  Sadly, there is thus no short-cut 
from behavioral anomaly directly to policy recommendations: rather, as 
Justin Syndor’s homeowner’s insurance analysis also demonstrates, the 
behavioral anomalies have to be inserted into an overall model of market 
functioning to predict how policy can influence welfare.  
We have proposed a three step regulatory solution to the add-on 
insurance problem.  First, unless there is a compelling case that a 
significant group of consumers truly needs to purchase the add-on 
insurance product together with the underlying product or service, the sale 
of the insurance at the same time as the base product should be banned.  
Second, if there is a compelling case that a significant number of 
consumers truly need to purchase the insurance at the same time and place 
as the base product, then regulators should consider whether it is possible 
to create a transparent and competitive on-line market for the add-on 
insurance.  If so, then the sellers of the base product should be prohibited 
from selling the add-on insurance themselves and required to provide a web 
access point in their establishments or on their web pages that directs the 
consumers to the on-line market.  When a consumer purchases the add-on 
product at a store or from a product seller’s web link, the core product or 
service seller should receive a standard, state-regulated commission that 
will fairly compensate the seller for the cost of maintaining the terminal or 
the web link, without motivating the seller to push the add-on insurance.  
Finally, if the regulator is not persuaded that it is possible to create a 
transparent and competitive on-line market, then the regulator should set 
the prices for the add-on insurance. 
 
RECONCILING THE IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT IN 
INSURANCE SEVERABILITY OF INTERESTS CLAUSE 
INTERPRETATION  
 
JOHNNY PARKER* 
 
*** 
 
This article explores the inconsistency with which courts interpret 
severability of interest clauses in insurance policy exclusions.  The article 
explores the severability of interest clauses and discusses the rules that 
courts employ to interpret such clauses.  Specifically, the article outlines 
three methodologies of contract interpretation used by courts when faced 
with severability of interest clause controversies and each method’s 
strengths and weakness. The article concludes that behind the different 
interpretive methods lie two schools of thought amongst the courts, those 
who follow a “traditional or formalist” approach and those who follow a 
“functional or reasonable expectations” approach. 
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Typically, a policy of insurance affords coverage to multiple 
insureds – those being the named insured, as well as individuals considered 
to be insureds as a result of their relationship with the named insured.  
When one or more, but fewer than all, of the insureds being sued actually 
engaged in conduct excluded from coverage in the policy, a controversy 
can ensue as to whether an exclusion from coverage, which is clearly 
applicable to one insured, operates to preclude all insureds – including 
innocent co-insureds – from coverage under the policy.  This issue is 
further complicated by the inclusion in the policy of a severability of 
interests clause, which typically provides that the insurance applies 
separately to each insured.1 Innocent co-insureds may argue that such a 
                                                                                                                 
 *Professor of Law, Tulsa University Law School. B.A., University of 
Mississippi, 1982; J.D., University of Mississippi Law School, 1984; LL.M., 
Columbia University Law School, 1987.  
 1 The severability of interest clause was first included in insurance policies in 
1955, when the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual Rating 
Bureau revised the standard provisions and included the clause as a new condition. 
The provision was designed to correct prior judicial interpretations which 
construed the term “the insured” to preclude coverage to all insureds when any co-
insured was excluded from coverage in the policy. Subsequent revision of the 
language used in the severability of interest clause sought to express this purpose 
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severability of interests clause overrides any exclusion to coverage as 
applied individually to them.   
 In practical terms, a dispute over a severability of interests clause 
involves an innocent co-insured who is sued in conjunction with, and as a 
consequence of, a culpable insured’s conduct.  The insurance company, 
upon receipt of a notice of claim from the innocent co-insured, denies 
coverage under the policy on the basis that because the conduct of a 
culpable insured is expressly excluded, the claim of the innocent co-insured 
is similarly excluded from coverage.  The innocent co-insured takes the 
position that regardless of the excluded conduct of another insured, she is 
nevertheless entitled to coverage because of the presence of a severability 
of interests clause in the policy.    
 Severability clause disputes can arise from a myriad of factual 
situations.  For example, in Co-Operative Ins. Co. v. Bennett,2 Michael 
Jacques allegedly kidnapped his twelve-year-old niece, Brooke Bennett, 
and transported her to his home in Randolph, Vermont where he “drugged, 
sexually assaulted, and murdered her.”3 At that time, Michael was married 
to Denise Woodward, who lived with him in the Randolph house.  Denise 
was not involved in the kidnapping or subsequent events.  Nevertheless, 
Brooke’s estate and father sued Denise for having “negligently failed to: 
(1) supervise minor children while they were in the home, (2) warn the 
Bennett family of the dangers posed by her husband, and (3) prevent the 
harm from occurring.”4  
 Both Michael and Denise were named insureds on a homeowners’ 
policy issued by Cooperative Insurance Company (“Cooperative”).  Denise 
tendered the claim to Cooperative, which filed a declaratory judgment 
action against Denise and plaintiffs in the underlying tort action on the 
grounds that its homeowners’ policy excluded from coverage “bodily 
injury” or “property damage”: “(1) which is expected by, directed by, or 
intended by an ‘insured’; (2) that is the result of a criminal act of an 
‘insured’; or (3) that is the result of an intentional or malicious act by or at 
the direction of an ‘insured.’”5  The policy also provided that each insured 
“is a separate ‘insured,’ but this does not increase ‘our’ limit.”6    
 The issues in Cooperative were whether a severability clause 
creates an ambiguity when read together with an intentional acts exclusion 
and whether such ambiguity must be resolved in favor of coverage.  
                                                                                                                 
even more clearly.  Norman E. Risjord & June M. Austin, “Who Is ‘The Insured’” 
Revisited, 28 INS. COUNS. J. 100, 100–101 (1961). 
 2 No. 168-8-10 Oecv, 2011 Vt. Super. LEXIS 35 (Apr. 11, 2011), aff’d sum 
nom. Co-Operative Ins. Cos. v. Woodward, 2012 VT 22 (2012). 
 3 Co-Operative Ins. Cos., 2011 Vt. Super. LEXIS 35, at * 3. 
 4 Id. at *4. 
 5 Id. at *5. 
 6 Id. at *6. 
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Defendants—Denise Woodward, along with Brooke Bennett’s estate and 
father—argued that the severability clause created an expectation that the 
intentional acts exclusion would be applied separately to each insured and 
that this expectation created an ambiguity when compared with the 
language of the exclusion.   
 According to the court, a severability clause does not create an 
ambiguity in an otherwise clear and unambiguous exclusion for three 
reasons.  First, even though a severability clause may mean that the 
insurance policy applies separately to each insured, it does not change the 
fact that the policy contains an exclusion.7 Consequently, the severability 
clause “cannot create coverage where none exists.”8 In other words, “the 
act of applying the policy separately to each insured does not alter or create 
ambiguity in the substance or sweep of the exclusion.”9 Second, the 
majority of jurisdictions had adopted the view that “a severability clause 
does not alter the collective application of an exclusion for intentional, 
criminal, or fraudulent acts by ‘an’ or ‘any’ insured.”10 
 Co-Operative Ins. Co. v. Bennett represents one factual extreme - 
heinous harm to person - on the severability dispute spectrum.  The 
opposite end of the factual spectrum - juvenile vandalism to property - is 
illustrated by Chacon v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company.11  
Chacon arose out of the vandalism of an elementary school by the 
Chacons’ ten-year-old son Nicholas and another boy.12 The vandalism 
caused damage in excess of $6,000.13 The school district’s insurer paid for 
the damage and filed suit against the Chacons for reimbursement.14 Prior to 
this lawsuit, the Chacons filed a claim relating to the damage caused by 
Nicholas under their homeowners’ policy provided by American Family.15   
 The Chacons were the named insureds in the policy, which defined 
“insured” to include “your relatives if residents of your household. . . . [or] 
any other person under the age of 21 in your care or in the care of your 
resident relatives.”16 The policy further provided that “each person 
described above is a separate insured under this policy.”17 It also contained 
a severability clause, which stated “this insurance applies separately to each 
                                                                                                                 
 7 See id. at *17. 
 8 Co-Operative Ins. Cos., 2011 Vt. Super. LEXIS 35, at *17.  
 9 Id. at *19 (quoting SECURA Supreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M., 755 N.W.2d 320, 
329 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).  
 10 Id. at *17–18 (quoting Minkler v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 232 P.3d 612, 623 
(Cal. 2010)). 
 11 788 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1990). 
 12 Id. at 749.  
 13 Id.  
 14 Id.  
 15 Id.  
 16 Id. at 750.  
 17 Id. 
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insured.  This condition will not increase our limit of liability for any one 
occurrence.”18   
 The Chacons’ claim, since it resulted from the actions of their son, 
was within the scope of coverage provided by the policy.  Nicholas was 
also an additional insured under the policy as a minor in their care.  
American Family, however, argued that coverage was excluded by the 
intentional acts exclusion which provided that personal liability coverage 
does “not apply to bodily injury or property damage . . . which is expected 
or intended by any insured.”19   
 According to American Family, the exclusion clearly and 
unambiguously excluded coverage to all insureds when any individual 
insured caused property damage that was “expected or intended.”  The 
Chacons asserted that American Family’s position failed to give effect to 
the severability clause contained in the policy.  They argued that the clause 
created separate insured status for each insured, which required that the 
exclusion be applied independently to each.   
 Under the guise of ascertaining the intentions of the parties, the 
Court engaged in an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person 
would have understood the contract to mean.20  The purported advantage of 
this approach was that it considered and gave effect to all the policy 
provisions and recognized that an insurance policy is a contract between 
the parties, which should be enforced in a manner consistent with the 
intentions expressed therein.21  Pursuant to this reasoning, the Court 
concluded that an exclusion containing the term “any insured” clearly and 
unambiguously expressed an intent to deny coverage to all insureds when 
damage was intended or expected as a result of the actions of any one of 
them.22     
 Between these two factual extremes lie a myriad of cases involving 
every type of insurance policy and factual circumstances imaginable.  This 
article examines the impact of a severability of interests clause on 
insurance policy exclusions.  Its objective is to ascertain and explain the 
reasoning that makes this area of insurance law seemingly irreconcilable.  
Section I introduces the severability of interests clause.  It uses several 
factual situations to illustrate and provide a context for severability clause 
disputes.  Section II discusses the rules of insurance contract interpretation.  
It explores how these rules are employed in the context of severability 
clause disputes.  Section II demonstrates that in the context of severability 
disputes the rules of contract interpretation are applied in ways which 
support the recognition of several distinct interpretive methodologies.  
                                                                                                                 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See id. at 752. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id.  
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Section III discusses the interpretive methodologies from the perspective of 
two competing theories of contract interpretation.  Section III explains the 
strengths and weakness of the various methodologies in the context of these 
theories.  Section IV concludes that the severability of interests clause 
interpretative landscape has been shaped by two diametrically opposite 
judicial philosophies, the traditional approach and the functional approach.  
I argue that the perception that severability clause jurisprudence is 
irreconcilable is misplaced and that reconciliation in this subject area can 
be achieved by adherence to the functional or reasonable expectation 
approach to contract interpretation.           
 
II. SEVERABILITY CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
 
 Severability clause jurisprudence has evolved on a variety of 
fronts.  The first is the basic principles used by courts to interpret insurance 
contracts.  All courts agree that the primary objective of insurance policy 
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the 
parties.23  Except in cases of ambiguity, this process typically begins with 
the language of the policy.24  In this context, the words are to be accorded 
their plain and ordinary meaning and usage,25 as ascertained from a 
standard English dictionary.26  Where possible, an insurance policy should 
be interpreted in a manner which gives reasonable meaning to all of its 
provisions.27  Courts, in ascertaining the intention of the parties, are at 
liberty to consider the intent and purpose of both the exclusion and 
                                                                                                                 
 23 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hooks, 853 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2006); T.B. v. Dobson, 868 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); American 
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d 108, 111 (Iowa 2005); Brumley v. 
Lee, 963 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Kan. 1998); K.M.R. v. Foremost Ins. Grp., 171 S.W.3d 
751, 753 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bierman, 292 A.2d 
674, 677 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972); Travelers Ins. Co. v. American Cas. Co. of 
Reading, Pa., 441 P.2d 177, 180 (Mont. 1968); Erdo v. Torcon Constr. Co., 645 
A.2d 806, 808 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 1994); Madison Constr Co. v. 
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999). 
 24 See Chacon, 788 P.2d at 750; Hooks, 853 N.E.2d at 5; K.M.R. v. Foremost 
Ins. Grp., 171 S.W.3d 751, 753 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); Erdo, 645 A.2d 806 at 808.   
 25 See Essex Ins. Co. v. City of Bakersfield, 154 Cal. App. 4th 696, 7 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007); Farmland Indus. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Mo. 
1997). 
 26 See Farmland Indus, 941 S.W.2d at 508; R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental 
Cas. Co., 870 A.2d 1048, 1059 (Conn. 2005). 
 27 See Cicciarella v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 1995); 
Amer. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. White, 65 P.3d 449, 454 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); 
Valero v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass’n, Inc., 59 So.3d 1166, 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App.2011); Hooks, 853 N.E.2d at 5; Dobson, 868 N.E.2d at 836; Benton v. Canal 
Ins. Co., 130 So.2d 840, 846 (Miss. 1961).   
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severability clause in the context of the type of policy at issue.  
Furthermore, in cases of first impression, courts may also be guided in their 
reasoning by precedents from other jurisdictions.   
 When an insurer proffers a policy exclusion as a basis for denying 
coverage, it asserts an affirmative defense for which it has the burden of 
proof.28  To prevail, the insurer must prove that the language of the 
insurance policy is clear and unambiguous.29  Otherwise, the provision 
should be construed in favor of coverage.30     
 Application of these rules in the context of severability clause 
disputes has resulted in three distinct interpretive methods.  These 
interpretive methods share only one common thread.  That being that each, 
in drastically different ways, purports to enforce the intention of the parties 
to the contract in the context of exclusions couched in terms of “an 
insured” or “any insured.”  The differences between the interpretative 
methodologies are reflected in whether the terms “an insured” and “any 
insured” are viewed as synonymous or distinct and whether the presence of 
a severability clause modifies or creates an ambiguity in the exclusion.     
 While the insurance industry’s preference has been to refer to 
excluded conduct from the perspective of “an” or “any” insured, some 
insurance companies use different and more specific language to describe 
what is excluded from coverage.  For example, in Ristine v. Hartford 
Insurance Co., Barbara Ristine and her minor daughter, L., sued David and 
Carol Purcell, alleging that David had sexually molested L. on repeated 
occasions while she spent the night at their home. 31   The complaint alleged 
that Carol was negligent in failing to disclose to the plaintiffs that David 
was a convicted child molester and in allowing him to be alone with L.32 
 The Purcells notified their homeowners’ insurance carrier – The 
Hartford – of the claim and requested a defense.  The Hartford refused the 
tender on the basis of a policy exclusion excepting from bodily injury or 
property coverage any claims “[a]rising out of sexual molestation, corporal 
punishment or physical or mental abuse.”33  The Ristines ultimately settled 
                                                                                                                 
 28 See First Specialty Ins. Corp., Inc. v. Flowers, 644 S.E.2d 453, 455 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2007); Lucas v. Deville, 385 So.2d 804, 819 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Thommes 
v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 155, 880 (Minn. 2001); Flomerfelt v. 
Cardiello, 997 A.2d 991, 1004 (N.J. 2010); Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville 
Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Purdy, 483 N.W.2d 197, 199 (S.D. 1992).  
 29 See Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 
(Pa. 1999); Cicciarella, 66 F.3d at 767 (proposing that language is ambiguous 
when its meaning is uncertain and doubtful or when it is reasonably susceptible of 
more than one meaning).  
 30 See Cicciarella, 66 F.3d at 768. 
 31 97 P. 3d 1206, 1207 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).  
 32 Id.  
 33 Id.  
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their lawsuit against Carol Purcell.  As a part of the settlement, Carol 
assigned to them her rights against The Hartford. 
 The Hartford asserted that the exclusion was unambiguous and that 
when compared to other exclusions, in policies using the terms “an 
insured” or “the insured,” the language in the policy manifested an intent to 
exclude all claims arising out of sexual molestation, regardless of who 
committed the acts.34 In other words, the exclusion was specifically 
designed to identify and exclude a particular act, as contrasted with 
exclusions that identify and exclude on the basis of the actor by using terms 
such as – “the insured,” “an insured” or “any insured.”  Therefore, all 
claims arising out of the specified act – sexual molestation – were 
precluded, without regards to the identity of the actor.  
 The court agreed with the Hartford that the absence of terminology 
– such as “the insured,” “an insured,” or “any insured” – identifying an 
actor demonstrated that the insurer intended to base the exclusion on the 
nature of the act, rather than on the identity of the actor.35  Consequently, 
even though the severability clause made the provisions of the policy 
separately applicable to David and Carol, it did not affect the sexual 
molestation exclusion because it contained no qualifications relative to the 
identity of the actor.36     
 The impact of a severability clause on an exclusion depends on the 
interpretive methodology used by the court.  For example, in some 
jurisdictions the terms “an insured” and “any insured” are viewed as 
synonymous and are not modified by the presence of a severability clause.  
Thus, all insureds are precluded from coverage because of the excluded 
conduct of any one insured. I will refer to this as “Methodology No. 1.” 
However, in other jurisdictions which also treat the terms as synonymous, 
the principle of ambiguity is applied to achieve coverage in light of the 
inclusion of a severability clause. This approach will be referred to as 
“Methodology No. 2.” A number of jurisdictions reject the conclusion that 
the terms “an insured” and “any insured” are synonymous when used in an 
exclusion.  Some jurisdictions that follow this view consider the former 
phrase to be modified by a severability clause while the latter is not 
(“Methodology No. 3a”).  Others reach the same result by construing the 
phrase “an insured” as ambiguous when read in conjunction with a 
severability clause while “any insured” is unaffected (“Methodology No. 
3b”).    
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 34 Id. at 1209.  
 35 See id.  
 36 Id.  
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A. METHODOLOGY NO. 1 
 
 Under this methodology, courts construe an insurance policy 
exclusion that is couched in the words “an insured” or “any insured” to 
apply to all the insureds and additionally hold that a severability clause has 
no impact on that exclusion.  This conclusion results when courts accord 
greater weight to the precise language – “an insured” or “any insured” – of 
the exclusion.37  Courts following this approach sometimes rule that an 
absurd or repugnant interpretation should not result from construing the 
policy to give effect to the severability clause.38  Under this line of 
thinking, an absurd or repugnant result would occur when the application 
of the severability clause would convert the policy purchased into a 
different type which the insured neither negotiated nor paid for or would 
otherwise enlarge the obligation originally undertaken by the insurer and 
permit a windfall to the insured.39   
 The dominant rationale for this approach is that the purpose of the 
severability clause is to spread protection to the limits of coverage, among 
all insureds, not to negate bargained-for exclusions.40 Consequently, a 
collective effect, pursuant to which the excluded act of one insured 
precludes coverage for all, is accorded the exclusion if it is “specific” or 
imposes a joint obligation on the insureds.41  Some courts construe the use 
of the terms “an insured” or “any insured” as unambiguously creating a 
                                                                                                                 
 37 See, e.g., Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 687 A.2d 642, 644 (Me. 1997); 
K.M.R. v. Foremost Ins. Grp., 171 S.W.3d 751 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); Nat’l Ins. 
Underwriters v. Lexington Flying Club, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 490 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto., 522 S.W.2d 184 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1975); Gorzen v. Westfield Ins. Co., 526 N.W.2d 43 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Home 
Owners Ins. Co. v. Selfridge, No. 280112, LEXIS 2504 (Mich. Ct. App. December 
18, 2008), McAllister v. Millville Mut. Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1283 (Pa. Super. 1994): 
Caroff v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 261 P.3d 159, 163 (Wash.App. Div. 
11999); Co-Operative Ins. Cos. v. Bennett, No. 168-8-10 Oecv, April 11, 2011 Vt. 
Super. LEXIS 35. 
 38 See Oaks v. Dupuy, 653 So.2d 165 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Shelter Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Haller, 793 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); B.P. Am., Inc. v. State Auto. 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 148 P.3d 832 (Okla. 2005); Transit Cas. Co. v. Hartman’s 
Inc., 239 S.E.2d 894 (Va. 1978). 
 39 See B.P. Am., Inc. 148 P.3d at 837–39; Transit Cas. Co. 239 S.E.2d at 897. 
 40 See Northwest G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard, 518 N.W.2d 179 (N.D. 1994); 
Caroff v. Farmers Ins. Co., 261 P.3d 159 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1999).  
 41 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (D. Haw. 2010); Villa v. 
Short, 947 A.2d 1217 (N.J. 2008); Northwest G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard, 518 
N.W.2d 179 (N.D. 1994); McAllister v. Millville Mut. Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1283 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Roemmich, 291 N.W.2d 772 (S.D. 
1980); Caroff v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 261 P.3d 159 (Wash.App. Div. 1 
1999). 
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specific exclusion imposing a joint obligation.42  Apart from this rule, 
courts otherwise have not articulated what makes an exclusion “specific” as 
opposed to “general.”   
 This interpretive model was employed in the often cited case of BP 
Am., Inc. v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Company.  BP involved a 
construction contract between B.P. America, Inc. (“BP”) and Doyal W. 
Rowland Construction, Inc. (“Rowland”).  As required under a construction 
contract, BP obtained $1,000,000 in comprehensive general liability 
coverage from State Auto and Casualty Company (“Insurer”).  Insurer 
issued two policies, listing Rowland as the named insured and BP as an 
additional insured.  The first policy covered general liability and the second 
covered automotive liability.  While the policies were in force, a multi-car 
accident occurred involving a dump truck driven by a Rowland employee.  
Three people died and a fourth sustained serious injuries.  Multiple lawsuits 
were filed.  In different combinations, the suits named as defendants the 
employee, Rowland, BP, and/or Insurer.  The personal injury lawsuits 
settled with Insurer contributing $1,000,000 pursuant to the automotive 
liability policy.  Thereafter, BP filed suit in federal court seeking recovery 
under the general liability policy.  Recognizing that the lawsuit involved 
issues of first impression, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Oklahoma certified two questions to the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court: 
 
1.  “[w]hether, under Oklahoma Law, the term ‘any 
insured’ in an ‘Auto Exclusion’ clause of a commercial 
general liability policy excludes from coverage all 
automobile occurrences attributable to any of the 
insureds?” [and] 
2.  “[w]hether, under Oklahoma Law, the inclusion of both 
an ‘Auto Exclusion’ clause and a ‘separation of insureds’ 
clause in a commercial general liability policy creates an 
ambiguity in the contract?”43 
 
 The Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative.  
Influenced by the “overwhelming number of courts” which had addressed 
the issue, the Court concluded that the use of the term “any insured” in an 
exclusion unambiguously expressed a definite intent to deny coverage to all 
insureds.44  According to the Court, insurers are not required to provide 
coverage in the absence of premium payments – as was the case – except 
                                                                                                                 
 42 See Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1301; Villa, 947 A.2d 1217; 
Northwest G.F. Mut. Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 179; McAllister, 640 A.2d 1283; Great 
Cent. Ins. Co., 291 N.W.2d 772; Caroff, 261 P.3d 159 
 43 B.P. Am., Inc., 148 P.3d at 833. 
 44 Id. at 836. 
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where public policy demands.45  Furthermore, a contrary interpretation 
would “convert a general liability policy—without [automotive] 
coverage—into an automotive liability policy.”46  The Court further found 
support for its answer to question one in Oklahoma precedents which 
construed the phrase “an insured,” as used in an exclusion, to preclude 
coverage to all insureds.47  In the process, the Court read “an insured” and 
“any insured” as synonymous. 
 With respect to the second issue, the insureds argued that, even if 
the exclusion was clear when read in isolation, the presence of a 
severability clause in the commercial policy created an ambiguity.  That 
clause provided: 
 
Except with respect to the Limits of Insurance, and any 
rights or duties specifically assigned in this Coverage Part 
to the first Named Insured, this insurance applies: 
a.  As if each Named Insured were the only Named 
Insured; and 
b.  Separately as to each insured against whom claim is 
made or ‘suit’ is brought.48 
 
Insurer contended, however, that to ignore the term “any insured” in the 
exclusion would be to render an otherwise unambiguous policy provision 
meaningless.   
 The Court reasoned that the clear intent of the parties was to 
preclude coverage for all insureds whenever an exclusion was applicable to 
“any insured.”  This intent was reflected not only in the exclusion’s use of 
the phrase “any insured,” but also by the fact that the parties negotiated for 
two different policies providing distinct coverages.49   
 Courts which rely on this interpretive method to conclude that a 
severability clause has no impact on the collective effect of an exclusion 
employing the phrase “an insured” or “any insured” typically view the 
phrases as synonymous.50  The phrases are viewed as manifesting the intent 
of the parties to make coverage for all insureds contingent on the actions of 
                                                                                                                 
 45 Id. at 837–38. 
 46 Id. at 839. 
 47 See Phillips v. Estate of Greenfield, 859 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla. 1993) 
(explaining a homeowner’s policy in clear and unambiguous language excludes 
coverage where an injury arises out of the use of a motor vehicle owned or 
operated by an insured). 
 48 B.P. Am., Inc., 148 P.3d at 839. 
 49 Id.  
 50 Villa v. Short, 947 A.2d 1217, 1223 (N.J. 2008); B.P. Am. Inc., 148 P.3d at 
839; McAllister v. Millville Mut. Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1283, 1288 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1994). 
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any one insured.51   These courts also overwhelmingly reject the argument 
that the language of the severability clause – “this insurance applies. . . 
[s]eparately as to each insured against whom claim was made”—creates an 
ambiguity when read in conjunction with exclusions employing either 
phrase.   
 Rejection of the ambiguity argument is typically based on one or a 
combination of two rationales.  The first is that the severability clause is 
located in a different part of the policy from exclusions.52  Consequently, 
the insured’s sole expectation is for equal coverage.53  The second rationale 
is that the use of the indefinite article “an” or “any” before insured in an 
exclusion clearly signals that the parties understood and intended that the 
exclusion would be applied collectively to bar all insureds from coverage.54 
 This interpretive method while not novel, is misguided because it 
ignores the reality that ambiguity in an insurance policy can arise from 
sources other than ambiguous language, such as inconsistent policy 
provisions, poor policy organization and inconsistent judicial 
interpretation.55  It is also predicated on a legal fiction that a single rule of 
insurance contract interpretation – language used in a single provision – is 
dispositive of the intention of the parties.  The focus of this line of 
reasoning is not whether the inclusion of a severability clause is 
inconsistent with a blanket exclusion, but “whether the contract indicates 
that the parties intended such a result.”56 The latter formulation allows 
courts to ignore the language and fundamental purpose of the severability 
clause.  This method is strict in its reliance on a single consideration – 
language of the exclusion – and harsh in that it places the entire risk of loss 
on the insured.  The most glaring flaw however, is that it provides no 
incentives for insurance companies to engage in better policy drafting.       
 
B. METHODOLOGY NO. 2 
 
 The second interpretive method stands in stark contradiction to the 
first.  It holds that while the terms “an insured” or “any insured” are 
synonymous, the presence of a severability clause in the policy renders the 
exclusion ambiguous.  This ambiguity derives from the conclusion that the 
                                                                                                                 
 51 See, e.g., Caroff v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 261 P.3d 159, 161 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1999). 
 52 See, e.g., Villa, 947 A.2d at 1224. 
 53 Id. at 1225. 
 54 Id. at 1223. 
 55 See Johnny Parker, The Wacky World of Collision and Comprehensive 
Coverages: Intentional Injury and Illegal Activity Exclusions, 79 NEB. L. REV. 75, 
101–06 (2000) (stating that ambiguity can arise from inconsistent policy 
provisions, policy organizations, or ambiguous language). 
 56 Chacon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 752 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 
1990). 
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language of the severability clause creates a reasonable expectation that 
each insured will be separately covered, while the exclusion purports to 
preclude coverage for all as a result of the excluded act of one.  This 
approach gives meaning and effect to both the severability clause and the 
exclusion because the culpable insured is excluded from coverage while the 
innocent co-insured’s right to a defense and indemnification is determined 
separately.     
 This interpretive model views an exclusion and a severability 
clause as competing provisions.  Where such is the case, the exclusion and 
the severability clause should be construed to require that the exclusion be 
applied only against culpable insureds for whom coverage is sought.57  In 
other words, the clear language of a severability clause dictates that 
“coverage as to each insured must be determined separately based on the 
facts applicable to each such insured.”58   
 Under this approach, because a severability clause renders a policy 
exclusion ambiguous,59 the term used in the exclusion does not alter this 
consequence.  As observed in Brumley v. Lee:  
 
The words “an” and “any” are inherently indefinite and 
ambiguous.  The two words can and often do have the 
same meaning.  The Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language 68 (1973) gives many definitions for the 
word “any.”  The first definition listed is “one, a, an, or 
some.”  Correspondingly, the Random House Dictionary 
includes the word “any” among its definitions for the word 
“a” or “an.”  Hence, the words may have the same 
meaning.  Thus, the word “any” is not materially different 
from the word “a” or “an,” and, contrary to the district 
court’s ruling, Safeco’s use of “any” instead of “an” in its 
policy does not eliminate the ambiguity created by the 
policy’s severability clause.60  
 
According to this interpretive model, this rule applies without regard to the 
type of policy, exclusion or language used therein.61          
 A severability clause, therefore, requires that the policy exclusions 
be interpreted with respect to the facts and circumstances specific to the 
                                                                                                                 
 57 See, e.g., Brumley v. Lee, 963 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Kan. 1998); Am. Nat’l Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Estate of Fournelle, 472 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Minn. 1991). 
 58 Rose Constr. Co. Inc. v. Gravatt, 642 P.2d 569, 571 (Kan. 1982). 
 59 Brumley, 963 P.2d at 1228. 
 60 Id. at 1227–28. 
 61 See, e.g., Rose Constr. Co., 642 P.2d 569 (noting that a severability clause 
modified an exclusion in an automobile policy using the term “an insured”). 
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individual insured seeking coverage.62  For example, in American National 
Fire Insurance Co. v. Fournelle, the Court entertained the issue of whether 
a household exclusion in a homeowners’ insurance policy containing a 
severability clause excluded coverage where the named insured killed his 
two children.63 
 In Fournelle, Robert Fournelle and his wife, Joanne Fournelle, 
separated on January 16, 1985. Robert left the marital residence, while 
Joanne Fournelle remained in the house with the couple’s two sons.  After 
filing for divorce on January 25, 1985, she received temporary custody of 
the children and temporary possession of the house.  Thereafter, Robert 
lived separate and apart from Joanne and the children. 
 On March 3, 1985, Robert arrived at the marital residence to visit 
his sons.  He shot and killed the boys, vandalized the house, and then 
committed suicide.  Joanne filed a wrongful death   lawsuit against 
Robert’s estate.  The estate tendered the defense of the suit to American 
National pursuant to the Fournelles’ homeowners’ policy on the marital 
residence. 
 The American National homeowners’ policy listed both Robert and 
Joanne as named insureds.  The deceased children were not named 
insureds.  The policy’s household exclusion provided that coverage “does 
not apply to: f. bodily injury to you and any insured within the meaning of 
part a. or b. of Definition 3.”64  Throughout the policy the terms “you” and 
“your” referred to the named insureds – here, Robert and Joanne.  
Definition 3, parts a. and b. stated that: “3. ‘insured’ means you and the 
following residents of your household: a. your relatives; b. any other person 
under the age of 21 who is in the care of any person named above.”65  The 
policy also contained a severability clause. 
 American National argued that the severability clause was 
immaterial because the exclusion, by its expressed language, applied to 
“any insured.”  Therefore, since the children resided with Joanne – an 
insured – at the time of their death, they qualified as insureds under the 
policy as “person[s] under the age of 21 . . . in the care of [a named 
insured].”  The estate countered that the severability clause required that 
the exclusion be read solely in reference to Robert because he was the only 
                                                                                                                 
 62 Compare Secura Supreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M., 755 N.W.2d 320, 324–25 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a juvenile’s attack on a neighbor fell within 
the meaning of “criminal acts” as used in the policy exclusion regardless of the 
juvenile’s intent), with Slavens v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., No. C7-00-1070, 2001 
Minn. App. LEXIS 94, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2001) (finding that an the 
intent of the policy was “to exclude coverage when someone who qualifies as ‘an 
insured’ under the policy commits an act of sexual molestation – regardless of 
whether that person is involved in the day care business”). 
 63 472 N.W.2d 292, 293 (Minn. 1991). 
 64 Id.  
  65 Id. 
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insured seeking coverage under the policy.   
 According to the Court, American National’s position was 
inconsistent with both the policy language and the doctrine of severability.  
Finding the policy’s language ambiguous,66 the Court observed that: 
 
Severability is a widely recognized doctrine that 
acknowledges the separate and distinct obligations the 
insurer undertakes to the various insureds, named and 
unnamed.  The intent of a severability clause is to provide 
each insured with separate coverage, as if each were 
separately insured with a distinct policy, subject to the 
liability limits of the policy.  Thus, severability demands 
that policy exclusions be construed only with reference to 
the particular insured seeking coverage.67    
  
 The Court surmised that the insurer must have inserted the 
severability clause in the policy for some purpose.  Furthermore, a 
reasonable interpretation of the words “this insurance applies separately to 
each insured” leads to but one conclusion: that each insured must be treated 
as if he or she was insured separately, applying exclusions individually as 
to the insured for whom coverage is sought.68  “There would be no point to 
a severability clause if it did not provide separately to each named 
insured.”69 Any other conclusion would render the severability clause 
meaningless.70 
 This methodology was also employed by the court in Hilmer v. 
White.71  In Hilmer, Benjamin White, then seventeen-years-old, pled guilty 
to the attempted murder of Casey Hilmer.  Benjamin had grabbed the 
thirteen-year-old Casey while she was jogging, dragged her into the woods, 
and stabbed her repeatedly in the side and neck. 
 Casey and her parents sued Benjamin as well as his parents, Lance 
and Diane White.  In the civil suit, the Hilmers claimed that Lance and 
Diane had been negligent in that they failed to properly supervise their son 
and entrusted him with a dangerous instrument.  The jury returned a verdict 
for compensatory damages in the amount of $6.5 million.  The jury further 
determined that Lance and Diane were responsible for seventy percent of 
that amount. 
 At the time of the attack, the Whites had two homeowners’ 
                                                                                                                 
 66 Id. at 294. 
 67 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 68 Id. at 294. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 No. C-070074, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6288 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 
2007). 
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insurance policies and two umbrella policies.  One of the homeowners’ 
policies was issued by defendant – appellee Federal Insurance Company 
(“Federal”).  One of the umbrella policies was issued by defendant – 
appellee Pacific Indemnity Company (“Pacific”).  The remaining policies 
were issued by plaintiff – appellant Safeco Insurance Company (“Safeco”).  
 Shortly after the Hilmers filed their lawsuit, Safeco filed a 
declaratory judgment action claiming that it owed no duty to defend or 
indemnify the Whites.  Safeco also requested that the trial court determine 
the priority of coverage between the two policies that it had issued and the 
two issued by Federal and Pacific.  The trial court concluded that the 
intentional tort exclusions in the Safeco policies were ambiguous because 
of the severability clause present in each policy.  The court also held that 
Safeco owed coverage on a pro-rata basis with the other two insurance 
companies.  Safeco appealed. 
 Lance and Diane White were named insureds in the Safeco 
homeowners’ policy.  The term “insured” also included relatives who 
resided in the household.  The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury 
“which is expected or intended by an insured or which is the reasonably 
foreseeable result of an act or omission intended by an insured.”72  Bodily 
injury “arising out of an illegal act committed by or at the direction of an 
insured” was also excluded.73   
 Safeco’s umbrella policy named Lance White as an insured.  As in 
the homeowners’ policy, the term “insured” included any member of the 
household.74  It excluded from coverage “any injury caused by a violation 
of penal law or ordinance committed by or with the knowledge or consent 
of any insured”75 as well as “any act or damage which is expected or 
intended by any insured, or which is the foreseeable result of an act or 
omission intended by any insured . . . .”76  Both the homeowners’ policy 
and the umbrella policy contained a severability provision stating that 
“[t]his insurance applies separately to each insured . . . .”77  The appellate 
court affirmed the trial court and concluded that Safeco’s use of the terms 
“an insured” and “any insured” in its homeowners’ and umbrella policies, 
respectively, caused the exclusions to be ambiguous when read in 
conjunction with the severability clause found in each.78     
                                                                                                                 
 72 Id. at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73 Id. 
74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
76 Id. at *8–9. 
 77 Id. at *9.  
 78 Id. at *11–12; see also Ill. Union Ins. Co. v. Shefchuk, 108 Fed. App’x 294 
(6th Cir. 2002). The court’s conclusion in Hilmer has not, however, been 
consistently followed by other lower courts in Ohio. See United Ohio Ins. Co. v. 
Metzger, No. 12-98-1, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 920 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1999). 
Interestingly, the Ohio Supreme Court has refused to resolve the conflict that exists 
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 This interpretive method is predicated on the maxims that an 
insurance policy must be read as a whole and, that ambiguity in an 
insurance contract can arise from inconsistent policy provisions79 as was 
the case in Fournelle and Hilmer, or from ambiguous language as in 
Brumley.  As demonstrated by Hilmer, the determination that an ambiguity 
exists as a consequence of inconsistent policy provisions requires little 
more than an examination of the entire policy and application of the rule of 
contra proferentem.  That is, ambiguity will be construed against the 
drafter and in favor of coverage. 
 
C.  METHODOLOGY NO. 3 
 
 This interpretive method is the most complex and perplexing of 
any used to resolve severability clause disputes.  While the focus of the 
inquiry remains the intention of the parties, courts using this approach do 
not treat “an” or “any” as synonymous.  Consequently, these courts reach a 
different result regarding the effect of a severability clause depending on 
whether an exclusion refers to the conduct of “an” or “any” insured.80     
 
1. Methodology No. 3a 
 
 In light of a policy’s severability clause, exclusions referring to the 
conduct of “an” insured have been distinguished from those using the 
phrase “any” insured and construed to apply separately to each insured 
such that one insured’s excluded activity does not preclude coverage for 
other insureds who did not participate in the excluded activity.81   For 
example, in United Services Automotive Association v. DeValencia,82 an 
Arizona appellate court found itself confronted with determining a 
                                                                                                                 
among the state appellate courts regarding the issue of whether a severability 
clause renders an exclusion using the term “an insured” ambiguous. See Safeco 
Ins. Co. of Am. v. White, 913 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio 2009). 
 79 See Parker, supra note 55. 
 80 Compare Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Nemetz, 400 N.W.2d 33, 38 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1986) (concluding that the “contract [was] ambiguous because the severability 
clause create[d] a reasonable expectation that each insured’s interests [were] 
separately covered, while the exclusion clause attempt[ed] to exclude coverage for 
both cause by the act of [an insured]), with Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 505 N.W.2d 
418, 422 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that “the term ‘any insured’ unambiguously 
precludes coverage to all persons covered by the policy if any one of them engages 
in excludable conduct”), and Nationwide Mut. v. Mazur, CV 980489231S, 1999 
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1533 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 3, 1999) (finding that a “policy’s 
specific use of the words, ‘each’ and ‘an,’ as opposed to the determiner ‘any,’ 
demonstrates an intent to provide coverage to the insureds separately”). 
 81 See, e.g., Litz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 695 A.2d 566 (Md. 1997). 
 82 949 P.2d 525 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). 
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severability clause’s effect on an exclusion from the perspective of a novel 
factual situation.  Therein, Dennis and Debra Gerow provided day care in 
their home to three minor children of the appellants, the DeValencias.  
After discovering that their children had been molested by the Gerow’s 
fourteen-year-old son CG, the DeValencias asserted negligent supervision 
and breach of contract claims against the Gerows.  
 The Gerows’ homeowners’ insurer – USAA – filed an action for 
declaratory judgment in response to the DeValencias’ lawsuit, asserting 
that its policy did not cover their claim.  The trial court granted USAA’s 
motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was no coverage 
under the policy because the business pursuit exclusion precluded liability 
coverage for acts and omissions “arising out of or in connection with a 
business engaged in by an insured.”83  The parties agreed that this 
exclusion was applicable to CG’s parents – the Gerows.  The DeValencias, 
however, argued that it was not applicable to CG because of the policy’s 
severability clause, which provided “[t]his insurance applies separately to 
each insured.  This condition will not increase our limit of liability for any 
one occurrence.”84   
 The court concluded that because the exclusion referred to the acts 
of “an insured,” applicability of the exclusion should be determined 
separately as to each insured.  Thus, “to bring CG’s acts within the business 
pursuit exclusion, USAA was obliged to show that he was individually 
engaged in a business pursuit when he committed the alleged acts.”85   
 The court’s reasoning and holding in DeValencia were 
subsequently clarified in Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. White.86  Therein, 
Travis Wilde hit Bryan White in the head with a metal pipe.  Travis pled 
guilty to aggravated assault.  White later sued Travis and his parents (“the 
Wildes”), who filed a claim with their insurance carrier, American Family.  
American Family filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that all the 
claims by all insureds were precluded under the “violation of law” 
exclusion contained in the Wildes’ homeowners’ policy:  “Violation of 
Law.  We will not cover bodily injury or property damage arising out of . . . 
violation of any criminal law for which any insured is convicted . . . .”87  
 According to the Wildes, because American Family’s policy 
contained a severability of insurance clause identical to that in DeValencia, 
DeValencia was controlling, and the applicability of the exclusion had to 
be determined separately as to each insured.  Therefore, because only 
                                                                                                                 
 83 Id. at 527 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 65 P.3d 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
 87 Id. at 452. The policy also contained an “Intentional Injury” exclusion, 
which like the violation of law exclusion, used the term “any insured.” Id. at 453 
n.2. 
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Travis was convicted of violating a criminal law, the claims against them 
remained covered under the policy.88 
 The court rejected this argument and distinguished the 
exclusionary clause in DeValencia from that in the American Family policy 
purchased by the Wildes.  “The exclusionary clause in DeValencia applied 
to ‘acts or omissions ‘arising out of or in connection with a business 
engaged in by an insured.’”89  The exclusion at issue in the case at hand 
applied to “violation of any criminal law for which any insured is 
convicted.”90  While the parties agreed that “any” meant no more than “an,” 
the court, which viewed the matter as a question of law, drew its own 
conclusion.  Deferring to the majority view, it concluded that the phrase 
“any insured” in an applicable exclusion operates as a bar to coverage for 
any claim of any insured, even if the policy contains a severability clause.91 
 DeValencia and White indirectly or implicitly held that the terms 
“an insured” or “any insured” when used in an exclusion are neither 
synonymous nor affected similarly by the presence of a severability clause 
in the policy.  However, in Nationwide Mut. v. Mazur,92 these questions 
were addressed head on.  In Mazur, Michael Mazur, a minor, lured Andrew 
Christmas to a remote area where he assaulted and struck him with such 
force as to render Andrew unconscious.  Michael then proceeded to punch 
and kick Andrew in the head while he lay helpless and unconscious on the 
ground.  Andrew and his father filed suit against Michael and his mother—
Judy Mazur – seeking to recover damages for injuries incurred by Andrew 
as a result of the assault.   
 Judy filed a claim under her homeowners’ policy provided by 
Nationwide Mutual (“Nationwide”).  Nationwide denied the claim, 
asserting that it had no duty to defend or indemnify either Michael or Judy 
because Michael’s acts were intentional and expressly excluded in the 
policy.  The relevant exclusion provided in part: “Coverage E Personal 
Liability . . . [does] not apply to bodily injury . . . . a. caused intentionally 
by or at the direction of an insured, including willful acts the result of 
which the insured knows or ought to know will follow from the insured’s 
conduct.”93   Judy contended that because the policy included a severability 
clause, she, as a separate insured under the policy, was entitled to coverage 
even if coverage was excluded for Michael. 
 The court agreed.  It construed the inclusion of the severability 
                                                                                                                 
 88 Id. at 456. 
 89 Id. (quoting United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. DeValencia, 949 P.2d 525, 527 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)). 
 90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 CV 980489231S, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1533 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 3, 
1999). 
 93 Id. at *25–26. 
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provision in the policy as recognition on the part of Nationwide that it 
owed Judy a distinct and separate coverage obligation aside and apart from 
any obligations it owed Michael.  Consequently, whether Michael’s 
conduct was excluded under the policy had no effect on Judy’s entitlement 
to coverage.   
 Nationwide also argued that the term “an insured” was 
synonymous with “any insured” in the intentional acts exclusion.94  The 
court rejected this assertion and concluded, that the policy’s use of the term 
“each” in the severability clause and “an” in the exclusion demonstrated an 
intent to provide coverage to the insureds separately.  Where the terms “an” 
or “any” are viewed as distinct, the latter term is often construed to 
unambiguously deny coverage to all insureds as the result of excluded 
conduct by any of the persons insured by the policy.95  The presence of a 
severability clause generally does not change this result.    
 In this method, the intent and purpose of the severability clause, 
which is to limit the scope of the exclusion to the insured seeking coverage, 
is construed in light of the language – “an insured” – as used in an 
exclusion.  Where the phrase “an insured” is construed as being modified 
by a severability clause, a narrow construction of the exclusion is implied 
from the presence of the severability clause in the policy.  This means that 
coverage consists of “what . . . the insured expected to receive and what the 
insurer agreed to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy . . . 
.”96  This approach does not assume that an exclusion is per se ambiguous 
merely because the policy contains a severability clause.97  Rather, the 
exclusion is applied to each insured individually for purposes of 
determining whether there is coverage.  The end result is that both the 
severability clause and the exclusion are given effect.98  The opposite result 
occurs where the phrase “any insured” is used.   
                                                                                                                 
 94 Id. at *27. 
 95 See Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 505 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); 
White, 65 P.3d 449; Chacon v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748 (Colo. 
1990); Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 2005); Am. 
Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Copeland–Williams, 941 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); 
Oaks v. Dupuy, 653 So. 2d 165 (La. Ct. App. 1995); but see, Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Bower, 752 F. Supp. 2d 957, 971 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (explaining a severability 
clause renders an exclusion referring to the conduct of any insured ambiguous); W. 
Am. Ins. Co. v. AV&S, 145 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining a severability 
clause renders an exclusion referring to the conduct of any insured ambiguous); 
Worcester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marnell, 496 N.E.2d 158 (Mass. 1986); Premier Ins. 
Co. v. Adams, 632 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (noting the term “any 
insured” modified by the presence of a severability clause). 
 96 See Covenant Ins. Co. v. Sloat, No. 385786, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
1557, at *20 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 23, 2003). 
 97 See Mazur, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1533, at *26–27. 
 98 Sloat, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1557, at *34–37. 
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2. Methodology No. 3b 
 
 This methodology is a variant of the one just discussed.  It differs 
only in its reliance on the principle of ambiguity to achieve coverage.  It is 
discussed separately for two reasons.  First, only a couple of state Supreme 
Courts have used the principle of ambiguity to determine the impact of a 
severability clause on an exclusion referring to the conduct of “an insured” 
distinct from “any insured.”  Second, it further demonstrates the general 
negative treatment that the phrase “an insured,” when divorced from “any 
insured,” has received throughout severability of interests clause 
interpretation.99  The California Supreme Court’s Minkler v. Safeco Ins. Co. 
100 decision is the most prominent example of this methodology.  It 
illustrates both propositions.  
 In Minkler, the California Supreme Court agreed to answer a 
question of California insurance law directed to it by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The question asked was “[w]here a 
contract of liability insurance covering multiple insureds contains a 
severability-of-interest clause . . . , does an exclusion barring coverage for 
injuries arising out of the intentional acts of ‘an insured’ bar coverage for 
claims that one insured negligently failed to prevent the intentional acts of 
another insured?”101  Minkler involved a lawsuit filed by Scott Minkler 
against David Schwartz and his mother Betty Schwartz.  Scott alleged that 
David, an adult, had sexually molested him when he was a minor.  Some of 
these acts allegedly occurred in Betty’s home and as a result of her 
negligent supervision. 
 Betty was the named insured under a series of policies issued by 
Safeco Insurance Company (“Safeco”).  David was an additional insured in 
each policy.  The policies provided liability coverage to an insured for 
personal injury or property damages arising out of a covered occurrence.  
They excluded from coverage any injury that was “expected or intended by 
an insured or which [was] the foreseeable result of an act or omission 
intended by an insured . . . .”102 The policy also contained a severability of 
interest provision which provided that “[t]his insurance applies separately 
to each insured.”103  The ultimate question before the Court was whether 
Betty “was barred from coverage only if her own conduct in relation to 
David’s molestation of Scott fell within the policies’ exclusion for 
                                                                                                                 
 99 See Wilson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 540 So. 2d 749 (Ala. 
1989)(illustrating how exclusion is ambiguous even in the absence of a severability 
clause). 
 100 232 P.3d 612 (Cal. 2010). 
 101 Id. at 616. 
 102 Id. at 615. 
 103 Id.  
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intentional acts.”104 
 The Minkler Court expressly noted the split of authority 
surrounding the issue of the impact of a severability clause on a policy 
exclusion referring to the acts of “an” or “any” insured.105 It also 
recognized that California law, in the absence of contrary evidence, viewed 
exclusions from coverage described in reference to the acts of “an” or 
“any,” as opposed to “the,” collectively, so that if one insured committed 
an excluded act, all insureds were barred from coverage.106  Nevertheless, 
the Court concluded that, “an exclusion of coverage for the intentional acts 
of ‘an insured,’ read in conjunction with a severability or ‘separate 
insurance’ clause like the one at issue . . . creates an ambiguity which must 
be construed in favor of coverage that a lay policyholder would reasonably 
expect.”107   
 Minkler has several noteworthy aspects.  First, the Court’s 
reasoning – which focused on the language of both the severability clause 
and the exclusion, in light of the reasonable expectation of the insured – is 
concise and consistent with the rules of insurance contract interpretation.  
Second, the holding of the court is supported in part by the general, rather 
than specific, nature of the exclusion.  In other words, the use of the term 
‘an’ is insignificant and does not cause an exclusion to be specific in 
nature.  Third, the Court cautioned that its reasoning and holding under the 
specific circumstances of the case did not mean that a severability clause 
necessarily affects all exclusions framed in terms of “an” or “any” 
insured.108 This cautionary note manifests judicial awareness of the fact-
sensitive nature of insurance policy interpretation.  In this context, it 
reflects sensitivity to situations where application of a severability clause 
would render an absurd result such as converting the policy purchased into 
a type of policy which was neither negotiated nor paid for.109  
 Courts employing Methodology 3a and 3b, respectively are 
exercising a policy choice in favor of coverage in limited situations.  That 
choice is reflected in the restricted application of the functional theory of 
contract interpretation to this methodology.  The problem, however, is that 
the functional approach is neither fully nor consistently applied.  For 
example, in the context of the term “an insured,” the philosophy of the 
reasonable expectation of a lay insured has been fully integrated.  However, 
                                                                                                                 
 104 Id. at 614. 
 105 Id.  
 106 Id. at 617. 
 107 Id. at 614. 
 108 Id. at 621–22 n.5. 
109 See, e.g., BP Am. Inc. v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 148 P.3d 832 
(Okla. 2005); Transit Cas. Co. v. Hartman’s, Inc., 239 S.E.2d 894 (Va. 1978); 
Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haller, 793 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. App. 1990). 
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when the exclusion is couched as “any insured,” the outcome reflects the 
functional theory of contract interpretation. 
 
III. RECONCILING THE INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGIES 
 
 While the ultimate legal conclusion reached in a particular case is 
frequently dictated by individual circumstances, the legal reasoning used 
by the court is often less transparent.  Nevertheless, there is a method to the 
madness.  The interpretive methodologies used to resolve severability 
disputes indicate that courts are applying principles of contract 
interpretation in a manner that reflects two competing approaches: (1) the 
“traditional” or “formalist” approach; (2) the “functional” or “reasonable 
expectation” approach.110  These approaches differ in that the “traditional” 
                                                                                                                 
 110 See Collins v. Farmers Ins. Co., 822 P.2d 1146, 1159 (Or. 1991) (Unis, J., 
dissenting). Justice Unis, dissenting, explained the similarities and distinctions 
between these interpretive approaches:  
 
Under the “traditional” or “formalist” approach, the court looks 
to the “four corners” of the insurance policy and interprets it by 
applying rules applicable to all contracts in general. The insured 
is held to have read and to have understood the clear language of 
the policy. Extrinsic evidence relating to the insurance contract 
may be examined for the purpose of determining the parties’ 
intention to an objective analysis of the “four corners” of the 
contract. . . . The rationale behind the “formalist” approach is 
that contracts of insurance rest upon and are controlled by the 
same principles of law that apply to other contracts, and the 
parties to an insurance contract may provide such provisions as 
they deem proper as long as the contract does not contravene law 
or public policy (citations omitted). . . . The competing approach 
to insurance contract interpretation—the “functional” or 
“reasonable expectation” approach – is that the policyholder’s 
reasonable expectations to coverage under the insurance policy 
should be honored even though those expectations vary from the 
policy provisions. . . . The “functional” or “reasonable 
expectation” approach is supported by the notion that insurance 
contracts are not ordinary contracts negotiated by parties with 
roughly equal bargaining strength. Rather, they are largely 
contracts of adhesion, where the insurance company, in 
preparing a standardized printed form, has the superior 
bargaining position, and the insured has to accept such a policy 
on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis if the insured wants any form of 
insurance protection. . . . Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 
211 (1981), “[r]epudiates the ‘four-corners’ [‘traditional’ or 
‘formalist’] approach to contract interpretation in the 
standardized agreement setting and in effect approves a doctrine 
of ‘reasonable expectations.’” . . . A growing number of courts 
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theory is logically based and precedent-oriented, whereas the “functional” 
theory is sociologically-based and result-oriented.111   
 According to the “traditional” or “formalist” approach, correct 
legal decisions are determined by pre-existing legal precedent.  Courts 
reach their decisions by logical deduction which results from applying the 
facts of a case to a set of pre-existing legal rules.  The “traditional” 
approach is premised entirely on the theory that the law is a science 
consisting of socially-neutral, logical principles and rules.112  Pursuant to 
the “traditional” or “formalist” approach, a severability clause ordinarily 
will not negate an exclusion unless: (1) the policy is ambiguous; (2) the 
exclusion is masked by technical or obscure language; or (3) the exclusion 
is hidden in the policy provisions.113   
 The “functional” or “reasonable expectation” approach posits “that 
the paramount concern of the law should not be logical consistency . . . but 
socially desirable consequences.”114  The “functional” approach looks into 
the future and considers “[w]hat substantive goals, derived from popular 
wants and interests, are relevant?  What rules or other precepts are required 
to further them?”115   Thus, the “functional” approach supports a finding of 
coverage “if (1) the insurer knew or should have known of the insured’s 
expectation; (2) the insurer created or helped to create those expectations; 
or (3) the insured’s expectations are objectively reasonable in light of the 
                                                                                                                 
use the “functional” approach to protect the “reasonable 
expectations” of the insured policyholder from possible denial of 
coverage that might result under the “traditional” or “formalist” 
contractual analysis of an insurance policy.  
 
Id. at 1159–61 (citations omitted). 
 111 Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the 
Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1042 (1991). 
 112 Id. at 1040–41. The formalist approach has been described as: 
 
It is not the duty of our courts to be leaders in reform … The 
judge is always confined within the narrow limits of reasonable 
interpretation. It is not his function or within his power to 
enlarge or improve the law [since that is the function of the 
legislature]. His duty is to maintain it, to enforce it, whether it is 
good or bad, wise or foolish . . . .  
 
id. at 1042 (quoting Elihu Root, The Importance of an Independent Judicary, 72 
THE INDEPENDENT 704 (1912)).  
 113 Johnny Parker, The Wacky World of Collision and Comprehensive 
Coverages: Intentional Injury and Illegal Activity Exclusion, 79 NEB. L. REV. 75, 
110 (2000). 
 114 Swisher, supra note 105, at 1043. 
 115 Id. 
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circumstances and facts of the case.”116  “There is no disagreement between 
the “formalist” and the “functional” approaches whenever the insurance 
policy is ambiguous or susceptible to two or more reasonable 
interpretations.”117 
 The traditional or formalist118 articulates the objective of contract 
interpretation as ascertaining the intention of the parties and, thereafter, 
inquires as to whether any rational support favoring application of the 
exclusion exists.  Such support is often gleaned from the language of the 
exclusion to the extent that it can be described as specific (as opposed to 
general in nature), unambiguous or imposing a joint obligation.  The 
formalistic approach is strict in its adherence to precedents and harsh in 
that it favors the insurer’s interpretation of the policy.  This approach also 
reflects a paternalistic interest in protecting an industry from the 
consequences of its own ill-advised drafting.   
 The overarching principle of contract interpretation is to ascertain 
and give effect to the intention of the parties.  While the interpretation of 
insurance contracts is guided by this principle, it is controlled by somewhat 
different standards because an insurance contract is often one of adhesion, 
particularly in personal lines.  Adhesion contracts provide insureds with 
little choice beyond electing among standardized provisions offered to 
them on a take it or leave it basis.  Furthermore, many insureds cannot view 
their policy language until after tendering payment.119  Consequently, under 
the functional approach, insurance policies are construed to provide 
coverage which a layperson would reasonably expect, given a lay 
interpretation of the policy language.120  This construction offsets the 
greater bargaining position of insurance companies and prevents the use of 
insurance policies as a wholesale method of controlling applicable law.121  
In contrast, the formalist approach ignores the fact that insurance contracts 
are contracts of adhesion, typically written to afford greater protection to 
the insurer.     
                                                                                                                 
 116  Parker, supra note 107, at 111. 
 117  See Collins, 822 P.2d at 1161 (Unis, J., dissenting). 
 118 See, e.g., The Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Holcim (US), Inc., 744 F. Supp. 2d 
1251 (S.D. Ala. 2010); Md. Cas. Co. v. Am. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 217 F. Supp. 688 
(E.D. Tenn. 1963); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. White, 65 P.3d 449 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2003); BP Am., Inc. v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 148 P.3d 832 (Okla. 
2005); Coop. Ins. Cos. v. Woodward, 45 A.3d 89 (Vt. 2012).  
 119  See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of 
Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 
Jan. 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2130 
908. 
 120 Stordahl v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 65–66 (Alaska 1977); Lee v. 
Interinsurance Exch., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 121 Am. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bottum, 371 F.2d 6, 12 (8th Cir. 1967). 
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 The functional approach to severability clause interpretation is 
reflected in every interpretive methodology which holds that a severability 
of interests provision modifies an exclusion referring to the conduct of ‘an’ 
or ‘any’ insured. 122  However, the functional approach has only been fully 
incorporated into Methodology No. 2, thus, making it the most insurance 
consumer oriented.  Methodology No. 2 is superior to Methodologies 3a 
and 3b because it recognizes that an insurance contract is one of adhesion 
and shifts the entire risk of loss to the drafting party by giving effect to the 
severability clause regardless of the language used to describe the excluded 
conduct.  Methodologies 3a and 3b use the functional approach to shift the 
burden of loss to the drafting party by giving effect to the severability 
clause exclusively in the context of exclusions referring to the conduct of 
“an insured.”  Both 3a and 3b use the traditional theory of contract 
interpretation when an exclusion refers to the conduct of “any insured.”  
Methodology No. 1 is the least favorable to insurance consumers because it 
relies solely on the traditional theory of contract interpretation, pursuant to 
which the adhesive nature of insurance contracts is insignificant.   
 The functional approach considers the policy as a whole and 
typically employs the principle of ambiguity or reasonable expectation of 
the insured to construe the severability clause in favor of coverage or as 
having severed application.  The availability of clearer language and 
alternative provisions are relevant considerations in the context of the 
functional approach to insurance contract interpretation.  The functional 
approach has become firmly entrenched in insurance law jurisprudence 
over the past four decades.123   
 The functional approach, unlike its “traditional” counterpart, 
promotes fairness in policy interpretation by avoiding the recognition of a 
per se rule of coverage or non-coverage.  Rather, the exclusion, in light of 
the presence of the severability clause, is applied to each insured 
separately.  It also promotes and encourages careful drafting.  For if it is 
                                                                                                                 
 122 See Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 2005); 
Chacon v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1990); Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. White, 65 P.3d 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Copeland Williams, 941 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Taryn E.F. v. Joshua 
M.C., 505 N.W.2d 418 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).  But see West Am. Ins. Co. v. 
AV&S, 145 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding severability clause renders an 
exclusion referring to the conduct of any insured ambiguous); Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Bower, II, 752 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (finding severability clause 
makes an exclusion referring to the actions of any insured ambiguous); Worcester 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marnell, 496 N.E.2d 158 (Mass. 1986). 
 123 The formal articulation of the doctrine is generally traced to Judge, then 
Professor, Robert Keeton’s seminal article, Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights 
at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARVARD L. REV. 961 (1970). 2 ERIC 
MILLS HOLMES & MARK RHODES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, 2D 416 
(1996). 
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asked, “why do insurance companies include severability clauses in 
insurance contracts?,” the “functional” answer is that a severability clause 
objectively conveys the impression of coverage.  It appears to be the 
virtually unanimous opinion of the legal scholars writing on the subject that 
the purpose of the addition of the severability clause was to provide 
coverage.124  Otherwise, the clause is unnecessary.   
 The problems associated with severability clause interpretation 
could easily be resolved by employing language which clearly alerts 
insureds to the absence of coverage.  The functional approach imposes such 
an obligation on insurers.  Where insurers fulfill this obligation, their 
interpretation of the exclusion should be adopted.  
 For example, in Northwest G. F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard,125 the 
insurer used language specifically designed to avoid a severability clause 
dispute.  In Norgard, Ray and Jean Norgard purchased a homeowners’ 
policy from Northwest G. F. Mut. Insurance Company (“Northwest”).  Jean 
operated a home day care business for which she purchased additional 
insurance coverage from Northwest.  Under the day care endorsement, 
Northwest provided coverage for “bodily injury and property damage 
arising out of home day care services regularly provided by an insured and 
for which an insured receives monetary or other compensation.”126  It 
excluded coverage for “bodily injury or property damage arising out of 
sexual molestation, corporal punishment or physical or mental abuse 
inflicted upon any person by or at the direction of an insured, an insured’s 
employee or any other person involved in any capacity in the day care 
enterprise . . . .”127  Ray was the named insured and all relatives residing in 
the Norgard household were also insured under the homeowners’ policy. 
 Ray Norgard was accused and convicted of engaging in sexual 
contact with L.A.A., the Andersons’ four-year-old daughter, while the child 
was under Jean’s supervision at day care.  The Andersons brought a civil 
action against both Ray and Jean, accusing the latter of negligence in the 
supervision and care of the child.  The Norgards tendered the claim to 
Northwest. 
 Northwest filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish 
that it was not obligated to defend or indemnify either Ray or Jean because 
the injuries arose out of Ray’s sexual molestation, which was specifically 
excluded from coverage.  While the parties agreed that Ray was 
disqualified from coverage under the sexual molestation exclusion, they 
disagreed as to whether Jean was entitled to coverage.  The Norgards 
argued that she was because of the severability provision, which provided 
                                                                                                                 
 124 Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schuitema, 183 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
1966). 
 125 518 N.W.2d 179 (N.D. 1994). 
 126 Id. at 180. 
 127 Id.  
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that “this insurance applies separately to each insured . . . .”128    
 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court 
judge found that the severability clause and the sexual molestation 
exclusion, when read together, were ambiguous, thus warranting 
construction in favor of coverage.  Northwest appealed. 
 On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that the severability clause 
precluded coverage to Jean.  The Court based its conclusion on the unique 
language of the exclusion, which pertained to the conduct of not only “an 
insured” but also “an insured’s employee or any other person involved in 
any capacity in the day care enterprise . . . .”  This language manifested the 
clear intent of the parties to preclude coverage when any person connected 
with the operation of the day care engaged in sexual molestation of one of 
the children.  The language clearly and specifically provided that these 
risks were outside the scope of the policy.129   
 Where the language of the exclusion is particularly tailored to 
except from coverage specific acts of specific individuals, it should prevail 
over a more general provision such as the severability clause.  Similarly, 
the absence of any reference to a specific actor – “an insured” or “any 
insured” – in an exclusion demonstrates that the parties intended to base the 
exclusion on the nature of the act, rather than on the identity of the actor.130   
In either instance, the severability clause is subordinate to the exclusion.131   
 Severability disputes could also be avoided by replacing the 
severability clause with a joint obligation clause in the policy.  The latter 
provides: The terms of this policy impose joint obligations on persons 
defined as an insured person.  This means that responsibilities, acts and 
failures to act of a person defined as an insured person will be binding upon 
another person defined as an insured person.     
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 The conflict that exists in the law of severability clause 
interpretation is primarily a consequence of misguided adherence to and 
use of the traditional or formalistic theory of contract interpretation.  This 
theory has no place in modern day insurance contract interpretation.  This 
proposition is illustrated by the court’s analysis in Maryland Casualty 
Company v. American Fidelity & Casualty Company.132  There, a federal 
district court was called upon to predict how the Tennessee Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 128 Id. at 181.  
 129 Id. at 183.  
 130 See, e.g., Ristine v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 97 P.3d 1206, 1209 
(Or. Ct. App. 2004).  
 131 See, e.g., Nw. G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard, 518 N.W.2d 179, 183 (N.D. 
1994); Ristine v. Hartford Ins. Co., 97 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Or. Ct. App. 2004). 
 132 217 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Tenn. 1963). 
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would resolve the question of whether a severability clause affected an 
employee exclusion contained in an automobile liability policy.  The court 
found both the exclusion and the severability clause to be ambiguous 
because the language used was susceptible to two reasonable 
interpretations.133  Ambiguity was also evidenced by the fact that various 
courts had arrived at conflicting conclusions as to the meaning of both 
clauses.134   
 Despite its finding of ambiguity, which should have been resolved 
in favor of the non-drafting party, the court proceeded to a consideration of 
prevailing precedents.  In that context, the court, despite its express 
disagreement with the soundness of the conclusions reached, felt 
constrained to hold that any employee of “the insured” meant any 
employee of any insured.  In Maryland Cas., use of the traditional theory of 
contract interpretation resulted in a restrictive construction of the 
severability clause which, though acknowledged by the court to be 
unsound, was nevertheless condoned (possibly because the court felt 
constrained as a federal court sitting in diversity).   
 Rigid adherence to the traditional theory of contract interpretation 
limits the legal system’s ability to deal with some of the most problematic 
and frequently litigated questions of insurance coverage.  It unduly limits 
the analysis of the meaning and function of insurance contracts.  For these 
reasons severability of interests clause interpretation remains the “only 
known situation where many of the courts persist in erring in favor of the 
insurance companies!”135           
 
                                                                                                                 
 133 Id. at 691–692. 
 134 Id. at 692. 
 135 Norman E. Risjord & June M. Austin, “Who is the ‘Insured’” Revisited, 28 
INS. COUNS. J. 100, 101 (1961). 
DOES AN INSURED HAVE A DUTY TO MITIGATE  
DAMAGES WHEN THE INSURER BREACHES? 
 
JAMES M. FISCHER∗ 
 
*** 
 
This article explores the uncertainty behind an insured’s duty to mitigate 
losses after the insurer has breached its contract.  The article explores the 
arguments for and against mitigation and concludes that the duty to 
mitigate should be imposed on insureds who are seeking damages for the 
insurer’s breach of a contractual obligation regardless of the type of 
insurance policy in question.  The failure by the insured to act reasonably 
post-breach should result in them being held responsible for losses that 
could have been avoided. 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 The principle that a plaintiff must make reasonable efforts to 
mitigate damages is well entrenched in the law of contract and tort,1 
although the origins of the requirement are somewhat obscure.2  The so-
called “duty”3 to mitigate operates to reduce damages to the extent losses 
could have been avoided had the plaintiff, post-breach, acted reasonably 
under the circumstances.  When insurers breach their obligation under an 
 
*Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School, Los Angeles, California 
1 Sutherland identified the origins of the mitigation principle as being 
equitable in nature, although it is not clear whether the reference was to equity 
jurisprudence or to general concerns for fairness.  1 J.G. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW 
OF DAMAGES §149 (3d ed. 1903).  
2 One scholar traces mitigation principles back to Roman law.  Saul Litvinoff, 
Damages, Mitigation, and Good Faith, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1998–1999). 
3 The mitigation of damages obligation is discussed in detail in JAMES M. 
FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES, §13 (2d ed. 2006).   
 
The plaintiff’s obligation should not be understood as arising to 
the level of a legal duty, such as would create affirmative rights 
exercisable by the defendant.  Rather, a plaintiff’s failure to 
mitigate, when mitigation is reasonable and would operate to 
reduce the plaintiff’s loss, will result in a dollar for dollar 
reduction in the recovery by the amount not mitigated.  
 
Id. 
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insurance contract, however, there is substantial uncertainty whether the 
insured has a duty to mitigate.  There are surprisingly few decisions that 
specifically address this issue.  Most that do address the question rather 
casually.  Sometimes, a duty to mitigate is assumed;4 other times, the duty 
to mitigate is rejected.5  This article explores the reasons for this state of 
affairs.  The article concludes that a duty to mitigate should be recognized 
and imposed on insureds who are seeking damages for insurer breach of an 
insurance contractual obligation. 
A. THE DUTY TO MITIGATE – AN OVERVIEW 
 A plaintiff’s recovery may be reduced if the plaintiff fails to make 
reasonable efforts, post-breach or post-injury, to lessen damages.  These 
efforts may be positive in the sense that the plaintiff must take affirmative, 
proactive steps to ameliorate the scope or severity of the loss, for example, 
submitting to reasonable medical procedures to reduce the injury or to 
hasten the healing process.  Alternatively, the obligation may be negative, 
in the sense that the plaintiff may be required to cease and desist from 
incurring further loss, as, for example, a contractor continuing to expend 
labor and materials, and thereby increasing the loss, after the owner has 
breached the construction contract.6 The fundamental justification for the 
mitigation requirement is that compensation should be tied to causal 
responsibility for the loss.7 The plaintiff is seen as the cause of any losses 
that could have been avoided by post-breach action.  The plaintiff is not 
allowed to sit idle and allow losses to grow and accumulate, but must act 
reasonably to reduce the quantum of loss caused by defendant’s legal 
wrong. 
 Mitigation resembles several liability doctrines, such as 
contributory negligence and comparative fault.  The doctrinal line that 
separates mitigation from contributory negligence and comparative fault is 
 
4 See, e.g, Campbell v. Norfolk & Deham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 682 A.2d 933, 
936 (R.I. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that insured need not await actual, physical 
collapse of insured structure before loss will be deemed covered because such a 
requirement would subvert insured’s duty to mitigate damages). 
5 See, e.g., Miller v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 289 N.W. 399, 402 (Minn. 
1939) (holding that disabled insured could not be denied benefits because insured 
failed to take insulin necessary to control his diabetes, which was his disabling 
condition under the policy). 
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmts. ab (1981). 
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c (1979) (“The factors 
determining whether an injured person has used care to avert the consequences of a 
tort are in general the same as those that determine whether a person has been 
guilty of negligent conduct . . . .”). 
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the time of the wrong and resulting injury.  Plaintiff’s pre-injury activities 
that contribute to the loss are addressed through liability-based doctrines, 
such as negligence and comparative fault.  Plaintiff’s post-injury activities 
that contribute to the extent or magnitude of the loss are addressed through 
remedial-based doctrines, such as mitigation.8 The distinction can be 
significant because mitigation raises pure loss sharing issues, while 
contributory negligence does not and comparative fault may not.9  
 The mitigation obligation is subject to several constraints.  A 
plaintiff need only expend reasonable efforts to mitigate damages; the 
plaintiff need not do what is unreasonable or impractical.  A plaintiff, who 
is financially unable to mitigate, need not do what he cannot do.10  
Mitigation is rarely a complete defense; rather, damages are only reduced 
by the amount of damages reasonable efforts would have avoided.  For 
example, assume an insured has a duty to mitigate after the insurer 
breached its duty to defend.  If the insured unreasonably failed to accept the 
claimant’s offer to settle the matter for $25,000 and the claimant thereafter 
recovered $50,000, the insured’s general, economic damages would be 
limited to $25,000 – the amount of damages the insured would have 
incurred had the insured acted reasonably, after the insurer’s breach, by 
settling with the claimant.  
 
8 Kocher v. Getz, 824 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind. 2005) (“While a plaintiff’s 
postaccident conduct that constitutes an unreasonable failure to mitigate damages 
is not to be considered in the assessment of fault, a plaintiff ‘may not recover for 
any item of damage that [the plaintiff] could have avoided through the use of 
reasonable care.’”) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
9 See Del Tufo v. Twp. of Old Bridge, 685 A.2d 1267, 1282 (N.J. 1996).  In 
Del Tufo, an arrestee died from a cocaine overdose while in police custody.  Id. at 
1267.  His estate brought a wrongful death action alleging that the police had 
negligently delayed securing proper medical care for the decedent.  Id.  Under New 
Jersey’s comparative fault statute, the plaintiff had to show that defendant was 
more than 50% responsible for the decedent’s injuries.  Id. at 1282.  The court held 
that, on these facts, the trial court should have instructed the jury on comparative 
fault and the failure to do so constituted prejudicial error since the decedent’s 
voluntary ingestion of cocaine was a substantial contributing factor to his death.  
Id.  Because New Jersey’s comparative fault statute would bar recovery if the trier 
of fact found that the decedent was more responsible than defendant for his death 
from a cocaine overdose, the estate argued on that remand it could receive a 
mitigation instruction, which would allow for some recovery based on the 
principles of pure fault.  Id.  Thus, if decedent were found to be 80% responsible 
for his death, the estate could still recover 20% of his damages, which reflected 
defendant’s share of responsibility.  The court held that mitigation principles did 
not apply and that the decedent’s actions should be evaluated under faultbased 
principles.  Id. 
10 FISCHER, supra note 3, at § 13.2. 
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B. INSURANCE AND MITIGATION 
 Courts have been inconsistent in their application of mitigation 
principles to insurance disputes regardless of the type of insurance 
involved,11 although most of the disputes have involved liability insurance.  
This article considers both breaches of the duty to defend (liability 
insurance) and breaches of the duty to pay (disability and property 
insurance).  While both duties involve distinct obligations of the insurer, 
neither duty presents unique issues or concerns pertinent to the mitigation 
obligation when the insured seeks damages.  The basic issue whether the 
insurer has a duty to mitigate does not turn on whether the insurer has 
breached the duty to defend or the duty to pay because in each case by 
seeking damages the insured has monetized the claim.  Whether the insured 
has acted reasonably in seeking to mitigate damages may be influenced by 
the nature of the duty the insurer breached, but that is a topic for later work.  
Here the focus is on the existence vel non of the duty to mitigate. 
 
1. Liability Insurance 
 
Liability insurance policies commonly provide a defense for 
insureds when the insured is sued and the insurer may be required to 
provide indemnification.12  Insurers do not agree to defend their insureds 
against all claims and whether the insured is or is not owed a defense under 
the policy is a fertile ground for litigation between insured and insurers.13  
 
11 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 168:9 
(3d ed. 2005) (“[T]he concept of mitigation of loss in insurance has not developed 
as cohesively as the doctrine of mitigation of damages in other fields.”). 
12 Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of 
Insurance Defense Counsel, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 302 (1995) (demonstrating that 
insurance law burdens the company with two relevant duties: a duty to defend the 
insured and a duty to behave reasonably in settlement.  The first duty requires the 
company to provide a lawyer to defend the insured.  The second duty requires the 
company to consider the insured’s interests along with its own when exercising its 
settlement discretion.); see James Fischer, Insurer or Policyholder Control of the 
Defense and the Duty to Fund Settlements, 2 NEV. L.J. 1, 32–34 (2002) (discussing 
separation of insurer’s contractual duty to provide a defense from the insurer’s 
contractual right to control the defense). 
13 The insured’s duty to defend is triggered by the insured’s tender of a third 
party claim against the insured to the insurer.  The tendered claim must be within 
the coverage promised by the insurer under the terms of the liability insurance 
policy, although this standard is liberally applied to the insured’s benefit.  First, the 
duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify and is triggered in many 
jurisdictions by a claim that raises the potentiality of coverage under the insurance 
policy.  KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 624 (5th ed. 
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If the insurer refuses to provide a defense and the insured seeks damages 
for breach, does the insured, putting aside issues of capability under the 
precise circumstances of the situation, have a duty to mitigate damages by 
providing a defense?  As one commentator observed, the resolution of this 
issue is “unclear” as courts are divided – some courts holding that 
mitigation principles apply, other courts concluding that they do not.14  
 
2. Disability Insurance 
 
 Disability insurance policies provide payments that substitute for 
compensation the insured could have earned but for the disability the 
insured has incurred.  Usually the payments are on a monthly basis and 
continue until the disability is resolved or the policy expires, whichever is 
earlier.  In Heller v. The Equitable Life Insurance Assurance Soc’y of the 
U.S.,15 the insured, a cardio-vascular surgeon, developed carpal tunnel 
syndrome, which precluded him from performing surgery.  His insurer 
claimed that he failed to mitigate his losses by submitting to surgery to 
relieve the condition.  The insurer relied on a provision in the insurance 
policy requiring, as a condition of receiving benefits, that the insured be 
“under the regular care and attendance of a physician” as requiring the 
insured to submit to surgery when recommended by an attending physician.  
                                                                                                                                      
2010).  Even if the jurisdiction follows the less liberal “pleading” test, which 
compares the actual allegations in the claim to the terms of the insurance policy, 
the test is applied liberally in the insured’s favor.  Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, 
Inc., 268 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Tex. 2008).  Second, many jurisdictions follow the rule 
that if the duty to defend exists as to part of the claim, the insurer must defend the 
entire claim.  3 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 17.01 
(3)(a) (Francis J. Mootz, III, et al. eds., LexisNexis 2012).  Third, many 
jurisdictions impose a high standard for insurer escape when the duty to defend is 
contested.  Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1993): 
 
[I]f the plaintiff’s complaint against the insured alleged facts 
which would not have supported a recovery covered by the 
policy, it was the duty of the defendant to undertake the defense, 
until it could confine the claim to recovery that the policy did not 
cover . . . .  [T]he insurer may terminate its defense obligation by 
proving that the underlying claim falls outside the scope of 
policy coverage, but not by demonstrating that the claim lacks 
merit, or might have merit only on some theory outside the scope 
of coverage. 
 
Id. at 1159 (citations omitted) (brackets added) (italics in original). 
14 ALLAN D. WINDT, 1 INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 4.18 (5th ed. 
2007) (collecting decisions). 
15 Heller v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 833 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1987).  
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The court rejected the insurer’s interpretation of the provision, rejecting the 
insurer’s argument that the insured was obligated to reduce or ameliorate 
his loss by submitting to surgery absent express language requiring such in 
the policy.16  The court even more broadly rejected the argument that the 
insured had an implied obligation to mitigate his disability if he can do so 
without reasonable risk or pain.17  Heller is consistent with the general 
approach in disability insurance disputes to resist imposing a duty to 
mitigate on the insured, although there is some contrary authority.18 
 
3. Property Insurance 
 
 Property insurance often has an exclusion to coverage that is 
triggered if the insured neglects to use “all reasonable means to save and 
preserve property at and after the time of loss.”19  This language creates an 
express, contractual obligation to mitigate.20  Some courts have found a 
 
16   
In the absence of a clear, unequivocal and specific 
contractual requirement that the insured is obligated to 
undergo surgery to attempt to minimize his disability, we 
refuse to order the same.  To hold otherwise and to impose 
such a requirement would, in effect, enlarge the terms of the 
policy beyond those clearly defined in the policy agreed to 
by the parties.  Thus, under the terms of this disability 
policy, Dr. Heller is not required to undergo surgery for 
treatment of his carpal tunnel syndrome condition before he 
receives disability income payments.  
 
Id. at 1257–58 (footnote and citation omitted); but see infra note 44 (noting 
contrary authority as to interpretation of “care and attendance” provision). 
17 “Although we might not choose to follow the same course of conduct and 
path of reasoning as Dr. Heller, there is no moral, much less legal obligation or 
compelling reason to second guess an insured’s, and in this case Dr. Heller’s, 
decision to forgo surgery.”  Id. at 1259 (footnote omitted). 
18 Compare Miller v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 289 N.W. 399, 402 (Minn. 
1939) (rejecting duty to mitigate) with Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Van 
Gemert, 262 F. Supp. 1047, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (applying California law and 
holding that that disability policy’s “care and attendance” provision required 
insured to comply with physician’s recommendations that would mitigate disabling 
condition). 
19 Insurance Service Office Homeowner’s Policy (H0 00 03 10 00), Section 1 
Exclusions, Exclusion A5.  
20 RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 11, § 149.69 (“Distinct from the question of 
whether there is coverage for loss when an insured voluntarily removes imperiled 
goods in order to avoid or reduce his or her loss, the policy of insurance may 
expressly impose upon him or her such a duty.  Such a provision is in effect an 
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duty on the insured’s part to mitigate damages even apart from a 
contractual obligation to do so.  In Real Asset Management, Inc. v. Lloyd’s 
of London21 the court held that Louisiana’s general common law duty to 
mitigate damages applied to an insured who claimed property loss under its 
property insurance policy.  The court reversed an award to the insured.  The 
trial court had excused the insured’s failure to comply with the contractual 
duty to mitigate because the insurer had breached its duty to pay, thus 
excusing the insured’s duties of performance under the insurance contract.  
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the insurer’s breach did 
not excuse the insured’s failure to mitigate and remanded for a 
determination of the extent to which the failure to mitigate contributed to 
the loss claimed by the insured.22  
C. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST MITIGATION IN THE  
INSURANCE CONTEXT  
1. Insured’s Reasonable Expectations 
 
 The most common argument against a mitigation requirement for 
insurer breach of the contract of insurance, absent an express contractual 
obligation, is that such a requirement defeats the insured’s reasonable 
expectations under the insurance contract.  Here’s how Windt puts it in the 
context of the insurer’s duty to defend under a liability insurance policy: 
 
What is unclear, however, is whether insureds have a duty 
to defend themselves after their insurers have unjustifiably 
refused to defend them.  Some courts have indicated that 
they do.  The majority, and better, rule, however, is to the 
contrary.  Having contracted to have the insurer defend, the 
                                                                                                                                      
exception to the coverage, and in the event of failure to make reasonable efforts to 
protect the property from peril, the insurer is not liable on its policy”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
21 Real Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Lloyd’s of London, 61 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(applying Louisiana law). 
22 Id. at 1229–30 (“We find, however, no legal support for the proposition that 
an insured’s duty to mitigate terminates when the insurer breaches his duty to 
timely settle a claim.  Under Louisiana law it is clear a plaintiff has a duty to do 
what it can to mitigate losses”) (citations and footnote omitted); see Jablonsky v. 
Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 174 A. 689, 691 (N.J. 1934) (noting split in 
authority whether the insured’s violation of the policy requirement that the insured 
expend reasonable efforts to protect the insured property postloss voids the policy; 
the court concluded, however, that the better rule is that the insured’s failure to 
protect will only affect the amount of recovery to the extent the insured’s failure 
compounded the loss). 
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insured should be able to do nothing more than cooperate 
with the insurer when a suit encompassed by the policy is 
filed.  The insured did not impliedly covenant to attempt to 
minimize the insurer’s exposure in the event of the insurer 
breaching its duty to defend, and, for policy reasons, the 
duty to mitigate damages should not be applicable.  Having 
itself refused to take any action in an effort to minimize its 
potential exposure in the pending lawsuit, the insurer 
cannot expect the insured to take such action.23  
 
 This argument against mitigation appears to consist of two claims.  
First, mitigation is only required when there is an express contractual 
obligation to do so, an implied obligation should not be read into the 
agreement.  Second, a mitigation obligation violates public policy, at least 
in the context of an insurer’s breach of the duty to defend.  There are, 
however, difficulties with this mitigation position.  If it is against public 
policy to impose a mitigation obligation on an insured, that public policy 
applies regardless of the content of the insurance policy.  It is a cardinal 
rule of Insurance Law that the terms of the policy may not violate public 
policy.24  To the extent they do, the terms are ignored.25  Thus, if public 
policy rejects a duty to mitigate, the inclusion of an express mitigation 
provision in the insurance policy would not alter that result.  
 The contention may be that public policy does not bar mitigation 
per se, but does bar implying an obligation to mitigate.26  That approach 
avoids logical inconsistency, but does so by neutering public policy of any 
meaning.  As revised, the public policy argument becomes a gloss on the 
 
23 WINDT, supra note 14, § 4.18 (footnotes omitted). 
24 16 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 49.12 
(Richard A. Lord, ed., 4th ed. 2000) (“A contract of insurance, or a clause or 
provision in it, which is contrary to law or public policy is invalid and 
unenforceable.”) (footnotes omitted). 
25 See Welin v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 717 N.W.2d 690, 702 (Wis. 
2006) (noting that “when an insurance policy violates a statutory provision, the 
remedy is to enforce the policy as though it conformed to the statutory 
requirement”); see also J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K., 804 P.2d 689, 694 (Cal. 
1991) (noting that statutory requirements are implied terms of insurance contracts).  
26 There is a conflict in the decisional law as to the extent, if at all, implied 
statutory requirements may be written over by the contracting parties.  Compare 
Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 110 P.3d 903, 907-08 (Cal. 2005) (noting 
that the statutory causation test could not be overwritten by contracting parties), 
with State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bongen, 925 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Alaska 1996) 
(“[A]n insurer may expressly preclude coverage when damage to an insured’s 
property is caused by both a covered and an excluded risk.”). 
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proper interpretation of insurance contracts, much like the doctrine of 
contra proferentum (construction against the drafter).  As so understood, a 
duty to mitigate should not be implied.  This position, however, does not 
raise a meaningful public policy argument because it does not substantiate 
why contractual silence as to the mitigation issue supports or creates a “no 
mitigation” public policy rule.27  
 I may, however, be over-reading Windt’s use of the term 
“implied.”  Perhaps Windt is arguing that public policy absolutely 
precludes imposing a duty to mitigate damages on the insured.  That 
position, however, is not substantiated by Windt.  More fundamentally, this 
public policy claim is inconsistent with the judicial willingness, noted 
earlier, to enforce express mitigation provisions in insurance policies.  If a 
mitigation duty violated public policy, these express provisions would be 
unenforceable.     
 
27 This is not to say that public policy arguments against mitigation are 
necessarily unsubstantial.  Several courts have, for example, concluded that it may 
violate public policy to impose a duty to mitigate on the United States.  In Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424, 1438-41 (7th Cir. 1993), the 
government had seized control of the assets of a failed banking institution and paid 
the obligations of the institution pursuant to the deposit insurance guarantee.  The 
government then sued the officers and directors of the institution seeking 
reimbursement.  The directors and officers contended the government had failed to 
mitigate damages by unreasonably managing the assets it had seized, thereby 
increasing losses above that which prudent action would have realized.  The court 
agreed with the government that there was no duty to mitigate.  Such a duty would 
conflict with the discretionary function exception on the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
See also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314, 1323-25 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(following Bierman in holding that the FDIC is not required to mitigate damages 
when it sues former directors and officers in their official capacities to recover 
losses sustained by insolvent financial institutions): 
 
We also overrule the third assignment of error in which appellant 
asserts, in essence, that the rest home had a duty to mitigate 
damages (that is, to stop the buildup of charges in her mother’s 
account) after appellant had denied any responsibility for the 
deficiency.  First, this claim was not made before the trial court 
and cannot therefore be raised on appeal.  Second, we are not 
persuaded that the rule requiring mitigation of damages applies 
against a rest home so as to require it to evict an elderly woman 
with minimal resources and unknown ability to cope by herself 
the moment her daughter denies liability for her support. 
 
St. Clare Ctr., Inc. v. Mueller, 517 N.E.2d 236, 239 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). 
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Neither the argument of no implied duty, nor the argument of 
violation of public policy explain why a mitigation requirement is 
inconsistent with principles of insurance law.  It is common to impose a 
duty to mitigate to contract breaches across the board.  Courts have 
consistently deemed efforts to reduce the harm associated with a breach of 
obligation, whether that obligation sounds in Contract or Tort, as consistent 
with public policy.28  Is there something about insurance contracts and 
duties arising out of the insured – insurer relationship that warrants a 
different approach?  
 One argument is that the insurer has promised a particular 
performance, e.g. defend the insured, provide monthly payments as long as 
the insured is disabled, etc., and imposing a mitigation obligation would 
negate the insurer’s promised performance, which the insured has paid 
consideration (premium) to receive.  The problem with this argument is 
that a mitigation obligation is frequently applied to non-insurance contracts 
that envision a particular performance – indeed, the purpose of all contracts 
is to obtain a performance in return for consideration.  If a plaintiff 
contracts for 1000 widgets at a particular price, the defendant’s breach does 
not excuse the plaintiff’s duty to mitigate. In fact, the duty to mitigate is so 
strong, that the cost of the substitute performance (cover) may be seen as a 
substitute measure of damages.29  Most contracts provide for reciprocal 
performances, e.g. buyer buys what seller sells, contractor builds what 
owner acquires, etc.  Each party to the contract renders a performance, even 
if the performance is no more than the payment of consideration for the 
other party’s performance.   
 
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1981):  
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), damages are not 
recoverable for loss that the injured party could have 
avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation. 
(2) The injured party is not precluded from recovery by the rule 
stated in Subsection (1) to the extent that he has made 
reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss. 
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1979): 
(1)  Except as stated in Subsection (2), one injured by the tort of 
another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that 
he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or 
expenditure after the commission of the tort. 
(2) One is not prevented from recovering damages for a 
particular harm resulting from a tort if the tortfeasor 
intended the harm or was aware of it and was recklessly 
disregardful of it, unless the injured person with knowledge 
of the danger of the harm intentionally or heedlessly failed 
to protect his own interests. 
29 U.C.C. § 2712 (2011). 
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 The contention that insurance contracts are different does not 
advance the “no mitigation” argument without identifying how insurance 
contracts are different from other contracts insofar as a mitigation 
requirement is concerned.  Insurance contracts have some unique 
characteristics.  First, the insured always performs, e.g. pays the premium 
for the insurance policy.  Second, the insurer’s performance is conditional 
on the happening of an insured event, e.g. the insured suffers a covered loss 
during the policy period.  If no such loss occurs, the insurer retains the 
premium, but never renders a reciprocal performance.30  These 
characteristics of the insurance contract do not, however, explain why a 
duty to mitigate should not be recognized.  The conditional nature of the 
insurer’s performance may require protections to assure that the promised 
performance is provided if the condition occurs;31 however, the insured’s 
duty to mitigate is distinct from the insurer’s duty to perform.  The duty to 
mitigate is based on the tenet that when the non-breaching party fails to 
exercise due diligence post-loss to ameliorate the loss, the factual cause of 
the avoidable portion of the loss lies with the non-breaching party.32  Of 
course, the non-breaching party may be incapable of exercising due 
diligence.  For example, if the insurer refuses to defend, the insured may 
lack the resources to retain a lawyer.  Mitigation only requires what is 
reasonable under the circumstances.33 In the duty to defend context, the 
insured may not be able to accept a settlement offer because the insured 
 
30 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 291 (1932) (“An ‘aleatory promise’ 
in the Restatement means a promise condition on the happening of a fortuitous 
event, or an event supposed by the parties to be fortuitous.”).  For this reason, 
insurance contracts have sometimes been classified as “aleatory” contracts; see id.  
cmt. a (noting that a fortuitous event may be one that is beyond the power of any 
human being to control; it may be within the control of third persons; it may be an 
event in the past if the fact is unknown to the parties; it may be positive or negative 
or an occurrence or failure to occur); 14 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 43:9 (noting 
that an aleatory promise is a contract in which one party is under a duty that is 
conditional on the occurrence of an event). 
31 If a right or duty of an injured party to perform is conditional on a fortuitous 
event, the injured party cannot treat his remaining duties to render performance as 
discharged unless he or she manifests his or her intent to do so to the other party 
before the other party has an adverse change in his or her situation.   
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 379 (1981). 
32 Injured person is required to exercise no more than reasonable judgment or 
fortitude and is only barred from recovery when it was unreasonable for the injured 
person to refuse or fail to take action to prevent further loss.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c (1979). 
33 Cf. Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., 147 P.2d 558, 561 (Cal. 1944) (noting that the 
duty to mitigate damages does not require an injured person to do what he or she 
cannot reasonably afford to do). 
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lacks the resources to fund the settlement and the offer is conditioned on 
immediate funding.  In this situation no breach of the duty to mitigate 
would occur.  Moreover, the standard of due diligence may be set very 
low,34 but obligation and capability should not be conflated or confused.  
Incapability, while it may excuse the particular instance of a failure to 
mitigate, is not a substitute for a general duty to mitigate.  
Alternatively, it may be argued that a non-breaching party should 
not, under the guise of a duty to mitigate, be deprived of the essential 
bargain he struck with the breaching party.35  For example, if the plaintiff 
agrees to sell Blackacre to defendant for $10,000 over the property’s actual 
market value ($100,000) and defendant breaches, the duty to mitigate does 
not require the plaintiff to engage in reasonable efforts to resell the 
property if the plaintiff only wishes to claim the $10,000 profit he would 
have made had defendant performed.  The law treats the $10,000 profit as 
fixed at the moment the contract was executed.  It might be argued that the 
insured has similarly bargained for an essential performance that is fixed 
and immutable at the moment of the insurer’s breach, thus, negating a duty 
to mitigate. 
The first problem with this argument is that it doesn’t travel very 
far outside the narrow area of benefit of the bargain.  When the benefit of 
the bargain is spread over time, as in the case of employment contracts, 
 
34 Heller, 833 F.2d at 1258 n.11 (noting that Illinois law gives substantial 
deference to a person’s personality, beliefs, and fears regarding the desirability of 
surgery when the defendant contends that the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages 
by submitting to surgery).    
35  
This was the argument made and accepted in Miller, 289 N.W. at 401:  
In the situation herein involved, the breach of contract was 
defendant’s refusal to continue payments under the policies.  It is 
for an amount equivalent to these unpaid benefits that this action 
was instituted.  In other words, they represent the amount of 
damages plaintiff has suffered by the breach.  They are not in an 
amount in excess of the actionable breach.  There is not involved 
in this case the question of increasing damage after the breach.  
What is being demanded is the equivalent to the agreed 
performance.  How then can the doctrine be applicable?  By the 
policies, defendant undertook to pay benefits if and when 
plaintiff became disabled.  It did not require submission to 
treatment.  Plaintiff’s refusal to take insulin is not increasing the 
damage after breach.  It is simply a refusal to do what there is not 
a duty to perform and for which defendant did not demand the 
obligation to perform. 
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courts consistently impose a duty to mitigate on the non-breaching party.36  
Moreover, because the essence of an insurance contract is indemnity, not 
profit, it is difficult to see how the insured could be brought within the 
narrow exception that permits recovery of bargain benefits without a 
corresponding duty to mitigate. Insurance contracts may be profitable for 
insurers, but the whole force of insurance law is that they are not a profit 
center for insureds.37  This point is addressed in more detail in Part D of 
this Article infra. 
 The second problem with the argument is that it misapprehends 
why the mitigation requirement is not applied to the plaintiff’s bargain 
expectancy.  If a mitigation requirement was imposed it would depreciate 
what belongs to the plaintiff, the expectancy itself.  Reconsider the plaintiff 
who sold property for $110,000, realizing a $10,000 profit (expectancy).  
When the buyer breaches, the plaintiff retains the property, which is worth 
$100,000.  The difference between what the plaintiff has and what the 
plaintiff is entitled to have is $10,000.38  In other words, the plaintiff is 
entitled to have $110,000; however, because of the buyer’s breach the 
plaintiff has only $100,000; thus, the plaintiff is entitled to $10,000 from 
the buyer.  Should the plaintiff have to resell the property to reduce the 
damages?  Reselling the property would not reduce plaintiff’s loss, 
although it might reduce the amount the buyer will have to pay as damages.  
The plaintiff has $100,000 in the form of the property.  Reselling the 
property at its market value ($100,000) will not reduce plaintiff’s loss.  It 
will simply substitute one asset (cash) for another asset (property), but both 
assets are of equal value.  Imposing a mitigation requirement on the 
plaintiff would require the plaintiff to find another buyer who would pay an 
above market price for the property.  A reasonable plaintiff can assume that 
a resale will be at the market price, but a market sale price does not affect 
the plaintiff’s damages.  Imposing a mitigation requirement assumes that 
reasonable efforts on the plaintiff’s part would produce another buyer who 
would overpay for the property.  That view is, however, completely 
 
36 3 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.21(2) (2d ed. 1993); 
FISCHER, supra note 3, § 13.2.2. 
37 Besides the basic indemnity principle one can identify a plethora of 
insurance doctrines that are centered on the proposition that insurance should 
indemnify against loss, not provide a possibility of gain, for example, insurable 
interest requirements, subrogation rights, coinsurance requirements.  Indeed, a 
primary argument for distinguishing insurance contracts from gambling contracts 
is that the prospect of gain only attaches to the latter.  
38 P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS 759 (1979); 
Louis E. Wolcher, The Accommodation of Regret in Contract Remedies, 73 IOWA 
L. REV. 797, 876 (1988).  I put aside arguments that the seller should not recover 
his expectancy. 
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inconsistent with the theory behind market valuation.  If there were other 
buyers who would pay more than $100,000 for the property, $100,000 does 
not accurately reflect the property’s actual market value.  And if the 
property is actually worth more than $100,000, this necessarily reduces the 
plaintiff’s expectancy.  Either way, a mitigation obligation would have no 
impact on the measure of the plaintiff’s loss. 
 Decisions like Miller v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York39 thus 
misapprehend when the mitigation principle is applied to a contract 
expectancy.  The contract for widgets creates an expectancy, but the duty to 
mitigate still applies because the plaintiff has the power post-breach to 
ameliorate the scope of the loss.  It is only in those situations when the 
plaintiff is entitled to the expectancy and reasonable conduct by the 
plaintiff, post-breach, will not affect the expectancy that the mitigation 
principle is set aside. 
 
2. Confusion of the Insured’s Legal Position 
In an early case, Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co.,40 the court 
excused the non-breaching party (the insured) from a duty to mitigate.  
Imposing such a requirement the court thought might subject the insured to 
a claim by the breaching party (the insurer) that it (the insured) had violated 
terms of the insurance contract in the effort to mitigate, particularly the no-
settlement without insurer consent provision.41  The idea that mitigation 
does not require a party to undermine its legal right is well settled.  A party 
need not mitigate when doing so would compromise the mitigating party’s 
legal position vis-a-vis that party’s adversary.  For example, a party need 
not mitigate when seeking the remedy of specific performance because the 
duty to mitigate is directly inconsistent with the legal right.42 
To the extent that the insured faces a credible threat that mitigation 
efforts may compromise the claim against the insurer, no duty to mitigate 
should be imposed.  An insured who has been denied disability benefits 
because the insurer contends she is able to work should not be required to 
 
39 See Miller, 289 N.W. at 402.  For further discussion, see supra note 35. 
40 Noshey v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934). 
41 Id. at 810. 
42 Redman v. Dep’t of Educ., 519 P.2d 760, 769 (Alaska 1974) (finding that an 
employee is not required to accept alternative employment that would compromise 
her claim to reinstatement); Billetter v. Posell, 211 P.2d 621, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1949) (stating that one employed for a definite period of time, at an agreed rate and 
wrongfully discharged before the expiration of his period of employment may 
refuse his employer's offer of reinstatement when the acceptance of such an offer 
would amount to a modification of the original contract or to a waiver of his rights 
to recover according to its terms). 
2013 INSURED’S DUTY TO MITIGATE DAMAGES? 103 
seek and accept work to mitigate damages.43  Here, plaintiff’s efforts to 
mitigate damages (work) would compromise the merits of her legal claim 
that she is entitled to disability benefits because she cannot work.  
Mitigation adds nothing to the controversy.  Either the plaintiff can work – 
in which case she is not entitled to benefits – or she cannot work – in which 
case she is entitled to benefits.44  On the other hand, when no reasonable 
likelihood exists that mitigation would compromise the insured’s legal 
claim against the insurer, mitigation should not be precluded per se.  This 
will often be the case in the context of breach of the duty to defend.  The 
insurer’s breach of its duty to defend typically excuses the insured’s 
compliance with other terms and conditions of the policy such as the bar on 
settlements without the insurer’s consent.45  When the danger of confusing 
 
43 Moots v. Bankers Life Co., 707 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985) (“It 
is well known that severely disabled persons, for reasons of physical and mental 
health, are frequently encouraged by their physicians to take some type of work as 
therapy.  If insureds were able to follow such valuable medical advice only at the 
peril of losing their only real means of financial survival, we would create for the 
already disabled a heavy burden indeed.  Further, an opposite result would put all 
insureds at the absolute mercy of their insurers.  In such a situation, the insurer 
could simply terminate disability benefits, wait until the insured is driven by dire 
necessity to seek any kind of employment, and then justify the termination 
retrospectively based on the subsequent employment.  In a society which values 
work and applauds extraordinary effort by the handicapped such a result would be 
anomalous, to say the least.”).   
44 This is typically the case with disability insurance because the policies 
contain a “care and attendance” provision.  This provision requires the insured to 
be under the care and attendance of a physician to receive benefits.  Some courts 
have interpreted this provision as requiring the insured to abide by the physician’s 
recommendations regarding treatment to continue to be eligible to receive benefits.  
See Van Gemert, F. Supp. 2d at 1051  (applying California Law: a disability policy 
that requires an insured claiming benefits to be “under the care and attendance” of 
a physician cannot reflect an intent of the parties that the insurer will be obligated 
to pay benefits even if the insured stubbornly refuses the only appropriate “care” 
recommended).  Other courts, however, have read “care and attendance” provision 
as not requiring the insured to abide by a physician’s recommendation of surgery 
in order to retain benefits.  See Tittsworth v. Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 6 Tenn. App. 
206 (1927). 
45 McNicholes v. Subotnik, 12 F.3d 105, 108 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying 
Minnesota law) (“When an insurer denies coverage, an insured defendant does not 
breach his duty to cooperate by entering a settlement with the plaintiff that serves 
the insured’s best interests; indeed the defendant is expected to do so.”).  See Ellen 
Smith Pryor, Comparative Fault and Insurance Bad Faith, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1505, 
1525 (1994) (“[G]enerally, the insurer’s material breach of an express or implied 
duty will excuse the insured from complying with contractual duties.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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and/or compromising the insured’s legal claim against the insurer does not 
reasonably exist, the argument against mitigation is mooted. 
3. Lack of Connectivity Between Breach and Avoidable Losses 
 
It has been argued the failure to settle after the insurer’s refusal to 
defend its insured is not connected or sufficiently related to the loss; 
therefore, it should not be considered as reasonable, required mitigation.  
For example, one commentator argues: 
 
Failure to mitigate damages is a contract defense designed 
to reduce damages because the nonbreaching party failed 
to make reasonable and required efforts to minimize its 
losses.  It applies against a claim that a liability insurer 
wrongfully failed or refused to defend, but it includes only 
conduct going to the provision of a defense, such as the 
insured’s failure to hire a lawyer.  It does not include 
matters not directly related to the provision of a defense.  
The insured’s damages must flow as a result of the duty 
breached and as a result of the insured’s self-protective 
responses to that breach. Thus, there is no duty under these 
circumstances to “mitigate damages by effecting a 
favorable settlement…”46 
 
 There are necessarily constraints on the scope of the duty to 
mitigate, but these are normally framed in terms of reasonableness.  While 
it is true the insurer’s contractual duty to defend does not, by its terms, 
include a duty to settle, the issue is the insured’s proper response when the 
insurer breaches its obligation.  The breaching party’s duties do not define 
the measure of the non-breaching party’s mitigation obligation, which 
accrues after breach and is responsive to the conditions created by the 
breach.  Moreover, it is contestable that the duty to defend does not include 
a duty to settle; some courts have concluded that it does.47  Finally, treating 
 
46 DENNIS J. WALL, LITIGATION & PREVENTION OF INSURER BAD FAITH § 5.28 
(3d ed. 2011) (footnotes omitted). 
47 Goddard ex rel. Estate of Goddard v. Framers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 22 P.3d 
1224, 1227 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (“The duty to defendant includes the duty to settle 
the case within the policy limits if it would be reasonable to do so.”).  But see 
Mowry v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 385 N.W.2d 171, 187-88 (Wis. 1986) 
(Steinmetz, J., concurring) (distinguishing between contractual duties (defend and 
indemnify) from the extra contractual duty to settle).  See generally Cindie Keegan 
McMahon, Duty of Liability Insurer to Initiate Settlement Negotiations, 51 A.L.R. 
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loss mitigation (settlement) as distinct from the breach is hard to square 
with the reality that the insured is seeking compensation for the breach that 
is the equivalent to what, in theory, could have been avoided.  It is logically 
inconsistent to contend that the insured’s losses are not connected to the 
breach for mitigation purposes, when measured in terms of avoidable losses 
(mitigation), but are caused by the breach when measured in terms of 
damages. 
 
4.  Mitigation Deprives the Insured of the Right to Specific   
     Performance of the Insurer’s Contractual Obligations 
 
It is commonly recognized that no mitigation requirement attaches 
to a specific performance claim because a mitigation requirement is 
mutually exclusive to the claim.48  If the plaintiff must mitigate, the 
plaintiff will lose the right to claim the defendant’s contracted for 
performance.  Although specific performance is not a perfect fit to the 
usual insurer breach claim, the thinking underlying the specific 
performance exception appears to underlie much of the reluctance to 
recognize a mitigation obligation when the insured seeks damages for 
insurer breach. 
Jerry and Richmond identify a number of courts that have held, in 
the context of a breach of the duty to defend, that the duty to defend is 
excused because it is foreseeable that the non-breaching party (the insured) 
will not mitigate damages.49  Jerry and Richmond note that under this 
rationale these courts excuse the duty to mitigate only for general damages; 
the duty to mitigate is imposed as to consequential damages.  When the 
insurer breaches the duty to defend, the courts following this approach 
permit recovery up to policy limits (general damages) without imposing a 
mitigation requirement, but do impose such a requirement to the extent the 
insured seeks an excess-of-limits recovery (consequential damages).50  
                                                                                                                                      
5th 701 (1997) (noting split in authority whether duty to defendant includes the 
duty to settle). 
48 Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 783 N.W.2d 294, 311 (Wis. 
2010) (declining to impose a duty to mitigate on a seller who requests interest in 
addition to specific performance because recognizing such a duty would create 
practical that would effectively negate the availability of specific performance); 
see Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified 
Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 390 (1984) (“With specific 
performance there is no such obligation to mitigate, nor is it easy to see how such 
an obligation could be imposed under that contract remedy.”); see supra note 42.  
49 ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW §111(i) (5th ed. 2012). 
50 This same rationale appears in duty to pay cases.  See Miller, 289 N.W. at 
402.  For further discussion, see supra note 35. 
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Jerry and Richmond rightly question whether the distinction can be squared 
with the test of foreseeability the courts purport to apply: 
 
The logic apparently underlying this rule is that it is 
foreseeable at the time of contracting that the insured will 
be unable to provide her own defense if the insurer fails to 
do so.  The logic underlying recovery for the default 
judgment up to the policy limits but not in excess thereof is 
not as apparent.  Insureds understandably argue that the 
entire amount of the judgment is the consequence of the 
insurer’s breach, not just the portion within the policy 
limits.51 
 
Jerry and Richmond are correct that the distinction drawn by courts is less 
than supportable under a foreseeability test; however, the limitation of the 
duty to mitigate to consequential damages is understandable when viewed 
through the lens of specific performance.  If the gist of the action is to 
require the insurer to perform its contractual obligations, e.g., provide/pay 
for a defense and indemnify the insured up to policy limits, imposing a 
mitigation requirement can be seen as detracting from the insurer’s 
contracted-for performance. 
 The specific performance argument is essentially the same as the 
“reasonable expectations” argument discussed earlier.52  The “no 
mitigation” position lacks traction here as it did there.  The fact is that the 
plaintiff is rarely suing for specific performance, which is equitable relief, 
or for temporary equitable relief, e.g., a preliminary injunction.  The 
insured is seeking compensation for the harm incurred by the insurer’s 
breach of its obligation.  Confusion arises because the insurer’s obligation 
is partially phrased in terms of an obligation to provide and pay for a 
defense and indemnify the insured.  When the insured seeks monetary 
compensation for the insurer’s breach of a duty to pay, it is easy to see how 
this may be equated to a performance like remedy.  That equating, 
however, is neither accurate nor helpful.  The insured does not seek an 
equitable remedy when suing the insurer for damages.  The ability of the 
plaintiff to be fully made whole by an award of damages militates against a 
finding that specific performance is an appropriate remedy.  The insured’s 
claim against the insurer is no different from a seller’s claim against a 
buyer.  In both cases the claims are for money damages resulting from a 
contract.  In neither case, absent a showing of irreparable injury, does the 
claim seek the actual performance due under the contract.  Rather, in both 
 
51 JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 49, at 828. 
52 See supra notes 23-39 and accompanying text. 
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cases, the claim seeks compensation for losses caused by the defendant’s 
breach. 
 It may be argued that, in the duty to defend context, insureds 
contract for a specific performance that only insurers can provide.  Insurers 
are sophisticated, repeat players in the defense of civil actions.  Insurers 
also employ experienced attorneys, at discount prices, to defend insureds.  
Insureds for the most part cannot duplicate these advantages that insurers 
bring to civil litigation defense.  This argument, while factually accurate in 
its assertions regarding insurer capabilities is misplaced when it comes to 
the issue of the insured’s duty to mitigate.53 
 The no mitigation position has some salience if the insured actually 
seeks specific performance of the insurer’s duty to defend to obtain the 
benefits listed above.54  In this context, the insured is claiming a specific 
performance (defense by the insurer) that would be negated if the insured 
was required to mitigate damages, such as by assuming the defense of the 
claim.  That is a rare occurrence.  Few insureds seek specific performance 
because it is unlikely a court would treat the injury alleged (failure of the 
insurer to provide a defense) as sufficiently unique and irreplaceable as to 
satisfy the irreparable injury requirement that is a precondition to equitable 
relief.55   
 A defense by counsel retained by the insurer is not likely to be 
meaningfully different from a defense by counsel retained by the insured. 
This is not to denigrate the experience and competence of retained defense 
 
53 An anonymous reviewer suggested this perceptive argument while the 
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal was considering this article for publication. 
54 See XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Level Global Investors, L.P., 874 F. Supp. 2d 
263, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that insurer’s failure to pay defense costs 
under a professional liability policy at the time they were incurred constituted an 
immediate and direct injury sufficient to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement 
for preliminary injunction). 
55 See Dover Steel Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 806 F. Supp. 63, 
66-67 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that insured had an adequate remedy at law by way 
of damages for insurer’s failure to pay defense costs; moreover, granting 
preliminary injunction would give the insured the very relief the insured was 
seeking in the litigation); cf. Weathersby v. Gore, 556 F.2d 1247, 1258-59 (5th Cir. 
1977): 
 
Weathersby was adequately protected from any damages 
occasioned by Gore’s breach of the contract, if any occurred.  He 
could have acquired additional cotton on the open market when 
Gore informed him he would no longer perform under contract.  
He did not do so and thus, if entitled to damages at all, must 
settle for the difference between the contract and the market 
price at the time Gore cancelled. 
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counsel hired by insurers.  It simply reflects the reality that an insured who 
can mitigate damages, i.e., has the resources to retain defense counsel, 
faces no significant impediment to securing competent legal assistance.  Of 
course, if the insured lacks the financial resources to secure counsel, the 
mitigation issue is elided.  The insured need not do what he is not 
reasonably able to do.  If the insurer’s refusal to defend is deemed 
wrongful, the insurer will ultimately reap the consequences of its 
shortsighted decision. 
 Even if retained defense counsel provided by the insurer were 
deemed qualitatively better than defense counsel that would be retained by 
the insured, it is questionable whether a court would specifically enforce 
the insurer’s duty to defend. A court might have reservations about its 
ability to specify in sufficient detail the insurer’s obligations if specific 
performance was ordered.  What after all is the content of the duty to 
defend?  An order that the insurer defend the insured, without further 
elaboration, would be vulnerable to the claim that the order was imprecise 
and uncertain.56  Providing the required precision might involve the court in 
a degree of day-to-day supervision of the defense that courts would prefer 
to avoid.57  Should the order to defend specify whether depositions should 
be taken and, if so, of whom?  Should the order specify whether experts are 
to be retained and, if so, whom and how much should they be paid?  Should 
the order specify whether the matter should be jury tried, whether summary 
judgment motions should be filed, etc. How would a court determine 
whether the order to defend was being observed by the insurer?  Either the 
order would be massively detailed or the parties would be constantly before 
the court seeking clarification and instruction.  Neither approach is likely to 
encounter judicial favor.  
 If the insured seeks damages, as is generally the case when the 
insured fails to defend, the insured has conceded that monetary 
compensation is an adequate remedy for the insurer’s breach.  When 
damages become the issue, the focus is now properly directed on the actual 
cause of the monetary losses.  This brings into consideration the issue of 
mitigation, which asks no more than who (plaintiff or defendant) was the 
 
56 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 36, §2.8(7), at 12 (noting that “as a matter of 
substantive and procedural justice” injunctions must be clear and understandable as 
to what the defendant must or must not do, otherwise the injunction is not valid); 
FISCHER, supra note 3, §34, at 1 (“An injunction must be ‘specific and definite’ if 
it is to be enforceable.”). 
57 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 36, §2.5(4), at 12 (noting traditional judicial 
reluctance to issue orders in private disputes that require substantial judicial 
oversight); FISCHER, supra note 3, §24, at 1 (noting traditional judicial reluctance 
to issue orders in private disputes that require substantial judicial oversight). 
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actual cause of the monetary losses the plaintiff seeks to recover.58  
Whether the plaintiff (insured) acted reasonably in seeking to mitigate 
damages post-breach is not the issue here – although it clearly will play a 
significant role in actual cases.  The issue here is whether there is a duty to 
mitigate at all, which is anterior to the question whether the plaintiff 
properly discharged that duty. 
 Insureds contract for specific types of performances by insurers.  
The failure on the insurer’s part to provide that performance does not mean 
that the insured’s claim for damages is analogous to a specific performance 
claim. Insurance contract exceptionalism, insofar as the duty to mitigate is 
concerned, must turn on public policy factors that are unique to insurance 
contracts. It is to that issue, this paper now turns. 
 
5.  Insurer Bad Faith Should Excuse the Duty to Mitigate 
 
Should the duty to mitigate turn on whether the insurer acted in bad 
faith?59 The mitigation obligation has not been deemed to turn on the 
defendant’s state of mind or motivation for breaching its legal obligation. 
This follows from the causal underpinnings of the mitigation requirement,60 
which applies independently from the defendant’s motivation and state of 
mind. There is some support for excusing the mitigation requirement when 
the defendant engages in intentional misconduct,61 but this exception is 
buttressed on the thesis that the mitigation requirement should not require 
the plaintiff to surrender a right of substantial value, e.g., submit to 
extortionistic demands to mitigate damages.62 As discussed previously, in 
the insurance context a mitigation requirement does not require the plaintiff 
insured to surrender a right of substantial value.63 
Excusing the duty to defend when the insurer acted in bad faith 
would be difficult to implement as a practical matter. The line that 
separates simple breach from bad faith breach is difficult to define in 
practice. Disagreement whether insurer conduct evidenced bad faith or not 
 
58 See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see infra notes 65-66 and 
accompanying text. 
59 The reviewer of this article perceptively raised this question. 
60 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918(2) (1977). 
62 Compare Sinclair v. Fotomat Corp., 189 Cal. Rptr. 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983), ordered not published per Cal. R. Court 976(c) (requiring plaintiff to pay 
illegal charge of $1 to reacquire his property (film) in order to mitigate his 
damages), with O’Brien v. Isaacs, 116 N.W.2d 246 (Wis. 1962) (requiring plaintiff 
to pay $1 illegal charge to retrieve his property (car)). 
63 See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.   
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is endemic among lawyers and commentators.64 And even if a bad faith 
exception were recognized, the determination whether the breach was in 
bad faith or not would occur long after the time mitigation would have 
practical value. An insured who by passed a reasonable opportunity to 
mitigate in effect assumes the risk that the court will ultimately conclude 
the insurer acted in bad faith. If the court finds that the insurer breached, 
but the breach did not amount to bad faith, the insured would be deemed to 
have failed to mitigate. One suspects that even if a bad faith exception to 
the duty to mitigate was recognized in theory, insureds who could mitigate 
would mitigate rather than assume the risk that they would be exposed to a 
ex post mitigation requirement.  
 
D. SHOULD INSUREDS BE REQUIRED TO MITIGATE WHEN SEEKING 
DAMAGES CAUSED BY INSURER BREACH? 
 
The duty to mitigate is modernly predicated on the belief that 
losses resulting from a legal wrong should be minimized and that 
regardless of the initial cause of the loss, when a party could, through 
reasonable care, ameliorate an existing loss, the law should incentivize that 
party to act.65  The basic principle is one of legal responsibility for loss that 
reasonable conduct could have avoided.66 
 The idea that a plaintiff must always seek to reduce his losses 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence has not been enthusiastically 
embraced by all commentators.  Professor Dobbs, for example, argued that 
mitigation is not required in two situations: (1) when a party bargains to 
avoid the requirement and (2) when enforcement of a mitigation 
 
64 Bad faith is an imprecise label for what is essentially unreasonable insurer 
conduct.  See Sharon Tennyson & William J. Warge, The Law and Economics of 
FirstParty Insurance Bad Faith Liability, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 203, 208 (2009) 
(noting uncertainty over proper standard to determine whether an insurer has 
engaged in bad faith regarding a coverage decision and discussing various 
approaches used by courts to address the issue). 
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §350 cmt. a (1981) (stating that 
the policy behind the mitigation requirement is to encourage parties to avoid 
further loss); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §918 cmt. c (1977) (stating 
that mitigation principle is based on principle of causation; the party that fails to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent further loss should bear the loss that party has 
caused). 
66 See Douglas H. Cook, Personal Responsibility and the Law of Torts, 45 AM. 
U.L. REV. 1245, 1252 (1996) (noting that the mitigation is one of a number of 
common law doctrines that allocated to the plaintiff’s responsibility for losses 
sustained through the actions of another). 
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requirement would encourage breach.67  More directly, Dobbs suggested 
that these principles were particularly relevant to insurance contracts.  First, 
insureds, as a group, bargain for a specific performance that a mitigation 
requirement would negate.  Second, a mitigation requirement would subject 
insureds to opportunistic leverage by the insurer.  Dobbs’s first argument, 
exemplified by the duty to defend cases, that the insured has contracted for 
a specific performance – a defense, which a mitigation requirement would 
negate, has already been addressed in this paper.  While insureds no doubt 
bargain for a specific performance, insureds are no different from all 
contracting parties who bargain for specific performances by their 
reciprocal contracting parties. Bargaining for a specific performance is, 
however, vastly different from the remedy of specific performance and 
Dobbs unfortunately confuses the two.  
Dobbs’s second argument is evidenced by the disability insurance 
cases.  Here, the insured has contracted for benefits because he is unable to 
engage in certain types of gainful employment; yet, a mitigation 
requirement would require him to work and, at the same time, provide the 
insurer with some evidence that the insured is not disabled and not entitled 
to continuing benefits.  Dobbs argues that a mitigation obligation would 
require the plaintiff to undermine his or her own claim and, thus, 
incentivize insurers to deny claims in the hope that the plaintiff’s mitigation 
effort would demonstrate the correctness of the denial.  In this sense Dobbs 
treats the mitigation requirement as opportunistic (my characterization not 
Dobbs) in that it allows the insurer to use the requirement to force the 
insured to undermine her own claim. 
 The “no mitigation” argument relieves the insured of any duty to 
exercise reasonable care to reduce his losses.  The problem is carving out a 
“no mitigation” requirement exception for insurance contracts cannot be 
justified by treating insurance contracts as different from other contracts 
without identifying a reason for different treatment.  The proponents of a 
“no mitigation” requirement have not done this.68  Every claim that is 
subject to a mitigation requirement presents the potential that the plaintiff’s 
efforts to mitigate will work against the overall success of the claim.  The 
landlord who must relet to mitigate damages defeats, to some extent, the 
claim against the tenant who abandons the leasehold, as does the buyer who 
must cover to mitigate losses when the seller breaches and refuses to 
 
67 1 DOBBS, supra note 36, §3.9, at 385. 
68 This is not to say that insurance contracts are not different in some respects 
from ordinary contracts.  I acknowledge that they are.  See supra notes 29-39 and 
accompanying text.  The issue is whether the differences warrant nonapplication of 
the general requirement that a plaintiff exercise a reasonable care to mitigate 
losses.  
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deliver contracted-for goods.  The insured who must mitigate is in no 
different position.  It is difficult to see how tenants or sellers are any more 
or less opportunistic than insurers when it comes to breach.   
 While a generalized, unproven concern regarding incentives to 
breach does not justify negating a mitigation requirement, there are 
situations when a mitigation requirement should not be recognized because 
it may confuse rather than enlighten. For example, in the disability cases 
there is usually a substantial overlap between the insurer’s claim the 
insured is not disabled and the mitigation issue – are there reasonable steps 
the insured could take to ameliorate the disabling condition. In some cases, 
a duty to mitigate should not be recognized because the mitigation 
requirement is directly at odds with the contentions raised by the insurer as 
to its coverage obligations. Cases such as Moots v. Bankers Life Company69 
illustrate this point. When the insurer contends the insurer can work and, 
therefore, is not disabled, imposing a mitigation requirement on the insured 
that the insured find work can be reasonably understood as tending to 
encourage the breach.  A mitigation requirement would give insurers unfair 
leverage in this situation. 
 Decisions like Heller70 and Miller71 are different, although the 
difference can be fine and nuanced. In these cases, there is some overlap 
between the insurer’s no coverage position and the mitigation obligation.  
In Heller the issue is whether the insured should submit to surgery to 
ameliorate the disabling condition (Carpal Tunnel Syndrome).  In Miller 
the issue is whether the insured should take insulin and watch his diet to 
control his disabling condition (diabetes).  In these cases the insurer is not 
contending, as in Moots, that the insured is not disabled; rather, the insurer 
is conceding present disability if the condition is untreated, but arguing that 
the insured has the means to end the disabling condition. The position 
argued here is that in the latter situation the mitigation requirement is 
properly imposed. An insured should be required to expend reasonable 
efforts to reduce damages.  
 One can justify the “no mitigation” rule in true specific 
performance cases because specific performance is an equitable remedy 
that requires that the remedy at law be inadequate.  In most cases, this 
requires that the subject matter for the contract be unique.  A mitigation 
requirement may be truly inconsistent with the plaintiff’s desired remedy 
because mitigation would deny the plaintiff the specific, unique thing that 
was contracted for initially and for which money is not an adequate 
substitute.  Insurance contracts are, on the other hand, all about money.  
 
69 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
70 Heller, 833 F.2d 1253, discussed supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
71 Miller, 289 N.W. 399, discussed supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
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There is nothing unique about the subject matter of the insurer’s 
performance.72 While an insurer’s performance itself may not be 
substitutable because, in most cases, the insured cannot purchase a 
substitute insurance policy to cover a known, existent loss;73 the fact 
remains that the insurer’s performance is essentially an obligation to pay 
money, whether for a defense or for indemnity, and money is not unique. 
 Insurance contracts are different in some respects from other 
contracts and this has caused courts to treat them differently, particularly 
insofar as remedies for breach as concerned.  I offered several doctrinal 
justifications for this approach in a prior paper.74 Because of these 
differences, many courts permit tort-based75 or extra-contractual remedies76 
 
72 See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.   
73 ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW §5.3(a), at 475 
(1988) (stating that it is a basic principle that insurance cover only the risk of 
fortuitous loss); 1A COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D §13:15 (2010) (“When the insured 
knows or has reason to know when it purchases a policy of insurance that there is a 
substantial probability that it will suffer or has already suffered a loss, the risk 
ceases to be contingent and becomes an uninsurable “known loss.”); see Foley v. 
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 39596 (Cal. 1988) (noting the special 
dilemma faced by an insured who cannot secure replacement insurance to cover 
the same loss). 
74 James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of 
Interpretation: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995 (1992) (noting, for 
example, the (1) quasipublic status of insurers, (2) informational asymmetry 
between insurer and insured, and (3) the desire to require insurers to internalize the 
costs of breach, among others). 
75 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 6062 (4th ed. 
2010) (stating that if the insurer refuses or delays payment in bad faith, the insured 
may recover consequential and punitive damages for nonpayment of a legitimate 
claim); Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in FirstParty Insurance 
Transactions: Refining the Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the 
Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 2226 (1992) (describing the 
creation of the tort of insurer bad faith); see generally A. S. Klein, Annotation, 
Insurer’s Liability for Consequential or Punitive Damages for Wrongful Delay or 
Refusal to Make Payments Due Under Contracts, 47 A.L.R.3d 314 (1973).  
76 BiEconomy Market, Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York, 886 N.E.2d 
127, 132 (N.Y. 2008) (holding that an insured may recover consequential damages 
flowing from an insurer’s breach of an insurance contract); the traditional rule in 
the United States when a breaching party failed to pay a claim was to limit the 
nonbreaching party’s recovery to the sum owed but not paid by the breaching 
party, plus delay damages in the form of prejudgment interest.  See, e.g., Loudon v. 
Taxing Dist., 104 U.S. 771, 774 (1881) (holding that an aggrieved party in a 
contract action is entitled only to the amount owed and any interest that has 
accrued during the delay period).  See generally 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §1410, at 60406 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d 
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to discourage opportunistic breaches by insurers.  Would a mitigation 
requirement encourage insurers to breach? If so, this would support not 
imposing such a requirement on insureds.  
 There is no empirical evidence one way or the other as to whether a 
mitigation requirement has any impact on the insurer’s decision to breach.  
It is reasonable to suppose that any rule that reduces the cost of breach 
produces some incentive, to a rational actor, to breach, all other things 
being equal.  This supposition may not, however, reflect the actual world of 
insurer breaches.  All other things are rarely equal and the incremental push 
toward breach that a mitigation requirement could provide in theory may be 
too small to measure in practice, much less attribute significance to in 
calculating legal responses.  For example, the threat of consequential and 
punitive damages for breach may nullify any offsetting benefits a rational 
insurer could derive from breach.  The assumption that the insurer acts 
rationally in deciding whether to breach may also be questioned.  Insurers 
are large, diverse organizations and identifying how a decision is made, 
much less why it was made, may be challenging.  Moreover, rationality 
may be compromised or preempted by cognitive biases that distort decision 
making and result in decisions inconsistent with the actual facts and not in 
the best interests of the insurer.  Incentives don’t work effectively unless 
the responding parties understand the signal the incentive is sending.  
 While one must be respectful of known unknowns, the lack of 
empirical evidence and the uncertainty of reasoned speculation cuts both 
ways; a mitigation requirement is neither supported nor derailed.  
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, the position taken here is that a 
mitigation requirement should be imposed on the insured for the following 
reasons. 
 First, mitigation does not impose a heavy burden on the insureds.  
An insured must act reasonably to mitigate breach related losses.77  
Moreover, what is reasonable is determined based on the facts realistically 
available to the insured when mitigation is required.78  A party who makes, 
with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, a bad choice does not fail to mitigate 
damages if the choice was reasonable under the circumstances as they 
existed at the time of the party acted.79 
                                                                                                                                      
ed. 1968) (citing several cases in which the only relief awarded in a suit for 
nonpayment of a debt was the debt itself plus interested from the time due); 
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §139, at 569 
n.28 (1935) (citing cases in which recovery for “normal damage” resulting from 
breach of contract to lend money was limited to excess costs incurred in securing a 
loan elsewhere). 
77 FISCHER, supra note 3, at 134. 
78 Id. 
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(2) cmt. b (1981). 
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 Second, mitigation does not require a party to do what that party 
cannot do.  It is a difficult proposition to sustain, as the “no mitigation” 
advocates must, that acting reasonably is undesirable.  If the insurer refuses 
to defend the insured, the insured need not reduce himself to poverty to 
defend the claim.80  Rather the insured may enter into a reasonable, non-
collusive settlement of the dispute even if the insured has a good defense to 
the claim.81  In disability insurance context, why should an insured be 
incentivized to reject reasonable efforts to reduce or cure the disabling 
condition?  In Miller v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York the court upheld 
the insured’s decision to refrain from taking insulin or following a 
physician recommended diet to control his disabling condition (diabetes) 
on the rationale the insured owed no duty to mitigate damages.82  What 
social policy is advanced here?  Recognizing a duty to mitigate would at 
least permit a trier-of-fact to assess whether the insured’s conduct was 
reasonable.  If the insured has a reasonable basis for not taking insulin or 
watching his diet, the mitigation requirement is met.  The “no mitigation” 
approach encourages unreasonable conduct.  How is that beneficial or a 
goal to be advanced by insurance law? 
 Third, mitigation doctrine has always been respectful of the right of 
the plaintiff to maintain his bodily and personal integrity, which need not 
be compromised to reduce the defendant’s damages exposure.  The plaintiff 
need not expose himself to risk nor must the plaintiff accept a materially 
different outcome as a substitute for the defendant’s promised 
performance.83  The mitigation requirement has always been tempered with 
the realization that the plaintiff’s mitigation obligation is not one that was 
voluntarily assumed, but is one that has been imposed by the defendant’s 
commission of a legal wrong.  In this regard, courts and juries tend to give 
plaintiffs substantial space by viewing the reasonableness requirement 
elastically and with a pro-plaintiff bias.84  Concerns that a mitigation 
requirement will provide insurers with a cudgel they can use to attack their 
insureds are unrealistic. 
 
80 See Damron v. Sledge, 460 P.2d 997, 999 (Ariz. 1969) (stating that when 
the insured is exposed by his insurer “to the sharp thrust of personal liability . . . 
[h]e need not indulge in financial masochism”). 
81 See Arizona Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Fund v. Helme, 735 P.2d 451, 460 
(Ariz. 1987) (holding that insurer breach permits the insured to enter into a 
reasonable settlement, as long as the settlement is not fraudulent, collusive, or 
against public policy).  2 WINDT, supra note 14, §6.29, at 6236.  
82 Miller, 289 N.W. at 402. 
831 DOBBS supra note 36, § 3.9, at 382 (“The plaintiff is not required to accept 
great risks, undertake heroic measures, or accept great personal sacrifice to 
minimize damages for the benefit of the defendant.”).  
84 See FISCHER, supra note 3, at 135. 
116 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 20.1 
 Fourth, it is difficult to avoid the force of the basic argument that 
the insured should act reasonably, when he can do so to mitigate damages.  
It may be argued that greater damages will result in a greater sanction and, 
thus, greater deterrence to insurer breach.  There is, no doubt, some truth to 
the basic proposition, but the question courts must ask is how much 
sanction can one impose before the sanction loses its compensatory 
element and become punitive?  And even if a punitive measure of damages 
is warranted, is encouraging the insured to act unreasonably a good method 
of punishing the insurer for its breach? 
 Fifth, courts have not extended the “no mitigation” rule to 
contractual expectancies that contain a durational element. By a durational 
element I mean a contract that envisions that a party’s performance will 
extend over a period of time. A contract of sale is usually not a durational 
contract because it envisions a specific closing date when performance is 
due. Employment contracts are examples of contracts that are durational.85 
The bargained for earnings are a contract expectancy, yet since the 19th 
century courts have imposed a mitigation obligation on the non-breaching 
employee. The underlying reason here was moral concerns over 
encouraged idleness and abnegation of a social duty to be a productive 
member of society.  Insurance contracts often possess this durational 
element. In the liability and disability insurance context where the 
mitigation argument has been most frequently claimed and challenged, the 
insurer’s obligations are often continuing, for example, the providing of a 
defense to a claim against the insured or the providing of periodic 
payments to an insured. In this sense, insurance contracts possess an 
element that aligns them with employment contracts. 
 This common element supports assigning a mitigation requirement 
to insureds even though they are seeking nothing more than the 
performance that was promised them under the insurance contract.  The 
durational element creates the opportunity post-breach for the insured to 
reduce the quantum of loss.  Because the loss is ongoing, mitigation efforts 
parallel the onset of each loss producing event.  And because the insurance 
contract is designed to indemnify against loss, rather than produce a 
windfall, mitigation efforts directly correlate with both the actual 
realization of loss and the quantification of that loss.  The insured has 
meaningful control over the realization or size of the loss.  This is a valid 
reason for requiring the insured to act reasonably to mitigate that loss. 
 A reviewer of this Article raised the provocative question whether 
instead of imposing a duty to mitigate on insureds a better approach would 
be to require insurers to timely commence declaratory relief actions when 
coverage disputes arise between the insurer and the insured. Quicker 
 
85 See Id. at 136-39. 
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resolution of coverage disputes would address some of the concerns raised 
in this paper.  Unfortunately, use of declaratory relief is unlikely to affect 
the mitigation issue unless the insurer is required to perform under the 
insurance contract (e.g., pay or defend) until the declaratory relief action is 
resolved.  Insurers are unlikely to accept this as a fair resolution of the 
controversy.  Absent the imposition of an ongoing duty to perform, 
institution of declaratory relief does not avoid the mitigation issue. 
Litigation tends to be a long, drawn out process, to which declaratory relief 
is no exception.86 During that time period, the insured may be able to 
ameliorate his losses by exercising reasonable care.  The position asserted 
in this Article is that when that situation presents, the insured should be 
required to exercise reasonable care to do so. If he does not, his recovery 
should be reduced pro tanto. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
 
The duty to mitigate has been aptly described as “an application of 
common sense.”87 Rejecting a duty to mitigate adopts the views that 
damages post-injury should be augmented rather than lessened.  Mitigation 
asks no more of the plaintiff than to act reasonably under the circumstances 
to ameliorate the plaintiff’s own injuries.  That is not an unreasonable 
expectation.  If the plaintiff fails to act reasonably, that is ample 
justification to hold the plaintiff responsible for the resulting losses 
reasonable care would have avoided. 
  
 
86 In some jurisdictions, courts defer resolving declaratory relief claims (e.g. 
no duty to defend) until the related litigation (claim against the insured for which 
the insured seeks a defense) is resolved.  See Johansen v. California State Auto. 
Ass’n InterIns. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744, 752 (Cal. 1975) (holding that the insurer 
does not have right to delay trial of a personal injury action in which its insured is a 
defendant pending resolution of a declaratory relief action in which the issue of 
coverage is to be determined); cf. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Rombough, 180 N.W.2d 775, 
778 (Mich. 1970) (holding that permitting insurer to pursue declaratory relief 
would impede resolution of the underlying lawsuit). 
 In these jurisdictions, resort to declaratory relief would not help resolve 
the mitigation issue.  Other jurisdictions take the opposite approach, seeing 
declaratory relief as an expeditious means of reducing confusion and avoiding 
needless delay and expense.  See Elliot v. Donahue, 485 N.W.2d 403, 406 (Wis. 
1992) (requiring insurer to institute declaratory relief action to resolve coverage 
dispute with insured).  See generally Davis J. Howard, Declaratory Judgment 
Coverage Actions: A Multistate Survey and Analysis and State Versus Federal Law 
Comparison, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 13 (1994).  
87 3 JACOB A. STEIN, PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 18:1 (3d ed. 
2012). 
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This article discusses the newly drafted “Principles of European Insurance 
Contract Law” (PEICL). The article explores the possibility of the PEICL 
becoming an optional legal instrument that parties to an insurance 
contract may use as an alternative to relaying on the laws of the various 
Member States in the European Union.  The article includes an in-depth 
investigation of the PEICL and concludes that while the draft language 
could benefit from certain adjustments, it nonetheless offers a strong basis 
for discussion amongst policymakers in the European Union and the U.S. 
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
From a U.S. perspective it used to be quite a difficult task to become 
acquainted with the main principles that govern insurance contract law 
within the European Union, as each of the twenty-seven Member States have 
their own law, and in addition the legal traditions that are reflected in these 
laws vary considerably.  However a recent initiative for a European 
Insurance Contract Law has changed the situation.  This set of rules has been 
elaborated on the basis of a thorough comparative analysis of the existing 
laws.  The initiative, which has recently been expedited by the European 
Commission, has led to a draft statute that shall be discussed here, as it might 
offer some inspiration for future law reform in the U.S. and other countries. 
The initiative mentioned above has to be seen in the context of a 
broader project of a common European contract law.  This project has led 
to the publication of the so-called Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR).1 While only few references to insurance contracts can be found in 
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2011, pp. 51-75 ss. 
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1 PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODELS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT 
COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (2008) [hereinafter ‘DCFR’]; see generally 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
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the index of the DCFR, this does not mean that no detailed provisions 
regarding the common European insurance law could be found.  On the 
contrary, a “Project Group on a Restatement of European Insurance 
Contract Law”, founded by Fritz Reichert-Facilides and now led by Helmut 
Heiss, has drafted a comprehensive set of rules called the “Principles of 
European Insurance Contract Law” (PEICL).2 The draft dated 1 August 
2009 is accessible online under www.restatement.info. 
The PEICL rules are strongly connected to a project that has been 
discussed for decades within the European Union: the development of a 
common European insurance contract law.  As early as in 1979, the 
Commission published the first and quite ambitious draft of a Directive.3 
This draft included rules on classical insurance contract law topics such as 
the reduction of risk and the payment of premiums.  During the following 
decades, however, the Commission focused on the harmonization of the 
conflict of law rules for insurance contracts while the draft for a 
harmonization of material insurance contract law seemed to be almost 
forgotten.  
Now with the PEICL – following the DCFR – a new attempt has 
been made to develop a consistent European insurance law.  On January 17, 
2013 the European Commission set up an Expert Group that is aimed at 
analysing the need for a common insurance contract law.4 The main task of 
this Expert Group will be to examine whether differences in contract law 
pose an obstacle to cross-border trade in insurance products, and to identify 
such products. 
The PEICL are neither aiming at a European Directive, nor at a 
mere restatement of the law in force, but rather at an “optional instrument” 
which is at the disposition of the parties.  Thus the PEICL shall apply when 
the parties have agreed that their contract shall be governed by them (Art. 
1:102 PEICL).5 The technique of an “optional instrument” is remarkable in 
                                                                                                                 
Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Oct. 11. 2011), for the 
European Commission’s 2011 proposal of a common European sales law. 
2 See Hulmut Heiss, The Common Frame of Reference (CFR) of European 
Insurance Law, in CFR AND EXISTING EC CONTRACT LAW, 229 (Reiner Shulze ed., 
Sellier 2008). For more information on the goals and intentions of this project; see 
also Christian Armbruester, Das Versicherungsrecht im CFR 775, (2008) for a 
comparison to the reformed German Insurance Contract Law offer by the author. 
3 See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Coordination of 
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Insurance Contracts, 
O.J. C 190/2 (July 10, 1979). 
4  Commission Decision of 17 January 2013 on setting up the Commission 
Expert Group on a European Insurance Contract Law, 2013 O.J. C 16/6. 
5 Principles of European Insurance Contract Law art. 1:102 (2009) [hereinafter 
PEICL]. 
2013  EUROPEAN INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW  121 
several respects.  It gives parties a choice between the laws that govern the 
contract under Private International Law and an alternative set of rules.  At 
the same time if the PEICL turn out to be considered an attractive 
alternative to domestic law by the parties of insurance contracts this may 
encourage Member states to change their domestic laws in order to make 
them more attractive for those parties.  However until now the PEICL are 
just a proposal by a working group; they are not in any sense binding law. 
In order to provide such a choice for the parties, the European Union would 
have to formally admit such an “optional instrument”.  Today no one can 
predict the likelihood of such a step, by which Member states would put 
their national insurance contract laws at the disposal of the parties to the 
insurance contract.  In any case the PEICL provide an important basis for 
the further discussion about a common European insurance contract law.6 
  
A. DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE ESSENTIAL PARTS OF THE 
PEICL  
 
The draft of PEICL dated August 1, 2009 consists of four parts. 
Part One contains common provisions, Part Two comprises provisions 
common to indemnity insurance, Part Three focuses on provisions common 
to the insurance of fixed sums, and the final Part Four is dedicated to 
special provisions.  While Parts One and Two already contain a 
considerable number of provisions, there are no special provisions yet, and 
in Part Three, for the time being, only an enumeration of different 
insurances (Art. 14:101 PEICL) can be found. In the following analysis the 
provisions shall be both explained and critically assessed. 
 
II. COMMON PROVISIONS (PART ONE)  
 
A.   INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS (CHAPTER ONE) 
 
1. Application of the PEICL (Art. 1:101 – Art. 1:105 PEICL) 
 
Art. 1:101 PEICL clarifies that the PEICL shall apply to private 
insurance in general, including mutual insurance.  Their application to the 
highly professionalized area of reinsurance is excluded, as legal provisions of 
contract insurance law which are mandatory or half-mandatory (i.e., 
mandatory insofar as they offer an advantage for the insured) are, in general, 
                                                                                                                 
6 See Daniela Weber-Rey, Harmonisation of European Insurance Contract Law, 
in THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAWS, BUSINESS AND LEGAL PRACTICE 207 (Stefan Vogenauer 
& Stephen Weatherill eds., Hart Publishing 2006).    
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meant to protect the insured, whereas professional market participants such 
as insurers and reinsurers do not need such protection.  Therefore, 
professional participants do not need the type of general framework that 
PEICL provides because they have the sophistication and bargaining power 
to protect themselves when negotiating individual agreements. 
A very important rule concerning PEICL’s optional use – 
especially in context with the private international law – is contained in 
Art. 1:102 sentence 1 PEICL.  According to this provision the PEICL rules 
apply whenever the parties have agreed that their contract shall be 
governed by them (notwithstanding any limitations of choice of law under 
private international law).  This is necessary in case that – according to 
private international law – the contract is governed by the law of a state 
that is not a Member of the European Union and that state’s law does not 
allow parties to choose the PEICL.  
However it is not entirely clear whether any restrictions concerning 
the choice of law – in case the law of a Member state of the European 
Union governs the contract – also affect the PEICL.  As the PEICL are an 
“optional instrument” that is destined to become part of European law7 
(e.g., by regulation), any restrictions on the choice of law in the law of the 
Member states as shaped by the Rome I Regulation or the Directives 
concerning international insurance contract law cannot apply.8 Art. 1:102 
sentence 1 PEICL needs to confirm that outcome by more clearly stating 
that PEICL only refers to restrictions of the choice of law in non-EU states 
but not in Member states. 
According to Art. 1:102 sentence 1 PEICL, the possibility of 
agreeing on the application of the PEICL is independent from the 
connection of the contract to one or more Member states.  The PEICL are 
therefore applicable as well if the contract has no connection to more than 
just one Member state,9 notwithstanding the fact that the PEICL are aimed 
at harmonizing the different national insurance contract laws and thus at 
helping to realise the single European Market in the insurance sector.  Art. 
1:102 sentence 1 PEICL offers parties – even if they are doing business 
exclusively in their common domestic market – a second set of rules beside 
the domestic insurance contract law. This may indeed help to simplify the 
insurer’s actuarial calculations, especially with regard to risk pooling.10 At 
                                                                                                                 
7 See Heiss, supra note 2, at 242 (explaining what an “optional instrument” is); 
see also Jurgen Basedow, Der Gemeinsame Referenzrahmen und das 
Versicherungsvertragsrecht, in ZEITSCHRIFT FU?R EUROPA?ISCHES PRIVATRECHT 280, 
285 (2007). 
8 Heiss, supra note 2, at 240. 
9 Heiss, supra note 2, at 229, 240, 250.  
10 Heiss, supra note 2, at 229, 246.  
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the same time the PEICL compete with the national insurance law systems.  
If the PEICL are seen as a first step on the way towards a common 
European insurance law this might be considered to be an advantage, as the 
national legislators could be forced to adjust their national provisions at 
least in a few significant points.  However, it is uncertain whether Member 
states are willing to accept this type of pressure with respect to a sector that 
is only partly covered by the law-making competence of the European 
Union.11 Furthermore, it remains unclear if the parties to a contract that is 
related only to one single state will be ready to agree on the application of 
the PEICL, especially if national provisions are imperative.12 
It is very reasonable that the parties cannot agree just partly on the 
application of the PEICL, but that if they want them they have to agree on 
them as a whole.13 This rule prevents abuse14 and helps to keep contracts 
understandable and clear.  Furthermore fewer doublings or gaps are to be 
expected if there is only one law that governs the contract and if 
interpretation rules are the same for the whole contract.15  
It is a different question whether the PEICL are binding or whether 
they may be modified by agreement of the parties.  According to Art. 1:103 
(1) PEICL, some provisions which are not yet finally enumerated shall be 
mandatory. As Art. 1:103 (2) PEICL shows, the basic rule, however, is that 
the contract may derogate from all other provisions of the PEICL as long as 
such derogation is not to the detriment of the policyholder, the insured, or 
the beneficiary. Exceptions are made, generally speaking, for major risks as 
defined in European Directives16 as well.  
The rule of Art. 1:104 sentence 1 PEICL on interpretation of 
PEICL provisions states what may be considered as opinio comunis 
(common opinion) in European law.  Thus, interpretation is based on the 
wording, context, and purpose of the respective PEICL rule. Besides, the 
                                                                                                                 
11 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) does not grant 
the EU comprehensive law-making competence in the field of contract law but only 
with regard to specific issues such as consumer protection.  Von Christian 
Armbrüster, Ein Schuldvertragsrecht für Europa? Bemerkungen zur 
Privatrechtsangleichung in der Europäischen Union nach "Maastricht" und "Keck” 
in RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 72 (1996).   
12 Heiss, supra note 2, at 241. 
13 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 1:102 sentence 2. 
14  Heiss, supra note 2, at 229, 248; Petr Dobiáš, Insurance Soft Law?, in 
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW 287, 289-95 (Jürgen 
Basedow et al., 2009). 
15 Dobiáš, supra note 14, at 289, 295.  
16  Council Directive 73/239, art. 35, 1973-2013 O.J. (L 228) 3-19 (EC); 
Directive 2001/83, of the European Parliament and of the Council as of 5 November 
2002 concerning life insurance, 2002 O.J. (L 345) 1. 
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comparative background of the PEICL shall be taken into account.  This is 
essential as the PEICL are modelled on national provisions and have been 
developed on the basis of a comparative analysis of European principles of 
insurance law.  However, taking into account the comparative background 
may lead to some difficulties, especially as European law and the PEICL 
are to be interpreted autonomously, i.e., independently from national 
perceptions. Interpretation is made much easier by the comprehensive 
comparative remarks regarding the single rules that have been published 
along with the PEICL, including hints concerning possible alternatives that 
are discussed.17 
According to Art. 1:104 sentence 2 PEICL, good faith and fair 
dealing in the insurance sector is a key canon of interpretation, in addition 
to the principles of certainty in contractual relationships, uniformity of 
application,18 and the adequate protection of policyholders. Some of these 
canons have also been laid down in I.-I:102 DCFR, while some others are 
not expressly mentioned in the PEICL, e.g. the fundamental freedoms 
granted by the EU. 19  In this respect, harmonization seems necessary, 
especially with regard to the principle of protection of policyholders.  The 
latter is an indispensible element of the purpose of the provision, at least as 
mandatory provisions are concerned.  If a provision, on the other hand, is 
not meant to protect the policyholder, this criterion cannot be taken into 
account for the interpretation.  
As parties cannot agree on a partial application of the PEICL, no 
recourse to national law, whether to restrict or to supplement the PEICL, 
shall be permitted.20 An exception is made in Art. 1:105 (1) sentence 2 
PEICL for national laws specifically enacted for insurance branches which 
are not covered by special rules contained in the PEICL. Any questions 
arising from the insurance contract which are not expressly addressed in the 
PEICL are to be settled in conformity with the Principles of European 
Contract Law (PECL), and in the absence of relevant rules within that 
instrument, they shall be in accordance with the general principles common 
to the laws of the Member states. Obviously, the PEICL are not considered 
to be part of the PECL (now the DCFR). 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
17 PEICL, supra note 5; see also Jürgen Basedow & Till Fock, Europäisches 
Versicherungsvertragsrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2002). 
18 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 7. 
19 The four basic freedoms guaranteed by the EU to each citizen are the freedom 
of movement of goods, the freedom of movement of persons, the right of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union art. 34, 45, 49, 57, Mar. 25, 1957 O.J. (C. 83) [hereinafter TFEU]. 
20 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 1:105 (1). 
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2.  General rules (Art. 1:201 – 1:207 PEICL) 
 
Art. 1:201 PEICL and 1:202 PEICL contain some definitions of 
essential terms.  A number of important terms, however, are missing, e.g., 
“insurance money”21 or “insurance benefits”22, which are probably meant to 
be synonymous. 
Art. 1:203 (1) PEICL is modelled on the provisions on 
transparency contained in the Directive on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts.23 There are, however, no sanctions mentioned in case the insurer 
does not comply with these transparency requirements. Art. 1:203 (2) 
PEICL, modelled on Art. 5 (2) of the Directive,24 stating that any doubt in 
interpretation must be resolved in favour of the policyholder, cannot be 
seen as a sanction.  This is because there is a significant difference between 
transparency rules and interpretation rules.  An application of II.-9:402 (2) 
DCFR is possible but is not satisfactory, as the PEICL are meant to be an 
independent set of rules. 
Art. 1:203 (1) PEICL contains an important liberalization 
concerning the language of the contract.  Until now, European rules in the 
insurance sector have hardly dealt with the question of the language in 
which the documents provided by the insurer are to be offered.  It was 
considered a basic rule that the language of the Member state of the 
commitment 25  governed the whole contract.  Usually, the contract is 
provided in the language of the Member state of the residence of the 
policyholder.  According to Art. 1:203 (1) PEICL, all documents provided 
by the insurer shall be plain and intelligible and in the language in which 
the contract is negotiated.  With regard to language, this rule offers an 
advantage for the insurer, which is not forced to translate documents in all 
languages spoken in the place of residence of any future clients.  There is 
no express sanction for a breach of this rule, which is fine as it is to be 
expected that insurers will comply with the rule anyway.  As to the 
transparency requirement, this is governed by a separate rule, which 
provides sanctions for opaque wordings.26 
The burden of proving that the policyholder has received any 
documents to be provided by the insurer shall lie with the insurer.27 This 
                                                                                                                 
21 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:102(5).  
22 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 7:102.  
23 Council Directive 93/13, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29. 
24 Id.; see also Dobias, supra note 14, at 289-95. 
25 Directive 2001/83, of the European Parliament and of the Council as of 5 
November 2002 concerning life insurance, 2002 O.J. (L 345) 1. 
26 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:304. 
27 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 1:204.  
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provision might be misused by some policyholders, especially in cases 
when the beginning or expiration of a time limit depends on the receipt of 
the documents.  Nevertheless, this rule on the burden of proof does not 
appear to be inappropriate.  It is possible for the insurer to ensure the 
policyholder has received the documents, e.g. by using special methods of 
delivery or by asking the insured to confirm the receipt of documents.  
However, this can be costly, and in any case some risk of abuse remains.  
Therefore, Art. 1:204 PEICL should be modified and the proof relaxed, e.g., 
in case a policyholder repeatedly denies the reception of documents. 
The “imputed knowledge” Art. 1:206 PEICL deals with is of 
particular practical impact.  According to this provision, any knowledge 
persons entrusted by the policyholder have or ought to have is considered to 
be the knowledge of the policyholder.  This rule does not just aim at proxies 
of the policyholder, but includes any person somehow entrusted by him. 
Like the DCFR (II.-2:101 ff.), and unlike the PECL, the PEICL also 
include provisions concerning anti-discrimination.  They are modelled on the 
Gender28 and Anti-racism29 Directives.  Contrary to the Gender Directive, the 
PEICL does not prohibit all forms of gender-related distinctions.  Based on 
Art. 5 (2) of the Gender Directive, Art. 1:207 (1) PEICL admits distinctions 
to be made if “the insurer shows that proportionate differences in individuals’ 
premiums and benefits are based upon relevant and accurate actuarial and 
statistical data” (except for differences resulting from pregnancy and 
maternity).  However, Art. 1:207 (1) PEICL does not have exactly the same 
wording as the Gender Directive, as the latter expressly states that it is legally 
sufficient if gender-related differences are a determining factor.  
Notwithstanding that difference, it is only necessary that the gender is one 
factor among others.  This is due to the actuarial reality30 and to multi-
factorial calculation.31 However, as the ECJ held on December 21, 2012, Art. 
5 (2) of the Gender Directive is incompatible with EU anti-discrimination 
law as laid down in Art. 5 (1) of the Gender Directive, as well as in Art. 21, 
                                                                                                                 
28 Directive 2004/113, of the European Parliament and Council of 13 December 
2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the 
access to and supply of goods and services, 2004 O.J. (L 373) 37. 
29 Directive 2000/43, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 
2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22. 
30  See M. Wandt, Geschlechtsabhängige Tarifierung in der privaten 
Krankenversicherung 1341 (Marlene Danzl, 2009). 
31  See Christian Armbrüster, Bedeutung des Allgemeinen 
Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes für private Versicherungsverträge [Importance of the 
General Equal Treatment Act for Private Insurance Contract], 
VERSICHERUNGSRECHT (VERSR) 1297, 1300 (2006) (Ger.). 
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23 EU Charter, so that no gender-based distinctions are admissible,32 Art. 
1:207 (1) PEICL needs to be changed. 
Nationality, “racial” or ethnic origin may – the latter in accordance 
with the Anti-Racism Directive – never justify differences in individuals’ 
premiums and benefits.33 Any contract terms in breach of Art. 1:207 (2) 
PEICL, including those concerning the premium, are not binding on the 
policyholder or the insured.34 In such a case the contract continues to bind 
the parties on the basis of non-discriminatory terms.35 These two provisions 
leave it open whether the insurer shall be bound to the discriminatory terms 
or not. 36  This point needs to be clarified.  As a further sanction the 
policyholder shall be entitled to terminate the contract.37 This seems to be 
inconsistent: if the discriminatory terms are eliminated,38 there is no need 
for a termination of the contract.  The entitlement to terminate the contract 
could even lead to misuse: the policyholder gets the possibility to terminate, 
by referring to discrimination, a contract which he or she does not want to 
continue for quite different reasons.  It is true that the Directives demand 
sanctions that have to be “effective, proportional and dissuasive,” 39 the 
latter meaning that the sanctions need to have a deterring effect on the 
purveyors of services.  This, however, refers much more to indemnification 
than to a right of termination, as the discriminatory terms contain some 
kind of “attack” on personal dignity, which is based on factors like gender 
or ethnic origin.  An indemnification of that “attack” would be much more 
effective than the right to terminate the contract, and it would allow for a 
reaction that is proportionate to the intensity of the discrimination. 
Furthermore there are a certain number of other questions for 
which Art. 1:207 PEICL does not offer an answer.  This is partially due to 
the fact that the PEICL are only applicable if the parties agree on them.  If 
the conclusion of the contract is declined to an interested party in a 
discriminatory way, the PEICL are not applicable, and therefore no 
                                                                                                                 
32  See Case C-236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats 
ASBL v. Conseil des Ministres, 2011 E.C.R. I-00773.  In this case a Belgian 
consumer protection association as well as two male citizens challenged a Belgian 
law that, in accordance with Art. 5 (2) of the Gender Directive, allowed differences 
in premiums and conditions of insurance contracts based on gender. 
33 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 1:207(2).  
34 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 1:207(3).  
35 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 1:207(3).  
36 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 1:207(3) (compare sentence one with sentence 
two).  
37 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 1:207(4). 
38 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 1:207(3).  
39 Council Directive 2000/43, art. 15 sentence 2, 2000 O.J. (L180) (EC); Council 
Directive 2004/113, art. 8 sec. 2, 2004/113 (L373) (EC).   
128     CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL    Vol. 20.1 
provisions concerning an obligation to contract or a “culpa in contrahendo” 
are necessary.  However some answers should be given, e.g. whether a 
positive (or reversed) discrimination may be justified. 
It is wise that the PEICL limits the rules on discrimination to the 
criteria of nationality, ethnic or “racial” origin and gender.  This means that 
different treatments with regard to other criteria – especially of those 
included in the employment Directives – do not have to be individually 
justified, which is reasonable as insurance premiums are risk-based and 
therefore any insurance contract implies a need for differentiation.  
Nevertheless, it is to be expected that European anti-discriminatory 
legislation will be extended to different treatment based on age, disability, 
sexual identity and religion/belief as well.40 Any such future legislation 
concerning insurance contracts will have to be implemented in the PEICL. 
 
3.  Enforcement (Art. 1:301 – 1:302 PEICL) 
 
The final provisions of Chapter One deal with injunctions seeking 
an order to prohibit infringements of the PEICL.  The provisions refer to 
the Directive on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests.41 
However it has to be taken into consideration that this Directive’s scope of 
application is limited to consumer protection.  The entities mentioned in the 
Commission’s list of entitled entities usually serve the purpose of consumer 
protection, while the application of the PEICL may be agreed on by 
commercial parties as well.  Of course this does not mean that there might 
be a lack of legal protection, as in the commercial sector there is no need 
for any such specific protection. 
Art. 1:302 PEICL clarifies that the application of the PEICL does 
not preclude access to other out-of-court complaint and redress 
mechanisms otherwise available to the policyholder.  This is important 
especially with regard to the Ombudsman systems which have been 
established in many Member states.  As to the recourse to State courts or to 
arbitration, the PEICL offer no specific rule.42 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
40 See Resolution on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Implementing the 
Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Religion or belief, 
Disability, Age, or Sexual Orientation, COM (2008) 0426, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA 
(2009) 0211.  
41 Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 
1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests 1998 O.J. (L 166). 
42 See Heiss, supra note 2, at 239 sec. (f).  
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A. INITIAL STAGE AND DURATION OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT 
(CHAPTER TWO) 
 
1.  Applicant's Pre-contractual Information Duty (Art. 2:101 –  
     2:105 PEICL) 
 
For the decision whether and with which contents to conclude a 
contract the insurer obviously needs some risk-related information from the 
applicant.  Art. 2:101 PEICL deals with the applicant’s duty of disclosure.  
The applicant has to inform the insurer about the circumstances of which 
he is, or ought to be, aware, including such circumstances of which the 
person to be insured was or should have been aware.  Art. 2:101 PEICL 
limits the duty to those circumstances which have been subject to clear and 
precise questions that have been put forward to the applicant by the insurer.  
Nevertheless, in case of any inaccurate additional information given to the 
insurer, there are the same sanctions that apply to information given in 
fulfilment of the duty of disclosure.43  
In the case of fraudulent breach of the duty of disclosure, the insurer 
is entitled to terminate the contract and to retain the right to any premium 
due.44 In any other case, the insurer is entitled to propose a “reasonable” 
variation of the contract.45 In that case the contract will be continued on the 
basis of the variation proposed for the future, unless the policyholder rejects 
the proposal within one month.46 Termination of the contract by the insurer is 
only possible if the policyholder is not in innocent breach of his duty of 
disclosure or if the insurer proves that the contract would not have been 
concluded had he known of the information concerned.  Whether the 
information was “material” in the decision to conclude the contract has to be 
determined, according to Art. 2:103 (b) PEICL.  The question is whether a 
“reasonable insurer” would have considered the circumstances to be essential 
for the decision to enter into the contract. 
These provisions should be reconsidered.  It is hard to understand 
why an insurer should only be entitled to terminate the contract in case of 
fraudulent breach of the duty of disclosure, and why there should be no 
                                                                                                                 
43 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:105.   
44 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:102.   
45 Concerning the insurer’s duty to provide information, the wording of PEICL 
art. 2:102(1)-(2) refers on the one hand to the intention of the insurer and on the other 
hand to the decision; but in fact, the meaning here is the same as both times the 
PEICL refer to the chosen legal consequence. 
46 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:102 (2) (referring to the agreement of the 
parties, but obviously means that the policyholder does not reject according to Art. 
2:102 (2)). 
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right of rescission.47 However, at least the insurer shall be entitled to avoid 
the contract according to Art. 2:104 PEICL.  
Even more important is a second point which concerns the criterion 
of the “reasonable insurer”.  This new creature seems questionable.  First of 
all there is no need for it.  In addition it appears to be highly problematic to 
introduce objective criteria – such as the “reasonable insurer” – while trying 
to establish the (hypothetic) intention of the individual insurer concerned.  A 
policyholder who breaches his duty of disclosure may, if the criterion of the 
“reasonable insurer” is applied, obtain an undeserved advantage compared to 
an honest policyholder.  The latter probably has to pay higher premiums than 
the former, accept surcharges or even risk that the insurer might refuse to 
conclude the contract.  It is absolutely sufficient to limit private autonomy by 
applying the general contract law principles (anti-discrimination rules, semi-
mandatory provisions, etc.), and not by asking what a “reasonable insurer” 
might consider to be appropriate. The objective approach of the PEICL 
would lead to a general control of the contract terms in case of breach of the 
duty of disclosure, while in the case that the duty is fulfilled according to the 
PEICL, no such control takes place.  This would lead to unequal treatment, 
and any such control regarding the adequacy of the terms would be 
incoherent with the principle of private autonomy. 
Some exceptions to the duty of disclosure are made in Art. 2:103 
PEICL.  According to lit. d of this provision, the sanctions shall not apply 
in respect to information which the insurer was or should have been aware.  
In this matter it can be difficult to draw the lines, e.g. if a policyholder 
features various risks that are covered by the same insurer.  The PEICL 
offer no further details, so that this will be a task of the courts. 
 
2.  Insurer's Pre-contractual Duties (Art. 2:201 – 2:203 PEICL) 
 
There exist a wide range of pre-contractual duties of the insurer, 
especially the duty to provide information before the applicant has decided 
on the contract.  Art. 2:201 PEICL is modelled on several European 
Directives.  This rule says that the insurer has to provide the applicant with 
a copy of the proposed contract terms, as well as with a document that 
includes further information about a number of circumstances if relevant.  
According to paragraph 2, the information shall be provided – “if possible” 
– in sufficient time to enable the applicant to consider whether or not to 
conclude the contract.  Although this is not expressly stated in the text, the 
purpose of the provision is to enable the applicant to decide on the basis of 
the information rendered by the insurer.  This is in accordance with the 
                                                                                                                 
47 Especially as, according to PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:102 (5), the insurer 
is released from the obligation to perform only in case of negligence.  
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European Directives, which are based on the concept of a well-informed, 
reasonable consumer.48 Apart from that, it is only the title of Art. 2:201 
PEICL that clarifies that the duties mentioned have to be fulfilled prior to 
the conclusion of the contract. 
The scope of application of this provision, as well as the question of 
how a breach of duty is sanctioned, remains unclear.  As to the scope of 
application, Art. 2:402 PEICL states that Art. 2:201-203 PEICL do not apply 
to preliminary insurance contracts.  However it is an open question as to how 
distance selling contracts are to be treated. Taking into account that “if 
possible” the information shall be provided “in sufficient time” to enable the 
applicant to consider whether or not to conclude the contract, it is likely that 
there will have to be a control regarding the circumstances of every single 
contract.  In this context a certain standardisation is desirable. As far as the 
sanctions are concerned, the time limit for the avoidance of the contract 
according to Art. 2:303 (1) PEICL starts with the receipt of the insurer’s 
acceptance or delivery of the documents enumerated in Art. 2:501 PEICL.49  
The insurer has to warn the applicant of any inconsistencies 
between the coverage offered and the applicant’s requirements.50  Upon 
closer inspection of Art. 2:202 PEICL, it becomes obvious that this 
provision establishes a comprehensive duty of the insurer to advise the 
applicant, including an initial identification of his needs and wishes with 
regard to the risk coverage, and to give a recommendation.  It is remarkable 
that the insurer has to take into consideration the circumstances and mode 
of contracting and, in particular, the fact whether the applicant has been 
assisted by an independent intermediary. However, it is hardly 
understandable why there should be a duty to advise the applicant, even if 
he has been assisted by an independent intermediary.  This is especially 
true given that the intermediary is himself liable according to the European 
Directive on insurance mediation.51 
Finally, the insurer immediately has to warn the applicant that the 
coverage does not commence until the contract is concluded and, if 
applicable, the first premium is paid,52 if the applicant mistakenly believes 
that the coverage begins earlier.  This article does not just represent a 
special case of the duty to give advice, as the insurer’s duty depends on the 
error of the applicant. 
 
                                                                                                                 
48 See also DCFR, supra note 1, at sec. II-3:102 (1). 
49 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:303(3)   
50 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:202 (1).   
51 See Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 
December 2002 on insurance mediation, 2002 O.J. (L 9). 
52 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:202(1).  
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3.  Conclusion of the Contract (Art. 2:301 – 2:304 PEICL) 
 
According to Art. 2:301 PEICL, the insurance contract need not be 
concluded or evidenced in writing.  This provision was modelled on the 
basic rule in II.-I:107 (1) DCFR. 53  It is, however, of no practical 
importance as insurance contracts are usually concluded in writing. 
Much more important is the right to revoke a contract.  While 
according to Art. II.-402 DCFR revocation is possible until the insurer has 
declared acceptance of the applicant’s offer,54 according to Art. 2:302 PEICL, 
the applicant may revoke the contract if the revocation reaches the insurer 
before the applicant has received an acceptance from the insurer.  In addition, 
Art. 2:303 PEICL grants the applicant a right to revoke the contract within 
two weeks after receipt of acceptance or delivery of the documents referred 
to in Art. 2:501 PEICL.  There are no further requirements for this right to 
revoke, and only a few exceptions.  Both provisions offer the applicant the 
possibility to withdraw from the contract for any reason or motive, even after 
the insurer has received the applicant’s offer. 
It is arguable why an offer that has been consciously and validly 
declared shall remain close to non-committal.  This seems extraordinary, 
especially if one keeps in mind the wide range of duties that the insurer 
already has to fulfil before the contract is concluded. This comprehensive 
right to revoke the contract appears questionable if the applicant, e.g., as an 
entrepreneur, doesn’t need any protection. Even major risks are not 
excluded from the right of revocation. 
Art. 2:304 PEICL is modelled on the European Directive on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts. 55  Therefore, the provisions regarding a 
significant imbalance of rights and obligations, as well as the exceptions 
concerning the premium and the essential description of the covered risk 
and terms individually agreed on, can be considered as European standard.  
However, according to Art. 2:304 paragraph 3 lit. b PEICL, the principle 
that the terms have to be in plain and intelligible language is only 
applicable on terms stating the essential description of the coverage granted.  
This allows the conclusion that any other term that is not in plain and 
intelligible language might cause a significant imbalance in rights and 
obligations pursuant to Art. 2:304 (1) PEICL as well.  However, in order to 
meet the requirements of the Directive, a clearer wording appears to be 
necessary.  It is, above all, not possible to apply exclusively Art. 1:203 (1) 
PEICL, as this provision contains no sanction. 56  Besides, many other 
                                                                                                                 
53 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:101(2).  
54 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:202(2).  
55 PEICL, supra note 5, at art.1:102(2).  
56 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:203(1).  
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requirements of the Directive are not met, e.g. with regard to the 
interpretation of ambiguities. However, the reference to the PECL/DCFR 
made in Art. 1:105 (2) PEICL should lead to satisfying results.  This article 
provides that any questions arising from the insurance contract, which are 
not expressly settled in the PEICL, are to be settled in conformity with the 
PECL and, where those do not contain any rules as well, in accordance 
with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States. 
As to the sanctions in case of a significant imbalance, Art. 2:304 
PEICL states that the term concerned is not binding for the policyholder (or 
the insured or the beneficiary).  In contrast, the insurer cannot claim that 
the term is not binding; thus he will not benefit from the breach of law 
which he is responsible for.57 The unfair term shall be substituted by a term 
which reasonable parties would have agreed upon had they been aware of 
the unfairness of the term.58 The idea of substituting the real parties with an 
abstract category like “reasonable” parties seems questionable but not as 
problematic as in the context of the duties of disclosure (see above a). 
 
4.  Retroactive and Preliminary Coverage (Art. 2:401 – 2:403  
     PEICL) 
 
The provisions concerning retroactive insurance rule that if, at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract, the insurer knows that no insured 
risk has occurred, then the policyholder owes premiums only for the period 
after the time of conclusion.59 Inversely, if the policyholder knows at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract that the insured event has occurred, 
the insurer shall provide coverage only for the period after the time of the 
conclusion of the contract.  The reason for this provision that does not 
declare the contract void is that retroactive coverage is possible yet quite 
unusual.  The provisions deserve approval.  However, there is a problem if 
the retroactive coverage is aimed at covering the risk between application 
and conclusion of the contract.  According to Art. 2:401 (2) PEICL, this 
may not be achieved as the insurer does not need to provide coverage for 
this period if at the relevant time of the conclusion of the contract the 
policyholder already knows that the insured risk has occurred. 
Only few provisions of the PEICL deal with preliminary coverage, 
which is an independent contract with no or only a limited risk assessment.  
According to Art. 2:402 PEICL, only very little information has to be given, 
and no contract terms have to be provided. Therefore, it is necessary to 
                                                                                                                 
57  See Ch. Armbrüster, ‘Das Transparenzgebot für Allgemeine 
Geschäftsbedingungen’ [2004] DNotZ 437, 439. 
58 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:304(2).  
59 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:401.  
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determine which contract terms shall be applicable to the preliminary 
coverage contract.  Neither is there a legal provision concerning the 
payment of premiums.  Furthermore, the important question of the duration 
and ending of the preliminary coverage remains unaddressed.  Art. 2:403 (1) 
PEICL does not state whether the conclusion of another preliminary 
coverage contract, or the beginning of a coverage provided by another 
insurer, will lead to the termination of the contract.  It should also be 
clarified that a revocation of the application according to Art. 2:302 PEICL 
terminates the preliminary coverage.  Finally, it would make sense to give 
the policyholder a right to terminate the agreement in case preliminary 
coverage was agreed on without a time limit. Without such a possibility, 
the policyholder would find it difficult to secure coverage by another 
insurer, e.g. if the insurer does not react to the application for the main 
contract in reasonable time. 
It does not seem necessary to expressly entitle the insurer to 
terminate the preliminary coverage contract as according to Art. 2:403 (1) 
PEICL he is able to do so by declining the conclusion of the main contract.  
Art. 2:403 (2) PEICL contains a special provision in case preliminary 
coverage is granted to a person who does not simultaneously apply for a 
main contract with the same insurer.  Such coverage may be cancelled by 
either party giving two weeks’ notice, which is a reasonable rule. 
 
5.  Insurance Policy (Art. 2:501 – 2:502 PEICL) 
 
According to Art. 2:502 PEICL, under certain conditions the 
contents of the insurance policy may determine the contents of the contract.  
If the terms of the insurance policy differ from those in the policyholder’s 
application or any prior agreement between the parties and these 
differences are highlighted in the policy, they are deemed to have been 
accepted to by the policyholder unless he objects within one month of 
receipt of the policy.  The insurer has to inform the policyholder about the 
right to object to the differences.  However, it remains unclear how the 
“prior agreements” are related to the application.  According to the wording 
“any prior agreement”, even prior independent contracts are included.  It 
seems questionable why such agreements should have to be considered 
although they are not part of the application. 
 
6.  Duration of the Insurance Contract (Art. 2:601 – 2:604  
     PEICL) 
 
The provisions regarding the duration of the insurance contract are 
very strict.  According to Art. 2:601 PEICL, the duration of the insurance 
contract is one year.  Exceptions are only possible in case this is indicated 
by the nature of the risk and in the area of personal insurance. 
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There are many possibilities for a maximum duration, varying from 
one year in French law, three years proposed in the 1979 draft for a 
Directive already mentioned, 60  to ten years in Spanish law.  The 
policyholder will frequently be interested in binding himself only for a 
short period in order to remain flexible: he may wish to adjust the contract 
to changed circumstances or even opt for another insurer.  A short period is 
also advantageous for new market participants within the insurance 
industry, as this facilitates their access to customers. However, the 
advantages of a longer insurance period are considerable.  First of all, 
continuity leads to an improvement of the basis for actuarial calculations.  
Furthermore, a longer period allows the insurer to save administrative costs, 
which implies an advantage for policyholders as well, as premiums may be 
lower.  The possible need for an adjustment of the contract terms may be 
met by inserting adjustment clauses. And last but not least, establishing a 
maximum period for insurance contracts constitutes an interference with 
private autonomy.  Therefore, the proposed maximum period of one year 
appears to be very short, unnecessarily preventing the parties from opting 
for the advantages of a longer period.  In addition, the exceptions admitted 
by Art. 2:601 (1) PEICL need to be clarified. 
Another severe interference with private autonomy is that the 
maximum period of one year at the same time constitutes the minimum 
period.  The exceptions provided in sentence two are identical with those 
for longer periods than one year.  They are necessary as otherwise, a travel 
insurance policy, for example, would have to run for a whole year.   It is 
difficult to see the reason why the maximum as well as the minimum 
duration should not, within a maximum limit of three years, for example, 
be left to the agreement of the parties.  There is no need for a legally 
determined insurance period, and Art. 2:601 PECL therefore appears to be 
over-regulating the topic.  This strict rule makes the PEICL, in this respect, 
a less attractive alternative to the national insurance laws, especially for 
commercial policyholders. 
Art. 2:602 PEICL states asymmetric time limits for the termination 
of the contract.  The insurer has to give notice that he does not want the 
contract to be prolonged at least one month before the expiration date.  The 
policyholder has to give notice at the latest by the day the contract period 
expires or within one month after having received the insurer’s premium 
invoice.  The latter provision leads to insecurity: until the very end of the 
contract he has to prove the receipt of the premium invoice, even after the 
end of the contract the insurer will not  know for sure whether the contract 
has expired or not.  At the same time, there is no need to protect the 
policyholder, as he usually knows that he should not wait with the 
                                                                                                                 
60 See Council Directive, art. 3-4, 1979 O.J. (C 190) at 3-4.   
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declaration of termination until the expiration date of a contract that will 
otherwise be automatically prolonged.  Therefore, a rule that contains 
symmetric time limits is clearly preferable. 
Any adjustment of premiums and terms of contract has to meet 
very strict requirements,61 notwithstanding further requirements (e.g. the 
rules on abusive clauses laid down in Art. 2:304 PEICL).62  For instance, 
any alteration shall not take effect before the next prolongation.  In addition, 
the insurer has to send a notice of alteration no later than one month before 
the expiration of the current contract period.  Both these rules, taken 
together, may lead to a delay of more than one year.  Thus, a quick reaction 
in case of changed circumstances becomes impossible.  This seems too 
strict, especially as adjustment clauses are anyway controlled separately 
under the fair contract term rules. 
The provision in Art. 2:604 PEICL on termination after an insured 
event has occurred is convincing, especially with regard to private 
autonomy.  The rule only contains requirements for clauses dealing with 
the termination without giving a right to terminate.  In any such clause, the 
right to terminate has to be granted to both parties, which seems reasonable.  
However, it is systematically unsatisfactory that both the provision on 
termination and the exercise of the right to terminate have to be 
“reasonable.”63 Here, the question arises as to where exactly the difference 
of this provision to the rules on abusive clauses64 is to be found.   In 
addition, as far as the exercise of the right to terminate is concerned, the 
fact that this must be “reasonable” should be part of the general rules as it 
constitutes a general principle of law. 
 
7.  Post-contractual Information Duties of the Insurer 
 
In the section “Post-Contractual Information Duties of the Insurer” 
(what would be more accurate is to say “Information Duties After 
Conclusion of Contract”), the PEICL deal with duties of the insurer in the 
period between conclusion and termination.  Among other duties, there is a 
duty of the insurer to provide the policyholder with information in writing on 
any change concerning his name and address and other related information, 
such as a change of his legal form, etc., without undue delay.65 However, 
there is neither a sanction in case of lack of compliance nor a corresponding 
                                                                                                                 
61 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:401.  
62  Those rules are modeled on Council Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts.  1993 O.J. (L 095) 0029 (EEC).   
63 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:604(2).  
64 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:304.  
65 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:701.  
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duty of the policyholder.  On request of the policyholder, the insurer has to 
provide him with information about all matters relevant to the performance 
of the contract, as well as about new standard terms offered by the insurer for 
insurance contracts of the same type as the one concluded with the 
policyholder. 66  Unfortunately, the PEICL do not state whether the 
policyholder can claim incorporation of the new standard terms in the 
contract or whether the incorporation is only possible after termination of the 
contract by concluding a new one.  If the insurer was forced to incorporate 
new terms – even terms developed for the acquisition of new clients – in 
every existing contract, this might discourage it from developing new terms.  
There is no duty to give advice comparable to Art. 2:202 PEICL for 
the time after the conclusion of the contract.  This is advantageous for the 
insurer as the fulfilment of such duties can be cost-intensive.  For the 
policyholder, however, the limited duty of information is of questionable 
use.  He has to be provided with information about relevant matters, but 
that will often not suffice as a basis for the decision whether a change is 
advantageous for him or not.  This is especially true as the duty according 
to Art. 2:702 (1)(b) PEICL is not limited to changes that are wholly or at 
least partly advantageous for the policyholder.  With regard to the interest 
of the policyholder to be provided with information on the one hand, and 
the high costs and constraining effect for innovation on the other, it seems 
preferable to not only develop a duty to provide information, but to also 
give advice.  However, this should be limited to the case that the innovation 
provides a reasonable benefit to the policyholder or the insured. 
 
B. INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES (CHAPTER THREE) 
 
The Chapter about insurance intermediaries only deals with two 
questions about the powers of insurance agents and the liability of agents 
purporting to be independent.  The insurance agent shall be authorized to 
perform all acts on behalf of the insurer are within the scope of his 
employment according to current insurance industry practice. Restrictions 
are only possible if disclosed to the policyholder in a separate document.  
But, even then, the authority has to cover at least the actual scope of his 
employment.67  This rule is aimed at the case where the insurance agent 
performs more acts than he is allowed to by the insurer, be it because his 
authority has been restricted by notice or by the scope of his employment.  
In this context, the usual activity of the agent, and not his behavior in the 
particular case, should be considered relevant.  However, this conclusion 
                                                                                                                 
66 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:702.  
67 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 3:301.  
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cannot be clearly drawn from the wording of PEICL.  The fact that the 
restriction of the authority may only be achieved by written notice – 
without it being necessary that the policyholder knows or ought to know of 
the restriction – results from the legal powers given to the insurance agent, 
and it secures legal certainty. 
Besides this, it is worth mentioning that the agent has the power to 
receive notices from the policyholder,68 and that relevant knowledge which 
the insurance agent has, or ought to have, shall be deemed to be the 
knowledge of the insurer.69 
A special provision concerning agents only purporting to be 
independent intermediaries can be found in Art. 3:102 PEICL.  If such an 
agent acts in breach of duties imposed on him by law, it is not only he but 
also the insurer who is liable for such breach.  The fact that the insurer is 
liable for the actions of the agent deserves approval, as in practice damages 
often cannot be obtained by the policyholder due to the absence of a 
liability insurance of the agent. 
Despite the headline of Chapter Three, the requirements of the 
Directive concerning insurance brokering70have not yet been incorporated 
in the PEICL.71 
 
C. THE RISK INSURED 
 
1. Precautionary Measures 
 
After a breach of an obligation, the insurer is only entitled to 
terminate the contract if the policyholder (or the insured) breached his 
obligation with the intent to cause the loss or if he acted recklessly and with 
the knowledge that the loss would probably result.72  “Recklessness” has to 
be interpreted as being more than just grossly negligent; it is close to dolus 
eventualis (awareness of an action’s possible outcome which the 
policyholder is willing to accept, rather than abstain, from the perilous 
action).  The burden of proof lies with the insurer, who in practice will 
                                                                                                                 
68 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 3:101(2).  
69 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 3:101(3).  
70 See Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 
December 2002 on insurance mediation, 2002 O.J. (L 9). 
71 Heiss, supra note 2, at 229, 238 (objecting to incorporation).  
72 PEICL, supra  note 5, at art. 4:102(1).  Looking at the wording, it is not clear 
whether the intent of causing a loss is sufficient or whether an additional element, 
like the knowledge that the act will cause a damage, is required.  It is more likely that 
this latter requirement only applies to the case of “recklessness.”  This is also 
evidenced by the clarifying comma in the parallel clause in art. 9:101.   
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often find it difficult to prove that the policyholder acted with the 
knowledge that the loss would probably result.  As a policyholder who does 
not think about the losses caused by his behaviour is not in need of 
protection, it should be sufficient that the policyholder ought to know that 
he could probably cause losses. 
Of great importance is the question under which circumstances the 
insurer is exempted from liability.  According to Art. 4:103 (1) PEICL, this 
is only the case if the loss was caused by the non-compliance of the 
policyholder (or the insured).  This deserves approval.  However, the fact 
that the exemption depends on the knowledge of the policyholder that the 
loss would probably result should be criticised (see above). 
In the case that the loss was caused by negligent non-compliance it 
is possible to reduce the insurance money according to the degree of fault 
by a “clear clause”.73  This rule is remarkable.  The exemption depends on 
the degree of fault, proportionality, and a clause that has to meet (as the 
mention of “clearness”74 superfluously suggests) special requirements.  Yet, 
there are certain disadvantages of such a clause that cannot be denied.  
Firstly, there is no need for any reduction of the insurance money according 
to the degree of fault in case of simple negligence.  Secondly, it will often 
be difficult to establish what grade of reduction should correspond to which 
kind of negligence. Thirdly, if the policyholder acts recklessly, but without 
knowing the loss that can result, Art. 4:103 (2) PEICL is, according to the 
wording, not applicable, although systematically this rule should apply.  In 
addition, there seem to be only few situations in which the insurer is totally 
exempted from liability as the subjective elements refer to the loss and not 
to the breach of obligation. 
Considering everything, the rule in Art. 4:103 (2) PEICL needs to 
be modified.  Most importantly, in case of simple negligence, the breach of 
an obligation that aims at avoiding the occurrence of the insured event 
should not even partially lead to an exemption from liability. 
 
1. Aggravation of Risk (Art. 4:201 – 4:203 PEICL) 
 
Usually, insurance contracts contain a clause about the 
consequences of an aggravation of risk. Such rules may provide for the 
insurer not to be held liable if the insured event occurs as the result of an 
aggravation of a risk that has intentionally been caused by the policyholder 
or the insured, but there may be provisions on legal consequences in less 
obvious cases as well.  
                                                                                                                 
73PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 4:103(2). 
74 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 1:203. 
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At the beginning of the section of PEICL which deals with the 
aggravation of risk, there is a provision that limits the impact of clauses 
concerning the aggravation of risk.  Those clauses shall have no effect 
unless the aggravation of risk in question is material and of a kind which is 
specified in the insurance contract.75  This provision offers some kind of 
definition.  It clarifies that immaterial aggravations of risk have no 
consequences for the insurance contract.  In addition, it states that the 
clause only has effects if the aggravation of risk is of a kind specified in the 
contract.  This seems problematic as the insurer is forced to foresee every 
kind of aggravation of risk that might occur in the future and describe it 
precisely in the insurance contract.  This is hardly possible.  Furthermore, 
the contract terms become lengthier, and thus, the policyholder risks 
excessive burden.  There is no predominant interest of the policyholder to 
be protected from a termination of the insurance contract or an exemption 
of liability by an exhaustive enumeration of possible aggravations of the 
insured risk, especially as only material aggravations are concerned. 
The further provisions concerning the aggravation of risk seem 
suitable.  There is a duty to give notice of an aggravation of risk.76  In the 
event of breach of the duty of notification, the insurer is not entitled to refuse 
to pay any subsequent loss resulting from an event within the scope of the 
coverage unless the loss was caused by the aggravation of risk.  Furthermore, 
it is necessary that the policyholder is, or ought to be, aware of the 
aggravation and that the insurer would not have insured the aggravated risk 
at all.  If, however, the insurer would have been prepared to insure the 
aggravated risk at a higher premium or on different terms, the insurance 
money is payable proportionately or in accordance with such terms.77 
If the contract provides that in the event of an aggravation of the 
risk insured, the insurer is entitled to terminate the contract, further 
requirements have to be met.78  However, it seems too strict that there is no 
possibility at all to continue the contract with adjusted conditions (e.g., 
higher premium, exclusion of risks).  In fact, the PEICL forces the insurer, 
even if he is prepared to continue the contract, to terminate it as long as he 
is not willing to stick to the original terms.  This is unsatisfactory for the 
policyholder as well as he is obliged to react in case of an “adjusting” 
                                                                                                                 
75 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 4:201. 
76 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 4:202. 
77 See PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 4:202(3); 4:203(3).  The rule in art. 4:203(3) 
does not match with the headline of this article, particularly as it should not only 
apply to the termination of contracts; from a systematic perspective, it would be 
preferable to combine this provision with art. 4:202(3) and create a separate article 
with the headline “release from obligation to perform in the event of aggravated 
risk.” 
78 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 4:203(1), (2). 
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termination (termination combined with an offer to conclude a new 
contract adjusted to the new risks).  If he does not react in due time, he will 
lose protection and will have to face all the risks of a new conclusion of 
contract (e.g., a new risk assessment and the consequences of a delayed 
payment of the first premium).79  
 
2. Reduction of Risk (Art. 4:301 PEICL) 
 
In the case of a material reduction of risk, the policyholder is 
entitled to request a proportionate reduction of the premium for the 
remaining contract period.80  As the wording is not very precise, this rule 
implies a risk of uncertainty.  It seems that the authors of the PEICL were 
well aware of this risk as paragraph two provides a right of the policyholder 
to terminate the contract in case the parties do not agree on a proportionate 
reduction of the premium within one month of the request. 
The difficulties start with the need for a “material” reduction of risk.  
Contrary to the provisions concerning the aggravation of risk, 81  the 
hypothetic reaction of the insurer is of no importance in this context.  
Further uncertainty is caused by the term of “proportionate” reduction.  
This makes a quantification of the reduction of risk necessary, even if the 
tariff structure contains no such quantification.  The provision therefore 
contradicts the insurer’s principles of calculation.  This may result in higher 
costs for calculation and administration, especially since according to the 
PEICL, the contract period may not exceed one year anyway.  It would 
clearly be preferable to insert a provision which is modelled on the 
structure of the tariffs of the particular insurer with differentiations based 
on certain circumstances. 
 
D.   INSURANCE PREMIUMS 
 
The chapter on insurance premiums contains no provision which 
deals with modalities such as the date on which when the premium 
payment is due.  Obviously, the more general provisions of the 
PECL/DCFR shall be applicable.  This should cause no problems, even 
though those provisions are not specially designed for insurance contracts. 
As to the consequences of non-payment of the premiums, the 
PEICL distinguish between non-payment of the first (or single) premium 
and subsequent premiums.  In the case of non-payment of the first premium, 
stricter rules are justified than in the case of the non-payment of subsequent 
                                                                                                                 
79 See PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 5:101. 
80 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 4:301(1). 
81 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 4:202(3); 4:203(3). 
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premiums, as in the latter case the policyholder fulfilled his contractual 
duty to participate in financing the risk pool at least once.  According to Art. 
5:101 PEICL, it is possible for the insurer to make the payment of the first 
premium a condition of the formation of the contract or the beginning of 
the coverage.  However, this requires that the condition be communicated 
to the applicant in writing and that a period of two weeks has expired after 
receipt of an invoice.  The notice has to be in clear language.  It remains an 
open question whether this means the same as the “plain and intelligible” 
language mentioned in Art. 1:203 PEICL.  However, it seems more 
important whether the condition has to be accentuated (e.g., communicated 
by extra notice).  The PEICL should clarify this issue.  The warning that 
the applicant lacks coverage until the premium is paid has to be given.82 
In accordance with the consideration made above, in case of non-
payment of a subsequent premium, it is more difficult for the insurer to be 
relieved of his obligation to cover the risk.  According to Art. 5:102 PEICL 
the insurer has to state the precise amount of premium due as well as the 
date of the payment and has to grant an additional period of payment of at 
least two weeks while he still has to cover the risks comprehensively. 
According to Art. 5:103 PEICL, the insurer is entitled to terminate 
the contract by written notice, provided that the invoice or the reminder 
states his right to terminate the contract, no matter what kind of premium 
has not been paid.  The contract is deemed to be terminated if the insurer 
does not bring an action for payment of the first premium within two 
months after expiration of the period mentioned in Art. 5:101 or Art. 5:102 
PEICL respectively.  This is meant to avoid requiring the policyholder to 
pay the premiums while he is no longer entitled to payment of the 
insurance money.  The solution found in the PEICL seems easy to handle.  
Nevertheless, it is preferable to grant a right of rescission if the first 
premium is not paid because in this case the contract has never been fully 
executed.  Furthermore, it is necessary to grant the right to terminate the 
contract only if the non-payment is due at least to negligence of the 
policyholder.  Otherwise, the provision would be too strict. 
According to Art. 5:104 PEICL, the premium is divisible.  This is 
appropriate as Art. 5:104 PEICL has to be seen in the context of Art. 2:104 
PEICL.  That rule contains an exception to the principle of divisibility of 
the premium in the case that the policyholder is in fraudulent breach of a 
duty of disclosure.  Here, there is an important pre-emptive effect if a 
policyholder has to pay the entire premium even though he is not being 
protected in case of the occurrence of the insured event. 
                                                                                                                 
82 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:203 (without expressly referencing to the details 
of art. 5:101(a)-(b)). 
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At the end of the chapter on premium, Art. 5:105 PEICL states 
under which circumstances third parties are entitled to pay the premium.  
This is important because in case of non-payment of the premium, the 
insurer may be relieved from his obligation to cover the risk, and he may be 
entitled to terminate the contract.  A third party is entitled to pay the 
premium if this party acts with the assent of the policyholder, or it has a 
legitimate interest in maintaining the coverage, and the policyholder has 
failed to pay or it is clear that the policyholder will not pay at the time the 
payment is due.  The latter case should be laid down more clearly.  
Beneficiaries and insured persons usually have a “legitimate interest,” as 
well as lien creditors.  It is worth discussing if in addition, tenants and other 
only obligatorily entitled persons, as well as friends and relatives of the 
policyholders, have a “legitimate interest” in the payment.  Furthermore, it 
is difficult to assess in which case it is “clear” that the policyholder will not 
pay at the time the payment is due.  This leads to the question why it shall 
be necessary that the policyholder has failed to pay or will not pay the 
premium.  In the relevant cases, there is no specific need to protect the 
policyholder.  If he is not interested in having the premiums paid by a third 
party, this will be taken into account if the third party asserts its claims 
against the policyholder. 
 
F.   INSURED EVENT (CHAPTER SIX) 
 
The occurrence of an insured event has to be disclosed to the 
insurer without undue delay.83  If the contract requires notice to be given 
within a stated period of time, such time shall be reasonable and no shorter 
than five days.  The insurance money payable shall be reduced to the extent 
that the insurer proves that he has been prejudiced by undue delay,84 no 
matter whether the policyholder has acted negligently or not.  A 
comparable provision is contained in Art. 6:102 (2) PEICL, which concerns 
a breach of the duty to cooperate with the insurer in the investigation of the 
insured event.  Both provisions appear to be too strict, especially as in other 
sections of the PEICL proportional reductions of the insurance money 
according to the degree of fault are common.85 
Art. 6:103 (2) PEICL contains a fiction which is of considerable 
importance: any claim shall be deemed to have been “accepted” unless the 
insurer rejects the claim or defers acceptance by written notice giving 
reasons for his decision within one month after receipt of the relevant 
documents and other information.  This provision is obviously meant to 
                                                                                                                 
83 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 6:101(1)-(2). 
84 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 6:101(3). 
85 E.g., PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:102(3), (5); 4:102(1); 4:203(2)-(3). 
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speed up the insurer’s decision about the claim. However, it seems 
questionable whether a period of one month is too short, especially as the 
beginning of the period depends on the receipt of the relevant documents 
and other information.  The insurer will often need to be able to investigate 
the event carefully (e.g., by contacting authorized experts).  In these cases, 
Art. 6:104 PEICL forces the insurer to give a notice (and, if necessary, 
prove its receipt by the policyholder) in order to avoid the fiction. 
Furthermore, it is questionable that the beginning of the period 
depends on the receipt of the documents and information.  If one keeps in 
mind the purpose of the provision, which is to give an incentive to the 
insurer to decide speedily, this can only mean the receipt of all relevant 
documents and information.  In practice, however, the information given to 
the insurer by the policyholder often leads to further investigations and 
requests (which must be responded to).86  This may lead to uncertainties 
about the beginning of the period. 
Art. 6:103 (2) PEICL does not state expressly who shall be the 
addressee of the notice.  While duties to give notice and to cooperate may 
bind the insurer, the policyholder or the beneficiary, the addressee of the 
notice should solely be the claimant.  However, this is not completely self-
evident, as the policyholder is party to the insurance contract.  It seems 
necessary to clarify this point. 
When a claim has been accepted, the insurer shall pay or provide 
the services promised without undue delay, meaning that the payment of 
insurance money has to be made no later than one week after the 
acceptance and quantification of the claim.87  If the insurance money is not 
paid on time, the claimant is entitled to interest on that sum from the time 
when payment was due at a rate applied by the European Central Bank.  
Furthermore, he may recover damages for any additional loss caused by 
late payment.  While a short period of only one week is appropriate 
according to the PEICL, the Directive on motor vehicle liability insurance88 
concedes a period of three months.  Art. 6:104 PEICL therefore seems too 
strict, especially as the sanctions do not depend at least on negligence of 
the insurer.  As far as the interest is concerned, PEICL are modelled on III.-
3:708 DCFR (Art. 9:508 PECL), while according to those rules damages 
are only paid if the insurer acted at least negligently.89 
 
                                                                                                                 
86 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 6:101(2). 
87 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 6:104(1), (3). 
88 Directive 2000/26, art. 4, 2000 O.J. (L 181) 65, 70 (EEC). 
89 DCFR, supra note 1, at art. III-3:701 (stating creditor is entitled to damages 
for loss caused by debtor’s non-performance of an obligation); PEICL, supra note 5, 
at art. 9:501. 
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D.  PRESCRIPTION (CHAPTER SEVEN) 
 
As to the limitations period or prescription, the PEICL distinguish 
between actions for payment of premiums (period of one year) 90  and 
actions for payment of insurance benefits (in general, a period of three 
years). 91   Art. 7:102 PEICL is modelled on the basic rule III.-7:201 
DCFR.92 One of the few passages in the PEICL that expressly refer to the 
PECL is Art. 7:103 PEICL.  In this respect, further harmonization is 
necessary, as Art. 1:105 (2) PEICL states that any questions arising from 
the insurance contract which are not expressly addressed by the PEICL are 
to be settled in conformity with the PECL.  The fact that there is no 
corresponding provision in other sections leads to the question of whether 
the provisions of the PEICL are meant to be exhaustive.  If the PEICL will 
be integrated into the DCFR, Art. 1:105 (2) PECL will become obsolete. 
 
III. PROVISIONS COMMON TO INDEMNITY INSURANCE 
(PART II) 
 
A.  SUM INSURED AND INSURED VALUE (CHAPTER EIGHT) 
 
Art. 8:101 PEICL contains the basic principle for the obligation of 
the insurer to make payments.  According to this provision, the obligation 
is limited to the amount necessary to indemnify losses actually suffered by 
the insured.  However, this provision is not mandatory. 93   Therefore, 
according to Art. 1:103 (2) sentence 1 PEICL, the contract may diverge 
from Art. 8:101 PEICL, as long as the derogation is not to the detriment of 
the policyholder. 
As far as agreements about the subject-matter are concerned, Art. 
8:101 (2) PEICL offers the parties quite a wide scope of choice.  Even if 
the value agreed upon exceeds the actual value of the subject-matter, it is 
considered valid except for the case when there is operative fraud or 
misrepresentation on the part of the policyholder or insured.  However, it 
has to be taken into consideration that the PEICL distinguish between 
indemnity insurance and insurance of fixed sums.  Typically, an indemnity 
insurance is meant to provide compensation for a loss actually suffered 
(e.g., the destruction of a home caused by a fire where the insurance money 
enables the owner to rebuild the home or to buy another one) contrary to 
                                                                                                                 
90 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 7:101. 
91 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 7:102. 
92 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 14:201. 
93 See PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 9:501. The PEICL in this version does not 
include any mandatory regulations. 
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the insurance of fixed sums (e.g., life assurance where the death of a person, 
as the insured event, does not cause the specific monetary loss which the 
insurance contract shall cover, so that no relation between an actual loss 
and the payment of the sum agreed by the insurer needs to be established).  
The higher the sum, the more the policyholder might find himself tempted 
to bring about the insured event.  Keeping this in mind, it would be 
appropriate to implement a proportional reduction of the sum agreed upon 
in case it is much higher than the actual value. 
Another provision that deserves special attention is contained in Art. 
8:102 PEICL.  According to this provision, the insurer is liable for any 
insured loss up to the sum insured even if the sum insured is less than the 
value of the property insured at the time when the insured event occurs.  This 
is astonishing as it obviously results in an unequal treatment of different 
policyholders.  A policyholder who correctly assumes that in most cases only 
a partial loss will occur and who therefore opts for a smaller sum is treated 
more favourably than a policyholder who opts for a sum corresponding to the 
value of the insured property and who consequently has to pay higher 
premiums.  Art. 8:102 PEICL cannot be explained by stating that measures 
taken to increase the value of the insured property or inflation would make an 
adjustment necessary in due course.  The first of these points cannot be 
generally assumed as value increasing measures result from individual 
decisions of the policyholder, while the latter (the effects of inflation) may be 
avoided by implementing a contract clause which contains an increase of the 
premiums in relation to inflation.  Furthermore, the parties have the 
possibility to avoid the situation of underinsurance. 
Obviously, the authors of the PEICL themselves have some doubts 
concerning Art. 8:102 PEICL as they entitle the insurer to offer insurance 
on the basis that the indemnity to be paid may be limited to the proportion 
that the sum insured bears to the actual value of the property at the time of 
the loss.94  This kind of technique is unusual for the PEICL, while the 
provision itself is very reasonable.  It should not only apply when agreed 
on and thus would correspond with the rule on over-insurance.95 However, 
the right of termination granted in paragraph two in the case that no 
agreement can be reached is as questionable as in the case of aggravation of 
risk.  Unfortunately, contrary to other provisions such as Art. 2:104 PEICL, 
there is also no special provision in case of fraudulent over-insurance. 
Art. 8:104 (1) PEICL dealing with multiple insurance appears to be 
acceptable.  However, a provision about the elimination of the multiple 
insurance should be added as well as a special provision dealing with 
fraudulent acts of the policyholder. 
                                                                                                                 
94 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 8:102. 
95 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 8:103(1). 
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B.  ENTITLEMENT TO INDEMNITY (CHAPTER TWO) 
 
According to Art. 9:101 (1) PEICL – under the somewhat vague 
title of “entitlement to indemnity” – neither the policyholder nor the 
insured is entitled to indemnity to the extent that the loss was caused by an 
act or omission on his part with intent to cause the loss or recklessly and 
with knowledge that the loss would probably result.  The causation of loss 
includes failure to avert or to mitigate loss.  This means that the 
policyholder has the duty to actively prevent the occurrence of an insured 
event even if the future losses have not at all been caused by him.  This 
may lead to gaps in cases of negligence.96 
Art. 9:102 PEICL that deals with the costs of mitigation, appears to 
be basically suitable.  Those costs have to be reimbursed by the insurer to 
the extent the policyholder was justified in regarding the measures as 
reasonable under the circumstances even if they were unsuccessful in 
mitigating the loss.  However, it is not easy to see why this rule shall not 
apply on costs meant to avoid the loss.  At first sight, it seems possible to 
interpret “to mitigate insured loss” as including the case of avoidance of 
loss.  However, Art. 9:101 (3) PEICL makes an express distinction between 
“mitigating” and “avoiding” the loss. 
 
C.  RIGHTS OF SUBROGATION (CHAPTER TEN) 
 
According to Art. 10:101 (1) PEICL, the insurer is entitled to 
exercise rights of subrogation against a third party liable for loss to the 
extent that he has indemnified the insured.  These “rights of subrogation” 
are structured differently; there is normal subrogation as well as the 
possibility for the insurer to claim in the name of the policyholder.  The 
purpose of subrogation is to avoid unjust enrichment of the policyholder 
through two indemnifications for one and the same case of loss.  
Furthermore, the insurer has an interest in getting the revenues resulting 
from the insured event for the benefit of the collective of policyholders.  
Therefore, the insured is not allowed to waive his rights against third 
parties,97 while the insurer must not exercise his rights of subrogation to the 
detriment of the insured.98  In order to pursue his rights effectively, the 
insurer will often have to rely on the insured.  Therefore a duty to cooperate 
– modelled on Art. 6:102 PEICL – should be added. 
Quite a range of persons who may be liable for the damage are 
protected against subrogation by Art. 10:101 (3) PEICL.  This rule not only 
                                                                                                                 
96 See PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 9:101(2). 
97 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 10:102(2). 
98 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 10:101(4). 
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concerns members of the household of the policyholder or the insured but 
also persons in an “equivalent social relationship” with the policyholder or 
insured, as well as employees.  Especially the protection of persons in 
“equivalent social relationships” could lead to some problems as there is no 
definition of such a relationship and it seems hard to specify the persons 
protected.  The provision offers an incentive for misuse as well.  If there is 
any doubt, a court will have to disturb the privacy of the involved persons 
in order to assess whether a relationship is already “equivalent” to that of a 
household member.  In contrast, the criterion of a member of the household 
is a clear and specified one, and it appears to be preferable that the 
protection should be limited to these persons. 
 
D.  INSURED PERSONS OTHER THAN THE POLICYHOLDER (CHAPTER  
       ELEVEN) 
 
The possibility to entitle a third party to request performance of a 
contractual obligation is dealt with in the DCFR.99  Nevertheless, Chapter 
Eleven of the PEICL contains some special provisions (which are amended 
by several provisions in other Chapters such as Art. 5:105 PEICL).100  In 
order to complete the provisions in accordance with Art. 1:105 (2) PEICL, 
the PECL as well as the DCFR must be applicable, including, e.g., the right 
to reject the right under the contract.101  
According to Art. 11:101 (1) PEICL, the person for which the 
insurance has been taken is entitled to the insurance money.  The provision 
does not use the words “insured” or “beneficiary” as defined in Art. 1:202 
(1, 2) PEICL.  Located in Part II of the PEICL, the provision is applicable 
exclusively to indemnity insurances and not to the insurance of fixed sums.  
This might cause some problems concerning the right of revocation: the 
policyholder is entitled to revoke the coverage unless the insured event has 
occurred.102  On first glance, this seems to be necessary as in this case, the 
insured person is already entitled to the insurance money.  The question, 
however, remains under which conditions does the policyholder have a 
right of revocation.  The PEICL do not grant such a right nor do they 
mention what consequences the revocation might have.  If in an insurance 
of fixed sums the policyholder only revokes without naming another third 
person, it is likely that the policyholder himself becomes the beneficiary, 
and Art. 11:101 PEICL would be not applicable then.  However, this is 
completely different in the case of indemnity insurance.  In that case, only a 
                                                                                                                 
99 DCFR, supra note 1, at art. II-9:301; PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 6:110. 
100 Weber-Rey, supra note 6, at 207.   
101 DCFR, supra note 1, at art. II-9:303; PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 6:110(2). 
102 PEICL, supra note 5, at art.11:101(2)(b). 
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person who has suffered a loss because of the occurrence of the insured 
event can be entitled to the insurance money.  Therefore, a revocation of 
the coverage (not of the contract as a whole) granted by Art. 11:101 (2) 
PEICL only makes sense if the risk of damage has shifted to another person. 
There is no provision dealing with the question how a person 
entitled to the insurance money may prove his position to the insurer.  
Furthermore, the relationship between this person and the policyholder is 
not addressed. 
A rule of considerable significance is Art. 11:102 PEICL. According 
to this provision, the knowledge of the person insured is not attributed to the 
policyholder (unless that person is aware of his status as insured) when the 
policyholder is obliged to provide relevant information to the insurer.  A 
clarification is necessary concerning the question whether the person has to 
be positively aware of his status as insured.  It seems appropriate to extend 
the rule to the case in which the person ought to be aware of his status but 
negligently fails to be. Otherwise, it could be difficult for the insurer to prove 
that the conditions of Art. 11:102 PEICL are met.  If this extension is added, 
it seems acceptable that in any other case the knowledge of the person 
insured is not attributed to the policyholder. 
Art. 11:103 PEICL contains the principle that the breach of duty by 
one insured cannot adversely affect the rights of other persons insured 
under the same insurance contract unless the risk is jointly insured. 
 
E.  INSURED RISK (CHAPTER TWELVE) 
 
If at the time of conclusion of the contract the insured risk does not 
exist, no premium will be due.103 Nevertheless, the insurer is entitled to a 
“reasonable” sum for expenses incurred.  According to paragraph two, the 
contract is terminated by law if the insured risk ceases to exist during the 
insurance period at the time that the insurer is notified thereof.  In this case, 
the insurer is entitled to the premium in respect to the period prior to 
termination.  This is principally acceptable.  However, the provision should 
include an exception for fraudulent acts of the policyholder.  In this case, it 
would be highly inadequate to release the policyholder from his duty to pay 
the premiums.  At least for the period of time until the insurer realizes that 
the risk has ceased to exist, the premiums should have to be paid. 
The transfer of property as a special case of the risk ceasing to exist 
is dealt with in Art. 12:102 PEICL.  According to this provision, the 
insurance contract is terminated by law one month after the time of the 
transfer if the title to insured property is transferred, unless the policyholder 
and transferee may agree on termination at an earlier time.  Nevertheless, it 
                                                                                                                 
103 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 12:101(1). 
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is possible that the insurer, policyholder and transferee agree otherwise.104  
In the absence of an agreement, the contract will be terminated.  This rule 
makes the insurance more flexible.  It takes into account that neither the 
insurer nor the transferee had the occasion to choose their potential 
contractual partner.  Therefore, it appears justified to terminate the contract 
after an orientation period.  However, it seems more suitable to grant the 
insurer and the transferee a right to terminate the contract instead.  Thus, it 
can be assured that the risks are still covered which helps to protect the 
transferee.  Especially as far as immovable property is concerned, this 
protection may be quite essential.  At the same time, the flexibility of the 
parties is ensured by granting them a right of termination. 
 
F. GROUP INSURANCE (CHAPTER THIRTEEN) 
 
There are, as of yet, no provisions in the PEICL dealing with group 
insurance. 
 
III.  PROVISIONS COMMON TO INSURANCE OF FIXED SUMS   
       (PART THREE) 
 
As to the insurance of fixed sums, the PEICL only contains a 
description of the scope of application for the time being.  According to Art. 
14:101 PEICL, the insurance of the person (examples given include 
accident, health, life, marriage and birth) may be taken out as an insurance 
of fixed sums.  This means that the parties alternatively may agree on an 
indemnity insurance.  It becomes clear, vice versa, that the insurance of 
fixed sums is possible only as insurance of the person following the 
traditional perception.  The reason is that the specific interest in an 
insurance of the person often can hardly be exactly determined as a sum of 
money especially as it depends on various individual factors and 
circumstances.  In contrast, in indemnity insurance, due to the indemnity 
principle laid down in Art. 8:101 (1) PEICL, it is essential to fix the interest, 
even if the rule on the maximum sum payable is somewhat flexible.105  Art. 
14:101 PEICL therefore is appropriate. 
 
A. SUMMARY 
 
Considering everything, it can be stated that the PEICL in their 
current version contain a wide range of basic principles which are the fruits 
of a careful analysis of the different insurance contract laws in Europe.  
                                                                                                                 
104 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 12:102(3)(a). 
105 See PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 8:101(2). 
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Many rules have to be assessed as being so essential for the functioning of 
the insurance contract that their necessity is beyond doubt. This is especially 
true for the pre-contractual duty of disclosure (Art. 2:101 PEICL) and to the 
consequences of the aggravation of risk (Art. 4:201 ff. PEICL).106 
However, a number of issues should be subject to further 
discussion.  This concerns especially those provisions that are not part of 
the basic principles of insurance contract law.  As pointed out above, the 
provisions dealing with the duration of the insurance contract, 107  for 
example, and prescription108 deserve further attention. 
The basic concept of the PEICL, which consists in just drawing the 
limits of private autonomy without trying to impose a certain content of the 
contract on the parties, seems to be very appropriate.  In certain matters, 
however, this idea is not consistently pursued (e.g., when it comes to the 
binding duration of the insurance contract, allowing different periods only if 
indicated by the nature of the risk).109  If the PEICL are supposed to be 
perceived by both parties as an attractive alternative to the application of 
national insurance laws, such strict provisions should be eliminated.  
Furthermore, the attractiveness of the PEICL could certainly be increased if 
the “reasonable insurer” were replaced by the particular insurer involved.  
Furthermore, it seems questionable that in some cases the contract is 
terminated if the parties do not reach an agreement about certain issues.110  
This legal technique sounds better than how it works in practice.  It will 
certainly be time-consuming and therefore result in high additional costs; 
thus, it does not appear suitable for the mass business of (non-industrial) 
insurance. 
Another point is that it seems important to harmonize PEICL with 
DCFR, in which essential parts of the PECL have been included. The 
references to the PECL should be revised, as mentioned above, in order to 
avoid uncertainties resulting from the general reference in Art. 1:105 (2) 
PEICL and some special references in other Chapters.  Should the PEICL 
be integrated into the DCFR, Art. 1:105 (2) PEICL will become 
superfluous while some special references will still be necessary. 
Furthermore, it is of great importance to increase the amount of the 
provisions and to make them more detailed.  As the PEICL are meant to offer 
parties an attractive alternative to national insurance laws and are supposed 
                                                                                                                 
106 See also Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Coordination 
of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Insurance Contracts, 
art. 2-4, 1979 O.J. (C 190) 2, 3-4 [hereinafter Proposed Council Directive]. 
107 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:601. 
108 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 7:101. 
109 PEICL, supra note 5, at art. 2:601. 
110 This kind of regulation can already be found in proposed Council Directive, 
supra note 106, at art. 3-4. 
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to be applicable all over Europe, it is obvious that certainty and feasibility are 
indispensable.  There are many questions still awaiting answers.  For instance, 
it should be laid down if there is a general duty of the insurer to give advice.  
Art. 2:202 and 2:203 PEICL only contain a number of special rules 
concerning this matter.  They leave open if there is a duty to give advice after 
the contract is concluded.  Just to name a few further questions that need to 
be tackled: Who has to bear the cost of investigations after the occurrence of 
the insured event?  Who will be entitled to possession of the policy in case of 
insurance for the account of a third party?  Which rules govern an open 
policy (i.e., coverage where the goods that are insured against loss or damage 
are not individually defined in the contract but where any kind of goods that 
fall under a general definition) (e.g., all goods transported by a specific 
carrier during a stated period) are covered?  In addition, there are a number 
of problems that have been left to be solved by the courts in the Member 
states but which should, if possible, be addressed by the PEICL, such as the 
responsibility of the policyholder for the behaviour of other persons or the 
rules for interpreting insurance contract clauses. 
Of course, the PEICL are only meant to be “principles.”  Provisions 
that are too comprehensive and detailed could limit private autonomy in an 
unacceptable manner.  Yet, legal certainty and the possibility of specific, 
clear answers to questions of law are merits that must not be 
underestimated.  In addition, the PEICL are meant to be an optional 
instrument for the parties much more than just a “restatement” (although 
the group of authors of the PEICL has been modestly named “Project 
Group Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law”). Therefore, it 
will be necessary to transpose all European Directives, including those 
dealing with specific insurance branches.  
As law suits arising from the application of the PEICL will be 
decided by the regular courts in the Member states, a unitary mode of their 
interpretation111 is essential as well as detailed provisions dealing with the 
most important problems.  It should be kept in mind that the national 
insurance contract laws have the advantage that the courts already have had 
and used the opportunity to apply and interpret them, which leads to a 
comparatively high level of legal certainty.  In any case, the PEICL, even as 
a draft that still needs completion, offers a very solid basis for further 
discussion in the European Union as well as in other countries such as the 
United States. 
 
                                                                                                                 
111 Heiss, supra note 2, at 229, 239. 
AN INTRODUCTION TO CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY 
LITIGATION AND A VIEW TO THE FUTURE 
 
MICHAEL B. GERRARD*  
JOSEPH A. MACDOUGALD** 
 
*** 
 
This article discusses the advancement of climate change litigation.  It 
explores two approaches to climate change litigation; the first is to use the 
federal regulatory apparatus and the second is to use the tort system.  The 
article explores key questions in climate change litigation such as, who is 
responsible for deciding the appropriate level of harmful emissions? How 
should courts handle the long tail effects of climate change? What are the 
proper forums to litigate in? And, what is the role of the federal 
government in climate change litigation? 
 
*** 
 
Climate change liability litigation is a United States phenomenon.  
Though climate related litigation exists in other countries,1 more climate 
change cases have been brought in the United States than in the rest of the 
world combined, and the United States stands alone in seeing significant 
litigation that seeks to hold greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters liable for the 
harms caused by climate change.  
 The first wave of climate liability litigation began in the mid-
2000’s during President George W. Bush’s administration. Frustrated by 
the absence of a national climate change regulatory scheme in the United 
States, climate liability litigation began as environmental groups sought to 
compel policy development through two litigation avenues.  One approach 
was to use the existing United States legal and regulatory apparatus to 
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visited Aug. 24, 2013).  See also CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
AND PRACTICE (Richard Lord et al., eds., 2012). 
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address rising GHG emissions.  The second approach was to use the tort 
system to seek monetary or injunctive relief from the largest emitters of 
GHGs, such as coal fired power plant operators, and the manufacturers of 
emitting equipment, such as automobile companies. 
This article introduces both approaches through their leading cases.  
It also serves as an introduction to a volume arising from an October 2012 
conference at the University of Connecticut School of Law, Climate 
Change Risks & Liability - The Future of Insurance & Litigation.  It is 
adapted in part from Michael Gerrard’s morning keynote address to that 
conference. 
Now is a remarkable time in the nearly decade long history of this 
topic.  As of the writing of this article, the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed its first regulatory framework for 
GHGs from coal fired power plants as anticipated by the Supreme Court’s 
rulings in this area.  Many of the liability cases discussed at the October 
2012 conference came to their procedural end only by June 2013.  However, 
this subsequent litigation history only serves to reinforce the view of the 
future and questions presented at the end of the conference and recounted 
here.   
 
A. MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA – ENGAGING THE EPA 
 
One avenue of climate litigation is to invoke the existing 
environmental laws to address climate change. Following this plan of 
attack, a collection of states, municipalities, non-profits, and land trusts 
filed a set of rulemaking petitions with EPA.  These petitions sought to 
establish GHGs as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act (CAA).2  The 
administrative and court cases around this strategy culminated in 2007 in 
the landmark decision from the United State Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter Mass v. 
EPA).3   
The CAA requires the EPA Administrator to set emissions 
standards for any air pollutant from stationary or mobile sources that 
contributes to air pollution that "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
the public health or welfare."4   While the case presented to the Court 
sprang from the part of the CAA that addressed mobile sources of pollution, 
Respondents made clear at oral argument that a ruling in their favor would 
establish CO2 as a pollutant under the CAA for the purpose of regulating 
not only motor vehicles, but also stationary sources (of which the largest 
category is coal fired power plants). 
                                                                                                                                
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 – 7671 (2006). 
3 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
4 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
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In initially responding to the rulemaking requests, EPA adopted the 
position that it should not regulate GHGs as air pollutants as a result of 
various policy considerations.   
The Agency’s rationale was based on several considerations 5 
including, among others, the assertion that since GHG emissions were the 
subject of international negotiations by the Executive Branch, regulatory 
development by the EPA would disrupt these delicate, international 
proceedings.  In disagreement, twelve States, several United States cities, 
and land trusts6 brought suit.  In March of 2007, the Supreme Court, by a 
vote of 5 to 4, held that carbon dioxide and other GHGs are within the 
definition of air pollutant under the Clean Air Act and that EPA does 
indeed have the authority to regulate them.7  Subsequent to the decision, the 
EPA under the Obama administration did indeed issue a two-part 
endangerment finding, concluding that rising GHG levels endanger public 
health, safety, and welfare.8  Thereafter, the EPA began issuing substantive 
regulations to restrict GHG emissions. 
                                                                                                                                
5  At oral argument, Justice Breyer made much of EPA’s considerations 
(plural). As the agency attempted to argue that there were legitimate grounds 
throughout their responses that would be consistent with administrative deference 
provided by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), Justice Breyer noted that their responses consistently integrated all 
considerations including a separation of powers argument involving international 
negotiations. For those interested in such matters, the oral argument, easily found 
on websites such as oyez.org, represents high theater for listeners. “JUSTICE 
BREYER: If they write that all of these considerations justify our result, again, one 
of them by themselves, it sounds, they think would not have been sufficient.” 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT 
CHICAGO KENT COLLEGE OF LAW (Nov. 10, 2013), http://www.oyez.org 
/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_1120/. 
6 The inclusion of land trusts in the litigation was strategic and presented itself 
in the briefing and oral arguments for the case. Land trusts hold an unusual 
position as large landowners who have a declared public purpose for stewardship 
of the land.  
7 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 500 (2007). 
8 Little happened for the balance of the Bush Presidency except that EPA 
issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.  When President Obama took 
office, however, the agency began acting very quickly, promulgating the 
Endangerment Finding required under the Clean Air Act and triggering EPA’s 
authority to regulate GHGs as pollutants that endanger the public as defined by the 
CAA, and served as the formal finding that greenhouse gases do indeed cause a 
danger to public health and welfare.  See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute 
Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 66,495 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 81, 63).  That finding is 
the basis for all further GHG regulations under the CAA.  Next, the Obama 
administration introduced a period of active climate regulation in the United States, 
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B. NUISANCE LAW AND TORT LITIGATION – TYING EMITTERS TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE’S CONSEQUENCES 
 
In parallel to Mass v. EPA, four lawsuits sought redress from large 
scale GHG emitters under various nuisance law theories.9  These cases 
were Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 10  California v. General 
Motors Corporation,11 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA,12 and Native Village of 
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation.13   
Connecticut v. American Electric Power (hereinafter Connecticut) 
was filed in 2004 by eight states, New York City, and three land trusts, 
against five major electric utilities that cumulatively burned a substantial 
amount of coal and released a significant amount of GHG emissions.14  
This lawsuit sought injunctive relief from the Southern District of New 
York.  It asked the district judge to issue an abatement order mandating that 
these companies’ power plants reduce their GHG emissions by  specific 
amounts each year.15  In addition to being the first lawsuit of its kind, 
Connecticut stands out for being the only such case that sought injunctive 
relief instead of money damages.16   
In California v. General Motors Corporation, California sued 
several of the major automakers over the GHG emissions produced by 
vehicles  they manufactured.17  California alleged that these pollutants were 
causing injury to the State, its coastline and other harms. The case sought 
monetary relief. 18  
Comer v. Murphy Oil (hereinafter Comer) was filed in Mississippi 
on behalf of many property owners against thirty or so chemical companies, 
                                                                                                                                
which invited counter-response litigating from industries and states alleging 
overregulation by the EPA. 
9 Maxine Burkett, Legal Rights and Remedies, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION 
TO CLIMATE CHANGE 815, 824-25 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 
2012).   
10 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), 
rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) [hereinafter Connecticut]. 
11 California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. WL 
2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).  
12 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 1:05-CV436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285 
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), rev'd, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009); Comer v. Murphy 
Oil USA, 839 F.Supp.2d 849 (2012), aff’d, 718 F.3d. 460 (2013).   
13 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009), aff'd, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
14 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 309; Burkett, supra note 9, at 825. 
15 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 309; Burkett, supra note 9, at 826.   
16 See Burkett, supra note 9, at 827.  
17 California, 2007 WL 2726871 at *1. 
18 Id. 
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oil companies, and others.19 The plaintiffs alleged that the property damage 
caused by Hurricane Katrina had been exacerbated, and the Hurricane’s 
power enhanced, by climate change.  The plaintiffs further alleged that the 
defendants’ emissions had substantially worsened that change. The case 
sought money damages in the amount of the additional property damage 
that they had suffered as a result.20  
Finally, Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation (hereinafter Kivalina), 
which serves as the keystone case for this journal issue, was filed on behalf 
of the remote Alaskan Village of Kivalina that, according to their 
complaint, had been severely damaged by the effects of global climate 
change.  The village, located on a narrow isthmus, was once protected from 
violent spring and fall storms by a natural sea ice barrier. As the climate 
has warmed, wave action and loss of ice eroded this safeguard.  Rising 
temperatures meant that the natural ice barriers formed later and later in the 
season, leaving the village exposed to the harsh fall storms and currents. 
This exposure created even further erosion, destroying the subaquatic 
protective sand bars and barriers. Alleging that a large number of fossil fuel 
companies, chemical companies and others exacerbated the climate change 
that will ultimately force the Kivalina villagers to relocate, the Village  
sued these companies for several hundred million dollars in money 
damages to cover the associated costs.21   
Each of these four original lawsuits was dismissed at the district 
court level on grounds that it raised a non-justiciable political question and 
each was appealed.22  These district courts all held that issues of global 
warming policy were not suitable for adjudication by the courts, but rather 
more appropriately decided by the Congress and by the Executive 
Branch.23 Some courts found other preclusive basis for dismissal, such as 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claim.24   
The notice of appeal for California v. General Motors Corporation 
was filed in the Ninth Circuit at the same time the automobile industry 
found itself deeply embedded in financial trouble.  The highly publicized 
government bailout of the automobile industry brought an end to this case 
                                                                                                                                
19 Comer, 2007 WL 6942285 at *1. 
20 Id. 
21 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009) aff'd, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).  Michael Gerrard was formerly a 
partner, and is currently Senior Counsel, in the law firm of Arnold & Porter LLP, 
which represented a defendant in Comer and a defendant in Kivalina.  He has 
written this article purely in his academic capacity. 
22  Burkett, supra note 9, at 824 n.110. For background on the political 
question doctrine, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
23 Burkett, supra note 9, at 824 n. 110. 
24 Id. at 824. 
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by including, as a term of the settlement among the Obama Administration, 
the automobile industry and the State of California, that the lawsuit be 
dropped.25   
 The Comer case enjoyed a more colorful and much less common 
procedural history.  On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, a three-judge panel 
reversed the decision upon finding that the case was not, in fact, barred by 
the political question doctrine, and reinstated the case to the district court 
for further proceedings.26  The defendants moved for an en banc hearing, to 
which the full court issued a decision granting that right and vacating the 
decision below.27 The very day that briefs were due to the en banc court, 
though, it announced that it had lost a quorum.28  Presumably due to the 
great number of defendants and the judges’ ownership of stocks of some of 
them, enough judges had recused themselves that the case could no longer 
be heard en banc.  There was, however, a quorum at the time that the panel 
decision was vacated.  Thus the case was remanded to the district court, but 
since it had previously been dismissed at that level, the case was over.29  
The court did provide plaintiffs with the right to apply for certiorari to the 
Supreme Court, but instead they applied for a writ of mandamus, 
requesting that the Fifth Circuit be ordered to decide the case.  The 
Supreme Court declined the plaintiffs’ request and effectively ended that 
version of the case.30  The Comer case was subsequently re-filed31 and 
dismissed by the District Court on many grounds including res judicata. In 
May 2013, the Fifth Circuit confirmed that this refiling was barred by res 
judicata. 32  The time for plaintiffs to petition the Supreme Court for 
certiorari has now expired, so the Comer litigation appears to have ended. 
 The Connecticut case was argued in the Second Circuit in July 
2005. It sat year after year without resolution. 33   The absence of this 
                                                                                                                                
25 For a discussion of the overall settlement, see Jody Freeman, The Obama 
Administration's National Auto Policy: Lessons from the "Car Deal," 35 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 343 (2011). 
26 Burkett, supra note 9, at 827. 
27  Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2010), reh'g 
granted en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
28 See Comer, 607 F.3d at 1055. 
29 Id.   
30 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), opinion vacated 
pending reh'g en banc, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 
1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc), mandamus denied, No. 10-294 (Jan. 10, 
2011); In re Comer, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011); Burkett, supra note 9, at 827. 
31 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012), 
aff'd, 718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013). 
32 Id. 
33 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 582 F.3d 309, 385 (2d Cir. 2009), 
rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).   
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decision had begun to emerge as one of the great mysteries in climate 
change litigation.  Finally in 2009, three and half years after the argument 
was heard, the Second Circuit issued a decision and reversed, holding that 
the case did not implicate the political question doctrine.34  (One of the 
members of the Second Circuit panel that had heard argument, Sonia 
Sotomayor, had been elevated to the Supreme Court and did not participate 
in the Second Circuit decision.)  
 Upon the dispositions of Comer and Connecticut, where two 
circuits held that the issue of liability for global climate change could 
properly be considered by the courts, the defendants in Conn. v. AEP 
applied for, and were granted, certiorari in December of 2010.35   In a 
unanimous eight justice decision, with Justice Sotomayor recusing herself, 
the Supreme Court reversed the appellate panel.36  The decision was written 
by Justice Ginsberg and turned on Massachusetts v. EPA’s holding that 
established the EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs.37  Congress had decided 
that it was the job of EPA, and therefore not the courts, to regulate GHG 
emissions. The federal common law of nuisance for GHG emissions had 
ultimately been displaced by the Clean Air Act, and these cases should 
have been dismissed after all.38     
 Kivalina was the last of these cases to be decided. As Connecticut 
had been the only GHG nuisance law case to be decided by the Supreme 
Court, 39  and in that case plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief, the 
Kivalina plaintiffs hoped their case was distinguishable since it claimed 
money damages instead.  In 2012, however, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the 
Kivalina case, holding that the same rationale of displacement in the 
Connecticut case applies to money damages as well.40  Finally, in the very 
end of the 2012-2103 term, the Supreme Court denial of the Village of 
Kivalina’s petition for certiorari effectively ended the case’s storied 
history.41 
Although federal common law for greenhouse gas nuisance claims 
has been displaced by federal regulation, there continues to be the 
                                                                                                                                
34 Id.  
35 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). 
36 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2011). 
37 See id. at 2537. 
38 Burkett, supra note 9, at 825. 
39  By contrast, Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007), was an 
administrative law case regarding statutory construction and agency obligations. 
40 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
41 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (May 20, 2013) (No. 12-1072). 
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possibility of a state common law cause of action. 42  Such a claim was 
appended to the Connecticut case, but the Supreme Court explicitly 
declined the opportunity to address whether it could survive. The 
Connecticut plaintiffs chose not to pursue this claim.  Other plaintiffs may 
press such a claim, but these or any similar claims face many significant 
hurdles. 
 
C. LESSONS FROM THE NUISANCE LAWSUITS 
 
Collectively, the four cases discussed above all foundered on a 
threshold barrier:  separation of powers.  Each of the cases has turned on 
some variation of this constitutional issue. Whether sounding in political 
question or displacement, the issue remains:  whose job is it to decide how 
much GHG emissions are too much?  These cases found that the Congress 
gave that job to EPA and that the courts therefore are without this power. 
None of these cases progressed beyond that foundational point.  
There was never any discovery or judicial fact-finding in any of these cases.  
Presuming further advancement is even possible, it will likely be met with 
an onslaught of additional obstacles.  There would be a question of whether 
the particular injury suffered is really attributable to climate change, a very 
difficult and technical issue.43  In the case of Kivalina, this connection was 
easier to argue. An Army Corps of Engineers analysis concluded that the 
melting ice was directly related to a changing climate.44 Contrast this with 
Comer, where the plaintiffs would have had the difficult task of proving 
that Hurricane Katrina struck with a force augmented by global warming. 
There is also the issue of how the law and courts should account 
for the long time scales of climate change. GHGs may reside in the 
atmosphere for a century or longer and, by their nature, spread rapidly and 
evenly across the globe.  The gasses residing in our atmosphere today are 
the culmination of more than a century’s worldwide pollution from many 
countries.  Unclear authority, common harm, long time spans separating the 
injuries from the emission, and multiple emitters of varying sizes all 
coalesce to show the difficulty the law has in attaching any single liability 
to one particular defendant.  As in Kivalina, additional defendants would 
almost certainly be continuously joined in the litigation, resulting in a 
potentially unlimited number of parties. 
                                                                                                                                
42 See Burkett, supra note 9, at 842 n.143. 
43 See Burkett, supra note 9, at 828-29.  See generally Michael B. Gerrard, 
What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 121 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 135 (2011). 
44 ALASKA DIST., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ALASKA VILLAGE EROSION 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 4-5, 23 (2006), available at 
housemajority.org/coms/cli/AVETA_Report.pdf.  
2013 CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY LITIGATION 161 
 
 Additional hard questions arise from jurisdictional issues.  How 
does a U.S. court get personal jurisdiction over all emitting parties, many of 
which are outside the United States?  What about a state court?  What is the 
capacity for a state court in Mississippi to bring in the Chinese electric 
power companies emitting CO2?  If admitted, what are the mechanisms for 
enforcing the judgment?  What set of laws apply?  Would the laws of the 
jurisdiction where the injury occurred prevail?  Or rather the law where the 
offending power plant is located?  If the parent company owns plants in 
several states, is it the law of each state that applies?  
And finally, what is the federal government's role in such 
litigation? The construction and use of coal-fired power plants, the use of 
motor vehicles, and other practices that would emit greenhouse gasses have 
all been a matter of United States government policy for decades.  The 
government subsidizes these activities, issues permits, builds interstate 
highway systems, and leases federal lands for coal mining and oil drilling.  
These greenhouse gas emitters are a central part of the economy, and 
certainly the historical emissions were all blessed by the government at 
some point, as evinced by the issued permits. 
There is also a conceptual problem with liability concerning the 
supply chain.  The use of electricity generated from coal requires one party 
to mine coal, one to transport it, another to burn it for electricity, a utility to 
deliver that power, and finally a consumer to use the electricity.  Where 
along that supply chain does liability attach?  The same issue arises with 
car emissions.  Somebody drills the oil, somebody else refines it and 
another, or perhaps the same company, transports it to gas stations, where 
people individually put it in their cars.  In addition to this supply chain, cars 
are also made by various manufacturers, and still additional people drive 
them. Every one of these activities is lawful, and many government policies 
and expenditures encourage them.  Finally, is every injured community 
going to bring its own lawsuit for individual adjudication of these issues?  
All of these obstacles and more will need to be considered if any of these 
cases are to proceed.    
A separate line of cases was launched in 2011 by a non-profit 
group called Our Children’s Trust.  These cases were all founded on the 
common law doctrine of the public trust, in which certain features of the 
natural world are held by the government in a public trust, and the 
government is obligated to protect them, at least unless the relevant 
legislature takes a different view.  This doctrine had long been applied to 
certain coastal waters, and in some jurisdictions to parkland.  The 2011 
cases sought to extend it to the atmosphere.  The lawsuits were brought 
against state and federal governments, and sought court orders that these 
governments adopt and enforce plans to reduce GHG emissions so that the 
atmosphere is preserved. 
None of these cases has succeeded. The one that got furthest was in 
Texas, where a judge found in July 2012 that a provision of the Texas 
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constitution did include the atmosphere in the public trust; but less than a 
month later the judge said that it was not the court’s role to intrude on the 
legislature’s decisions as to environmental policy.45  The other cases were 
dismissed on the grounds that the public trust doctrine does not extend to 
the atmosphere, or that the doctrine of separation of powers does not allow 
the courts to make policy decisions of the sort requested.46 
 
D. THE FUTURE OF CLIMATE LITIGATION 
 
So what is the future of climate litigation? Despite the failure of 
common law tort and public trust litigation against GHG emitters, from an 
alternate perspective one can argue that climate litigation has been 
extremely effective.  Lawyers are struggling to find appropriate roles for 
the courts in this difficult debate, where the legal apparatus was not even 
previously engaged. While the claims attaching direct liability have 
recently subsided, the legitimacy of climate change as a legal and 
regulatory concern has been strengthened. In reviewing EPA actions 
regulating GHGs under the Clean Air Act, the courts have strongly 
reaffirmed the legitimacy of EPA's role in the face of strong challenges 
from industry and from states that oppose climate regulation.47  Further 
EPA and state regulatory actions will surely be challenged in court by the 
same forces, but the battles will concern administrative procedures and 
statutory minutiae and not the underlying rationale behind protecting the 
climate. 
It is likely that we will soon see a new phase litigation over climate 
change liability -- responsibility for adaptation to the effects of climate 
change, such as sea level rise.  This kind of litigation has a much greater 
potential for success than common law litigation against GHG emitters, and 
will involve a much different set of defendants. 
Perhaps the story of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, or MRGO, 
points the way to climate litigation’s next phase.  At issue in the case is a 
channel that was constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers to facilitate 
maritime travel to the Port of New Orleans, enabling passage so that ships 
                                                                                                                                
45 Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194, 
2012 WL 2946041, at *1 (D. Tex. July 9, 2012); Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm’n on 
Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194, 2012 WL 3164561, at *1 (D. Tex. Aug. 2, 
2012). 
46  See, e.g., Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2012); 
Barhaugh v. State, 264 P.3d 518 (Mont. 2011). 
47 E.g., Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir.), 
reh’g denied, 2012 WL 6621785, and reh’g en banc denied, 2012 WL 6681996 
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom, Utility Air Regulatory Group v.  
EPA, 134 S.Ct. 418 (2013). 
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could enter from the Gulf of Mexico without having to navigate through 
the circuitous Mississippi River. When Hurricane Katrina came ashore, 
however, the impact revealed that the Army Corps of Engineers had done a 
very poor job of maintaining MRGO.  Consequently, the channel had 
become much larger. This widened channel facilitated the rapid delivery of 
massive quantities of water, which overwhelmed dikes and levees in New 
Orleans, and augmented the damage caused during the hurricane.  
 In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation 48  constituted the 
numerous resulting lawsuits brought by homeowners and other parties 
whose property had been damaged by the breaches of those levees. 49  
According to a federal statute, flooding related to flood control projects 
cannot be the basis of liability, but liability may attach to other projects, 
including navigation projects.  Thus, when trial was held in the District 
Court of New Orleans on behalf of bellwether plaintiffs, the first question 
asked was whether MRGO was a flood control project, or a navigation 
project.  The Court made a preliminary finding that MRGO was a 
navigation project, and not a flood control project.  The next question at 
issue was whether this suit fell under the discretionary function exemption 
in Federal Tort Claims Act, which provided immunity from liability.  The 
Court again found in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that this was not a 
discretionary function case; the Army Corps of Engineers did not make a 
policy choice not to maintain the canal adequately, but rather did so out of 
negligence.   
The National Environmental Policy Act had obligated the Army 
Corps of Engineers to update the environmental impact statement for 
MRGO to reflect significant new conditions, and their failure to do so 
constituted a breach of duty.  The District Court awarded $750,000 in 
damages to the five bellwether plaintiffs.  With thousands or tens of 
thousands of similarly situated plaintiffs, this could easily amount to 
billions of dollars, and the Army Corps of Engineers appealed.  The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed, allowing the lawsuit to proceed.   
This decision opened up a completely new avenue of liability 
litigation against the providers of infrastructure, as well as the designers 
and builders of structures that do not withstand foreseeable events.  When 
the Army Corps of Engineers moved for an en banc hearing, though, the 
Fifth Circuit reversed itself, treating the motion as a rehearing and 
unanimously changing the disposition.  With barely an acknowledgement 
or explanation, the three members of the original panel issued a decision 
                                                                                                                                
48 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Latimore v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2013) (mem.). 
49 Robert R.M. Verchick & Joel D. Scheraga, Protecting the Coast, in THE 
LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 235, 247 (Michael B. Gerrard & 
Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012). 
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holding the exact opposite of their previous decision on the issue of 
sovereign immunity.  Following the Comer case, this next internal reversal 
of the Fifth Circuit only generated more curiosity. The Supreme Court 
denied the writ of certiorari challenging the Fifth Circuit’s decision on June 
24, 2013.50 
Although this case has presently exited the legal stage, it has 
successfully created an air of credibility concerning the liability for 
infrastructure providers and building designers.  In contrast to the long list 
of difficulties and obstacles that pertain to the common law nuisance cases, 
there is a much shorter list for this type of liability litigation.  These cases 
are not against greenhouse gas emitters, and thus do not depend on a 
showing that any particular event was caused by greenhouse gas emissions 
or by any party in particular.  Here, the burden of proof pertains merely to 
whether this kind of weather event was foreseeable to the builders or 
designers of infrastructure, and whether they had a duty to take precautions. 
For governmental defendants, there will still be a sovereign 
immunity issue.  Every state has its own tort claims act and every state has 
its own way of interpreting the discretionary function exemption.  
Therefore, much to the disappointment of private architects, engineers, 
builders and so forth, it remains to be seen on an individual basis how each 
state will resolve the issue.  There also remains the question of who has the 
ability to sue, that is to say, who owes a duty to whom.  But despite these 
issues, this remains an area ripe to become a major and growing subject of 
litigation, and where there is litigation, there are, of course, claims for 
insurance coverage.  
In closing, climate change will remain a motivation for litigation in 
our court system. Through Mass. v. EPA and many state and municipal 
actions, climate change has gained legitimacy as a source of harm and a 
cause of action. In this next phase of our evolving, societal reckoning with 
our changing world, litigation will surely focus on the responsibility of 
public and private parties to adapt to our new normal, the realities of a 
climate changing world.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                
50 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied sub nom. Latimore v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2013) (mem.).  See 
also Willis Hon, Field Report, 5th Circuit Reverses Itself on Hurricane Katrina 
Liability Lawsuit, COLUM. J. ENVTL. L., (2013).  
KEYNOTE ADDRESS, CLIMATE RELATED EXTREME 
EVENTS, LIABILITY REGIMES & THE ROLE OF THE 
GLOBAL INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
 
JOHN H. FITZPATRICK∗ 
 
 Climate change is a topic of great and increasing significance.  The 
inherent risk it presents to people all over our planet will require the best 
and the brightest to address many different aspects of the problem, and 
many perspectives from the world of insurance, and its management of 
extreme risks, so that societies can, and will, utilize them to address some 
of the issues presented by climate change.   
The unique characteristics of risk management, and of the 
insurance industry itself, create an integral and dynamic role for insurance 
as a tool to mitigate several aspects of climate change.  Today, the 
messages of greatest importance revolve around the recognition and 
examination of what the insurance industry can achieve in the face of 
climate change risk, and also what it cannot.   
For centuries insurance has ameliorated the damage of extreme 
weather events, and in the last two centuries, has protected many cities 
around the globe against the risks of extreme weather.  The unique capacity 
of the world’s insurance industry to protect society from the damage that 
can come from extreme weather events is based on a deep knowledge of 
risk engineering that can be employed to foster sound land use planning, 
more secure construction techniques and widespread adoption of protective 
building codes.  Insurers can, and do, develop new products that foster 
better loss prevention while utilizing the best of global operating methods 
to bring initial and essential relief to the victims of climate related damage.  
Regrettably, however, these industry resources are all too often ignored by 
policymakers who favor a narrow, short term, and sometimes politically 
motivated, role for the insurance industry to minimize loss from extreme 
events for their constituencies. 
Property insurance, which is free to be sold in conditions and at 
prices that fairly reflect the risks of the location and facilities seeking 
coverage, is distinctively competent in providing first party compensation 
for climate related losses. In this regard, insurance, by the pooling of large 
numbers of risks, reduces the individual’s risk of loss and therefore the 
expense of loss.  These competencies should be deployed in tandem with 
community, state, and national resilience movements. Regarding climate 
risks, this requires the terms and prices to grow with the frequency and 
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severity of anticipated losses.  Allowing these risk management tools to be 
freely applied will cause commercial and personal property owners to 
reconsider where they wish to locate and how they should operate.  But all 
too often, laws and regulations limit or prohibit such tools from being 
utilized, depriving many property owners of any insurance coverage and 
further burdening taxpayers and other insureds, impairing climate change 
sustainability rather than fostering it.  
The industry can fill this role of facilitating resiliency more 
effectively than it does today, but it has been inhibited by public policies 
that view many functions, such as the setting of building codes, land use 
patterns, and others, as exclusively government functions.  As a result, 
there has been little opportunity for the “market” to inform the debate on 
such topics.  As an exclusively governmental function, it is inevitable that 
the decisions regarding such important long-term subjects are informed by 
politics, rather than by a proper risk management or reflection of risk 
pricing.  In this area, it is the insurers and stakeholders that are able to 
achieve more than is currently being done through effective public-private 
sector collaborations. 
But insurance, as it stands today, remains limited in its capacity to 
improve the risks and minimize the effects of climate change.  For instance, 
the frictional cost of compensating loss through liability litigation at 40-
50% of the throughput of funds seems like an unsound and expensive 
social policy that would threaten the sustainability of insurance as a 
resource for sustainable development.  Still more evidence of these 
shortcomings emerge through a reflection on the developments of the past 
twenty years, and two seminal events that galvanized the U.S. public 
attention to the confluence of climate change and the law.   
 The first event was Earth Summit, held in June, 1992, in Rio de 
Janiero.  It was a global call to arms, warning that the acceleration of global 
warming constituted a meaningful threat to the sustainability of the 
comforts of life in developed countries and the opportunities for those 
comforts in the not yet developed parts of the world.  The nations and 
institutions gathered in Rio committed to change behaviors through both 
governmental and private actions, with ambitious goals for reducing carbon 
emissions contributing to global warming.  The Rio commitments have not 
been implemented as their authors hoped, but the message of urgency that 
Rio launched remains with us today.  
 The second event came just three months later in September 1992.  
Hurricane Andrew attacked Florida with a vengeance: a Category 5 
hurricane with wind gusts up to 206 mph.  The storm’s toll included 126 
lives lost, 126,000 homes destroyed and over $18 billion (in 1992 dollars) 
in property damage.  As significant as those storm totals were, it was 
fortunate that the storm was just a glancing blow south of Miami.  Yet it 
still created devastation, lowering property values and alerting many in 
America to the potential for loss of life and property if a Category 5 
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hurricane struck Miami directly, or any major U.S. costal city in the 
changing storm tracks of the future. 
 The events of 1992 changed the direction of the world, but not 
enough.  Individual regard for the environment has improved, and 
organizations have mobilized various forms of remedy, but geo-politics has 
not made climate change a priority. There are however, two consequences 
of note. 
 First, the insurance industry “got it.”  It saw the need for better 
protection of its shareholders assets, and understood the need for 
commitment to the requirements of climate related sustainability.  By the 
mid-1990’s most of the world’s leading insurers had adopted sustainability 
programs that influenced discretionary investments, captured the collective 
energies of employees and elevated sustainability consciousness among 
shareholders and business partners.  Individually the industry leaders began 
producing annual sustainability reports as complements to annual 
shareholder financial reports.  More important, those early movers invested 
in the action programs described in the reports.  The insurance industry 
became the first industry to truly embrace sustainability. 
 The insurers embrace of the implications of climate change was 
rational as self-interest became clearer.  While no single storm can be 
attributed to climate change, a defining moment of US weather related 
extreme events occurred thirteen years later in 2005 when four Category 5 
hurricanes struck the U.S. and Mexico.  Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and 
Wilma, demonstrated the enormous energy and destructive potential of 
windstorms as never before.  The combined death toll exceeded 2,000, and 
the property damage topped $125 billion.  Katrina alone cost $81 billion, 
triple that of Andrew.   The costs of a changing climate pattern affecting 
frequency and severity, clearly exceeded the loss models on which property 
insurance had been priced.   
 The initial reaction from the public sector was slow and woefully 
insufficient.  Insurers went about their responsibilities as fast as the public 
sector could allow, and sometimes even faster than the public sector was 
able to allow access.  Adjusters were on site as the flooding subsided; 
processing claims rapidly to assist homeowners and businesses in restoring 
life amidst the ruins.  When the final loss data was compiled, it showed that 
reinsurers from all parts of the world had paid 61% of the damage.  
Combined with the losses paid by direct insurers, the insurance industry 
paid approximately 75% of the property losses.   
 For The Geneva Association, Katrina, Rita and Wilma were the 
signals that the world needed to pay much more attention to the risks of 
climate change.  The “Climate Risk and Insurance” program, a special 
initiative of the Association, works with the United Nations and other 
organizations to assure that the knowledge and special competencies of the 
insurance industry contributes to the understanding and modeling of 
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climate events and the measurement and quantification of those risks.  The 
Climate Risk and Insurance Working Group also assisted in the 
development of a statement by CEO members declaring the responsibilities 
of the industry in coping with the challenges of climate risks.  Titled “The 
Kyoto Statement of the Geneva Association” (for its adoption in Kyoto on 
May 29, 2009), the Statement reads as follows:1 
  
The latest climate science strongly indicates that climate 
change is happening, Mankind’s influence is very material 
and the changes are occurring faster than earlier projected.  
The prospect of extreme climate change and its potentially 
devastating economic and social consequences are of great 
concern to the insurance industry.  Against this backdrop, 
we, the leaders of the world’s largest insurance and 
reinsurance companies, as assembled in The Geneva 
Association wants to make known our view through the 
following key messages. 
 
Those key messages involve commitments to customers, policymakers and 
the industry on a global basis.  It is in this regard that the second 
consequence to emerge from the events of 1992 bears significance.  Not 
only did the insurance industry “get it”, but others interested in 
compensating victims of climate related catastrophes, and their attorneys, 
got their own message: with vast needs for compensation, and no 
humanitarian solution in sight as a result of governments that could not or 
would not pick up the tab, invoking the liability regimes of the world, or 
creating new ones to justify the transfer of assets from the pools where they 
could be found to where relief was needed, was the solution.  
 The humanitarian appeal of changing a tort liability system to a 
compensation system is undeniable.  However, one can question the utility 
of transforming a system founded on principles of fault to one founded on 
principles of need without first creating a sustainable model of linkage 
between economic reality and responsible behaviors.  One need not be a 
legal scholar to recognize the clumsy process of attempting to squeeze a 
square peg into a round hole.  Nor does it take an expert on constitutional 
law to recognize efforts to convert the U.S. civil justice system into a 
system to socialize losses from massive weather related events.  One can 
question the motives, but more importantly, one can question the method 
 
1 The Kyoto Statement of the Geneva Association, The Geneva Association, 
May 29, 2009 available at https://www.genevaassociation.org/media/206439/ 
GA2009-Kyoto_Statement.pdf.  
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with concern that the short-term objectives will undermine long-term 
sustainability. 
 Beginning with consideration of economic scale, there is no doubt 
that the defendants in the Kivalina case,2 and their insurers, would be able 
to bear the costs of relocating that unfortunate community.  The costs will 
be de minimis compared to what the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers spent 
enabling large sections of New Orleans to rebuild below sea level after it 
drowned in Katrina.  But was that public cost a wise use of national 
resources?  There was little, if any debate about that decision and certainly 
almost no economic analysis.3 Nor was there much concern that the new 
levees were rebuilt to withstand only a once-in-100-year weather event, 
when there have been several such events in the U.S. in just these past 
twenty years.  If the public sector is the place to fund the rebuilding of New 
Orleans below sea level, perhaps it is the proper source of funds to relocate 
the Inuits to safe ground. 
 These, however, are all affordable issues, but the potential costs of 
climate related extreme events may not be.  A study conducted by Trucost 
consultants for the financial institution branch of the UN Environmental 
Protection Agency recently produced some striking numbers that UNEP FI 
has endorsed.  Trucost has determined that the annual global cost of climate 
related extreme events attributable to greenhouse gas emissions is $6.6 
trillion, annually.4  Further calculations lead Trucost and UNEP FI to 
attribute $2.15 trillion of this annual amount to the GHG emissions of our 
global industrialization—the “anthropogenic” component.5   
 UNEP FI helpfully notes that the $2.15 trillion could be 
compensated out of the operating revenues of the 3,000 largest public 
companies in the world, and presumably their insurers.6  What is the 
connection that links the universe of business and the community of need?  
That has not been explained, but the implication drawn by these 
policymakers seems clear: large businesses are likely large emitters of 
greenhouse gasses and should be held responsible for the consequences.  
 
2 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009), aff'd, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
3 It has to be said that politicians get the microphone first after an event, and it 
is as predictable as the sun rising after a dark night that they immediately vow to 
“Rebuild their City”, New Orleans in 2005, the vast neighborhoods south of Miami 
in 1992, and if one is a student of insurance you can find the same said about San 
Francisco in 1906. 
4 Trucost, report, Universal Ownership: Why Environmental Externalities 
Matter to Institutional Investors, April 6, 2011.   
5 Id. at 25. 
6 Id.  
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There seems a similarity of approach between the Inuits and the global 
victims; the similarity being the lowering of tort and mass claim liability 
standards to a point that they do not impede the flow of funds from owner 
to a new beneficiary.  
 The scale and precision of the numbers may be difficult to accept, 
but there lies no reason to question the good faith belief behind that effort.  
If costs of that magnitude were to be incurred, the theories of socializing 
those costs through a liability system would not be a sustainable 
commercial or governmental model for any country in the world. 
 Good things have emerged from the climatological and political 
events triggered by Rio 1992 and the new era of catastrophic hurricanes 
that began with Andrew.  The humanitarian movement understands that 
insurance assets are a resource to be utilized, and the insurance industry 
understands that climate change and its consequences are of great concern 
for which it must play a leading role in finding solutions. 
 These insights clearly need to be conjoined in a constructive way, 
but perhaps draining the river of business and insurance assets as fast as 
climate related extreme events requires is not such a constructive way, as 
the river is not fed by a bottomless well of resource.   
 As for the financial resources available, it is important to note that 
the coffers of the insurance industry were depleted not just by extreme 
insurance events of recent years, but also by the financial crash of 2008.  
Much more damaging to these coffers, however, is the daily erosion that 
comes to the insurance industry from the cures implemented to fix our 
ailing western and eastern economies.  The collective action of the world’s 
central banks to repress interest rates over several years is more than 
hurting the margins of the insurance industry, it is reducing the industry’s 
ability to resiliently deal with future climate events.  This financial 
repression caused the entire industry’s equity to be valued by investors 
below book value, a condition which, if it continued, would severely limit 
the likelihood and amount of post-event financing that could ever be 
supplied by investors.7  So, as long as the sustainability challenge operates 
within a clearly financially limited insurance industry there will have to be 
a better way. 
 The search for a better way requires clarity about the problem.  The 
expectation that climate risks will rise in frequency and severity is not the 
problem.  The problem lies in the approach to mitigate the effects of 
climate change and how to most efficiently deal with the impending losses 
 
7 After September 11, 2001, an extreme event that no insurer was ever paid 
for, 6 billion Swiss francs of capital was raised to replenish Swiss Re’s balance 
sheet post event.  This tool of post-event financing is severely limited in today’s 
world given these, arguably rational, valuations. 
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and hardships.  The use of liability mechanisms or artificial surrogates 
operating under the procedures of liability litigation, with frictional costs of 
40-50% for payers and beneficiaries, is the least efficient option.  It is 
worth noting that the frictional costs of workers compensation systems in 
the U.S. are at 3%, so at the very least it can be said that choosing the 
liability route to compensation is not in the interests of either the providers 
or victims. 
 The components of the problem are numerous and often debated: 
flawed land use planning, weak and poorly enforced building codes, 
absence of resilience planning from the community level on up, and the 
absence of post-event recovery planning, especially for events that spread 
over the borders of many sovereign jurisdictions.  The commitment 
adopted in the Geneva Association’s Kyoto Statement provides directional 
guidance about dealing with these problems: 
  
 In dealing with our customers insurers: 
                 
• …[A]re committed to enhancing our research capabilities 
in order to provide a better evaluation and management of 
climate risks. 
• …[P]romote mitigation efforts by developing products 
which incentivize offsetting 
or reducing greenhouse gas emission levels. 
• …[D]esign insurance products to support low carbon 
energy development projects 
and to help attract investments to such projects. 
• As major institutional investors, the insurance industry 
(will) encourage mitigation and adaptation efforts such as 
investing in low carbon energy projects. 
 
In dealing with those who make or influence public policy 
insurers: 
 
• …([W]ill) help counter climate risk through active 
cooperation in implementing building codes or similar 
means which encourage the use of sustainable practices. 
• …[W]ork closely with policymakers on communicating to 
our customers their climate risk levels, possible strategies 
of mitigation and adaptation, and in quantifying the 
financial benefits of those strategies. 
• …([P]rovide) innovative solutions for climate risk issues.   
These include funding relevant research and providing 
tools to its customers to assess and counter climate risks. 
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• …[R]ecognize the significant benefits of pooling climate 
risks.  We urge policy-makers to collect robust data and 
make it freely available to allow risk assessment and to 
facilitate efficient solutions where premiums are risk 
based.8 
 
 These may sound like institutionalized, high sounding phrases 
without meaningful content, but they are not.  There is no better place to 
begin addressing the real issues of climate change.  Each of those simple 
statements has a depth of thought and substance embedded in it to 
determine what is optimally possible and about how to construct 
sustainable solutions to the climate change challenge. 
 But if that is correct, why has there been only a modest, and 
generally unrecognized, progress in the three years proceeding the issuance 
of that Statement?  Has the insurance industry failed to deliver on its 
commitments?  No, but the progress and effort behind it have not been as 
robust as it should and can be.  The causes for the snail’s pace of progress 
are complex and intertwined.   However, one factor stands out as the 
primary obstacle:  the absence of needed cooperation from public sector 
policymakers, and regrettable public sector obstacles to the implementation 
of sound initiatives.  Private sector actors, all acting in their acknowledged 
self-interests, have also contributed to the absence of take up of these and 
other like minded proposals. 
 Behind the insurance industry’s pledges lie vast and unique 
competencies, data resources and analytics, risk management expertise, and 
the disciplinary tools of product terms and pricing to help policymakers, 
and the insured, take serious and immediate actions to mitigate risks to life 
and property.  But there is little that can be done with these tools unless 
there are actors willing to incorporate them in response to the real climate 
change problem.  Further, there will be few such actors if those who set 
public policy, law, and regulation interfere with market dynamics. 
 Responses to Hurricane Andrew illustrate the public sector’s 
interference with the potential for effective private-public collaboration at a 
time it could be most valuable.  The endless stretches of devastated housing 
flattened by Andrew were dramatic proof that the applicable building codes 
fostering those housing developments were not sound.  One might have 
expected two things to have happened, not just in South Florida, but in 
many parts of the U.S., in the wake of Andrew’s destruction: 1) major 
reformation of building codes, incorporating the data and expertise of the 
insurance industry, and 2) the escalation of property insurance premiums 
using insurance pricing tools to assure those who chose to settle in areas 
 
8 Kyoto Statement at 1. 
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vulnerable to hurricanes would pay according to their choice to live in 
harm’s way.   
 But the State of Florida had other ideas.  First, it prevented insurers 
from charging actuarially sound prices for the risk.  As a result, insurers 
announced they would withdraw from the state.  To combat the effects, 
Florida passed a law preventing any insurer from withdrawing more than 
5% of its business in a single year.  Insurers appealed this decision and 
spent the next year figuring out which 5% of their business would not be 
renewed.  The most wind-exposed policies found their way into the Joint 
Underwriting Association (“JUA”), a state owned and operated insurer of 
last resort that provided insurance coverage at prices far below actuarially 
sound prices. These events reduced the pressure for a true rectification of 
building codes, land use restrictions, and movement of facilities off of 
heavily exposed coasts. 
 Four years into this march of folly, a consultant to the State of 
Florida submitted a study on the risk the JUA faced now that it was the 
third largest homeowners insurer in the state with more than a million 
policies on its books.  The study pointed out that if the wind blew, not only 
would the JUA be bankrupt, it could also impede the State of Florida, 
which would be required to finance the claims of the JUA in such a large 
event.  
 The second act of the State was to pass legislation to entice new 
entrant insurers to take policies out of JUA at a high cost to JUA, a folly 
not required if the State would have allowed the actuarially proper price to 
be allocated.  To this day, the Florida insurance market continues to be in 
an unsustainable position, given the frequency and severity of hurricane 
activity likely to occur, the limits placed on market-based catastrophe 
models and direct limits on pricing. 
 It does not require much thought to recognize the consequences of 
such a series of efforts to control the price of insurance.  Poor land use 
planning continued into a statewide boom, slowed only temporarily by the 
financial crisis fifteen years later.  Building codes were not rigorously 
corrected - another area where the expertise of insurers went largely unused 
- and the amount of commercial and residential property in coastal Florida 
has increased to this day.  Subsequent storms much less fierce than Andrew 
will prove the risk that the state insurance fund face; the risk it would need 
to be bailed out at taxpayer expense when an extreme event occurs.   In 
essence, it can be said that the relatively affluent developed the state and its 
coastal areas to a point where they will be the victims, predictably, of 
extreme windstorm losses.  It can be argued that this affluent group is using 
the powers of the state to be bailed out in the future by the relatively less 
affluent not on the coast in their heavily exposed houses and other 
facilities. 
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 The Florida experience has been replicated throughout the U.S. in a 
variety of ways, although there have been some examples of courageous 
public sector use of wiser principles and of the power of insurance industry 
advice and products that were properly designed and priced.  But sadly, 
those wise courses chosen are not in the majority.  Is it not fair to suggest 
that rebuilding large sections of New Orleans below sea level, at a 
hurricane prone location, was a massive misallocation of resources that 
benefitted the few with political influence at the expense of taxpayers 
nationwide? 
 These issues continue to unfold around the globe, and 
implementing the solutions embedded in the Kyoto Statement is 
considerably more difficult when dealing with multiple sovereign countries 
than here in the U.S. where public policy responsibilities operate in a 
largely federal context.  However, the challenges of mitigation, adaptation, 
remediation, and resilience to climate change are not substantially different, 
and the impediments to sound public-private sector collaboration in the use 
of insurance expertise and tools, is as strong today as ever. 
 Beyond the politically motivated, there are other public sector 
obstacles facing the insurance industry in seeking to implement the goals of 
the Kyoto Statement. First, the public-private collaborations that are 
essential to meaningful solutions must begin with close cooperation among 
the leading insurers and reinsurers.  That cooperation will be most useful if 
these groups can work with one another to design products and services for 
public authorities and private clients.  But there are competition law 
constraints in all developed economies, and competition enforcement 
authorities in many, that create a serious risk if such cooperation were to be 
meaningfully pursued absent some accommodation in law.   
 That is not to suggest that the traditional role of competition 
authorities should be abandoned for insurers.  In developed lines of 
business they are as warranted for insurance as for other industries.  But 
where insurers are attempting to contribute their vital skills to solving 
crises as large as climate change, changes to laws should be implemented 
for the greater good of financial stability and social sustainability.  
Regrettably, to date there has been no sign of policymaker support for this 
accommodation. 
 Second, the insurance industry is undergoing massive regulatory 
and solvency revisions, arising out of the financial crisis.  Politicians and 
regulators tend to view the insurance industry as an industry with a similar 
business model to that of investment banks, retail banks and other deposit 
taking institutions.  Consequently, they worry about runs on insurance 
assets as systemic risk and look at our solvency needs as though our 
liabilities are as volatile and as easily callable as bank deposits.   
 In fact, there are structural and business model differences that 
make insurance a natural stabilizer for domestic and global economies. 
“Deposits” are premiums, for which the corollary obligation to pay is 
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contingent and largely outside the timing control of the insured.  With the 
power of history as a guide, the severity and frequency of most claims 
exposures are quite predictable, especially over multiple years.  The 
insurance position in the U.S., and elsewhere, is further secured by the 
claims reserve requirements of existing insurance regulation.  For all its 
adverse publicity, AIG’s regulated insurance subsidiaries were able to pay 
all legitimate claims when due and its holding company pay back the 
American taxpayers all loans, plus a $15 billion profit with another $8 
billion of profit to be realized by future sales of stock by the U.S. Treasury.  
It is clear, however, that the industry faces uncertain outcomes regarding 
solvency standards and regulatory constraints that run directly counter to 
the flexibility required to innovate and respond to climate related risks.   
 Finally, politicians and regulators misperceive the purpose and role 
of insurance in the free market economy.  Even those who realize the 
industry’s financial resources do not magically descend to earth from 
another planet hold a similar assumption that whenever an insurer incurs 
losses beyond their expectation—a not uncommon experience in the 
property sector with the advent of climate change or in the liability sector 
with innovative efforts to lower the bar of recovery with retrospective 
effect that is unknowable at the time of underwriting— the industry has an 
endlessly elastic capacity to increase premiums in all classes of business to 
pay such losses and that investors have an unending appetite for insurance 
stocks such that capital can be replenished in this manner.  If only that were 
so.  
 Commercial insurers cannot transfer the costs of Katrina to auto 
and homeowner customers in, Minnesota, or even to auto manufacturers 
and the energy sector.  There is no legal or economic basis for doing so, 
and a healthy free market environment in which new capital can arise as 
competition at any time prevents such loss shifting —as it should.  
Insurance serves society and the economy by distributing losses on an 
equitable basis among the universe of insureds facing similar risks.  In that 
process, the insurer often absorbs loss in greater or lesser amounts than 
anticipated.  But the industry cannot consistently bear aggregate losses that 
are not recoverable over time, for our investor capital will quickly move to 
other industries with better and more reliable returns.  
 Those policymakers and humanitarian organizations who expect 
insurance to operate as a public resource, able to tax customers for 
whatever is necessary to meet evolving theories of climate related liability 
may harvest a few eggs in the short term, but will kill all the geese before 
the long term arrives. 
 In the greater context of climate risk liability, and at some risk of 
informality, a well-worn aphorism comes to mind: When one is up to your 
axx in alligators, it is difficult to remember that we are here to drain the 
swamp.   Referring, of course, to draining the swamp as the counterpart to 
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finding the path toward a sustainable future, which adapts to climate 
change, the reference to alligators is not intended to be a metaphor for 
anyone, particularly some of our legal brethren in the audience today.  
Indeed it can be a term of respect for those with a different view of how to 
drain the swamp. 
 The work of the Geneva Association’s liability regimes program 
has described and analyzed the trends of the past sixty years for 
innovations in liability law and practice to be used as a medium of social 
change and a form of regulation in the private sector.  The asbestos and 
tobacco industries will testify to that, as will many consumers who give 
thanks to the model (or myth) of Erin Brockovich.  But the forecasted 
effects of climate change envision property losses and human suffering far 
beyond the scale of all the world’s swamps, and the players in the climate 
change drama need to find common ground and collaborative innovations 
if the dry land of sustainable development is to be secured from a 
vulnerable swamp. 
 Climate change and its manifestations in extreme weather events 
cannot be terminated by fiat, but the manifestations might be minimized by 
collective global wisdom.  Reasonable doubt exists about the early 
prospects of accomplishing this until the goals and undertakings of close to 
200 some sovereign states can be aligned.  With so little progress toward 
that alignment since 1992, the duty now is to minimize the adverse 
consequences of climate change, using complementary skills and aligned 
interests of those like thinking parties in the private sector, combined with 
pursuit of collaboration with public sector bodies willing to participate.   
 Thus, the optimum foreseeable goals should be: 
 
• Universal appreciation of the challenges. 
 
• The transformation of political will from short term 
opportunism that creates moral hazard to the hard decisions 
of responsible planning. 
 
• The removal of government owned insurers from distorting 
the policy terms and price signals that the insurance market 
can provide. 
 
• Public sector regulation of land use, structural design and 
population center developments that give due consideration 
to the mitigation of losses, using insurance data and 
expertise and all other useful inputs. 
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• Appropriate accommodations from competition authorities 
and insurance regulators to allow full use of the industry’s 
assets and competencies to address this issue. 
 
• Maximum innovation of new products by insurers to foster 
better preparedness and to limit the need to depend on high 
carbon industrial processes. 
 
• Public-private collaborations on readiness plans for post 
event recovery, utilizing the insurance industry’s capacity 
to provide suitable market priced policies, to respond 
quickly with large numbers of trained personnel, and to be 
better able than most to deliver integrated attention across 
national borders where the climate event spans regions. 
 
 Bringing together all these several themes regarding the insurance 
industry, climate change, and the interplay between them, several 
conclusions emerge. First, climate change mitigation—the reduction of 
CO2 gas emissions—is a government responsibility and can be achieved by 
changes in technology such as: shifting from coal to low carbon shale gas 
or near zero carbon (hydro, geothermal, wind and solar).  Second, adapting 
to extreme weather events is most efficiently done through the cooperation 
of governments, the insurance industry and the potential victims. Three, 
insurance is based on risk assessments, risk pricing and risk transfer and 
will thus promote cleaner technologies with lower risk potential by offering 
lower premiums for them.  Finally, the inability of governments to mitigate 
climate change will lead to a shift of liability to the private sector. Similar 
to asbestos and tobacco, the insurance industry will be faced with the 
possibility of having to pick up this bill and here it has no realistic capacity 
to do so. 
 The insurance industry has a sound and sincere understanding of 
the challenges embedded in climate related extreme events, and is well 
suited as a contributor to drain the swamp.   Implementation, however, 
holds a pace that is less promising, and cannot be accomplished without 
collaboration in conjunction with legal and regulatory cooperation.  It is 
imperative, however, that the insurance industry continue to strive for 
further progress on all fronts with a required sense of urgency.   
 Finally, reliance on unadapted liability law and practice remains 
an unsuitable method to drain the swamp, insofar as using liability claims is 
a means of socializing the unavoidable hardships.  The socialization of 
losses is likely to be a goal most thinking, feeling people would choose.  
But it is a goal that must begin with multi-governmental agreements that 
create an efficient and equitable basis of asset transfers.  Such agreements 
are also necessary to enable insurers and other contributors to act in 
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compliance with domestic laws and regulations.  Socialization of climate 
losses through the reshaping of liability law and practice is intrinsically 
inefficient, consistently confrontational where cooperation is required, and 
has the risk of preventing sustainable development. 
  Finally, reliance on modifying liability law and practice remains an 
unsuitable method to drain the swamp, insofar as using liability claims is a 
means of socializing the unavoidable hardships.  The socialization of losses 
is likely to be a goal most thinking, feeling people would choose.  But it is 
a goal that must begin with multi-governmental agreements that create an 
efficient and equitable basis of asset transfers.  Such agreements are also 
necessary to enable insurers and other contributors to act in compliance 
with domestic laws and regulations.  Socialization of climate losses through 
the reshaping of liability law and practice is intrinsically inefficient, 
consistently confrontational where cooperation is required, and has the risk 
of preventing sustainable development. 
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*** 
 
This article discusses whether or not commercial liability insurers have a 
duty to provide coverage to policyholders who are sued because their 
activity contributes to global warming.  The article focuses on a decision 
by the Virginia Supreme Court in AES Corp. v. Steadfast Insurance Co.  in 
which the plaintiff insurance company sued its policyholder claiming that 
the act of emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere was not an 
“occurrence” as defined in the insurance policy and therefore no coverage 
was required.  The Virginia Supreme Court agreed, ruling that coverage by 
the insurer was not necessary for any period in which the policyholder 
knew, or should have known, that the emission of carbon dioxide had a 
substantial probability of causing harm. 
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In AES Corp. v. Steadfast Insurance Co.,1 the Virginia Supreme 
Court held that claimed injury due to a power company’s alleged 
contribution to global warming was not an “accident.”2 Therefore, although 
the insurance company had issued the power company several commercial 
general liability (“CGL”) insurance policies that provided coverage for an 
“occurrence,” the insurance company did not have a duty to provide 
coverage for the insured’s cost of defense because those policies defined 
“occurrence” as an “accident.”3 This Article contends the Virginia Supreme 
Court’s decision in AES was wrong, and the insurance company should 
have been required to provide the insured with a defense.4 
                                                                                                                                
* Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Los Angeles.  Mr. Heinke argued on 
behalf of AES in the Virginia Supreme Court. 
**Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Los Angeles. 
1 AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 725 S.E.2d 532 (Va. 2012). 
2 Id. at 537. 
3 Id. at 538. 
4 The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors.  They do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the AES Corporation or Akin Gump Strauss Hauer 
& Feld LLP. 
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II. BASIC FACTS 
 
The plaintiff in AES was Steadfast Insurance Company, a global 
insurance provider.  From 1996 to 2000 and 2003 to 2008, Steadfast issued 
a series of CGL policies to the defendant, AES Corporation, a Virginia-
based energy company that produces electrical power around the world.5 
In the underlying litigation that gave rise to the issues in AES, the 
Native Village and City of Kivalina (“Kivalina”), a native community in 
Alaska, brought suit against AES and numerous other energy companies in 
2008 in the Northern District of California.  Kivalina alleged it was harmed 
as a result of global warming to which defendants contributed through the 
emission of greenhouse gases.6 
Specifically, Kivalina contended: (1) defendants’ fossil-fuel-fired 
electrical generating plants emit large quantities of carbon dioxide as a 
waste by-product of combustion, 7  (2) defendants fail to reduce these 
emissions by not using “alternatives to fossil fuel combustion,”8 (3) these 
emissions “mix in the atmosphere”9 and “merge[] with the accumulation of 
emissions in California and in the world,” 10  (4) the emissions further 
accumulate in the upper atmosphere and trap heat, along with carbon 
dioxide emitted many years ago by other sources,11 (5) over a period of 
time the trapped heat raises the temperature of the atmosphere,12 (6) the 
increased temperature raises ocean temperatures, which melts Arctic 
glaciers and ice caps, including Arctic sea ice in the upper northwest corner 
of Alaska that ordinarily builds up in front of Kivalina during the winter,13 
(7) this leads to sea ice forming later or melting earlier than usual in front 
of Kivalina, with the ice not being as substantial, 14  (8) this results in 
Kivalina, located on an Alaskan coastal barrier island, being more 
vulnerable to waves and storm surges that cause erosion and flooding, 
which render the island uninhabitable.15 
                                                                                                                                
5 AES Corp., 725 S.E.2d. at 533. 
6 Id. 
7 Complaint for Damages; Demand for Jury Trial at 2, 4, 7, Native Village of 
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N. D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 696 
F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 08-01138) [hereinafter Kivalina Complaint]; AES 
Corp., 725 S.E.2d. at 534. 
8 Kivalina Complaint, supra note 7, at 23–24.  
9 Id. at 34. 
10 Id. at 3. 
11 See id. at 31. 
12 Id. at 31; see also id. at 32 (alleging that the fourteen warmest years on 
record have all occurred since 1990). 
13 Id. at 33, 45. 
14 Id. at 45. 
15 Id.; AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 725 S.E.2d 532, 534 (Va. 2012). 
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Kivalina further asserted that there is “a clear scientific consensus 
that global warming is caused by emissions of greenhouse gases, primarily 
carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion and methane releases from 
fossil fuel harvesting.”16 Thus, Kivalina alleged that AES and the other 
defendants “intentionally emit[] millions of tons of carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere annually” and “knew or should 
have known” of the “impacts of [their] emissions on global warming.”17  
Kivalina contended that “[d]espite this knowledge,” AES continued to emit 
greenhouse gases as part of its daily business operations. 18  Kivalina 
concluded that AES “[i]ntentionally or negligently,” has “created, 
contributed to, and/or maintained” global warming causing Kivalina’s 
alleged injuries, and that AES and the other defendants intentionally and 
negligently violated federal and state nuisance law. 19 
AES requested that Steadfast provide it with a defense pursuant to 
the terms of its CGL policies.  Steadfast provided a defense, but under a 
reservation of rights, and filed a declaratory judgment action in Virginia to 
determine whether Steadfast had a duty to defend AES.20 
The Virginia trial court held that “Steadfast has no duty to defend 
AES in connection with the underlying Kivalina litigation because no 
‘occurrence’ as defined in the policies has been alleged in the underlying 
Complaint.”21 AES appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, which granted 
discretionary review.22 
 
III. STEADFAST’S ARGUMENT 
 
In making its argument that it had no duty to defend AES in the 
underlying Kivalina litigation, Steadfast pointed out that the CGL policies 
only applied to complaints alleging an “occurrence,” which is defined in 
the CGL policies as an “accident.”23  Steadfast contended that Kivalina’s 
complaint did not allege damages caused by an accident, but rather by 
                                                                                                                                
16 AES Corp., 725 S.E.2d. at 534. 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 534–35.  The Ninth Circuit rejected Kivalina’s federal claims on the 
grounds that the federal Clean Air Act displaced any federal common law nuisance 
claim.  Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 
2012).  The federal court then declined to hear the state claims.  Id. at 858. 
20 AES Corp., 725 S.E.2d. at 533. 
21 Steadfast Ins. Co. v. AES Corp., No. 2008-858, 2010 WL 1484811 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. 2010). 
22 AES Corp., 725 S.E.2d. at 535. 
23 Brief of Appellee, AES Corp. v. Steadfast Insurance Co., 715 S.E.2d 28 (Va. 
2011) (No. 100764) 2010 WL 6893536, at *11, *18. 
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intentional conduct with known consequences.  That is, Steadfast alleged 
that AES “knew or should have known” its actions would result in global 
warming and Kivalina’s alleged injuries.24   
Steadfast further contended that Kivalina alleged there was a clear 
scientific consensus that global warming is caused by the release of the 
type of greenhouse gases that AES regularly emitted every day. 25  
Accordingly, Steadfast asserted it did not owe AES a defense because 
allegations of intentional conduct with known consequences are not 
allegations of an accident.  Thus, it argued, Kivalina’s allegations were 
outside the scope of the CGL policies that Steadfast issued to AES.26 
 
IV. AES’S ARGUMENT 
 
AES contended that well-established law distinguishes between an 
insured’s acts and the consequences of its acts.27 While AES acknowledged 
that intentional conduct that has direct and certain consequences is not an 
accident, it asserted that Kivalina’s alternative allegation that AES acted 
intentionally in emitting greenhouse gases, but only “knew or should have 
known” the consequences of its action described an accident.28   
More specifically, AES contended that Kivalina alleged that AES 
engaged in intentional conduct that, through a highly attenuated causal 
chain, led to global warming and damage to Kivalina.29  AES contended 
that because Kivalina did not allege the harm was solely a direct and 
certain consequence of its acts, it was also an accident, so there was 
coverage.30 
 
V. FIRST DECISION 
 
The Virginia Supreme Court issued two decisions.31  In its first 
decision, the Court held, consistent with standard insurance law, that to 
                                                                                                                                
24 Id. at *12–13, *26–27.  
25 Id. at *19–20. 
26 Id. at *20. 
27 Brief of Appellant, AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 715 S.E.2d 28 (Va. 
2011) (No. 100764), 2010 WL 6893538, at *14–15. 
28 Id. 
29 Id at *14.  The District Court in the underlying case held that causation was 
so attenuated that Kivalina had not even successfully pled causation under Article 
III of the federal constitution.  Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 
F. Supp. 2d 863, 880–82 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 696 F.3d 849 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
30 Brief of Appellant, supra note 27, at *14–16. 
31 AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 715 S.E.2d 28 (Va. 2011), reh’g granted, 
opinion set aside, 725 S.E.2d 532 (Va. 2012), and superseded, 725 S.E.2d 532 (Va. 
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determine if Kivalina’s allegations come within the coverage provided by 
Steadfast’s CGL policies, the “four corners” of the complaint must be 
compared with the “four corners” of the policy.32  This is the eight corners 
rule (sometimes referred to as the four corners rule) that a duty to defend is 
determined by the underlying complaint’s allegations and the terms of the 
policy.33   
The Virginia Supreme Court also recognized, again consistent with 
standard insurance law, that Steadfast’s duty to defend is broader than its 
obligation to pay a judgment, and arises whenever the complaint alleges 
any facts and circumstances, even in the alternative, that fall within the 
risks covered by the policy.34 
Referencing authorities like City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co,35 and Barry R. Ostrager and Thomas R. Newman’s Handbook on 
Insurance Coverage Disputes,36 the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that 
Steadfast did not have a duty to defend because “[w]hen the insured knows 
or should have known of the consequences of his actions, there is no 
occurrence and therefore no coverage.”37 The Court went on to hold that 
“[i]f an insured knew or should have known that certain results would 
follow from his acts or omissions, there is no ‘occurrence’ within the 
meaning of a comprehensive general liability policy.”38   
 
VI. REHEARING 
 
AES petitioned for rehearing, arguing that the duty to defend is 
excused only when the complaint alleges that a defendant knew or should 
have known to a substantial probability that its conduct would cause the 
alleged harm, not merely when a defendant “should have known.”39   
                                                                                                                                
2012) [hereinafter AES I]; AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 725 S.E.2d 532 (Va. 
2012) [hereinafter AES II]. 
32 AES I, supra note 31, at 31–32. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 32 (quoting Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 475 S.E.2d 264, 265–66 (Va. 1996)).   
35 604 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1979). 
36 1 BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE 
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 8.03[c] (15th ed. 1990). 
37 AES I, supra note 31, at 33–34 (citing OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 
36). 
38 Id. at 34 (citing OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 36 (citing City of Carter 
Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1058–59 (8th Cir. 1979)). 
39 Petition for Rehearing at 4–6, AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co.,725 S.E.2d 
532 (Va. 2012) (No. 100764). 
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In making its argument, AES cited the very authorities relied on by 
the Court.  AES pointed out that City of Carter Lake and Ostrager & 
Newman stand for the proposition that there is no “occurrence” within the 
meaning of a CGL policy if an insured knows or should have known there 
was a substantial probability that certain results would follow from the 
insured’s acts.40  However, if the insured only “should have known” of the 
consequences of his actions, then there is an “occurrence.”41 Thus, AES 
asserted that because Kivalina did not allege that AES “should have known 
to a substantial probability” that its actions would harm the village 
(Kivalina merely alleged that AES should have known this), there was an 
occurrence, and thus Steadfast owes AES coverage.42 
AES also argued that by omitting the “to a substantial probability” 
element, the Court had redefined “accident” to exclude coverage in 
virtually all negligence cases because “should have known” is a 
foreseeability standard (that is, a mere negligence standard), and that to 
have a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must at least allege that a defendant 
“should have known” the consequences of its actions.43 
AES further argued that if “should have known” allegations would 
defeat coverage, then there would almost never be coverage for an 
accident, because any plaintiff alleging negligence will allege that the 
defendant “should have known” of the consequences of its acts.44 AES 
quoted City of Carter Lake, an authority the Virginia Supreme Court had 
relied on, rejecting the very argument the Virginia Supreme Court adopted:  
“Under [this] construction of the policy language if the damage was 
foreseeable then the insured is liable, but there is no coverage, and if the 
damage is not foreseeable, there is coverage, but the insured is not liable.  
This is not the law.”45 
The Virginia Supreme Court granted rehearing.46 
 
                                                                                                                                
40 Id. at 4–5 (citing OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 36, at 658–59 (“if an 
insured knew or should have known there was a ‘substantial probability’ that 
certain results would follow from his acts or omissions, there is no ‘occurrence’ 
within the meaning of a CGL policy.”)). 
41 Id. at 5 (citing City of Carter Lake, 604 F.2d at 1059 (“if the insured knew 
or should have known that there was a substantial probability that certain results 
would follow his acts or omissions then there has not been an occurrence or 
accident.”)).   
42 Id. at 1. 
43 See id. at 9–10. 
44 See id. at 10. 
45 Id. (citing City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 
1058 (8th Cir. 1979)). 
46 AES II, supra note 31, at 532 n.1. 
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VII. SECOND DECISION 
 
In its second and final decision, the Virginia Supreme Court held 
that Kivalina alleged that the result of AES’s intentional acts was not 
merely foreseeable, but a “natural or probable consequence” of those acts, 
and thus the resulting alleged injury was not an accident.47 This holding is 
surprising because Kivalina, in its underlying complaint, did not assert that 
the harm it allegedly suffered was the “natural and probable consequence” 
of AES’s intentional acts - it merely alleged that AES “knew or should 
have known” that would be the consequence.48  Thus, Kivalina did not 
allege that AES knew to a substantial probability that harm would result.  
The Court did not discuss the substantial probability issue. 
The Court further held that a natural or probable consequence of 
AES’s intentional emissions of carbon dioxide was global warming 
because Kivalina alleged there is a scientific consensus that such emissions 
cause global warming. 49  However, as actually alleged by Kivalina, the 
consensus was equivocal, albeit it was alleged to have become more certain 
over time.50   
Moreover, Steadfast began issuing CGL policies to AES in 1996.51  
Because Kivalina alleged the consensus became less equivocal over time, 
                                                                                                                                
47 Id. at 537–38. 
48 Id. at 534. 
49 Id. at 537. 
50 Kivalina cited in its complaint twenty-seven examples from 1896 to 2007 to 
support the allegation that there is a “clear scientific consensus that global 
warming is caused by emissions of greenhouse gases.”  Kivalina Complaint, supra 
note 7, at 33–39.  But the majority of these examples use subjective language that 
merely suggests carbon dioxide emissions “could,” “may,” or “should” result in 
global warming.  See, e.g., id. at 33 (“In 1956 scientist Gilbert Plass published a 
paper in American Scientist stating that global warming could be a ‘serious 
problem to future generations.’” (emphasis added)); id. at 34 (“The First Annual 
Report of the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality in 1970 contained a Chapter 
entitled ‘Man’s Inadvertent Modification of Weather and Climate,’ which stated 
that ‘air pollution alters climate and may produce global changes in 
temperature . . . .’” (emphasis added)); id. at 35 (“[I]n 1988, NASA scientist James 
E. Hansen published results showing that ‘global greenhouse warming should rise 
above the level of natural climate variability within the next several years, and by 
the 1990s there should be a noticeable increase in the local frequency of warm 
events . . . .’” (emphasis added)); id. at 37 (“In 1995 the [Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC)] published its Second Assessment Report in which it 
stated that ‘the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on 
global climate . . . .’” (emphasis added)); id. (“In 2001 the IPCC . . . stated that 
‘most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to 
the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations . . . .’” (emphasis added)).           
51 AES II, supra note 31, at 533. 
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but did not allege when the consensus became certain, AES - at the very 
least - was entitled to coverage under some of the policies when the alleged 
consensus was still equivocal.  The Court did not discuss this issue, either. 
 
VIII. PROPER RULE 
 
The proper rule, as reflected in City of Carter Lake and Ostrager 
and Newman, is that there is no coverage for an “accident” if either: (1) the 
insured’s acts were intentional and it knew what the consequences of those 
acts would be; or (2) it “acted intentionally and should have known to a 
substantial probability” what the consequences of its acts would be.52   
This rule ensures that only true accidents are covered, and that 
mere negligence allegations where a defendant should have known about 
the consequences of its acts will not defeat coverage.  The Virginia 
Supreme Court’s holding will, as City of Carter Lake and the two 
concurrences to the Virginia Supreme Court’s two decisions recognized,53 
eliminate insurance coverage in all negligence cases if it is followed in 
other cases. 
 
IX. HYPOTHETICAL 
 
A hypothetical illustrates the issue presented and its proper 
resolution.  Suppose there are two lanes of automobile traffic going in 
opposite directions east and west.  Suppose further that the insured driver is 
                                                                                                                                
52 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 36, at 658 (“If an insured knew or 
should have known there was a ‘substantial probability’ that certain results would 
follow from his acts or omissions, there is no ‘occurrence’ within the meaning of a 
CGL policy.”); City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1059 
(8th Cir. 1979) (“If the insured knew or should have known that there was a 
substantial probability that certain results would follow his acts or omissions then 
there has not been an occurrence or accident . . . .”). 
53 See City of Carter Lake, 604 F.2d at 1058 (“To adopt [the] interpretation 
that an injury is not caused by accident because the injury is reasonably foreseeable 
would mean that only in a rare instance would [a CGL] policy be of any benefit to 
[the insured] . . . .”); AES I, supra note 31, at 34 (Koontz, J., concurring) (“In my 
opinion, the majority does not adequately explain that the argument which 
Steadfast makes here would not be applicable to the vast majority of cases where a 
policyholder seeks to have his insurance company provide him with a defense for 
an accidental tortious injury.”); AES II, supra note 31, at 538–39 (Mims, J., 
concurring) (asserting the majority’s holding suggests “accidents” as defined by 
CGL policies do not include acts of negligence, and thus “[o]ur jurisprudence . . . 
is leading inexorably to a day of reckoning that may surprise many policy 
holders”).  
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in the south lane of the two lanes headed west and decides to change to the 
north lane.  That act is indisputably intentional. 
The question is: What did the driver know about the consequences 
of his intentional act of changing lanes?  Whether his act of changing lanes 
is an “accident” depends on what he knows about its consequences.  If the 
driver makes the lane change, but does not bother to look in his rear view 
mirror or to check his blind spot, and collides with another car, that is 
surely a covered “accident.”  He should have known what could happen, 
which is an “accident.” 
On the other hand, if the driver engages in the same intentional act, 
but before switching lanes sees his mortal enemy next to him and knowing 
he is there still changes lanes, that is not an “accident.”  Not only was the 
act intentional but the consequences were known and indeed intended. 
Similarly, assume the same hypothetical but the lane change is 
made at rush hour in a heavily congested urban area and the lanes are filled 
with traffic.  Then not only is the act intentional, but the driver can be said 
to have known to a “substantial probability” that the consequence of his 
action would be a collision.  Again, the act would not be covered. 
However, with global warming, while the act of emitting carbon 
dioxide was intentional, the consequence was not known or at least not 
known to a substantial probability.  Therefore, there should have been 
coverage.  In sum, the Virginia Supreme Court in AES got it wrong. 
  

 LOCALITY OF HARM: INSURANCE AND CLIMATE 
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*** 
 
This article focuses on how climate change has, and will continue to, alter 
the insurance industry.  The article explores the impact of climate change 
on the insurance industry’s ability to predict losses accurately as well as 
how actors who contribute to climate change must be held accountable.  In 
answering these questions the article explores the laws and regulatory 
systems pertaining to insurance and environmental law in the U.S., the 
European Union, China and the Middle East and determines that some of 
the laws and regulatory systems in place are inadequate.  The article calls 
for the development of a comprehensive legal structure to address climate 
change risk and warns that a failure to enact such a structure may leave 
the insurance industry unable to deal with catastrophic loss from climate 
change related risk. 
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The current shifts in the global economy are the most significant in 
more than half a century.  Adding to this economic uncertainty is an 
increasing recognition of the profound changes that human activity has on 
weather patterns, biodiversity, and other life-sustaining systems.  In this 
context, the importance of establishing more efficient mechanisms of 
insurance and environmental law cannot be overstated.  
                                                                                                                 
∗ De la Mare received his J.D. and LL.M. (Insurance Law, Honors) from the 
University of Connecticut School of Law, where he helped coordinate symposia on 
international insurance regulation, developments in U.S. health insurance, and the 
interface between climate change and the international insurance industry for the 
Insurance Law Center.  He is the founder of De la Mare Law LLC (a law firm 
specializing in the international governance of risk, including insurance matters 
related to international regulatory issues, governance systems, and climate change 
for multinational corporate clients) and Objective Imagination Enterprises LLC (an 
enterprise development and management consultancy specializing in the 
navigation of contemporary economic, environmental, political, and social issues 
for not-for-profit, think-tank, and international investment company clients).  He 
has worked with international law practices and multinational financial company 
firms in London, New York, and Connecticut. 
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Vital to the ability of insurance companies to do their job is the 
ability to calculate, reasonably accurately, the risks society faces.  Climate 
change undermines this ability not only in the obvious example of 
predicting increasingly erratic and destructive storm patterns to which 
historic data becomes decreasingly relevant, but also in what way 
policyholders and market participants may be held to account for the role 
they have played in contributing to climate change and its associated 
losses.  On both international and domestic scales, the laws pertaining to 
environmental protection and liability are drastically underdeveloped when 
we take into account the economic effect that climate change will have in 
both developed and developing countries.  
The shortcomings of the regulatory systems related to the insurance 
and environmental fields will prove to be incredibly and increasingly costly 
if they are not addressed immediately.  In the insurance field, strides have 
been made to overcome the problems related to the oversight of cross-
sector and cross-border enterprises by sector- and jurisdiction-specific 
regulatory bodies.  These developments have been most notable in the 
European Union, and in the EU-based models being instituted in the 
Middle East and China.  The United States holds to its state-based system 
while making tentative steps towards a heightened role for Federal 
regulation and increased harmonization of state regulatory models.  In the 
environmental arena the situation is dire, and this will eventually have its 
effect on the insurance industry, which will find itself unable to analyse 
effectively the risks it faces in light of the lack of a mature and 
comprehensive legal structure pertaining to the source of those risks.  
Without such a structure, the industry faces a high level of litigation risk as 
the courts fill the gap left by inactive legislatures. 
For the insurance industry to be able to spread risk in the future 
effectively, the reality of world-wide climate change needs to be accepted 
at the social, government, and industry levels if it is to be adequately 
understood and responded to.  Mechanisms need to be set in place 
specifically to deal with what is likely to become the most major issue that 
the insurance industry has ever managed – climate-change related 
catastrophic risk.  
 
II.  UNDERAPPRECIATED UNCERTAINTY 
 
A. THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
 
The inherent problem with preparing for future losses is the 
uncertainty in knowing what form they will take and how large they will 
be.1  Two particularly major forms of risk can be defined as arising out of 
                                                                                                                 
1  This paradigm of uncertainty, though universally applicable, is nowhere 
better represented that in the context of the insurance industry’s response to 
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the economic system itself: economic bubbles, and systemic risk.  These 
risk-factors have different but related effects.  
 
1.  Economic Bubbles 
 
The term “economic bubble” refers to situations in which “assets 
and liabilities become improperly valued, and balance sheets give a false 
impression of the true [economic] situation.  [These i]ncorrect price signals 
cause [a] misallocation of resources.” 2   Whereas economic uncertainty 
results from a recognised lack of knowledge, bubbles are the result of false 
knowledge.  When it becomes apparent that a bubble exists, and because 
the true value of the subject assets and liabilities are unknown, ambient 
uncertainty must be increased through the added factor of the realisation of 
the actual mistake of certainty – bubbles remind us that even when we 
think we know something well, we may be very wrong indeed.  
 
2.  Panic Ripples 
 
This recognition of mistake despite relative certainty causes fear-
based magnifying panic-responses that accelerate ripples of actual value 
correction that take place throughout the markets.  This effect is well 
known in the depository banking context as a “run on the banks” and is 
largely the reason the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 3 
exists – to help alleviate the insecurity depositors feel when faced with the 
worry that their bank may fail and their deposits may disappear if they do 
                                                                                                                 
climate change. See Michael Hawker, Climate Change and the Global Insurance 
Industry, 32 GENEVA PAPERS RISK & INS. 22, 25 (2007) (“A changing, less 
predictable climate has the potential to reduce [insurers’] capacity to calculate, 
price and spread … weather-related risk. … Historical records will become an 
increasingly less reliable guide to future weather risk, as greenhouse gas 
concentrations rise.”).  
2 ZURICH FINANCIAL SERVICES, DEALING WITH THE UNEXPECTED, 4 (2008) 
(quoting ANDREW FARLOW, BUBBLES AND EMERGING MARKET CRISES 1 (Oxford 
Analytica 2003)).  See also DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, GREG FELDBERG, & ANDREAS 
LEHNERT, THE HISTORY OF CYCLICAL MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES (May 15, 2013) (providing an excellent survey of economic bubbles, their 
effects, and regulatory responses since the First World War), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/201329/201329abs.html. 
3 Established as part of the Banking Act of 1933 in response to the bank runs 
that took place in the context of the Great Depression.  FDIC: The First Fifty 
Years—A History of the FDIC 1933–1983, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank 
/analytical/firstfifty/chapter3.html. 
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not withdraw them immediately.  In a more general context, these response 
ripples can result in misguided policy decisions.4  
 
3.  Regional Effects 
 
Another effect can take place when bubbles are particularly 
concentrated regionally.  Given the right overall circumstances, the 
bursting of a regional bubble can instigate material shifts of economic 
influence in the global economy.  An example of this can be seen in the 
fallout from the 2007–2009 financial crisis, in which the US and the EU 
were harder hit than China.  The regional concentration of the 
repercussions of the U.S. housing bubble has helped China’s economic rise 
by weakening China’s major economic competitors.5   
 
 B.  SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
Systemic risk refers to the extent to which interconnectedness (of 
otherwise separate aspects of the overall economy) allows the fallout of a 
particular crisis to spread.6  An example of this is the spreading of loss 
from the U.S. housing bubble throughout the general world economy, even 
to parts of the global economy far removed from any direct relation to the 
housing bubble.  This systemic mechanism is essentially the result of the 
mutual reliance that exists within a closed system.  The more the various 
parts of that closed system are connected, and not somehow 
compartmentalised, the greater the systemic risk.  Illustrations of this 
                                                                                                                 
4 As has been posited was the case in the context of the 1990–1994 recession 
that followed an asset-price bubble in Japan.  See Adam S. Posen, It Takes More 
than a Bubble to Become Japan, THE PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., Oct. 2003 
(arguing that Japanese monetary and fiscal austerity measures were sufficient to 
undermine the 1995–1996 economic recovery) (working paper), available at 
http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/03-9.pdf.  
5 This is not to say that China, as a major world exporter and holder of foreign 
treasury bonds, has not been hit by the weakening of the markets to which it sells 
its goods.  At the time of writing, China’s economy continues to grow at almost 
double digit pace (only dropping below 9% in 2012).  The economies of its major 
western competitors are faring less well (US 2008–2012 growth ranged from a low 
of -3.1 (in 2009) to a high of 2.4% (in 2010); German 2008–2012 growth ranged 
between a low of -5.1 (in 2009) and a high of 4.2% (in 2010).  See THE WORLD 
BANK, GDP GROWTH (ANNUAL %), available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicato 
r/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. 
6 See generally Douglas J. Elliot, Regulating Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions That Are Not Banks, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (May 9, 2013) 
(discussing in particular the designation of Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act), available at http://www.brookings.e 
du/research/papers/2013/05/09-regulating-financial-institutions-elliott. 
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concept can be found in ship design, and in the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933.  
 
1. Compartmentalization in Ships 
 
The compartmentalization that is built into the structure of ships is 
a perfect illustration of systemic risk prevention.  In naval vessels, the 
space within the hull is divided into many watertight compartments.  When 
damage occurs to a particular part of the hull some compartments may 
become flooded, but other compartments do not – provided enough 
buoyancy remains to keep the ship afloat, it can reach port for repairs.  In 
the case of bulk carriers, ships are designed to counter what is called the 
“free surface effect”, the tendency of liquids or other loose matter to slosh 
about when affected by movement.7  Where a ship is sailing in heavy seas, 
the unimpeded movement of large volumes of liquids (stored in the ship’s 
hold) has a tendency to increase with the roll of the vessel.  The 
momentum-weight of the dynamic flow of liquid in large un-
compartmentalized spaces creates feedback loops of extreme roll that 
prevent the vessel from properly righting itself.  This eventually causes the 
vessel to capsize. 
 
2.  Compartmentalization in Banking 
 
For the purposes of this paper, the more directly pertinent example 
of compartmentalization is the Banking Act of 1933, commonly referred to 
as the Glass-Steagall Act.  The ability of financial institutions to 
simultaneously offer both commercial and investment banking services 
between 1913 and 1933 was largely blamed for the financial collapse of the 
late 1920s.8  There is a commonly held (though admittedly much disputed) 
belief that this arrangement allowed overly risky activities by depository 
banks – the failure of these overly risky activities ultimately led to the 
separation of commercial banking and securities trading with the 1933 
Banking Act.9   
For sixty-six years, this separation (according to risk category) 
remained the rule.  It prevented, at least in theory, the possibility of 
contagion, the crossing over of loss-risk from the higher-stakes activity of 
                                                                                                                 
7 Ships generally must make sure that particular compartments are full to 
prevent the catastrophic movement of goods in heavy seas.  See generally MARINE 
ENGINEER WORLD, available at http://www.free-marine.com/i8freesurface.htm. 
8  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO 
MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 8–10, 14 (Jan. 
8, 2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/284691.pdf. 
9 Id. 
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securities trading to the more secure activities of depository institutions.  It 
was, however, an embattled sixty-six years – during that period, the 
restriction on banking activities was significantly weakened and was 
ultimately repealed with the Gramm-Leach-Blyley Act of 1999, which 
opened up the possibility for the three branches of financial services to 
exist under one roof. 10   
 
3.  Financial Crisis: 2007–2009  
 
The question of to what extent the de-compartmentalization of 
financial services brought about or contributed to the 2007–2009 financial 
crisis is, in some quarters, hotly disputed.  What cannot be disputed is that 
certain unregulated actions of financial companies, when allowed to seep 
through a highly interconnected international financial system like a virus, 
not only caused the crisis but perpetuated and exacerbated it. 
 
4.  Necessity for Effective Risk Management  
 
The following quote from Zurich Financial Services 11  precedes 
Zurich’s discussion of economic bubbles and systemic risk. It suggests, in 
the face of growing complexity, the importance of establishing and 
instituting effective risk management structures to mitigate potential losses: 
 
Global business is growing in complexity, as are the 
number and types of risks and opportunities that 
companies face.  Extreme events that cannot be fully 
predicted or understood until they occur, such as terrorist 
attacks or natural disasters, will continue to confound us.   
While it is unlikely that we will ever be able to anticipate 
such extreme events precisely, we can mitigate their effects 
                                                                                                                 
10 A full history of financial services regulation in the United States is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  For such a history, see id. at 5–48.  Note that the history 
this GAO Report provides covers the period from the founding of the United States 
through January 2009, and so while covering the financial services issues related to 
the 2007–2009 crisis, it does not incorporate the changes made in 2010 with the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  
A comprehensive discussion of the Dodd-Frank Act has been produced by the 
Congressional Research Service.  See CONG RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE 
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: ISSUES 
AND SUMMARY (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41350_201007 
29.pdf. 
11  Zurich Financial Services is one of the world’s leading providers of 
insurance products, offering services in more than 170 countries. See Who We Are, 
ZURICH FINANCIAL SERVICES, available at http://www.zurich.com/aboutus/ataglan 
ce/whoweare.  
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by trying to identify them in advance, and ensuring that 
robust risk management structures are in place to absorb 
such events when they occur.12 
 
The lack of “robust risk management structures” became apparent 
in the aftermath of the eruption of the Icelandic volcano, Eyjafjallajökull, in 
2010.  The eruption caused massive business interruption losses, many of 
which were not covered due to the fact that they resulted from the 
grounding of aircraft rather than from damage to aircraft as was required 
for coverage under the relevant business interruption insurance policies.  
While pointing out that the volcano seems to have been forgotten almost as 
suddenly as the eruption occurred, Munich Re discusses several lessons to 
be learned from the event.  These reasons include that:  
 
Instead of mounting a concerted European response, the 
individual national air traffic safety authorities reacted in 
different ways.  Coordination between countries was poor 
and there was no central European authority. …   [Further,] 
contingency planning in the private and the public sector 
appears to be inadequate where incidents last more than 
three days. 13 
 
This last point, regarding contingency planning, is the most 
alarming.  What would happen, Munich Re asks, if the eruption had 
continued for months or years?   As we know from the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, we are not nearly so prepared for large 
catastrophic events as we like to think we are.14 
                                                                                                                 
12 ZURICH FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 2, at 4.   
13  TOPICS GEO, MUNICH RE,  NATURAL CATASTROPHES 2010 : ANALYSES, 
ASSESSMENTS, POSITIONS 5 (2011), available at http://www.munichre.com/pub 
lications/302-06735_en.pdf.   
14 Another interesting example of this problem is far less dramatic.  In New 
York, in August 2003, the power went out.  As New Yorkers did not know at the 
time, due to the widespread reliance on cell phones and other electronic 
mechanisms that had ceased to work, the blackout stretched right up into Canada 
and as far to the west as Ohio and Michigan.  It was the second largest blackout in 
history and affected as many as fifty-five million people.  The blackout was caused 
by a power surge, rather than by a storm or terrorist attack, but it immediately 
made clear to what extent we rely on a very fragile system.  Bridges connecting 
Manhattan to the mainland were blocked with cars, refrigerators had shut down, 
trains stopped running.  The weather was hot and outdoor gatherings appeared in 
the streets of drummers and intrigued, chatting people.  But had the blackout 
continued, once the food and water in the shops started to run out due to panic 
buying or even looting, once the refrigerated food started to rot in the heat – the 
picture would have become very different very quickly.  Along similar lines, 
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5.  The Insurance Context 
 
When taking the above risk factors into account, and considering 
the interconnected nature of modern human endeavour, it is clear that 
without robust economic and environmental management and regulatory 
systems it will be impossible to avoid consequences that will be seriously 
detrimental to our ability to sustain a manner of living commensurate with 
the standards we have come to expect.15  Among the particular systems that 
are most in need of overhaul are insurance and environment.  The reason 
these particular systems are important is not just because they are 
themselves seriously deficient in terms of their adequacy and efficiency; 
they are important because their modernization is vital to provoking 
modernization in other systems, most particularly – the business systems 
that make up the overall economy, and overall patterns of public 
consumption. 
 
6.  Society’s Risk Manager 
 
The importance of insurance in the global economy can hardly be 
overstated – it is an industry that is fundamental to the security that both 
individuals and companies require in order to operate effectively.16  In the 
                                                                                                                 
Munich Re suggests its readers consider the potential result of a “supraregional 
power failure or collapse of the worldwide web lasting several weeks[?]  The 
consequences for our networked world, with its dependence on technology and 
lack of preparation, would be devastating.”  Id. at 7.  
15  See Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk: 
Insurance Matters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2008) (“If our society is to survive 
climate change without significant human costs, we must develop robust 
institutions and practices to manage these risks.”). 
16 See PATRICK LIEDTKE, INSURANCE AS A REGULATORY OBJECT, THE FUTURE 
OF INSURANCE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 7–9 
(Patrick M. Liedtke & Jan Monkiewicz eds., The Geneva Association, 2011) (“The 
importance of the insurance industry for an economy can only in part be measured 
by the number of its employees in a given country, the assets under management, 
or its contribution to the national GDP. It actually plays a more fundamental role in 
the workings of a modern society, being a necessary precondition for many 
activities that would not take place were it not for insurance. Insurance is a key 
component of economic development and an important driver for growth…. 
Today, in all advanced and emerging markets, insurance plays a key role in the 
efficient and sustainable development of the economy…. It is often the 
precondition for (economic) action, facilitates new ventures and is intertwined with 
the most basic human needs and aspirations. The availability of insurance has 
important positive effects and externalities that go far beyond the purely financial. 
It is not only a tool for addressing the immediate risk assessment and risk 
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context of climate change, the insurance industry, as “our society’s primary 
financial risk manager”, 17  will be vital to the success of humanity’s 
uninterrupted economic well-being – “If insurers do not rise to the 
challenge of climate change, there could be a serious financial and social 
crisis on a global scale.”18   
 
 C. CLIMATE CHANGE AND INSURANCE 
 
  1. Underwriting and Investment Risks 
 
In light of the importance of the insurance industry going forward, 
it must be understood what undermining factors may prevent its useful 
employment.  Insurers are subject to the risks of climate change both in 
their underwriting and investment capacities.  On the underwriting side, 
where damages occur to policyholders the insurer must bear the brunt of 
the costs in claims.  On the investment side, where companies or other 
sectors are affected by climate change, they may not generate the return on 
capital that insurers, as investors, are expecting.19   
The underwriting and investment sides20 of insurance companies 
are interlinked in the sense that when investment returns are good, the 
insurance company may lower its rates to make them more affordable or 
competitive (subject in the US to regulatory rate requirements).  Likewise, 
in years when losses are relatively high, 21  the insurer can rely on 
                                                                                                                 
management challenges before us; it can also be a powerful mechanism to discover 
and incentivize the right behavior.”). 
17 See Hecht, supra note 15 at 1561–62 (Climate change poses risks that are 
unprecedented in the short time span of industrialized society; some of the risks are 
startlingly uncertain in nature and degree and have financial consequences to 
business and individuals. Because insurers play a central role in helping our global 
economy to manage risk and to make business and personal financial ventures 
viable, their participation in solving the climate change problem is essential).  
18 Id. at 1561. 
19 See Andrew Dlugolecki, Climate Change and the Insurance Sector, THE 
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 33, 73 (2008). See also INST. OF INT’L 
FIN., THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL REFORM FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY, 
17–20 (2011) (pointing out insurance investment uncertainty in light of Basel III 
banking reforms), available at http://www.oliverwyman.com/implications-of-
financial-regulatory-reform-for-the-insurance-industry.htm#.UfFpLRa_AfE. 
20 For a good discussion of insurance company balance sheet considerations, 
see generally INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 19. 
21 For insurers, a major issue with climate change is the shrinking of “return 
periods” – the amount of time between incidences of certain events (e.g. 100-year 
storms).  See Dlugolecki, supra note 19, at 77 (“When return periods shrink, there 
are five important implications for insurers. (a) Historical models of costs are 
inapplicable, because the scale and frequency of events moves outside the zone of 
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investment returns to make up for underwriting losses.  If an insurer is 
unable to rely on investment income, then its prices must increase on its 
policies to make up the surplus required to meet regulatory requirements; 
but this creates a “hardening” of insurance markets – an increased difficulty 
for consumers to procure insurance or to be able to afford it in the event it 
is available. 
 
2. Risk Coverage Limitations 
 
The ability of insurers to cover the risks entailed in climate change 
is at this stage uncertain.22   This is not necessarily because of any inherent 
fault in the industry itself; rather, it is due to imperfections in internal 
company ability and external regulatory response.  
 
3.  Insurability 
 
For a risk to be “insurable”, the insurer must be able to handle the 
risk without undermining the solvency of the company.  The risk must be 
determinable and quantifiable.  In addition, the risk must be able to be 
offset within a diversified portfolio of other risks, and it must not be overly 
subject to the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.23   
                                                                                                                 
historical experience. …  (b) Risks are incorrectly rated, because the probability of 
an extreme loss is assessed too low. …  (c) Exposures are too high, because the 
maximum probable loss is underestimated. …  (d) Claims-handling capacity is too 
low, because the scale (extent and intensity) of destruction in new extreme events 
is beyond experience. …  (e) Credit ratings are too generous, because the 
probability of a serious depletion of capital from a disaster is underestimated.”). 
22 See Hawker, supra note 1, at 25 (“Climate change is expected to bring 
increased damage costs as well as increased variability. Increased variability has a 
cost; it means that additional capital needs to be set aside to ensure that insurers 
continue to be able to pay claims during the “hard times”.  Insurers will look for 
ways to manage this increasing variability and, therefore, the availability and 
affordability of reinsurance as well as other risk transfer mechanisms will become 
increasingly important.”).  See also Dlugolecki, supra note 19, at 78 (“The entire 
capital of the global insurance industry is around 700 billion USD.  Perhaps 200 
billion USD is earmarked for catastrophe…. This provides security for only 25 per 
cent of today’s economic losses from extreme events…. From a variety of sources, 
it is estimated that the annual cost of weather damage on average is probably in the 
range 200–300 billion USD currently.  By 2030, this may rise to between 850–
1,350 billion USD (in 2006 values). …  This is a four-fold increase on today’s 
level in real terms.  Over the same period, world economic product is projected to 
grow by a factor of 2.5-3 in real growth.”). See also Hecht, supra note 15, at 1565–
68 (describing the factors that establish the insurability of a risk, and how some 
types of risk challenge the core principles of insurability). 
23 See Hecht, supra note 15, at 1565. 
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In the climate context, each of these insurability factors presents 
particular challenges.  The potential losses are large enough to threaten the 
solvency of even the largest insurers.  There are issues of massive 
uncertainty, such as the size and frequency of loss events, and the way such 
loss events will be handled in the coming years as regulatory systems and 
legal systems change to take account of the shifting risk landscape; this 
increased uncertainty must be paid for, but insurers are limited in what they 
can charge.  For the pooling of risk to work, it is necessary that the risks be 
diversified, if not in kind then in location; but the nature of climate risk 
potentially entails a very high level of correlation, especially when the 
subsequent effects of large-scale events are taken into account.  Finally, the 
climate arena is subject to massive issues of moral hazard.24 
 
4.  Rate Regulations 
 
The ability of insurers to cover climate risks is deeply affected by 
the regulatory system that sets the guidelines by which insurers must act.  
Insurers ideally price their policies at a rate that actuarially reflects the risk; 
but that price might be, for many, unaffordable.  Large rate increases can 
cause a negative economic/political reaction, and since insurers in the US, 
for example, are generally subject to rate regulation,25 the state insurance 
commissioner may simply disallow the increase.  
                                                                                                                 
24  These issues of moral hazard are discussed throughout this paper, they 
include, inter alia, by government, business, and/or public entities: the 
development of high-risk coastal areas, forced under-pricing of insurance by 
supervisory dictate, the subsidized development of various industries that return 
immediate or short term profits and long term environmental and/or social costs, 
the avoidance of immediate mitigation in favour of later adaptation as a means of 
avoiding immediate cost impositions, the passing of risk from the local to the 
distant in terms of geographic location and/or temporal existence, the resulting 
consumption patterns of all of the above, etc.  In all of these cases, the lack of a 
perceived proximate locality of harm allow the displacement of a sense of 
immediate responsibility as would cause a shift of policy and action towards a 
more localized bearing of costs.  
25 Rate regulation under state law pertains to “regulated” insurance entities.  
These are, in general, entities that write policies for customers that, in the eyes of 
public policy, require a degree of state-based protection.  Certain other types of 
insurance relationships can be distinguished on the basis of the mutual 
sophistication of the parties – for example, reinsurance contracts are subject to less 
regulation, as these exist only between insurers and reinsurers.  “Non-admitted 
insurers” are also subject to a lesser degree of regulation as they tend to write only 
special lines of insurance required by parties who are deemed able to adequately 
fend for themselves in the market.  However, even reinsurers and non-admitted 
insurers are subject to insurability factors as they must be able to procure rates that 
both cover their risks and are affordable, even if these rates are market-based as 
opposed to regulation-based. 
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The inability to charge risk-appropriate rates can be highly 
dangerous to an insurer’s ability to sustain its solvency and insurers may in 
such cases seek to stop writing certain lines.  Regulators generally will 
attempt to prevent a dearth of available insurance, and one way they do so 
is by disallowing an insurer to leave a particular market on the threat that if 
the insurer does so, the commissioner will discontinue the insurer’s license 
to write any line of insurance in the state.26  For major multi-line insurers 
this can be a significant threat and the result of it is a long-term loss for 
everyone involved – it means, for example, that high-risk coastal insurance 
must ultimately be subsidized by lower-risk policyholders and by taxpayers 
in general where government backstops must be set in place in the absence 
of adequate insurance company presence.27   
 
5.  Economic Distortion 
 
The inability for insurers to charge actuarially sound premiums is 
one of the most egregious examples of market distortion through 
understandable, but unsound, public policy.  The ultimate result is two-
fold: first, it results in the undermining of the industry’s capacity to 
influence the economic decisions of government, business, and society on 
the basis of a “true-cost” calculation of risk; second (and stemming from 
the first), it promotes the ability for the development of unsustainable 
                                                                                                                 
26  In some U.S. states, the barriers to insurers’ ability to exit markets is 
mandated by the state legislatures, in others the barrier is legislated to be governed 
by the discretion of insurance commissioners. 
27 See Ins. Info. Inst., Catastrophes: Insurance Issues 1, 12–13 (Aug. 2013) 
available at http://www.iii.org/issues_updates/catastrophes-insurance-issues.html. 
(“The growth and concentration of property values in hurricane-prone areas has 
pushed to the forefront of public policy debates the issue of coastal development 
and hidden insurance subsidies.  Subsidies exist in various aspects of the property 
insurance transaction.  First, they exist where rates for property insurance are no 
longer commensurate with risk because it is politically unpalatable to raise rates to 
actuarially justified levels.  Second, there are subsidies in the pooling arrangements 
that were set up to make sure people living along the coast can obtain property 
insurance.  When these pools have insufficient funds to pay claims, the shortfall is 
picked up by insurance companies, which may then pass the cost on to all property 
insurance policyholders in the state through explicit policy surcharges, as in 
Florida, or indirectly in the form of higher property insurance rates.  Third, the 
federal flood insurance program has paid out millions of dollars to rebuild 
structures in high-risk zones known as repetitive loss properties, where the cost of 
claims over the years may have totaled much more than the home was worth.  This 
has contributed to the program’s deficit and to continued building in high-risk 
areas.”).  
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infrastructure on the basis of subsidization propelled by short-term 
cost/benefit considerations.28 
                                                                                                                 
28 As described earlier in the paper, one of the major factors in the increasing 
cost of natural catastrophes is the continued development of high-risk areas.  The 
Gulf-Coast of the US is the prime example of this phenomenon.  Instead of 
incentivizing in-land development, and despite the exposure of coastal areas to 
increasingly powerful and frequent storm events, subsidized coastal development 
continues.  Of course, it hardly need be said that a significant portion of tax 
revenue, in Florida for example, comes from coastal developers and tourism-
related businesses.  Although these businesses may be able to afford increased 
insurance rates (though they would certainly vehemently fight against any such 
increase), the workers the businesses employ very likely would not be able to 
afford rate increases, nor would smaller businesses in the area.  The short-term cost 
of moving significant housing and business infrastructure in-land would be 
significant, and this economic cost would be in addition to the political cost that 
would inevitably be borne by any Governor who would suggest such an idea.  
There are significant long-term detriments to this type of behaviour.  On the 
business front, the long-term detriment can be found in the economic upheaval of 
establishing business enterprises on an unsustainable model of cost-externalisation.  
The longevity of this model is limited by the fact that business can only be 
subsidized so long as the funds exist to subsidize it.  In other words, the 
subsidization of an economically unsound business enterprise is a luxury that must 
be supported.  Where money is cheap and the true-costs of the maintenance of the 
enterprise remain avoided, this sort of subsidization is possible; but where risks 
increase, where general economic circumstances are tighter, and where heightened 
potential for incurred liability all lead to costs that cannot be externalized, the 
business model will falter and the resulting vacuum will undermine the overall 
business environment through decreased investor confidence and general market 
instability.  On the political front, the detriment can be found in the undermining of 
the credibility of government.  To the extent a government, for political reasons or 
for reasons of economic short-sightedness, allows the entrenchment of 
unsustainable infrastructure it has failed to uphold its duty to the tax-paying public 
who ultimately will have to foot the bill of loss that is beyond the ability of 
insurers to pay, the cost of the reorganization and restructuring of infrastructure 
required in the event of an inability to sustain the current infrastructure, the 
increased cost of insurance in the event rates are allowed to be raised, the 
subsidization of the ultimate inefficiency of unsustainable and externalized costs in 
the event rates are not allowed to be raised, and the eventual insurance market 
failure in the event it is no longer in insurers’ interest to stay in the market even if 
this means losing their ability to write other lines of insurance in the state in 
question.  See Hawker, supra note 1, at 26 (“If trends persist, impacts of climate 
change in the US will inevitably result in more insurance claims and increased 
costs, in turn leading to higher premiums and deductibles and broader coverage 
restrictions. …  [C]limate stresses will place more political and financial burden on 
federal and local governments as they assume broader exposures and become 
insurers of last resort.”).  On the public front, it means suffering the consequences 
of misguided development policies established by both business and by 
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6.  Lines of Insurance Coverage at Risk 
 
For the insurance industry, climate change will have a substantial 
effect not only on property/casualty lines, but also on life and health lines.  
On the property/casualty front, it can be expected that claims will continue 
to increase for property damage and for business interruption arising from 
events including increasingly volatile storm systems, flooding, earthquakes 
and wildfires in developed areas.29   On the life/health front, claims will 
increase in relation to infectious and respiratory diseases, heat stress, 
pollution, and malnutrition-related disorders – this increase will make life 
and health insurance more expensive to underwrite.30  On the liability front, 
duties of defence and indemnity will be triggered in the event of claims 
brought by third-parties.31  The inadequate planning of companies may be 
also be grounds for redress in business interruption claims which insurers 
will also be required to defend.  Finally, on the professional liability front, 
directors and officers may face claims of failure to disclose material facts 
in relation to their company’s risk exposure where climate change is 
concerned, or on grounds of failure to address climate risks, and ultimately 
for a breach of their fiduciary duties in protecting the company from 
climate risks.  
 
7.  Global Coverage Problem 
 
                                                                                                                 
government leading to heightened levels of unemployment, decreased public 
services, and higher relative-cost of living. 
29 Hecht, supra note 15, at 1574–75. 
30 See id. at 1575–76 (Infectious diseases expected to increase include: malaria 
due to increases and changes in mosquito breeding grounds – malaria currently 
kills over 3,000 children each day; West Nile virus in Europe and the US – which 
can cause death and neurological impairment; and Lyme disease – which can cause 
permanent damage to the nervous system, the musculoskeletal system and the 
heart.  Respiratory diseases expected to increase include: asthma, allergies, and 
other problems related to increased pollen allergens, increased airborne particulate 
matter from smog, mold, wildfires, and ozone pollution.  Heat stress is expected to 
increase cardiovascular problems, deaths from dehydration, and heat stroke – “over 
52,000 people are estimated to have perished in the 2003 heat wave” in Europe.). 
31 See id. at 1577–78 (“[N]uisance claims against greenhouse gas emitters 
have already alleged injury from the direct and indirect effects of climate change, 
and other similar lawsuits may follow.  These claims are likely to be covered under 
either commercial general liability or environmental liability insurance policies.  
Negligence, products liability, and other tort theories may also lead to significant 
defence costs, and possibly indemnity costs . . . for insurers whose policyholders 
may have contributed to climate change or have not planned adequately for climate 
change’s impacts.”). 
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Considering the global nature of modern risks, their enormity,32 
and the extent to which they affect all aspects of contemporary living 
models, “[i]ntegrated prevention on all levels is essential….loss prevention 
programmes must be implemented on a local, regional, national and 
international level, in both the private and public sector.”33   But successful 
loss prevention requires widespread awareness of risk, “[t]his is where the 
insurance industry can make a valuable contribution, be it through 
professional risk expertise or suitable insurance products providing 
financial safety for new or residual risks.”34 
The lack of adequate insurance and government systems was 
painfully apparent in the context of the Haiti earthquake of January 12, 
2010 (the most devastating seismic catastrophe since 1976).  Due largely to 
“the precarious condition of society in general,” very little of the damage 
was insured.35 One of the key benefits of a developed insurance sector is 
the incentive effect that insurance pricing can have on government-
instigated building regulations and on the organizational influence that 
insurance can have on construction processes in general.36 However, in 
developing countries like Haiti, there is little money available to develop, 
let alone support an on-going insurance mechanism.  In these cases it is 
vital that international development organizations play a role in supporting 
the creation of catastrophe reinsurance facilities (such as the Caribbean 
Catastrophe Reinsurance Facility 37 ) and microinsurance mechanisms. 38 
                                                                                                                 
32 See TOPICS GEO, MUNICH RE supra note 13, at 16. (“The earthquakes in 
Chile and New Zealand were the first natural catastrophes in recent times to have 
caused an insured loss of several billion US dollars outside the highly developed 
insurance markets of the USA, Japan and Europe.”). 
33 Id. at 7.  
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 16. 
36 However, see Hecht, supra note 15, at 1587 (discussing the limitations of 
pricing incentives by insurance companies: “Despite the incentives that the 
insurance industry appears to have to make climate risk more manageable, there is 
a significant market failure that limits insurers’ motivation to do so through their 
product pricing.  A stable climate, like clean air or other similar common resources 
that cannot be owned, is a public good.  The benefits of insurers’ contributions to 
this public good cannot be internalized through the operation of the insurance 
market.  Moreover, insurers in particular will collectively benefit from a stable 
climate because of their high exposure to climate-related risk and uncertainty.  But 
no individual insurer can reap the benefits of its incremental contribution to 
reducing climate risk.”). 
37 See Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 27, at 6 (“Established in 
2007, the CCRIF is an insurance pool that covers hurricanes and earthquakes for 
its 16 Caribbean member nations and their territories.”). 
38 See id. (discussing the program that has been set up in Haiti: “A syndicate, 
which includes a reinsurer, a global development and relief agency and a 
microfinance distribution institution, will offer parametric coverage to businesses 
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These stop-gaps can assist in easing the risk faced by societies in an already 
precarious position, which in turn can help those communities develop into 
viable markets that can eventually support their own insurance needs, thus 
contributing to the pooling of international risks and the lowering the 
overall price of insurance.39   
 
III. THE STATE OF PLAY 
 
To the extent that the international regulation of insurance can 
assist the international management of risk, it is necessary to understand 
what changes must be made for it to do so most effectively.  Due mainly to 
local public policy concerns, insurance regulation remains a very 
fragmented area of law; however, for the last ten years, changes have been 
taking place towards greater efficiency through harmonization and 
increased systemic security.  Considering the increasing intensity of the 
economic and climactic uncertainty we face, and taking into account the 
central role the international insurance industry plays in stabilizing our 
experience of that uncertainty, it is of the utmost importance that the 
systems that govern international insurance be as efficient as possible – this 
means modernization to account for the nature of modern insurance 
enterprises and the risks they face.40 
 
                                                                                                                 
that have taken out small loans with the finance company.  Parametric coverage is 
based on a claim settlement process that takes into account the known and 
‘observable characteristics’ of various types of disasters, such as the potential 
damage that a crop would sustain in a 150 mph wind in a certain part of the 
country.  By not having to rely on individual claims adjusters to decide the amount 
of damage, claims can be settled quickly, thus allowing the claimant fast access to 
funds that might be needed to keep the business going.  The premium will equal 6 
percent of the business’s total loss.”). 
39 The harsh effects of climate change on developing countries will not just 
affect those countries: “The most serious impacts for Europe [from climate change] 
may be those that occur elsewhere. One important risk is a potential surge in 
refugees from climatic impacts in North Africa, where drought is expected to be 
more frequent. Another is that there could be supply chain disruption due to events 
in coastal regions in China . . . [, which are] vulnerable to typhoons, erratic river 
flow, and sea-level rise.” Dlugolecki, supra note 19, at 73.  
40 See INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 19, at 2 (discussing current international 
financial reform and the importance of understanding the insurance business model 
in the context of overhauling banking and insurance regulation; “Each industry 
must be regulated separately to ensure that the specific risk profiles of firms are 
addressed.  However, it is also necessary to adopt a comprehensive cross-sectoral 
perspective on regulation to ensure that unintended effects of regulation do not 
create additional risks.  The developing concepts of macroprudential regulation and 
the increasing coordination provided through the FSB should go a long way to 
achieving these goals, if pursued in the right spirit.”). 
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 A.  MODERNIZATION OF REGULATION: THE SOLVENCY CONTEXT 
 
The greatest steps towards modernization are being made where no 
prior regimes exist. Specifically, the international sphere has the benefit of 
being able to forge ahead more or less from scratch.  The EU, similarly, has 
the benefit of being a relatively new governmental system.  
 
1.  IAIS 
 
A comprehensive system of regulation (that will more closely 
match the interconnected cross-border and cross-sector enterprises that the 
regulatory systems are in charge of supervising) is being developed by the 
IAIS in ComFrame. ComFrame’s group-wide supervisors and supervisory 
colleges is a large step in this direction, giving internationally-based 
guidance and leadership to different regional and national systems.  
Already IAIS Principles are being employed in jurisdictions such as the 
Middle East, which is fast developing a regional system of its own along 
the lines of the European Solvency II initiative. 
 
2. European Union 
 
In the EU, major structural changes have been taking place in the 
regulation of financial services over the last ten years.  The beginning of 
this process preceded the 2007–2009 financial crisis, but that event 
continues to have a strong influence on the process.  Although the new 
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) is now in place, much 
of the most recent restructuring surrounding Solvency II is still in play and 
subject to amendment.  It remains to be seen exactly what form many 
provisions will take, but the ultimate focus is to implement a harmonized 
system of risk-based supervision that takes into account the entirety of the 
cross-sector and cross-border risk carried by financial services enterprises. 
It also remains to be seen to what extent the changes in EU law will affect 
the laws of other countries, particularly in light of the institution of the EU 
“equivalence” concept.  
 
3. United States 
 
The US retains a diversified domestic regulatory structure. 
Although it too has a unifying body (in the form of the NAIC), that body 
does not have actual authority over the many jurisdictions its membership 
represents.41  The NAIC has been working to harmonize the law in the US 
                                                                                                                 
41  The International Monetary Fund, in May 2010, reported that the US 
insurance regulatory system is compliant on 28 of the IAIS’s core insurance 
principles.  It did not match international standards in three areas: insulation of 
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with international regulatory developments, and in effect generally 
provides principles of risk-based solvency regulation that are in practice 
attuned with those of the IAIS and the EU.42  The differences, however, 
                                                                                                                 
insurance regulators from political pressure, failure to assess group-wide financial 
conditions, and lack of cooperation and information between state and federal 
authorities in the life insurance sector to prevent money laundering.  See Ins. Info. 
Inst., Insolvencies/Guaranty Funds (Sept. 2013), available at http://www.iii.org/iss 
ues_updates/insolvencies-guaranty-funds.html. 
42 This result is consistent with historical precedent - it has been largely the 
risk of Federal pre-emption of state insurance regulation that has spurred the NAIC 
to push for greater harmonization and consideration of ways by which to interrelate 
with international supervisors.  The consequence of this for the NAIC is that (with 
every step towards harmonization of law in the US) it decreases its own reason to 
exist.  Modern IAIGs are global enterprises that require a global approach to 
market entry and solvency regulation.  The maintenance of the state-based system, 
as applied to IAIGs, is inefficient and outdated and needs to be pre-empted by 
federal regulation that will be better able, through a bottom-sensitive top-down 
approach, to regulate IAIGs effectively, and act as a single voice regarding the US 
market alongside bodies such as EIOPA in Europe.  The conflict of interest 
arguments that the NAIC has leveled against the notion of the FIO addressing 
questions of whether the federal government should play a larger role in the 
insurance area may all too easily be leveled at itself - can a system be restructured 
by a governing body that would itself have to be discarded in the process?  The 
answer is usually not.  However, despite differences, the US is adopting more 
robust own-risk assessment requirements, further refining group supervision 
concepts and the modernization of reinsurance regulatory provisions, and aligning 
itself with the EU as well as the IAIS and those jurisdictions that are basing their 
regimes on IAIS principles.  While harmonizing developments are needed in the 
US, the increasing harmonization of law undermines one of the key tenets that 
uphold the State system - the regulatory laboratories that the state systems have 
been said to embody.  Another key argument towards the maintenance of a State-
based system is the ability for policyholders to have more direct access to 
insurance regulators, and that, were the system to be centralized in the Federal 
government in Washington D.C., then this access would be diminished.  However, 
with State-regulators increasingly beholden to an NAIC under pressure to 
harmonize regulatory law, policyholders are already one step removed from the 
actual source of regulation and, unlike the Federal government, the NAIC is a non-
governmental body that is neither accountable to policyholders, nor directly to 
voters.  Any increase in the power of the NAIC to develop and apply law through 
the states directly contradicts the principle of policyholder protection to the extent 
the power of state regulators is in practice subjected to the NAIC.  The 
international sector has the advantage of playing in a (more) clear field.  Like the 
NAIC, it may not, except through formal treaty or agreement between national 
governments, proscribe law to be implemented by national (or, in the case of the 
NAIC, State) officials.  It may only recommend systems and principles that should 
be adopted on the weight of the expertise of those involved in the process.  Thus, 
also like the NAIC, its principles are more along the lines of model laws.  The 
difference lies in the starting-point interests inherent in each body.  The NAIC has 
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between the US and the EU systems are such that the US, currently, is 
unlikely to achieve “equivalent” status if that requires U.S. regulators adopt 
a solvency regime virtually identical to Solvency II.  If the US is 
alternatively granted transitional status, the date by which the US will have 
to achieve “equivalent status,” should it wish to do so, will be set back as 
late as 2018.43  
 
4. Effective Systemic Oversight Bodies 
 
Symbolically at least, the most important developments have 
occurred with the establishment of the Financial Stability Board by the G20, 
the European Systemic Risk Board by the EU, and the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council in the US.  These organizations are all focused on 
overseeing financial systems as a whole and thus complement individual 
sector supervision in much the same way the Group-Wide Supervisors of 
ComFrame supplement the supervision of the solo-supervisors in the 
supervisory colleges.  The creation of these bodies suggests a meaningful 
move by governmental organizations to take into account, more effectively, 
the business reality of modern financial enterprises.  
 
B. MODERNIZATION IN THE INSOLVENCY CONTEXT 
 
Entailed in catastrophic risk is the possibility of insurance company 
failure. For this reason it is important that the insolvency context not be 
neglected in the modernization process.44  
                                                                                                                 
an inherent interest in protecting the system that allows its existence and 
influence—the state-based system.  Therefore, the NAIC’s proposals are always 
founded on the continued regulation by the states of the business of insurance.  The 
international sector does not have this concern, and thus has focused on not only 
establishing principles, but also on systems of interaction that embody the 
principles they attempt to establish. It has the luxury of considering the question—
if the best possible regulatory regime were to be created from scratch, what would 
it look like?  One of the requirements of progression is that the possibility exists 
for reinvention. 
43 It may be possible for U.S. regulators to convince EU regulators within such 
a long time period that the systems developed in the US are functionally equivalent 
to the processes adopted in the EU, even if the approach uses different tools to 
arrive at a common objective.  One of the problems with the US gaining equivalent 
status within the EU is that the view persists, outside the US, that modernization is 
taking place less quickly in the US, and although the establishment of the Federal 
Insurance Office is a step in the right direction, it is one that is far too small when 
considering the opportunity that the 2007–2009 financial crisis provided for a 
long-overdue overhaul of the U.S. state-based insurance regulatory system. 
44 See INST. OF INT’L FIN, supra note 19, at 9 (“The failure of an insurer may 
… have serious consequences. The resolution of a cross-border insurance group 
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1.  Jurisdictional Protectionism 
 
Although international frameworks increasingly apply to insurance 
solvency regulations and requirements, they still fall short in the event of 
an insurer’s insolvency. National, jurisdiction-based, public interest 
concerns take over in this context and international (and interstate) 
agreements defer to resolutions under national law. 
Some noteworthy progress has been made. The supervisory 
structures set in place in IAIS’s ComFrame, to oversee the solvency of 
IAIGs and the pre-resolution crisis management of IAIGs, should greatly 
help in the resolution process. Supervisors will be more used to working 
with one another and this familiarity, ideally, will breed trust, which should 
spill over into the resolution context. However, the resolution of a 
company, especially an insurance company, is a sensitive affair that entails 
long-crystalized instincts on the part of particular jurisdictions to protect 
domestic interests. In the insolvency context, the incentive of those who 
hold the assets of the troubled company to cooperate with the company 
decreases. 45  This protectionist instinct will not be fully rectified by 
increased supervisory cooperation in the solvency context, but it may be 
alleviated on the basis of the comity and reciprocity that will likely develop 
through cooperation. 
 
2.  Sources of Complexity 
 
All large cross-border insolvencies are relatively complex. In the 
insurance area, certain factors come into play to increase that complexity. 
Three major issues stand out, the nature of the business that must be wound 
down, the public policy implications involved in the insurance arena, and 
the structure of cross-border proceedings.  
 
3.  Nature of Business 
 
In the corporate arena, assets and liabilities are often more 
straightforward and more immediately ascertainable than those in the 
insurance context.  Barring, for example, long-term environmental damages 
                                                                                                                 
may pose challenges which arise from differences in legal environments and 
potential conflicts of interest between regulatory authorities defending their 
national interests. The latter may result in litigation that increases both the cost of 
resolution and legal uncertainty for policyholders.”). 
45 Including reinsurers who may hold payables that the estate could use to pay-
off claims, and regulators and other authorities who may want to make sure that 
what reserves they have control over remain in their jurisdiction so that domestic 
policyholders are more likely to be covered.  
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that may be attributable to a corporation, most of the typical corporation’s 
assets and liabilities can be determined with relative ease. Insurance 
company liabilities, on the other hand, often take many years to manifest. 
The company has contracted to cover certain risks that may or may not ever 
materialise, and are certainly by no means necessarily ascertainable at the 
time of the winding-up proceedings.  
 
4.  Public Policy Implications 
 
To a much greater extent than in the general corporate arena, 
insurance has enormous public policy implications.  These include the fact 
that insureds have contracted for the future coverage of potential claims, 
that they have paid premiums for such coverage, and the implications of 
that coverage not being available in the event it is needed. With the 
exception of concerns such as loss of company-funded pensions, general 
corporate insolvency simply does not normally entail such loaded public 
implications.  For this reason, the business of insurance is far more tightly 
and directly regulated than general corporate activity.  But this regulatory 
structure, created on foundations of strong public policy concerns, brings 
its own complexities. 
 
5.  Cross Border Considerations 
 
In the cross-border insolvency context, there has always been a 
degree of difficulty where the collection of assets into the bankruptcy estate 
is concerned. This difficulty is heightened in the insurance context. This is 
due to the increasing complexity of multinational insurance enterprises, the 
insurance entity-based regulatory structure, the protectionism afforded 
insurance by territorial-based regulatory bodies and courts, and the fact that 
such bodies and courts are not always in the best position to manage the 
complexities of the proceeding. 46   Where difficult issues (such as the 
                                                                                                                 
46 See James W. Schacht & Lynne Prescott Hepler, Insolvencies In-Depth 
Series (Part 2): Analyzing the Life Cycle of an Insolvency, LRP Publications (Feb. 
1 2007), available at http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=1340452 
9. (“Unlike the United Kingdom, Bermuda and other countries, the United States 
does not have licensed insolvency practitioners who must be appointed to 
administer a receivership estate … Winding up the affairs of insolvent insurers of 
the recent past and likely the future is a business and management function not 
well-suited for government.  When insolvencies were modest affairs, there was no 
need to question the government’s role, but, today, insolvencies are often large, 
complex and national, and in some cases international.  This makes the two 
primary functions of estate administration [marshaling assets, and approving and 
fixing claims,] anything but simple and straightforward … The United States has 
yet to develop an effective means of accelerating the slow and expensive 
evaluation process for long-tail claims.”  Further, “[t]he receivership proceeding is 
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marshalling of international assets) are handled badly, the result can be 
expensive litigation and delay. Reinsurance recoverables are very often the 
largest value in the estate, but reinsurance is a global business and 
reinsurers are unlikely to be based in the same jurisdiction as the authority 
in charge of the winding-up proceeding. Negative experiences with 
authorities over the winding-up of insurers can cause bad relations to 
develop between the company and its reinsurers. 47  Further, different 
structures of law and proceeding can hamper efforts towards a harmonized 
approach.48 
                                                                                                                 
under the oversight of the court; however, the court is ill-equipped to perform 
effective oversight … most courts have neither the time, nor the resources, nor the 
expertise, to examine data and information to evaluate performance and hold a 
receiver accountable. There are no common standards governing the accountability 
of receivers to the courts, creditors or the public.  Lack of information hampers the 
ability of stakeholders to monitor and encourage efficient management.”).  
47  For example, in the winding-up of Mission Insurance Company, the 
California Insurance Department found itself in a very awkward position in its 
relations to the mainly foreign reinsurers, who held the bulk of the estate’s 
potential assets. “The reluctance of Mission’s reinsurers to pay reinsurance 
balances alleged due now resulted in reinsurance recoverables being the fastest 
growing asset on the company’s balance sheet. While the cause of this nonpayment 
is open to debate, and was the subject of litigation, in part it was the unexpected 
level of losses being reported to reinsurers. To some extent, the nonpayment was 
also caused by the public complaints about the behavior of Mission’s reinsurers 
and the subsequent drawing down of letters of credit held by Mission, which 
created a very adversarial relationship between Mission and its reinsurers and 
retrocessionaires, particularly those outside the United States. This ‘uncommercial 
behavior’ would impact other U.S. receiverships. Nevertheless, and perhaps more 
importantly, these circumstances put the insurance department at odds with the 
reinsurers. This conflict would remain when the insurance commissioner put on the 
receiver’s hat.”  Furthermore, “[t]he dissention between Mission and its reinsurers 
not only continued but worsened as the liquidation process continued, at least in 
part due to the, at best, ‘unconventional’ positions taken by the receiver.” James 
W. Schacht and Lynne Prescott Hepler, Insolvencies In-Depth Series (Part 3): One 
Long, Long Mission, LRP Publications (Mar. 1 2007), available at 
http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=13403894. 
48 Even in related systems, such as the UK and Australia, difficulties can arise, 
such as in the HIH Casualty and General Ins. Ltd. v. McGarth case, “In 
proceedings involving HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd., which collapsed 
in March 2001, the English Chancery court held that, in an English liquidation of a 
foreign insurer, English courts may not direct the Joint Provisional Liquidator to 
transfer funds for distribution in the principal liquidation if the foreign and English 
distribution schemes are not substantially the same. After the declaration of 
insolvency by the New South Wales Supreme Court, winding-up petitions against 
the companies were presented to the English High Court, Queen's Bench Division, 
because the insurers conducted business in several countries, including England. 
Australian liquidators and the Joint Provisional Liquidators (JPL) appointed by the 
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6.  Harmonization of International Processes 
 
Complete harmonization of law pertaining to the resolution of 
insurance enterprises has been achieved in neither the US nor the EU.  
Each region consists of a collection of ‘sovereign’ states with similar 
though divergent law.  
 
7.  United States 
 
Through the 2007 NAIC Insurer Receivership Model Act (and the 
1939 Uniform Insurer Liquidation Act and the 1997 Rehabilitation and 
Liquidation Model Act), attempts have been made to unify the law in the 
United States, but not one of these Acts has been enacted by every state, 
and even if all states enacted the Model Act, there is no necessity that any 
of those states would enact it word-for-word, nor that they would apply it 
in the same way.  
Reciprocity provisions exist in all three of the above-listed Acts, 
but as not one of them has been adopted by all U.S. jurisdictions, decisions 
as to whether to recognise proceedings in another state, let alone another 
country, remain grounded in the discretion of the State Commissioners. 
That being said, states do generally take the importance of comity and 
reciprocity very seriously, 49  through recognition of foreign proceedings 
states are more likely to garner similar respect in return.50  This application 
                                                                                                                 
English court proposed that the English assets be kept in a separate fund for 
distribution in accordance with English insolvency law. Some Australian creditors 
objected to the proposed scheme, and argued instead that the Australian court 
should decide distribution of assets in accordance with Australian law. The 
Australian Liquidators demanded that the JPLs pay them the assets after deduction 
for costs and expenses. The court refused to direct or authorize the JPLs to remit 
the assets collected by them to the Australian Liquidators unless there could be a 
means of ensuring that those assets could be distributed as if in an English 
liquidation, and held that in case of default the assets would be distributed in 
accordance with English law.” Semaya, Insurer Insolvencies: Looking Back and 
Forging Ahead, Reinsurance Law & Practice 2006: New Legal & Business 
Developments in a Changing Global Environment, 89 PLI/Comm 207, 284 (2006).  
49 See, e.g., Hall v. Michael Bello Ins. Agency, Inc., 880 A.2d 451, 453–55 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005);  Aon Risk Servs, Inc. of Georgia v. Commercial 
& Military Sys. Co., Inc., 270 Ga. App. 510 (2004);  Home Ins. Co. v. 
Montgomery Cnty Comm’n, 902 So.2d 677 (Ala. 2004);  All Star Adver. Agency, 
Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 898 So.2d 369 (La. 2005). 
50 See Hall, 880 A.2d 451 at 453–55 (even though, unlike New Jersey, Texas 
had not adopted the UILA, the New Jersey Superior Court decided to recognize the 
Texas resolution proceedings pertaining to the insolvency of the Highlands 
Insurance Company, and refused to ignore the stay that had been instituted in that 
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of comity falls short of the Constitutional full faith and credit standard, and 
is rather a doctrine “of practice, convenience, and expediency…. Comity 
persuades; but it does not command…. It demands of no one that he shall 
abdicate his individual judgment, but only that deference shall be paid to 
the judgments of other co-ordinate tribunals.”51    
The adoption, by all states, of the same law (at this point probably 
the Model Act) would further reciprocity, at least between the States, and 
would decrease the uncertainty of current discretion-based comity. For the 
foreseeable future, however, each State retains power over insurer assets 
located within their jurisdiction even in the event of insolvency 
proceedings elsewhere, particularly where those proceedings are taking 
place in another country. 
 
8.  European Union 
 
The EU regulatory framework is far more equivalent to the U.S. 
framework in the insolvency context than in the solvency context.  In the 
EU, the law adheres to national interests in the area of insurance insolvency 
just as does the law in the US adhere to state interests. In both jurisdictions 
this prevents regulatory harmonization, and the relative certainty such 
harmonization entails.  The EU does benefit from a layer of certainty that 
the US cannot claim. It replaces the more uncertain (common law based) 
comity and reciprocity of U.S. state courts with a statutory mandate 
requiring recognition of the home-state jurisdiction’s resolution law and 
mechanisms.  This home-state jurisdiction is easy to discern as it is based 
on the EU “passport” system that requires an insurer to be licensed by only 
one EU jurisdiction.  To the extent that U.S. common law principles of 
comity and reciprocity generally produce the same effect as the EU 
Directive on the Reorganisation and Winding-Up of Insurance 
Undertakings (i.e., the recognition of home state jurisdiction), insurance 
company considerations end up in the same place – that is, national (or 
state) resolution law applies.  
 
C. IAIGS AND THE LAW 
 
                                                                                                                 
proceeding.); see also Aly v. E.S. Sutton Realty, 822 A.2d 615, 620 (2003) (“[T]he 
Commissioner voices a concern that our refusal to honor the Pennsylvania stay 
would be shortsighted, arguing that were we to now do so, the courts of other states 
might in the future do likewise and refuse to honor a similar stay order issued by 
our courts should one of our domestic insurers face rehabilitation.”). 
51 Aly, 822 A.2d 615 at 619 (quoting Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 
177 U.S. 485, 488–89 (1900) in the context of discussing whether to recognize the 
stay instituted in the ongoing Legion Insurance Company proceedings then taking 
place in Pennsylvania). 
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U.S. state-based regulation is a stumbling block in the international 
regulatory arena – the arena in which IAIGs play – and this is important 
because it is there that international concerns regarding systemic efficiency 
play out.  The difference in state law becomes in this context a risk liability 
through the regulatory inefficiencies and uncertainties it entails.  
The recent crisis taught us that it is simply not a sustainable 
position to continue to supervise financial institutions as if the fiction of the 
corporate form maintains total relevance in the cross-border cross-sector 
enterprise context.  For the inherent risk of these enterprises to be fully 
accounted for, equivalent supervisory bodies (ones that can cast the scope 
of their perspective across both borders and sectors) need to be in place, 
and must be properly empowered to act as regulators. State-based 
protectionism of oversight thus has no place in this particular context – 
there is no way the average insurance department can properly, and 
completely, comprehend the intricacies of the more complex businesses for 
which they have responsibility.  Indeed, it is quite impossible for even the 
managers in charge of the more complex enterprises to fully comprehend 
the extent of the intricacies of their own businesses let alone the networks 
within which their businesses exist.52  
It is certainly a mistake to consider regulatory systems as, by 
definition, adverse to business interests.  It may, however, fairly be said 
that to the extent regulatory systems constrain business interests in ways 
those interests should not be constrained, they are adverse to business 
interests – for example, by adding costs and imposing extraneous 
requirements that are neither conducive to the regulatory purpose of 
protecting policyholders, nor to the regulatory purpose of maintaining the 
solvency of insurance companies.53 Maintaining a closer relationship with 
                                                                                                                 
52 This might be considered a cousin of the uncertainty principle of quantum 
mechanics – the extent of the complexity of factors involved, generally heightened 
with the increasing size and extent of a given enterprise, means that previously 
unknown factors will always appear to affect the enterprise at any or all of its 
various levels of operation, and will cause response mechanisms within the 
business that likewise are unknowable in the absolute. Risk management is 
therefore precisely what it claims to be—not the total removal of risk, which would 
be (particularly in a market system) impossible, but the management of inevitable 
risk by way of understanding (to as great an extent as possible) potential 
influencing factors and their respective probabilities. 
53 Regulatory systems should be a check only on the dangerous practices of 
companies – those practices that (through misguided internal policy or through 
failures of prudential governance) in fact generate risks that violate established 
public policy (the extent to which a system will look to protect the solvency of an 
insurance company must be considered a matter of policy – in a market system, 
some failure is expected and allowed.) Internal governance is the major 
consideration here.  Where necessary and proper internal checks and balances are 
not in place, serious mistakes can be made.  In such instances, supervisors should 
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regulators of increased caliber would entail extra costs; however, these 
extra costs would be more than made up for with the savings that would be 
gained from substantially decreased comparative regulatory due-diligence, 
licensing, and filing costs.  In the insolvency context this streamlining of 
regulation holds an even greater importance.  In the insolvency context, 
barring the application of guaranty funds – an inherently inefficient though 
necessary mechanism – the potential for policyholders not having the 
coverage for which they contracted is highly likely.  Here, the estate’s 
administrative costs, related to litigation between jurisdictions in 
attempting to draw assets into the estate, can be considerable. With 
increased uniformity of law, and structures in place to streamline assets 
into an estate, costs will be lowered and a greater possibility of 
policyholder and creditor protection can be gained. 
There is an increasing weight of risk inherent in the financial 
markets today, and insurance companies are tied into those markets – they 
rely on those markets for their investment of premiums.  There is the 
unknown factor of future risks related to climate change and catastrophic 
damage, but there are also the risks of increased social unrest, and the 
heightened business risk that such unrest can bring about.  There is every 
sign that these factors will increase rather than slow in the foreseeable 
future.  Therefore, it is of the greatest importance that the insurance 
regulatory systems of the world be as capable and efficient in their 
structure and practice as possible if they are to spread risk efficiently, 
which is vital to societal, political, and economic stability.  
 
IV. LOCALITY OF HARM 
 
The magnitude of the risks humanity faces is increasing 
dramatically, and with the development that is taking place in countries like 
China, India, and Brazil, we can expect to see the costliness of risk that has 
so far only been relevant to Japan, the EU, and the US, spread to other parts 
of the world as well.  The global repercussions of this increasing risk for 
the insurance industry and for society in general are enormous.  Consider 
this Swiss Re appraisal of catastrophic losses in 2010: 
 
Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters claimed 
nearly 304[,]000 victims and resulted in economic losses 
of close to USD 218bn in 2010. The cost to insurers was 
                                                                                                                 
take on that role; but to do so they must be able to understand the entirety of what 
they are dealing with just as well as, if not better than, the management of the 
company itself.  This is a lofty goal, and yet a necessary one; but it is not a goal 
that can possibly be reached without the removal of all possible extraneous 
regulatory hurdles and requirements.  Regulators must be able to focus on what is 
actually important.  
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more than USD 43bn. In terms of insured losses, 2010 
ranks as the seventh highest year since 1970, when sigma 
began collecting catastrophe data. Compared to 2009, 
insured losses were more than 60% higher in 2010, but still 
below 2005, the year that insured losses soared after 
Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma and Rita struck the US.  
In 2010, 304 catastrophic events occurred, consisting 
of 167 natural catastrophes and 137 man-made disasters.54 
… 
…[T]he number of fatalities and insured losses from 
earthquakes are rising because population growth and 
higher population density, especially in urban areas, 
exposes more people to a single damaging earthquake. 
Many of the rapidly growing urban areas with high 
population densities are located in seismically active areas. 
Due to this, the probability for earthquakes with high death 
toll continuously increases, although the seismic threat 
itself remains unchanged.55 
 
The above figures are somewhat misleading, but only in the sense 
that we were lucky the losses were as low as they were. The reason we can 
consider these almost record-level losses low is that there was very little 
hurricane damage in 2010.  As Munich Re points out, this was not for a 
lack of hurricane activity, just that, fortunately, they did not touch land.56 
Indeed, it was the fifth consecutive year that a major hurricane did not 
make landfall.  The lesson to be reminded of from this is that there are 
things we can control and other things we cannot.  We cannot assume that 
nature, every year, will spare us from having to face a year like 2010 
without a major U.S. city-devastating hurricane to add to the mix of 
earthquakes, harsh winter storms, volcanic eruption, tornadoes, cyclones, 
typhoons, floods, tropical storms, and landslides that we did experience in 
2010.57   
                                                                                                                 
54 The most recorded per year since Swiss Re started compiling data. 
55  Lucia Bevere et al., Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters in 
2010: A Year of Devastating and Costly Events, SIGMA, no. 1, 2011, available at 
http://media.swissre.com/documents/sigma1_2011_en.pdf. 
56  “The 2010 hurricane season was one of the most active since reliable 
records were first kept. That it should nevertheless have proved so benign can only 
be described as a stroke of good luck. Hurricane Earl, which at times reached 
Category 4 on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale, passed within a few hundred 
kilometres of the eastern seaboard of the USA. Had it moved just a little further 
west, it could have caused immense damage and losses in and around New York 
and the New England states.”  MUNICH RE, supra note 13, at 11. 
57 See SIGMA, supra note 55, at 6–8. 
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Indeed, in 2011, this lesson was proved.  Economic losses as a 
result of natural catastrophes and man-made disasters were the highest ever 
recorded at over USD 370 billion while insurance losses stood at USD 116 
billion.58 The difference between these costs highlights the difficulty faced 
by those who, while suffering the consequences of climate change, are not 
in a position to protect themselves from it.  There is another important 
perspective to be taken into account – even though less than a third of 
economic losses were insured, the amount of insured losses was the second 
highest Swiss Re has recorded since it started gauging in 1970.59  Once 
again, these loss figures were spared the addition of major hurricane losses 
in the US.60 
So far, despite massive losses in the last decade, the reinsurance 
market has withstood; but this has not been without strain.61 Questions have 
arisen regarding alternate methods of spreading risk. Such considerations 
have, for obvious reasons, looked to the capital markets and the 
development of insurance-linked securities and special-purpose vehicles,62 
which allow the hedging of insurance and reinsurance climate-related risks.  
 
A. ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION 
 
Active responses to climate change can take two forms: adaptation 
and mitigation, each with limited capacities. Many changes are already 
taking place in the environment and these changes will continue to take 
                                                                                                                 
58  Lucia Bevere et al., Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters in 
2011: Historic Losses Surface from Record Earthquakes and Floods, SIGMA, no. 2, 
2012, at 2, 4–5, available at http://media.swissre.com/documents/sigma2_2012_en 
.pdf. 
59 Id. at 2, 5. 
60 Id. at 5. 
61 See Hecht, supra note 15, at 1583–85 (discussing the role of reinsurance and 
other risk transfer instruments in helping insurers cope with climate change). 
62 See Christopher Kampa, Alternative Risk Transfer: The Convergence of The 
Insurance and Capital Markets Part II, INS. STUD. INST. 1, 2–3 (2010), 
http://www.insurancestudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/ISI_Insurance-
Convergence-Series-Part-II.pdf. “A basic catastrophe bond structure involves an 
insurance or reinsurance company (‘sponsoring company’) issuing a bond security 
through a Special Purpose Vehicle (‘SPV”’).  The sponsoring company enters into 
a reinsurance contract and pays premiums on the reinsurance to the SPV.  The SPV 
issues the bond to investors with a defined trigger that specifies the situations 
where the investor would lose principal.  The SPV holds funds received from the 
bond offering in a trust that invests the funds into Treasury securities and/or other 
highly rated assets.  Investors, mostly institutions, typically receive a spread over 
LIBOR.  The sponsoring company collects part of or the entire bond principal 
when the covered catastrophic event occurs, thus reducing or wiping out returns to 
the investors.” (citation omitted). 
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place and will accelerate, regardless of any mitigation measures that may 
be instituted.63  In light of this, adaptation measures are unavoidable, and 
the reason to mitigate rests in the economic and social necessity of limiting 
the effects of climate change so that we are able to continue to adapt 
without suffering the failure of our supporting systems. 
 
1.  Adaptation 
 
The ability to adapt is limited by available means such as “a 
society’s productive base, including natural and man-made capital assets, 
social networks and entitlements, human capital and institutions, 
governance, national income, health and technology.”64  Our capacity to 
adapt can only consist of removing climate risks to the extent allowed by 
our available means of adaptation. 
 
2.  Mitigation 
 
If we wish to limit our need to adapt, we must mitigate future risks. 
One of the principle arguments against mitigation is based on humanity’s 
well-established adaptive potential including the ability to adapt 
sufficiently to create the ability to more effectively mitigate in the future. 
This argument takes particular strength from advances in scientific 
understanding and our ability to solve problems through advances in 
technology – it argues that we will discover the necessary technology to 
adequately mitigate the problems we may face.  
 
3.  Mitigation and Producers 
 
As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) 
states, “[n]o single technology can provide all of the mitigation potential in 
any sector.  The economic mitigation potential, which is generally greater 
than the market mitigation potential, can only be achieved when adequate 
policies are in place and barriers removed.”65 Without adequate policies in 
place to spark mitigating processes, the processes will be delayed too long 
to be sufficiently successful.  This construct is in the process of being 
demonstrated.  In the most “sophisticated” private market economies in the 
world, mitigating processes have already been delayed for what have 
                                                                                                                 
63 Lenny Bernstein et al., Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Summary 
for Policymakers, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 14 (2007), 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf [hereinafter 
IPCC]. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. 
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proven to be crucial decades.66 This delay is largely a result of the difficulty 
of shifting long-established and entrenched economic superstructures for 
which the maintenance of the profitable67 status quo is more attractive than 
embracing the risks of substantial change.68   
                                                                                                                 
66 Modern economies that are based on high levels of increasing consumption 
fuelled by credit and the resulting debt require the constant growth of economy for 
their perpetuation.  In order to fuel this consumption, inefficiencies such as 
“planned obsolescence” are built-in to productive processes—without adequate 
consideration of the repercussions of waste we specifically design products to 
prematurely fail in order increase production to secure the profit of continued 
consumption.  See The Lightbulb Conspiracy: The Untold Story of Planned 
Obsolescence, Synopsis, http://www.media314.cat/eng/docu_24.html, a multiple 
international award-winning 2010 documentary film by Cosima Dannoritzer (“A 
long time ago, consumer goods were built to last.  Then, in the 1920s, a group of 
businessmen realized that the longer their products lasted, the less money they 
made.  Thus was born Planned Obsolescence, the deliberate reduction of a 
product’s life span to increase sales.  And ever since, manufacturers have designed 
their products in order to make them fail.”).  Financial companies benefit from the 
interest gained from the credit they deliver to companies so that companies can 
produce; energy and chemical industries profit from the production and delivery of 
the goods as well as their packaging, manufacturing and shipping companies profit 
from the sale and delivery of the goods; financial companies profit again from the 
credit they provide the consumers of the goods.  There is little incentive to limit 
production so long as the total costs of the process can be subsidized by the 
externalization of the damage the process causes to the natural environment.  These 
costs are now proving to be very large indeed. 
67 It should be noted here that where energy companies are concerned, this 
“profitable status quo” is only profitable for the enterprise concerned.  When true 
costs are taken into account, traditional power generation is not so profitable as it 
has been presented as being: “With or without a price on carbon, nuclear power 
and big fossil-fueled power plants simply cost far more than ‘micropower’ 
generation (renewables except big hydropower, plus cogenerating electricity with 
useful heat) or saving electricity through efficient use.”  Amory Lovins, On 
Proliferation, Climate, and Oil: Solving for Pattern, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 21, 
2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/21/a_roadmap_to_our_ener 
gy_future.  
68 This construct is particularly evident in the energy industry.  For example, 
in the context of discussing the oil and gas subsidy battles of 2011, one scholar 
wrote, “Defenders of oil and gas industry tax breaks are clearly finding it harder to 
maintain support for tax and other provisions for a mature, highly profitable 
industry whose incumbency essentially locks in U.S. economic vulnerability and 
energy dependency and inhibits the emergence of alternative energy sourcing.  The 
sheer cost of these provisions is one issue, given that the fossil fuel sector reeled in 
more than $72 billion in subsidies in a seven-year period in the 2000s, compared to 
the $29 billion received by the renewables sector . . . [a]dding to the imbalance is 
the fact that while most of the largest subsidies to fossil fuel production are written 
into the U.S. Tax Code as permanent provisions, many subsidies for renewables 
are time-limited, implemented through energy bills, with expiration dates that 
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4.  Mitigation and Government 
 
To the extent that markets are liable to delay on systemically 
important reforms, it becomes necessary that they be sparked to action by 
government-imposed policy. Such policies may include “integrating 
climate policies in wider development policies, regulations and standards, 
taxes and charges, tradable permits, financial incentives, voluntary 
agreements, information instruments, and research, development and 
demonstration….”69 Although these mechanisms are within the power of 
government to impose, they can be difficult to institute where the political 
process is highly influenced by the very industries that would suffer a 
diminishment of profits as a result. 
 
5.  Mitigation and Consumers/Managers 
 
To the extent government policy is not instituted because of the 
existence of political/regulatory capture, other mitigation methods may be 
employed.  For example, the consumer base can affect the market through 
changing the nature of market demand; or, as shareholders or management 
in the commercial enterprises themselves, through the management 
practices of the organizations they own or run.70   
 
B. CONSUMER SOCIETY 
 
A problem with relying on consumer demand and management 
responsibility for imposition of mitigation is the establishment of the 
knowledge and incentive required to spark the imposition.  The reason this 
is a problem is that modern consumer societies, especially the US (long the 
world’s largest producer of GHGs), have established prevalent media 
structures that are largely funded through advertisements by the very 
companies that might potentially suffer through decreased demand.71  To 
                                                                                                                 
continually create uncertainty for the industry and undercut deal-flow and 
deployment.”  Mark Muro, Rationalize and Reform the Energy Subsidy Mess: It’s 
Time, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, (June 27, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
opinions/2011/0627_energy_subsidies_muro. 
69 IPCC, supra note 63, at 18. 
70 Id. 
71  See THE CENTURY OF THE SELF (BBC Four 2002) (an award-winning 
documentary film by Adam Curtis, focusing on how Edward Bernays, a pioneer in 
the field of public relations and propaganda, employed the psychological 
understanding developed by his uncle Sigmund Freud to influence the way 
corporations and governments analyse markets and populations; and, further, on 
how that knowledge has been used to influence consumers and voting 
populations). 
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the extent the average member of society is more likely to be influenced by 
one of these media outlets than by other sources, changes in lifestyle 
priorities are unlikely to shift sufficiently to cause a material difference in 
the mitigation of climate damage.  
 
1.  Costs as Incentives 
 
Where general purchasing influence fails to change management 
approaches, changes may still take place on the basis of management’s 
appraisal of the company’s “reputational risk”.  This is the risk that a 
company faces when its market activities fall afoul of customer 
expectations regarding corporate practices. 72   But this too requires a 
consuming public that has developed a moral position that a company may 
infringe upon.  Further, it requires the transparency to allow the 
information to reach the public, and it requires that the public be 
sufficiently invested in the issue to respond in such a way as to actually 
cause a change in corporate behaviour.73   
 
2.  Externalization of Costs 
 
Given the current state of advanced market economies, it can 
logically be argued that (where information regarding the cost of 
consumption is freely and easily available, and has been considered by the 
consumer) the desire for the consumed product must outweigh any concern 
over the cost of the process by which that product came into being – if it 
did not, then changes would necessarily take place. In this construct, we are 
talking about externalized costs (whether environmental or human), as the 
consumer will assume that all internalized costs are being paid for.  An 
externalized cost will only be addressed once it grows to the extent that it 
                                                                                                                 
72 See Charles Durhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built 
Into an iPad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, for an example of how a large percentage 
of Apple customers expected Apple to carefully monitor their factories to guard 
against exploitation of the factory workforce, and how questionable practices, by 
western standards, came to light after a New York Times article exposed round the 
clock hours and barracks living-conditions at the Foxconn Technology plant in 
Chengdu, China. 
73 Consider that allegations and publicity surrounding the use of sweatshops in 
Southeast Asia have repeatedly plagued the sports merchandiser Nike since the 
1970s, despite some actions of the company to respond. This ongoing controversy 
has not prevented Nike from remaining a world market-leader in its industry. 
Ultimately, the plight of distant workers is likely not a sufficiently local problem to 
spark action from a wider section of Nike’s customer base.  
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becomes a sufficiently local problem for the consumer. For a problem to be 
local, it must be psychologically local.74 
The market has mechanisms to prevent the localization of 
externalized cost – a significant one is information disparity.  Savings from 
externalized cost may not necessarily or entirely be passed on to the 
consumer. Externalized costs, by definition, lower the internalized 
production costs of an enterprise. This saving allows the potential for lower 
market costs; but to the extent the savings are not passed on to the 
consumer, they become the profits of the enterprise. Increased profits mean 
more money for management and shareholders, and the greater possibility 
of attracting new capital for growth.  On this basis, there is a built-in 
systemic incentive to both save on production costs and to pass on as little 
of those savings as possible to the consumer.75 To take complete advantage 
of this information disparity, enterprises rely on maintaining it to the extent 
possible.  It will rarely be the Apples or Nikes of the world that will 
voluntarily submit (to the public) information regarding in what ways they 
save costs through externalization, such information would invite calls for 
lower market prices for products, and in the event sufficient concern for 
human wellbeing (or environmental responsibility) were brought into play, 
might invite calls for costly corporate governance reforms. 
The result of this pattern is the situation we currently face in the 
environmental arena – the return of 150 years of externalized costs related 
to highly damaging industrial and market practices.  We must now begin to 
pay for those costs. Fortunately, we have well-established systems of 
international political interrelation, technology advancement, and finance, 
which have the potential to be employed to adapt to climate change and 
mitigate further climate change.76  Unfortunately, so far, these systems are 
                                                                                                                 
74 It may be assumed that physical locality, in general, suggests psychological 
locality.  The human cost of sweatshops becomes a psychologically local issue for 
unrelated consumers in another part of the world when sufficient light is shed on 
the living conditions of the workers to trigger an empathetic response in consumers 
of the products made in those sweatshops.  But the response need not be in the 
context of a direct relationship between producer and consumer.  An example of an 
indirect response would be where the environmental cost of Japanese nuclear 
energy policy causes a local issue for California when radiated waste, water or air 
arrives in California as a result of failed generators at a coastal nuclear power plant 
built in a location exposed to the possibility of damage from earthquakes and 
tsunamis; this physical exposure to the risks of nuclear energy production may 
effect consumer policy positions on local nuclear energy production. 
75 It hardly need be stated here that collusion in this incentive underlies the 
existence of anti-trust laws. 
76 See IPCC, supra note 63, at 18 (“Many options for reducing global GHG 
emissions through international cooperation exist. There is high agreement and 
much evidence that notable achievements of the [United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change] and its Kyoto Protocol are the establishment of a 
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outdated and/or have not been employed effectively, and have as a result to 
a large extent actually hindered progress towards sufficient adaptation and 
mitigation.77  
 
3.  Reducing Future Vulnerability 
 
Regardless of past successes and failures in addressing these 
issues, in moving forward, it is clear that international government, 
commercial, and public policy will need to be consciously and directly 
focused towards reducing vulnerability to the changes we will face.  Since 
the 2001 Third Assessment Report, the 2007 IPCC understanding of the 
risks facing both natural and human systems is that they have in large part 
increased.78 It is now clear that both adaptive and mitigating actions will 
                                                                                                                 
global response to climate change, stimulation of an array of national policies, and 
the creation of an international carbon market and new institutional mechanisms 
that may provide the foundation for future mitigation efforts. . . . Greater 
cooperative efforts and expansion of market mechanisms will help to reduce global 
costs for achieving a given level of mitigation, or will improve environmental 
effectiveness.  Efforts can include diverse elements such as emissions targets; 
sectoral, local, sub-national and regional actions; [research development and 
demonstration] programmes; adopting common policies; implementing 
development-oriented actions; or expanding financing instruments.”). 
77  These hindrances may be in many forms, including: the protection of 
national sovereignty and protection of established internal industry (whether on the 
basis of protection of jobs, or on the basis of protection of vested interests), the 
protection of established technology by impeding the advancement of new 
potentially superseding technology by potential competitors, and the protection of 
financial interests in the profitability of established systems. 
78 See IPCC, supra note 63, at 19 (“There is new and stronger evidence of 
observed impacts of climate change on unique and vulnerable systems (such as 
polar and high mountain communities and ecosystems), with increasing levels of 
adverse impacts as temperatures increase further.  An increasing risk of species 
extinction [(20–30% of species assessed)] and coral reef damage is projected with 
higher confidence than in the [Third Assessment Report (TAR)] as warming 
proceeds . . . Confidence has increased that [an increase] in global mean 
temperature . . . poses significant risks to many unique and threatened . . . 
biodiversity hotspots . . . There is now higher confidence in the projected increases 
in droughts, heat waves and floods, as well as in their adverse impacts . . . 
Compared to the TAR, initial net market-based benefits from climate change are 
projected to peak at a lower magnitude of warming, while damages would be 
higher for larger magnitudes of warming.  The net costs of impacts of increased 
warming are projected to increase over time . . . There is better understanding that 
in the TAR that the risk of additional contributions to sea level rise from both the 
Greenland and possibly Antarctic ice sheets may be larger than projected by ice 
sheet models . . . .”). 
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need to be taken for an effective response.79  While adaptation will be 
necessary, “[u]nmitigated climate change would, in the long term, be likely 
to exceed the capacity of natural, managed and human systems to adapt. … 
Early mitigation actions would avoid further locking in [of] carbon 
intensive infrastructure and reduce climate change and associated 
adaptation needs.”80 Our strongest asset in this process will be the maturity 
and sophistication of our market and regulatory systems,81 but “[w]ithout 
substantial investment flows and effective technology transfer, it may be 
difficult to achieve emission reduction at a significant scale.”82 In light of 
past experience, neither government action, nor market forces can solve the 
problem alone – they will have to rely on one another within a balanced 
framework, but that framework will be very difficult to achieve without a 
major upheaval of perspective. 
  
4.  Localizing the Cost of Inaction 
 
Establishing a balanced framework means, on one front, pressuring 
markets and government to accept and respond to the extent of the cost of 
inaction. If this is to take place, the current information disparity (between 
the voting populace and business) needs to be addressed to trigger a more 
localized understanding of the risks.  To wait for the actual local experience 
of the risks to manifest will mean massively increased and likely 
unmanageable costs will manifest. 83  The voting populace will need to 
pressure government to install policies that will incentivize the shifting of 
the overall economy in a more sustainable direction.  In addition, the voting 
                                                                                                                 
79 Id. (“There is high confidence that neither adaptation nor mitigation alone 
can avoid all climate change impacts; however, they can complement each other 
and together can significantly reduce the risks of climate change . . . Mitigation 
efforts and investments over the next two to three decades will have a large impact 
on opportunities to achieve lower stabilization levels. Delayed emission reductions 
significantly constrain the opportunities to achieve lower stabilization levels and 
increase the risk of more severe climate change impacts.”). 
80 Id. (emphasis added). 
81  Id. at 20.  “There is a high agreement and much evidence that all 
stabilization levels assessed can be achieved by deployment of a portfolio of 
technologies that are either currently available or expected to be commercialized in 
coming decades, assuming appropriate and effective incentives are in place for 
their development, acquisition, deployment and diffusion and addressing related 
barriers.”  
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 22.  “Choices about the scale and timing of GHG mitigation involve 
balancing the economic costs of more rapid emission reductions now against the 
corresponding medium-term and long-term climate risks of delay.”  
224  CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 20.1 
 
 
 
populace, as market consumers, needs to make clear that a sustainable 
economic structure is desired.84  
 
C. FREEDOM TO ACT 
 
Humanity faces very real and costly events in the coming decades. 
Our preference for adaptation (such as building higher sea-walls, changing 
the building codes for coastal structures or structures at risk from 
earthquakes) is not surprising – it is the equivalent of reactive medical 
treatment as opposed to preventative behaviour. Reactive behaviour is fine 
so long as a fund exists to pay for it.  Where funds do not exist (such as in 
developing countries), or where they are diminished (such as currently in 
the US or EU), it becomes necessary to consider alternatives. 
 
 
1.  Self-Interest as Incentive 
 
Unlike adaptation, mitigation requires actual fundamental change 
in behaviour and systems – it requires we take a long hard look at the 
circumstances that gave rise to these issues we face. This is not an easy 
thing to do as it requires changes in well-established patterns of behaviour, 
and habits are particularly hard to change where they are systemically 
reinforced by surroundings.85  However, mitigating climate change need 
not be costly if it is done in a considered and sensible way:  
 
                                                                                                                 
84 That being said, it is unfair to place all of the weight on consumers.  Where 
a market is structured to favor certain established infrastructures, and where real 
alternatives are practically non-existent because of market forces beyond the scope 
of the person at the fuel pump, it is not fair to hold that person (say 95% of the 
population) to account for the perpetuation of the inefficiencies in the overall 
system. 
85 Antony Froggatt & Glada Lahn,  Sustainable Energy Security: Strategic 
Risks and Opportunities for Business, LLOYDS 360° RISK INSIGHT, Sept. 13, 2012 
at 20, available at http://www.lloyds.com/news-and-insight/riskinsight/reports/ 
energy-security/energy-security (“In spite of broad international agreement on the 
importance of inventing and deploying technologies at scale to meet energy and 
climate security goals, progress has been too slow.  Uncertainties around domestic 
and international regulations and pricing structure can stall investment, discourage 
collaborative projects and generally dampen investor confidence.  For example, 
inconsistent policies have entrenched a pattern of boom and bust in the renewable 
energy and efficiency industries in many parts of the world, including the US.  
Enacting policies and freeing up the necessary finance for technological 
transformation is even harder in the context of the global financial crisis and 
volatile energy prices.”). 
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Business experience proves climate protection is not costly 
but profitable, because saving fuel costs less than buying 
fuel. Changing the conversation to profits, jobs, and 
competitive advantage sweetens the politics, melting 
resistance faster than glaciers. Whether you care most 
about security, prosperity, or environment, and whatever 
you think about climate science, you’ll favor exactly the 
same energy choices: focusing on outcomes, not motives, 
can forge broad consensus. … The climate conversation 
gets vastly easier and less necessary when it’s shifted from 
shared sacrifice to informed self-interest.86 
 
In the context of alleviating stress-based paralysis, the above quote 
perhaps understates the difficulties and complexities of restructuring 
energy sourcing where that restructuring has been described as “the third 
industrial revolution [that] will challenge all aspects of energy services: 
from energy sources and storage; to user-technologies, such as lighting, 
vehicles and electric motors; and infrastructure.”87   
                                                                                                                 
86 Amory Lovins, On Proliferation, Climate, and Oil: Solving for Pattern, 
Foreign Policy, January 21, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 
articles/2010/01/21/a_roadmap_to_our_energy_future. 
87 LLOYDS 360° RISK INSIGHT, supra note 85, at 20. “There is now widespread 
acknowledgement that we are in a ‘transition’ period heading towards less-
polluting, more-sustainable forms of energy. Yet there are a variety of views as to 
what this involves, the duration, and to what extent hydrocarbons should be part of 
the energy mix. Added to this is the uncertainty around what will replace them. 
This involves scaling up new technologies and introducing completely different 
energy delivery systems.” Id. at 8. “Recoverable reserves of natural gas are enough 
to meet world demand for heat, power and petrochemical uses to at least 2030 . . . . 
But production equal to that of two Russia’s would need to come on-stream by 
then just to make up for the decline in existing fields. Over half of conventional 
natural gas resources are concentrated in three countries Russia, Iran and Qatar, 
and there are political, geological and technological obstacles that may restrict 
international supplies in the short to medium term.” Id. at 12. “Even before we 
reach peak oil, we could witness an oil supply crunch because of increased Asian 
demand. Major new investment in energy takes 10–15 years from the initial 
investment to the first production, and to date we have not seen the amount of new 
projects that would supply the projected increase in demand.” Id. at 13–14. “The 
costs, environmental impact and security implications of [unconventional fossil 
fuel] options [(such as heavy oil, oil sands, and tar sands)] differ and are at the 
centre of fierce debates about the trade-offs between climate and energy security . . 
. [T]he energy input (usually in gas) needed to get the oil out is around three times 
as much as for conventional oil. It also takes three barrels of water to produce each 
barrel of oil, most of that being too toxic to return to the rivers. Emissions from 
shale oil are likely to be higher and those from coal to liquids are at least double 
the levels of those from conventional oil-based fuel. Gas to liquids would produce 
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2. Affected Sectors and Types of Risk 
 
Three general business sectors dominate global energy use: 
manufacturing, household consumption and transport. 88  The risks these 
sectors face can be broken down into short-term operational and supply 
chain (changes in prices paid for energy affect global competitiveness; 
disruption of electricity supply can cause operational failures and restart 
costs), financial and regulatory (uncertainty over potential changes in 
regulatory treatment undercuts security in investment), longer-term 
operational and supply chain (risk of regional carbon pricing in developed 
countries for energy intensive industries such as cement and steel), and 
reputational (public scrutiny of government, business, and other 
institutional emissions profiles).89   
 Energy companies also face risks that fall into the following 
categories: regulatory and environmental, financial and investment, 
technology, physical and operational, and reputational. As regards 
regulatory and environmental, energy companies face two key challenges: 
“how to adapt to a resource constrained and low-carbon world and how to 
deliver the non-traditional energy sources that are being encouraged by 
government policy.” 90  Due to the “common good” nature of the 
environment as a whole, it is not clear at this stage how the economic costs 
of pollution of the environment will be attributed in the future.91 Also, even 
though renewable energy targets have been set in place in many countries 
around the world, the binding nature of these targets is unclear, and for that 
reason the extent of the need for the continued provision of traditional 
energy sources is also unclear. 92  But “Government implementation of 
‘investment grade’ energy policy will reduce these risks and give investors 
confidence in the longevity and breadth of the proposed policies. To 
achieve this it is necessary to establish long term policy targets and 
incentives that remove ambiguities and ensure that all aspects of energy 
policy and investment are addressed.”93   
Financial and investment risks are similar to regulatory risks in that 
they are greatly affected by the extent to which consistency in policy can be 
relied upon. However, they are also greatly affected by the even greater 
whims of the market itself.  For significant shifts in energy infrastructure, 
                                                                                                                 
emissions some 10% to 15% higher than those from conventional petrol or diesel.” 
Id. at 14. 
88 Id. at 25. 
89 Id. at 25–30. 
90 Id. at 31. 
91 Id. at 31–32. 
92 Id. at 32. 
93 Id. 
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there must be significant investment – but investment follows market 
conditions.  Thus, “[i]n the last decade [2000-2010], high energy prices 
have led to great surges in investment … in renewable energy technologies 
worldwide. But many projects were stalled, cancelled or became 
unprofitable when the price fell. …  The uncertainties of price fluctuations 
are amplified by variations in the carbon price and the uncertainties over 
which sectors it will affect.”94   
Technology risks likewise are exacerbated by uncertainty in policy 
going forward; for this reason, many businesses have delayed investment in 
new technology that may be made uncompetitive in the event policy does 
not prove to support it.95   
Political and operational risks refer to the issues involved in 
finding new sources of energy in harder-to-access locations where easier-
to-access energy is depleted or made less accessible for political reasons.96 
Infrastructure investments are put at risk by changing climate patterns, such 
as increased storms at sea or on coasts, or the drying up of rivers required 
for the cooling of power stations.97   
Finally, as regards reputational risk, share prices can be 
substantially affected by public perception of a company’s operations – 
where companies operate in increasingly sensitive environments, the results 
of failures are increasingly damaging for the company’s reputation and 
economic situation.98 
 
3. Prospects 
 
The risks described above pertain both to investment in next-
generation energy technology, and to the maintenance of current generation 
technology. Ultimately though, the risks of not investing in next-generation 
technology are greater and the business opportunities of early investment 
                                                                                                                 
94 Id. 
95 “New technologies and processes must be developed, piloted and scaled up, 
yet incentives to drive their innovation and deployment at the scale and necessary 
pace often lack long-term political commitment.” Id. at 33. 
96 Id. at 33–34. 
97 Id. at 34. 
98 “Operating in more difficult terrains increases the risk of accidents which 
have human, environmental and economic consequences. The economic 
consequences relate to the costs of remediation, compensation and the potential 
impact of reputational damage on the company’s share prices. The pressure to 
invest in areas with unclear legal frameworks and governance challenges will 
continue to expose companies to accusations of collusion in human rights abuses 
or corruption.” Id. at 35. However, the fact that accidents such as the Exxon 
Valdez and the BP Gulf Spill does not prevent discussion, for example, of the 
opening up of the Alaskan Wildlife Refuge to drilling represents the extent to 
which we are reliant on oil under the current system. 
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are growing. “The threat of man-made climate change and supply security 
concerns is challenging the relative competitiveness of fossil fuels in terms 
of cost, environmental impact, energy output and access.”99 As the realities 
of climate change become more localized, governments and companies will 
increasingly realize that “[r]enewable energy solutions can help diversify 
the energy portfolio of many businesses, bringing added price and supply 
security in the long-term while adding to a company’s sustainability 
profile.”  Even if companies don’t get on board as quickly as they might, 
the specter of the repercussions of global average temperatures rising by 
2°C above pre-industrial levels will force “a transformation in the way we 
live and the way governments regulate our activities, particularly in relation 
to industry, transport and buildings.”100 
Such government action is likely necessary to instigate a full-
fledged movement of industry towards mitigation measures.  But this 
action will have to take place on an international level. As Lloyd’s of 
London points out: 
 
Despite great expectations, the Copenhagen Summit in 
December 2009 did not lead to a binding international 
treaty on [GHG] emission reductions. . . .  The outcome is 
seen by many in the private sector as a missed opportunity. 
Without clearer and stronger domestic policies in key 
markets, it is unclear whether there are sufficient drivers 
for large-scale renewable investment and deployment. …  
[But pure domestic action, such as through border 
measures, are problematic.]  Unilateral action to impose 
border tax adjustment outside any global climate 
agreement is likely to prompt trade-related retaliatory 
actions, undermining the global trading system. …   
To achieve the 2°C target . . .  countries and markets 
must stimulate opportunities in low-carbon and energy-
efficient investments across the globe and generate $30trn 
of investment in the next two decades. . . .  Only strong 
policy incentives will promote renewable energy activity 
under existing market conditions. This is often described as 
a ‘market failure’ in need of market mechanisms or 
policies that factor in the environmental cost of higher 
emitting fuels or subsidize cleaner ones, as a public good. 
Lack of confidence in the binding nature of national 
renewable energy targets or incentive mechanisms has 
                                                                                                                 
99 Id. at 17.  
100 Id.  
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hampered the growth of the sector. But where there is 
political will, investments are taking place.101 
 
Even in the absence of determined government action, there is still 
the possibility that companies can make a difference. Particularly where 
companies intelligently collaborate, they have the potential, through 
innovation, to create the conditions that allow the profitability of new 
ventures. This dynamic is called “game-changing strategy”,102 and it should 
be encouraged to the extent possible both by governments (through 
enabling legislation) and by support-industries such as finance and 
insurance. 
 
 
D. LOCALITY OF HARM 
 
A major issue in both the insurance and environmental arenas, 
where the updating of systems-regulation and mechanisms of mitigation 
and adaptation is concerned, is a perceived non-locality of harm.  
“Locality of harm” is the objective proximity of harm to an entity. 
A given entity’s perception of the locality of harm is the measure of risk to 
which the entity perceives itself to be exposed – this is the subjective 
proximity of harm, the entity’s risk exposure, or vulnerability. If the 
proximity of harm is calculated to be distant, then the behaviour producing 
the risk will not change.103   
                                                                                                                 
 101 Antony Froggatt & Glada Lahn,  Sustainable Energy Security: Strategic 
Risks and Opportunities for Business, LLOYDS 360° RISK INSIGHT, Sept. 13, 2012 
at 18, available at http://www.lloyds.com/news-and-insight/riskinsight/reports/ 
energy-security/energy-security 
102 Id. at 36. 
103  The subjective proximity of harm will always be different from the 
objective proximity of harm. This is due to the inevitable discrepancy between 
perception and reality. In some cases, there may be an over-abundance of caution 
and risk-aversion, and in such cases the locality of harm will be deemed closer than 
it truly is. On the opposite end of the spectrum is the case in which the locality of 
harm is deemed further away than it truly is and behaviour may be taken that 
increases the level of harm on the basis of the underestimation of the magnitude of 
that harm. Where harm is underestimated, and continuing behaviour increases that 
harm, the result can be catastrophic, such as was the case with the financial crisis 
of 2007–2009, and such remains the case to the extent the underlying problems 
that gave rise to the 2007–2009 crisis have not been fixed. Underestimation of the 
locality of harm can take place for various reasons.  See, e.g., Hecht, supra note 15, 
at 1591–92 (discussing possible explanations for a lack of demand for first-party 
catastrophic risk insurance).  “[There are] several possible explanations for this 
behavior. First, limits on time and other resources . . . . Second, people may be 
motivated to choose not to think about outcomes that are scary or negative. Third, 
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In the following quote, Patrick Liedtke104 highlights a scenario in 
which locality of harm issues appear – he argues against the rash 
development of new regulatory models in response to crises:  
 
[W]hat is unsettling is that many reform projects apply a 
perceived urgency that appears to sacrifice too readily 
methodical analytics and careful investigation for quick 
action. In the quest for solving the problems at hand, rapid 
action is desired and the time for meticulous examination 
seems too long-winded and politically inopportune. This is 
a shame. Regulation, especially if it is comprehensive and 
meant to stand the test of time, needs a proper gestation 
period and enough time for appropriate consideration and 
thorough discussion.105 
 
Change necessarily entails uncertainty and risk. Where the 
instigator of change is something that is perceived as negative or harmful 
or where the necessary result of confronting a given issue is perceived as 
involving hardship, the inherent psychological avoidance of uncertainty is 
exacerbated by the inherent desire to avoid difficulty to the extent 
reasonably possible – the linking of these two creates inertia.106 In the case 
of climate change, the required changes are extreme precisely because they 
                                                                                                                 
people may assume that if a situation is terrible enough, someone else will bail 
them out. Fourth, perceived or real budget constraints . . . . Fifth, people’s view of 
insurance as an investment rather than as a hedge against loss . . . . And finally, 
consumer myopia, a tendency to ignore any costs or benefits with a time horizon 
over approximately one year . . . .” Id. 
104 Patrick Liedtke is the former Secretary General of The Geneva Association 
and former Editor-in-Chief of The Geneva Papers. He is one of the world’s 
foremost authorities on the international regulation of insurance. INSTITUTE FOR 
THE STUDY OF LABOR, http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/personnel/photos/index_ 
html?key=162 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
105 Patrick Liedtke, Rules of Engagement: Global Regulatory Reforms and the 
Insurance Industry, 36 THE GENEVA PAPERS 325, 326 (2001), http://www.palgrave 
-journals.com/gpp/journal/v36/n3/pdf/gpp201116a.pdf. 
106  See Stephen M. Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, 
Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption, 15 
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 397, 402 (2006) (“[A]ction on climate change is likely 
to raise serious, and perhaps uncomfortable, questions about who we are and what 
we want to be. …[T]his suggests a status quo bias in the face of uncertainty. 
Contemplating change is often uncomfortable; contemplating basic change may be 
unnerving, even distressing. Since the social ramifications of action appear to be 
large, perspicuous and concrete, but those of inaction appear uncertain, elusive and 
indeterminate, it is easy to see why uncertainty might exacerbate social inertia.”), 
http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/21093100/1401045316/name/Gardner_Perfect_Mor
al_Storm.pdf. 
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have already been avoided for so long, and one of the factors that made 
climate change easy to ignore is the fact that most people simply have not 
seen the results of it in a sufficiently threatening form.107   
 
1. Exploiting Uncertainty 
 
Interests that would maintain the status quo, for the time being at 
least,108 are able to reinforce avoidance through appeals that rest on the 
uncertainty inherent in climate science.109 This approach fails to admit that 
all knowledge is uncertain and that the basis of the western scientific 
tradition rests on an appreciation of uncertainty. Science is constantly 
called to consider and reconsider extant knowledge, to update and correct 
the canon of empirical knowledge.  
                                                                                                                 
107 See Hecht, supra note 15, at 1586 (“On the demand side, cognitive biases 
cause individuals and risk managers to treat many catastrophic risks as trivial if 
their probability is perceived as below a certain threshold amount, and to place an 
extremely high discount rate on contingent events.”) 
108 See Dlugolecki, supra note 19, at 84 (“Despite the gravity of the threats, the 
will to act is weak. There are powerful lobbies ranged against mitigation. The 
chain of accountability in asset management is confused and priorities are short 
term. Politicians fear to act, because making energy cleaner, or constraining 
consumerism are potentially vote-losing. Insurers themselves have been reluctant 
to become involved. In the face of scientific uncertainty and political antagonism, 
American insurers have been very reluctant to commit themselves….”); see also 
Hecht, supra note 15, at 1586 (“On the supply side, collective action issues, 
perverse incentives provided by regulation, uncertainty aversion, and concerns 
about short-term profits all tend to hinder the development and deployment of 
products that will help to solve climate change-related problems.”); Id. at 1589 
(“High transaction costs also tend to favor existing modes of doing business over 
innovation. Insurers typically benefit from large economies of scale and put large 
amounts of capital at risk. The transaction costs of adapting business practices are 
especially likely to affect insurance lines that aggregate risk from a very large 
number of policyholders. This phenomenon may explain, in part, the increased 
willingness of [certain] large surplus [lines] insurers and reinsurers, [those] which 
engage in fewer transactions overall, to explore taking on climate change more 
aggressively. Finally, insurers, most of which are publicly-traded companies, may 
have incentives to be concerned with short-term profits rather than risks that may 
materialize over the long term.”). 
109 See Justin Gillis, Clouds’ Effect on Climate Change is Last Bastion for 
Dissenters, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2012) (discussing the passionate embrace by 
climate change skeptics in industry and government of the MIT climate scientist 
Richard Lindzen, who, standing largely alone on the basis of research (that has 
been so discredited by other climate scientists that he had to go to Korea in order to 
publish his findings in a journal) holds to a theory that it is not necessary and 
would be wasteful to make any political moves on climate change risks), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/science/earth/clouds-effect-on-climate-ch 
ange-is-last-bastion-for-dissenters.html. 
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Where policy involves large expenses of finite capital politicians 
rightly seek a degree of certainty in their decisions. Climate change is an 
area that brings this problem into acute focus.110 Huge economic interests 
are involved; society must choose whether or not to fundamentally 
restructure long-standing and deeply entrenched systems of economy.  To 
make the necessary changes, massive legal shifts must be made that will 
affect hundreds of millions of people, huge shifts of investment must be 
made to fund new enterprises aligned with speculative models.  
Understanding is never complete and to require (for public policy 
decisions to be made where hundreds of trillions of dollars are at stake 
along with the well-being of all future generations of humanity and the 
survival of countless other life-organisms) certainty greater than 97% of 
working climate scientists is unreasonable. Inaction in the face of such 
certainty represents gross negligence on the part of public servants in their 
duties to the public in a representative democracy.111 
 
2. The Precautionary Principle 
 
In modern international environmental law, the acceptance of 
uncertainty (matched with recognition of the duties of public servants) is 
embodied in what is called the “precautionary principle”. As laid out in 
Principle 15 of the United Nations Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (1992), the principle states: 
 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to 
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.112 
                                                                                                                 
110 “For decades, a small group of scientific dissenters has been trying to shoot 
holes in the prevailing science of climate change, offering one reason after another 
why the outlook simply must be wrong. Over time, nearly every one of their 
arguments has been knocked down by accumulating evidence, and polls say 97 per 
cent of working climate scientists now see global warming as a serious risk.” Id. 
111 “Gross negligence” is “[a] conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless 
disregard of a legal duty and of the consequences to another party”. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1062 (8th ed. 2004). Gross negligence is the opposite of 
“diligence”, which entails care and caution, traits that are the very least that should 
be expected of any public servant in the exercise of his duties to the public. Id. at 
488. 
112  United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (Aug. 12, 1992) reprinted in 31 
I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992) (emphasis added). 
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Principles require adherence to an abstract (the spirit of the law), it 
does not matter what form of action is taken, so long as the action falls 
within the guidance or meaning of the principle. By way of contrast, rules-
based law requires adherence to specific mechanisms or guidelines. Rules-
based law encourages creativity in how to profitably undermine the spirit 
of the law while technically adhering to the law. 
The precautionary principle is thus inherently vague – it leaves 
policymakers to determine its application. Determinations may include 
questions such as: What degree of protection is required? What measure of 
capability should be employed when deciding the extent of actions 
expected of states? What exactly constitutes serious or irreversible 
damage? What level of certainty is required for action? What are cost-
effective measures? What does environmental degradation mean? These 
questions may be asked out of honest concern for how to apply the 
principle, or they may be asked so as to undermine the possibility of 
establishing what the principle seeks to establish through the creation of 
uncertainty-based inertia.  
 
3. The Desire for Particularity 
 
Both forms of question contain a fundamental flaw – they apply a 
rules-based paradigm of thought in a principle-based environment.113 The 
requirements of the precautionary principle are perfectly clear if one 
considers the meaning of the principle in its true context. The true context 
of the principle is one in which the intent of the principle and what it 
represents is actually and inherently understood. When the principle is 
approached with this understanding the answers to the questions are 
integrally answered in the context of upholding the principle. This last 
statement is admittedly enigmatic in the context of a legal/business policy 
paper. We are used to, and generally require, a far greater degree of 
particularity – consider this statement:  
 
                                                                                                                 
113 Two examples illustrate this problem of applying a certain paradigm of 
thought in a fundamentally inconsistent context. The first is Zeno’s paradox of 
motion, set out in the 4th Century BC. This paradox describes how in order for an 
arrow to reach its target it must first reach the mid-point between the bow and the 
target, but once it has reached that mid-point, it must then reach the next mid-point 
between the first mid-point and the target before it can reach the target, and so on. 
Ultimately the arrow spends an eternity reaching the next mid-point and can never 
actually reach the target. The second is the application of classical mechanics at the 
quantum level of matter. In both of these cases the logical problems that result are 
due to a misapplication of a paradigm of rules on the basis of an assumption of the 
universal relevance of those rules to all potential states. 
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To assure efficiency and sustainability, the dialogue about 
the risks associated with new technologies must be 
improved and conducted at a more granular level. Only 
when sufficient granularity in the discussion of risks 
related to each new technology is achieved can appropriate 
risk management solutions and appropriate public policies 
(where necessary) be devised. Risks must be identified, 
categorized and analysed with respect to the cause of loss 
in developing economically efficient solutions that are also 
reasonable, responsible and responsive. If risk is not 
appropriately characterized, inappropriate policy solutions 
result, which ignore relevant market forces, create the 
potential for long-term dependency, foster economic 
inefficiency and aggravate the risk of environmental harm 
– all of which are unsustainable conditions. . . . Many 
approaches to risk analysis are possible. The key is to 
assure that the appropriate analysis is used for the 
technology under discussion, and the analysis itself is 
comprehensive and granular. Only when risks are parsed 
and defined appropriately can one determine what 
mechanisms are most effective and economically efficient 
to manage such risks.114 
 
The above quote captures the requirement for specificity in 
analysis and comprehension of complex issues if they are to be effectively 
solved. The quote does not, however, represent a more fundamental 
concern, the question of whether the discussion at the granular level can 
possibly satisfy the underlying issue that prevents the ability for market 
participants to intuitively comprehend the requirement set in place by the 
precautionary principle, or the governing impetus for which the principle 
stands – which is, quite simply, “intent”.115   
                                                                                                                 
114  Lindene Patton, Beyond Rising Sea Levels: The Importance of the 
Insurance Asset in the Process of Accelerating Delivery of New Technology to 
Market to Combat Climate Change, THE EUROPEAN BUSINESS REVIEW 
(2008) (Lindene Patton is Chief Climate Product Officer for Zurich Financial 
Services), available at http://www.zurich.com/internet/main/SiteCollectionDocum 
ents/insight/NewtechnologyPatton.pdf. 
115  Consider the five-stage UK Civil Service formula for progressively 
preventing Cabinet Ministers from achieving anything during their time in office 
between general elections: “1. ‘The administration is in its early months and 
there’s an awful lot to do at once.’ 2. ‘Something ought to be done, but is this the 
right way to achieve it?’ 3. ‘The idea is good, but the time is not ripe.’ 4. ‘The 
proposal has run into technical, logistic and legal difficulties which are being 
sorted out.’ 5. ‘Never refer to the matter or reply to the Minister’s notes. By the 
time he taxes you with it face to face you should be able to say it looks unlikely if 
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Where faced with the extreme repercussions that climate change 
provides, the seeking of particular answers prior to action generally causes 
unsustainable delay. To attempt to completely understand the various 
factors involved at the granular level is a futile exercise, and the adherence 
to this perspective leads to an impossible position – the discarding of the 
principle until the granular repercussions have been discerned – but this 
would effectively undermine the very basis of incentive that the discovery 
of granular answers requires. In other words, in certain circumstances 
action must be taken before all of the questions are answered, and in the 
course of acting the answers that are required are inherently discerned. 
The above discussion should not be taken to suggest that a granular 
understanding of risk is not required in the creation of the concrete 
mechanisms to adapt to and mitigate any given risk.116 What it does suggest 
is that, to the extent the abstract requirement of the precautionary principle 
is not intuitively understood, a problem exists that will undermine the 
possibility for the granular understanding to develop. Further, unless a 
factor of focused intent is harnessed to govern, even where a granular 
understanding may develop it will constantly be left open to countering 
arguments relying on alternative granular evidence, or interpretations of 
evidence, derived from the ever-present measure of uncertainty.  
V.  MANAGED EVOLUTION 
As the pressures of climate change increase, if the global insurance 
system does not develop the necessary internal structures to spread risk as 
efficiently as possible, two possible outcomes will emerge: insurers will 
become insolvent due to not being allowed to charge adequate premiums, 
or they will have to leave markets due to the markets being unable to afford 
the actuarially-true premiums. Simultaneously, to the extent government, 
corporate, and investment policy allows an increasing wealth gap in the US 
or elsewhere in the developed world, increasingly few individuals will be 
                                                                                                                 
anything can be done until after the election.’” Yes, Minister: Big Brother, at 
14:34–15:41 (BBC television broadcast Mar. 17, 1980) (the Yes, Minister series 
and its sequel, the Yes, Prime Minister series, ran on BBC between 1980–1984 and 
1986–1988 respectively – the script, written by Jonathan Lynn, was noted for its 
brilliantly insightful satire of the relationship between the permanent Civil Service 
and elected government ministers, often focusing on the creation of inertia in 
government action), available at http://www.free-tv-video-online.me/player/tudou. 
php?id=03ewO032bXg. 
116 See Hecht, supra note 15, at 1587 (discussing pricing in the context of 
climate change and insurance supply, and ultimately shedding light upon the 
necessary link between a demonstrable granular understanding of risk and the 
ability to employ that understanding as a price signal).  As indicated by Sean 
Hecht, “where actuarial risk is not correlated with climate-friendly behavior, it is 
far more difficult to justify incorporating climate concerns into policy pricing.”  Id. 
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able to afford insurance causing a feedback loop to develop that will further 
exacerbate the problem. 
When we consider the sensitivity of modern infrastructure it 
becomes very clear that we have been, particularly over the last forty years, 
sailing directly towards a perfect storm. It is the admitted intention of this 
paper to highlight the urgency of the matter. 117  Regulatory systems 
certainly do need “proper gestation period[s] and enough time for 
appropriate consideration and thorough discussion,”118 but the appropriate 
consideration in an ideal system should be on-going and engaged in by 
academics, private policy/research institutions, industry, and public 
regulators on an on-going basis.  
The current European system of insurance regulation is perhaps the 
best example of considered regulatory evolution.119 While the regulations 
of Solvency I are still in place, Solvency II has been developed and is being 
tested, and (in response to those tests) is being adjusted prior to 
implementation. This process of evolution should not end with the 
implementation of Solvency II in 2016, but should ideally continue after 
Solvency II is implemented. The reason for this is obvious: the business 
market that Solvency II will regulate is in a state of constant change.  A 
regulatory system must take this into account, and through the International 
                                                                                                                 
117 On a similar note, this exasperated Op-Ed, by the Director of NASA’s 
Goddard Institute for Space Studies, should be required reading in every classroom 
across the country today: James Hansen, Op-Ed., Game Over for the Climate, N.Y. 
Times, May 9, 2012, (describing in detail the dangerous insanity of Canada’s plans 
to exploit the oil in its vast tar sands reserves) available at http://www.nytimes.co 
m/2012/05/10/opinion/game-over-for-the climate.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc= 
edit_th_20120510.   
118 See Liedtke, supra note 105, at 326. 
119 Solvency II is not a perfect system. Concerns have been made regarding the 
level of complexity that the system has developed over the course of the several 
Impact Assessments that have been incorporated into the process of 
implementation to analyse the possible macroeconomic and financial repercussions 
of the legislation. Other concerns have been raised pertaining to the potential for 
changes that have been made to Solvency II to actually increase the possibility of 
systemic risk embedding itself into the insurance industry. See Philipp Keller, 
Solvency II and Incentives for Systemic Risk Exposures, 54 PROGRES (The 
Geneva Association, Geneva, Switz.) Dec. 2011, at 1, 2–8 (arguing that the main 
objective of Solvency II is policyholder protection, but also that protecting 
policyholders might not always be consistent with objectives of sustaining market 
stability or other macro-economic aims; and discussing “changes that were 
introduced to Solvency II that lower technical provisions, that are not consistent 
with an economic valuation standard, changes that could lead to an increased 
exposure to banking and sovereign risks, and changes to the structure of Solvency 
II, namely from the reliance on the standard formula and on governance 
requirements which introduce other specific risks . . . [which] bear the risk that the 
insurance industry will become increasingly exposed to systemic risk.”). 
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Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC) in the US, and the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) in the EU, international regulatory systems are now learning 
to take a more inclusive, business-reality based view of the objects of their 
oversight.  By setting in place mechanisms by which regulatory systems 
can incorporate evolution, the opportunity for market-failures to surprise 
regulatory systems will be diminished.  
The United States system can reasonably be considered an example 
of the failure of a system to instil this principle of managed evolution into 
its regulatory mechanisms. The financial crisis provided a great deal of 
urgency that would have, ideally, been employed to more significantly 
overhaul the financial services sector. Even though in that instance the 
main causes of concern were not in the insurance area, it was nevertheless 
an excellent opportunity to create a more simplified structure of regulation 
across the financial services spectrum, one that would more closely match 
the modern requirements of the global economy.120  
Making unconsidered but systemically important changes in the 
midst of a crisis constitutes bad planning. 121   Fundamental structural 
changes must be made to the systems of environmental and insurance 
                                                                                                                 
120  The opportunity was largely lost, and now we see quite clearly the 
importance of substantial impetus – now, the public will, the public perception of 
urgent need, is gone and very little of material substance has changed. Another 
opportunity will not present itself except in the event of another crisis, which will 
certainly come and will very likely be significantly worse than the last because it 
will be a crisis that will very likely strike when economic and political systems are 
already weak and underfunded. 
121 This is of course the situation we are currently in, and it is not to be envied: 
“The additional challenge and complexity of the actual situation is that 
policymakers are faced with a volatile economic and market environment. 
Uncertainty rules—uncertainty stemming from several distinct sources: the 
continued lack of a full resolution to the European sovereign debt crisis, fiscal 
constraint and political infighting in the US, dwindling effective options remaining 
to the [U.S. Federal Reserve] and European Central Bank (ECB), disappointing 
economic data, and unknown implications from regulatory reforms. Erratic 
markets reflect this uncertainty: investors worldwide have little sense of how 
economies will develop. We face a severe crisis of faith in economic policy, 
undermining business confidence. In times [of great uncertainty] like these, it 
becomes even more critical that policy be appropriate and credible. . . . The 
industry is at a critical time to reflect on the process of regulatory reform.” Philippe 
Brahin, Regulatory Reforms in an Uncertain Environment, 54 PROGRES (The 
Geneva Association, Geneva, Switz.) Dec. 2011, at 21, 22. But though the industry 
is a critical time to reflect on the process of regulatory reform, it is also the worst 
time to reflect on the process; going forward, it will be vital to precisely consider 
the reform that is needed in advance so that it is not necessary to consider it amidst 
such insecurity as currently exists. In other words, preventative action is generally 
a far less disruptive course than reactive action. 
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regulatory law in the expectation of crises, not in the midst of them. The 
two must take place simultaneously and will require the participation of 
government, business, and the voting/consuming public.  
 
A.  STRUCTURAL INVESTMENT 
 
We must concentrate on helping dedicated insurance industry 
players to conduct their business more efficiently, we must increase the 
ability for a wider segment of the general population to achieve an 
economic position in which they can afford insurance at actuarially-
accurate rates, and we must save money where we can by understanding 
more carefully the value of money and the relationship of its investment to 
long-term considerations. If we do not achieve all three of the above, the 
losses that will result from increasingly devastating weather events, 
affecting increased worldwide development, will deplete the surpluses of 
the industry and make insurance unaffordable if even available.  
It must be recalled that even where losses are insured and the pain 
of the loss has been spread, even though there is benefit to be had for local 
businesses in rebuilding, the overall economy has still suffered a loss. It is 
not sufficient that the proceeds of policies are used to rebuild in exactly the 
same place where the loss occurred with adaptation to future events in 
mind. Consider, for example, the development that is currently taking place 
in Southeast Asia and Indonesia, the historical prevalence of 9.0 
earthquakes in the region. In March 2011 this problem came into sharp 
focus with the tsunami that struck northeastern Japan, a stark “reminder 
that secondary loss elements, such as tsunamis, can be a crucial loss driver 
in an earthquake event.”122 
 
                                                                                                                 
122 Lucia Bevere et al., Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters in 
2011: Historic Losses Surface from Record Earthquakes and Floods, SIGMA, no. 2, 
2012, at 1, 7, available at http://media.swissre.com/documents/sigma2_2012_en 
.pdf. 
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Historical Epicenters with a Moment Magnitude of 6 or Higher:123 
 
Now consider the next graphic, and the result that on-going 
consistent growth will produce in the fatality statistics.  
Comparison of Annual Fatalities Due to Earthquakes since 1970:124 
 
 
To consider the matter coldly, from a purely economic perspective, 
it does not matter so much that people have died – what matters more is the 
                                                                                                                 
123 Lucia Bevere et al., Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters in 
2010: A Year of Devastating and Costly Events, SIGMA, no. 1, 2011, at 1, 11 fig.7, 
available at http://media.swissre.com/documents/sigma1_2011_en.pdf. 
124 Id. at 9 fig.4. 
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disruption that will take place when highly populated coastal areas are 
devastated, when governments must respond to millions of people in 
trouble, when the population is burdened with the psychological scars of 
their neighbours having been killed, their small businesses, their fields and 
livelihoods devastated. These are massive costs.125   
Whether the situation is looked at in terms of morality or in terms 
of economics, the magnitude of the risk that our growth patterns create 
when considered in light of climate change is disturbing. The money spent 
in response to preventable loss from catastrophic events is economic value 
that has not been used for other purposes, for relocation of infrastructure, 
for education, for research and development of next-generation technology. 
Economic buying power is finite – with every dollar we spend we are 
forming our future experience. Responding to catastrophes is expensive. 
Instead of using our creativity to come up with ingenious methods of 
avoiding facing the problem, we must work to develop methods by which 
we can bring down the price of insurance, so that it is affordable even in 
situations of greater risk.  
 
1.  Making Insurance Affordable 
 
There are ways of decreasing the price of insurance that make 
sense, and many others that seem attractive in the short term, but prove not 
to make sense when looked at more carefully. Subsidization by un-like 
risk-holders does not make sense. Local, jealous protection of regulation 
does not make sense. Forcing insurers to stay in markets while disallowing 
them to charge actuarially sound rates does not make sense.126 Allowing the 
continuation of industrial and other living practices that provoke climate 
change does not make sense. Preventing international and enforceable 
                                                                                                                 
125 The insured losses from the 2011 flooding in Thailand were unprecedented. 
Though different in cause from coastal damage from earthquakes, the flooding 
produced a similar result. Many companies had moved production facilities to 
Thailand, including Japanese firms that had moved facilities in response to tsunami 
damage in Japan; these large businesses are generally insured. The owners of 
residential homes and small businesses in an area the size of Switzerland were not 
so fortunate, only about 1% of them held flood insurance – they lost everything. 
See id. at 12–16. 
126 “Regulators have generally sided with the financial interests of affected 
policyholders in situations where affordability or availability of insurance is 
threatened, limiting insurers’ ability to charge purely risk-based premiums.” Hecht, 
supra note 15, at 1607. “Regulators may indeed have a significant role to play in 
the attempting to change their regulatory structure to promote incentives to 
properly incorporate risk. If they do not do so, they will not only sacrifice the long-
term health of the insurance industry, but may impede opportunities to help address 
climate change where insurers’ interests are aligned with climate-friendly 
practices.”). Id. at 1609–10. 
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systems of environmental cooperation from gaining momentum does not 
make sense. 
What would make sense would be to gather together as an 
international community and conclude a global agreement on a world 
environmental organization that can harmonize, systematize, and 
streamline global approaches to environmental protection, adaptation and 
mitigation policies, and liability structures 127  with biting enforcement 
mechanisms. Also, to harmonize the law pertaining to the international 
spreading of risk, the regulation of IAIGs, and the mechanisms by which 
insurance regulators from all over the world determine and vouch for the 
solvency of complex enterprises so that like-risks can be more easily and 
efficiently be pooled on a global basis. And finally, to incentivize the 
building and spreading of sustainable wealth models so that a greater 
numbers of people are more securely able to afford insurance. The 
insurance industry can and should help in this process.128 
                                                                                                                 
127 Id. at 1598–99 (“[T]he current ambiguity in legal liability regimes relating 
to responsibility for climate change will continue to pose a challenge to insurers 
who attempt to consider climate change-related liability risks in their 
underwriting.”). 
128 See Dlugolecki, supra note 19, at 88 (“Insurers have a duty as ubiquitous 
players in the economy and society to help to shape climate policies in a 
responsible and effective way. With their expertise in risk management, and their 
responsibilities as custodians of future wealth they are uniquely placed, but in 
general they have been dilatory in this task.”). See also Hecht, supra note 15, at 
1587, 1613–14, 1616 (“[I]nsurers . . . should be motivated to take significant 
actions aimed at reducing overall societal greenhouse gas emissions and increasing 
adaptive capacity. These actions will reduce overall uncertainty and other barriers 
to insurability, by reducing insurers’ potential exposure to catastrophic risks in 
excess of their capacity as well as the potential for property/casualty and liability 
claims in excess of current pricing structures. It will also allow insurers to price 
their products at marketable rates, giving them wider potential markets of 
policyholders . . . [Further t]he insurance industry in particular has significant 
potential to influence the behaviour of other market actors through its contracting. . 
. . Firms with significant market power can use contracts and other instruments to 
achieve broader environmental goals, complementing and in some cases 
substituting for government regulation . . . In light of its market power, influence, 
and incentives, the insurance industry is a potentially powerful instrument of 
private governance to address climate change. The industry wields enormous 
market power internationally by serving as a facilitator of new ventures and 
spreader of risk for new and existing ventures. Its contracts affect individuals and 
businesses around the globe. And consumers of insurance are often beholden to 
insurers’ unilateral decisions about the pricing and the availability of insurance 
products . . . [But, insurers cannot do it alone,] the public sector must work 
together with the insurance industry . . . to develop partnerships and regulatory 
relationships that promote sound climate policy while benefitting insurers and 
policyholders. . . . Unless and until these challenges are overcome, the insurance 
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2.  Foundations for Action 
 
Without a perception of proximate locality of harm, responsive 
action is impossible due to a lack of incentive. The problem with presenting 
doomsday scenarios is that they can have a tendency to cause people to feel 
the problem is just too much to consider. Solutions help alleviate the stress 
of facing problems, they allow confidence that the problem is something 
that can be managed. That being said, it is dangerous to require absolute 
certainty in the choosing of solutions – there are very good reasons to 
expend attention, energy and resources on overwhelming problems prior to 
the existence of certain solutions.  
First, sometimes problems can only be managed if they are 
addressed. The overwhelming problem of climate change is precisely of 
this nature. The optimistic avoidance argument that we will be able to solve 
climate change problems through future technology is problematic – while 
it is the case that human beings have proved remarkably ingenious and 
effective in solving pressing problems, the difference between the climate 
issue and other issues is that there is much more at stake with the climate 
than was the case in any previous problem modern mankind, as a whole, 
has faced. In the context of climate change delay on the basis of a future 
quick-fix is too much of a gamble, it places on the line the lives of too 
many people (and other life-forms) who have not had adequate opportunity 
to be informed and heard. 
A second reason to act despite overwhelming odds would be that it 
is the right thing to do – irrespective of whether or not a solution is in fact 
possible, action should be taken anyway. This argument rests in a notion of 
duty – duty to others, duty to nature and the earth, duty to our descendants, 
and perhaps most importantly, duty to ourselves. By not acting we 
undermine our own credibility, our own ability to look into a mirror and 
feel truly proud and satisfied with the way we spend our days, with the 
choices we make. This concept refers to a certain heroic element in the 
human spirit, it is one that comes through in adversity and fights for what is 
right regardless of apparent futility.129  On this basis alone, we should feel 
                                                                                                                 
industry will have limited ability to help society address climate change through its 
products.”). 
129  Consider these words from the speech given by Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill to the House of Commons on August 20, 1940:  
 
What a cataract of disaster has poured out upon us . . . . The 
trustful Dutch overwhelmed; their beloved and respected 
Sovereign driven into exile; the peaceful city of Rotterdam the 
scene of a massacre as hideous and brutal as anything in the 
Thirty Years’ War. Belgium invaded and beaten down; our own 
fine Expeditionary Force, which King Leopold called to his 
rescue, cut off and almost captured, escaping as it seemed only 
2013  INSURANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE  243 
 
 
ashamed of our inaction, and should act to prevent the continued support of 
unsustainable enterprises.  
Such sentiments, while noble, generally hold little weight in the 
cold reality of international politics, business and economics.130 Luckily, a 
third reason for acting against overwhelming odds in the climate area is 
that it is, given the right circumstances, economically profitable to do so.131   
                                                                                                                 
by a miracle and with the loss of all its equipment; our Ally, 
France, out; Italy in against us; all France in the power of the 
enemy, all its arsenals and vast masses of military material 
converted or convertible to the enemy’s use; a puppet 
Government set up at Vichy which may at any moment be forced 
to become our foe; the whole Western seaboard of Europe from 
the North Cape to the Spanish frontier in German hands; all the 
ports, all the air-fields on this immense front, employed against 
us as potential springboards of invasion. Moreover, the German 
air power, numerically so far outstripping ours, has been brought 
so close to our Island that what we used to dread greatly has 
come to pass and the hostile bombers not only reach our shores 
in a few minutes and from many directions, but can be escorted 
by their fighting aircraft. . 
. . .  
. . . The British nation and the British Empire finding themselves 
alone, stood undismayed against disaster. No one flinched or 
wavered; nay, some who formerly thought of peace, now think 
only of war. Our people are united and resolved, as they have 
never been before. Death and ruin have become small things 
compared with the shame of defeat or failure in duty. 
 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, “The Few” Address at the House of Commons 
(Aug. 20, 1940) (emphasis added). 
130 “Britain should always be on the side of law and justice, so long as we 
don’t allow it to affect our foreign policy.” Yes, Prime Minister: A Real 
Partnership (BBC television broadcast Feb. 6, 1986), available at 
http://www.veoh.com/watch/v21039982Jw546Dc4?h1=Yes+Prime+Minister+1.5+
-+A+Real+Partnership (the Yes, Minister series and its sequel, the Yes, Prime 
Minister series, ran on BBC between 1980–1984 and 1986–1988 respectively–the 
script, written by Jonathan Lynn, was noted for its brilliantly insightful satire of the 
relationship between the permanent Civil Service and elected government 
ministers, often focusing on the difference between the importance publicly placed 
on principles such as law and justice, and the extent to which such principles fail to 
guide public policy in actual practice where economic or business concerns are 
raised). 
131  Aside from the profitability of a new industrial revolution in next-
generation technologies: 
 
[T]here is much analysis and evidence to show that “green 
sectors” such as building retrofits and renewable energy have the 
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3.  “ESG” Factors 
 
In October 2009, the United Nations Environment Program 
Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI) published a report by its Insurance Working 
Group,132 called The State of Sustainable Insurance: Understanding and 
Integrating Environmental, Social and Governance Factors in Insurance:   
                                                                                                                 
prospect of leading the global economic recovery while 
addressing major environmental crises, and doing so with better 
returns to capital than “brown” development or a “spending 
spree”. . . . Falling employment and income levels are the 
destabilizing social consequences of the economic crisis. 
Maintaining and creating jobs and income levels is vital for 
social stability as well as for restoring aggregate demand to start 
and underpin economic recovery. Many green sectors have 
higher employment leverage per unit investment than less green 
alternatives. There are also very significant opportunities to 
create employment in green sectors as part of short-term stimulus 
packages. . . . We believe that there is a unique historical 
opportunity now to create the basis of a new Green Economy 
that is able to allocate natural capital and financial capital in a far 
more effective and efficient manner into the foreseeable future. 
 
U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL GREEN NEW DEAL: POLICY BRIEF 1, 4 (Mar. 
2009), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/A_Global_Green_New_Deal_Policy_ 
Brief.pdf. See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE, THE GLOBAL STATE OF 
SUSTAINABLE INSURANCE: UNDERSTANDING AND INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL, 
SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS IN INSURANCE 1, 13–14, 35–40 (Oct. 2009), 
available at  http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/global-state-of-sustain 
ableinsurance.pdf (describing how proper management of Environmental, Social 
and Governance factors potentially enhances insurance company earnings and 
long-term company value via avoided loss and new product offerings); see also 
GLOBAL GREEN NEW DEAL: POLICY BRIEF supra, at 19–29 (describing the 
advantages to such an approach as applied to specific industry sectors such as 
building, energy, transport, freshwater, ecological infrastructure, and agriculture, 
there are specific profitability factors from which the insurance industry in 
particular stands to gain).  
132 U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE, supra note 131, at 9.  Although 
UNEP is an entirely underfunded and largely overlooked limb of the United 
Nations framework, the significance of its Finance Initiative Working Groups 
should not be overlooked. The Insurance Working Group membership includes 
over 200 financial institutions, including some of the world’s largest banks and 
insurers. Initially it was hoped UNEP-FI’s membership would represent a larger 
share of the banking/insurance world, but interest diminished in light of 
uncertainty over liability and reputational concerns. This is particularly unfortunate 
as regards potential insurer membership – as this paper argues, greater certainty 
regarding liability exposure for insurers would increase their ability to assist in 
manifesting behavioral change in markets such as would decrease and make more 
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We believe that through the systematic integration of 
material [Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)] 
factors into core insurance processes, insurance companies 
– along with the individuals and entities they protect and 
the entities that they invest in – will be able to sustain their 
economic activities and play their roles in the creation of a 
more sustainable global economy that invests in real and 
inclusive long-term growth, genuine prosperity and job 
creation, in line with UNEPs Green Economy Initiative 
and the broad objectives of its ‘Global Green New Deal’[, 
which includes making] a major contribution to reviving 
the world economy, saving and creating jobs, and 
protecting vulnerable groups.133 
 
In the preparation of its report, UNEP conducted a comprehensive 
survey134 of the insurance industry in regards to the role of ESG factors in 
their underwriting and investment practices. ESG risk factors are broken 
down into sub-factors by UNEP as follows: Environmental – climate 
change, biodiversity loss & ecosystem degradation, water management, 
pollution; Social – financial inclusion, human rights, emerging manmade 
health risks, ageing populations; and Governance – regulations, disclosure, 
ethics & principles, alignment of interests. 
Five key findings were made by the report. First, “ESG factors 
influence underwriting, and have varying degrees of impact across lines of 
insurance”; second, “Proper management of ESG factors potentially 
enhances insurance company earnings and long-term company value via 
avoided loss and new product offerings”; third, “Given their assessment of 
ESG risks, underwriters judge the societal response for many ESG factors 
as underdeveloped”; fourth, “The evolution of ESG factors in developing 
regions is different, but there are aspects common globally”; and fifth, 
“Active promotion and adoption of integrated ESG risk management and 
financing is needed”.135  
As regards the first of the above thematic findings, the report 
points out that “in a data-driven industry, the absence of a substantial track 
record in utilising ESG factors as a performance predictor or risk quality 
was noted as a barrier to both the development of new products and further 
                                                                                                                 
manageable the overall risks to which society and economies are exposed through 
climate-related issues. 
133 Id. 
134 Resulting in “nearly 2,700 pages of data from 60 territories worldwide and 
from respondents with over 3,800 years of cumulative insurance experience.” Id. at 
12. 
135 Id. at 13–17.  
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integration of ESG criteria into formal underwriting guidelines.”136  With 
more concerted study, the relationship between ESG factors and the overall 
risk exposure of companies will become increasingly apparent. Insurers, 
going forward, will need to take more conscious account of this area, not 
only in terms of how particular climate change related repercussions will 
affect particular lines – like ageing populations and life insurance for 
example – but also in terms of the overall and developing reputational-risk 
faced by insureds in light of their treatment of ESG factors.137 
As regards the second of the above thematic findings, the report 
points out that the development of new insurance products has been 
challenging.138 Because these risks fall into a new category, and therefore 
historical exposure data is largely non-existent, the product development 
process relies to some extent on legal and regulatory frameworks. On this 
basis, inter-governmental action could help by establishing a more effective 
infrastructure of international environmental law, as well as harmonization 
of domestic environmental law, to help crystallise these ESG risk-factors 
into a more economically measurable state through reporting and liability 
mechanisms. Without such mechanisms in place, if the insurance industry 
wants to develop new products, it must accept an additional regulatory risk 
burden that will make the products more expensive, and thus less viable. 
As regards the third of the above thematic findings, the report 
points out that there exists a disconnect between industry assessments of 
ESG-related risks, and the apparent societal response to those risks. The 
insurance industry, as an entity, is the world’s most expert risk analyst. It is 
expertise in this area that makes the on-going provision of insurance 
possible. It cannot be surprising that those who specialize in the area would 
see new risk-factors earlier than others. Whereas in the public sphere there 
is a marked inattentiveness to climate change related risks, the results of 
UNEP-FI’s survey found that “underwriters judged ESG risks to have 
significant loss potential. . . .”139   
In light of this, to return to the question of establishing systems to 
crystalize risk-factors into economic models, the report asks “whether a 
regulatory or legal framework is a precondition of insurability, or whether 
                                                                                                                 
136 Id. at 13. One area of particular difficulty in this context is the natural 
commons. “[M]ost biodiversity and ecosystem benefits are largely public goods 
with no price, and are therefore rarely detected by our traditional economic 
compass.” Id. at 33. But see  U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE, THE NCD 
ROADMAP: IMPLEMENTING THE FOUR COMMITMENTS OF THE NATURAL CAPITAL 
DECLARATION, 31–34 (May 2013), available at http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/d 
ocuments/ncd_roadmap.pdf (marking the beginning of Phase II of efforts under the 
Natural Capital Declaration, an initiative of signatory financial institutions to 
include natural capital on balance sheets). 
137 U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE, supra note 131, at 13. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 14. 
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it is simply one of many important issues that influence the underwriting 
process.”140 In response to its question, the report points out:  
 
The insurance industry perspective reflected in the survey 
results suggests that ESG risks may be ‘outrunning’ the 
development of prudential regulatory or legal frameworks. 
This is significant because it is a fact that the insurance 
industry is highly regulated, and the survey statistics reveal 
that regulations is the number one factor influencing 
underwriting, and the number one factor in terms of risk 
severity.141  
 
Here the report makes clear its view that where industry must lead the way 
in a dynamic market, there must be in place an equally dynamic framework 
by which to guide that industry response.142 Without such a framework, it is 
particularly difficult for insurers in the context of emerging risks as it is not 
clear to what extent they may be held liable for claims made for losses 
based on those risks. For an insurer to take on a risk, it is important that it is 
able to charge an appropriate premium, and important that it not be unduly 
expected to pay claims outside of the risk it has taken on in the event of 
unknown liabilities arising.143  
As regards the fourth of the above thematic findings, the major 
difference between developed and developing countries is in the extent of 
insurance penetration—there is not necessarily such a difference where 
incorporation of ESG factors are involved. As regards the fifth of the above 
thematic findings—that active promotion and adoption of integrated ESG 
risk management and financing is needed – the report breaks down its 
findings into five critical required actions:  
 
1. Working together within a fragmented insurance 
industry structure on how to achieve collective industry 
action on ESG factors. . . . 2. Creating enhanced forums for 
                                                                                                                 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 14–15. 
143 See id. (referring to insurer hesitancy in joining UNEP-F1 as a result of 
liability uncertainty). Note that the insurance industry suffered major damage as a 
result of the irresponsible practices of its insureds in the case of asbestos. Tort 
liability for asbestosis almost bankrupted Lloyd’s of London, one of the most 
important markets for the spreading of risk in the world. Frameworks for the more 
effective understanding and measurement of ESG factors have begun to be 
developed both in the insurance industry (with the ClimateWise Principles) and in 
the investment industry (with the UN-backed Principles for Responsible 
Investment).  ClimateWise is an insurance industry project launched by Charles, 
Prince of Wales.  
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dialogue on ESG factors within the insurance industry, and 
between the industry and its stakeholders. . . . 3. 
Embedding material ESG factors in underwriting 
guidelines, and building the appropriate skill sets. . . .   4. 
Addressing ESG communication gaps and barriers within 
insurance companies. . . . 5. Recognizing and respecting 
divergent interests on ESG factors. . . .144 
 
In regards to divergent interests, the report makes a particular point about 
legacy issues, and their potential effect on insurer openness to 
environmental concerns. Legacy issues are:  
 
[P]otential loss exposures arising from policies issued in 
the past where new theories of litigation might trigger a 
claims payment never contemplated at the time the policy 
was underwritten. . . . Potential legacy issues could be . . .  
liability risks associated with the failure to act on climate 
change. Not all conversations on ESG issues are ‘safe’ or 
‘comfortable’ for insurance companies as they can touch 
not just the coverage to be offered in the future, but also 
the potential reinterpretation of policies issued in the past. 
Without addressing these structural issues, it will be 
difficult to seize the benefits arising from a public-private 
partnership in response to the universe of largely long-term 
and systemic risks inherent in many ESG factors.145 
 
On the basis of these themes, the UNEP-FI report makes 
recommendations specific to insurance companies, the insurance industry, 
and regulatory systems and stakeholders:   
Regarding insurance companies, UNEP-FI suggests the integrating 
of ESG risk factors into company-wide policy and insurance processes 
including: a clear mandate and strategy at Board and senior management 
levels; the provision of ESG education, training, tools and information for 
                                                                                                                 
144  Id. at 16–17. In regard to critical action 3, note that “as skilled as 
underwriters are, the reality is that many ESG factors entail enhanced skill sets, 
involve regulatory and legal challenges, and require greater knowledge and 
exposure data in order for the risks to be properly underwritten.” Id. at 16. In 
regard to critical action 4, note that “communication gaps or barriers that exist 
between underwriters and investment managers [is an example of how] 
organisational silos can impede ESG integration.” Id. In regard to critical action 5, 
note that “enhanced forums . . . will be a useful means of identifying those areas of 
common ground to be seized for mutual benefit, as well as those areas of clearly 
divergent interests to be more effectively managed once defined.” Id. 
145 Id. at 17. 
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employees; the review of formal underwriting guidelines to integrate ESG 
factors; consideration of the potential for ESG-related products; the 
assessment and monitoring of both direct (within the company itself) and 
indirect (insurance, reinsurance, and investment portfolios, as well as 
supply chain) ESG performance; and the transparent disclosure of direct 
and indirect ESG performance.146 
Regarding the overall industry, UNEP-FI suggests that “the 
insurance industry should develop and adopt a set of ‘Principles for 
Sustainable Insurance’ focused on ESG factors, tailored to the insurance 
business, grounded on risks and opportunities, and in line with the goals of 
sustainable development. These principles can provide the global 
sustainability framework through which the industry can work together to 
address, among others, the major challenges” outlined by the five thematic 
findings described above.147 
Regarding the regulatory and stakeholder level, UNEP-FI suggests: 
that policymakers and regulators should establish and maintain prudential 
frameworks relating to ESG factors; that civil society institutions, through 
self-education, should help the insurance industry in becoming more 
sustainable and should support the provision of ESG-related products and 
services; and that the academic community should advance research in 
related areas.148 
 
In order to sustain the long-term economic health and 
resilience of the insurance industry – and unleash its 
immense capacity to tackle ESG factors as risk managers, 
risk carriers and institutional investors – material ESG 
factors must be systemically integrated into underwriting 
guidelines and product development, and other core 
insurance processes such as investment management, 
claims management and sales & marketing. . . . [T]he 
societal response to managing the global, long-term and 
systemic risks posed by many ESG factors is 
underdeveloped. [The development of] ‘Principles for 
Sustainable Insurance’ . . . can act as a dynamic best 
practice framework, pool information and resources, 
inform regulators and policymakers, create a global 
sustainability forum for the industry and its stakeholders, 
foster inclusiveness across markets, drive innovative 
solutions, and accelerate collective action on global 
sustainability challenges.149 
                                                                                                                 
146 Id.   
147 Id. at 17–18. 
148 Id. at 18. 
149 Id. 
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4.  The ClimateWise Principles 
 
The ClimateWise Principles150 are an example of an industry-led 
approach to taking ESG factors further into account in the absence of a 
government-imposed framework. 151   The Principles were launched by 
Charles, Prince of Wales, in September 2007 on the basis of his 
understanding of the social and economic importance of insurance in our 
society.152   The Principles are to: 1. Lead in Risk Analysis; 2. Inform 
Public-Policymaking; 3. Support Climate Awareness Amongst Insurance 
Customers; 4. Incorporate Climate Change into Investment Strategies; 5. 
Reduce the Environmental Impact of Business; and 6. Report and Be 
Accountable. 
By its second year, this initiative had grown from 16 original 
insurance company members to over 40 from Africa, Asia, Europe, and 
North America. Most prominent in its membership however (as is the case 
with the UNEP-FI Industry Working Group) are large European insurers. 
The underlying reality that this imbalance reflects is perhaps well-
demonstrated in the below excerpt from the Executive Summary of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ independent review: 
 
Overall, ClimateWise members have maintained the high 
levels of compliance seen in the 2010 Independent Review, 
with average compliance across all the principles standing 
                                                                                                                 
150 See CLIMATEWISE, THE CLIMATEWISE PRINCIPLES, http://www.climatewis 
e.org.uk/storage/The%20ClimateWise%20Principles.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 
2013). 
151 As a matter of transparency, the ClimateWise Initiative members agreed 
that they would publish an annual statement detailing what actions they have taken 
to comply with the ClimateWise Principles. See CLIMATEWISE, CLIMATEWISE 
PRINCIPLES: THE FOURTH INDEPENDENT REVIEW 2011, http://www.climatewise.org 
.uk/storage/fourthyearreview2011/ClimateWise%20Fourth%20Year%20Review%
20-%20Summary%20Version.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2013); CLIMATEWISE, 
CLIMATEWISE PRINCIPLES: THE FIFTH INDEPENDENT REVIEW 2012, 
http://www.climatewise.org.uk/storage/_website-2012/fifth-anniversary-review-
and-summit/ClimateWise%205th%20Year%20Review%202012%20-%20Execu 
tive%20Summary.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
152 For more than thirty years, the Prince of Wales has been advocating a more 
sustainable and responsible manner of living, in terms of both human-built 
environments and natural environments. For decades, his ideas on these topics 
have been dismissed, if not ridiculed, as eccentric in the press and many segments 
of the government and public. The ClimateWise project is just one of many such 
projects that the Prince has launched. His battles in fighting for principles of 
sustainable living and applied concepts of sustainable development directly 
highlight the regrettably inadequate and/or misguided attention given to 
maintaining basically healthy human and natural environments. 
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at 88%.... Posting [] growth in compliance in this reporting 
period was always going to be difficult against the 
backdrop of the external market challenges. Therefore 
maintaining compliance at just under 90% can be seen as 
something of a strong performance.  It is also key to point 
out that members of ClimateWise, in signing up to the 
principles and reporting against them, are indicative of a 
section of the industry that is more advanced in addressing 
climate risk. In September 2011, Ceres released a report 
entitled ‘Climate Risk Disclosure: Evaluating Insurer 
Responses to the NAIC Climate Disclosure Survey’. While 
clearly focussed on the North American market, the report 
concluded “while the NAIC survey revealed a broad 
consensus among insurers that climate change will have an 
effect on extreme weather events, only 11 of the 88 
companies reported having formal climate risk 
management policies in place, and more than 60% of the 
respondents reported have no dedicated management 
approach for assessing climate risk.” In contrast, the level 
of compliance across the ClimateWise Principles 
demonstrates that, for most members, activities supporting 
management and assessment of climate risk are well 
established.153  
 
The above excerpt demonstrates the different approach taken in 
Europe to the climate change issue. Problems related to climate change are 
too large for individual insurers or regions to tackle alone – it is of the 
utmost importance for the US insurance industry, public, and government 
to follow suit. The actions of a single insurer (or even a single group of 
insurers) will not have a sufficient effect in influencing global industry or 
governmental/social policy towards a more responsible approach to the 
magnitude of the concerns the society faces; second, the embracing of ESG 
factors by a single insurer (or group of insurers if they do not have 
sufficient bargaining power to force a shift in global industry) can place 
that/those insurer/s at a competitive disadvantage in the short-term, and 
potentially prevent them from realizing the benefit of their action in the 
mid- to long-term. By acting together, and by thinking of mid- to long-term 
interests, insurers can pool their collective bargaining power in the overall 
markets. The driving push of insurers will help to spur their counterparties 
in the process.  
 
5.  The Principles for Responsible Investment 
                                                                                                                 
153   CLIMATEWISE PRINCIPLES: THE FOURTH INDEPENDENT REVIEW 2011, 
supra note 151, at 6 (emphasis added). 
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On the investor side, a similar initiative to ClimateWise is the 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI).154 PRI was founded in 2005 
on the invitation by the UN Secretary General to institutional investors to 
develop, in cooperation with the UNEP-FI and the UN Global Compact, a 
set of principles upholding and promoting the ESG concept in the 
investment arena. The Principles are: 1. We will incorporate ESG issues 
into investment analysis and decision-making processes; 2. We will be 
active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and 
practices; 3. We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the 
entities in which we invest; 4. We will promote acceptance and 
implementation of the Principles within the investment industry; 5. We will 
work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles; 
6. We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing 
the Principles.155 
The PRI initiative is organized principally into four Work Streams. 
These are: Implementation Support, Academic Network, Principles for 
Investors in Inclusive Finance, and PRI Country Networks.  
Implementation Support breaks down into nine subcategories 
related to different areas of investment activity: listed equity, fixed income, 
private equity, property, hedge funds, commodities, infrastructure, small 
and resource-constrained signatories, and investing with impact.156 The PRI 
Academic Network “is a unique research community established to support 
the work of the PRI through research on responsible investing. It fosters a 
network of scholars, practitioners, policymakers and students interested in 
responsible investment issues [and provides] a global platform to deliver 
high-quality and accessible academic research to PRI signatory 
organizations. . . .”157 The Principles for Investors in Inclusive Finance 
(PIIF) provides a framework for “expanding access to affordable and 
responsible financial products and services by poor and vulnerable 
populations. . . . A wide range of financial products and services are 
incorporated within the remit of inclusive finance including savings, credit, 
insurance, remittances, and payments.”158 PRI Local Networks have been 
set up in Brazil, South Africa, Korea, Japan and Australia in order to 
                                                                                                                 
154 See PRI ASS’N, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, available at 
http://www.unpri.org/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
155 See PRI ASS’N, THE SIX PRINCIPLES, available at http://www.unpri.org/ab 
out-pri/the-six-principles/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
156 See PRI ASS’N, IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT, available at  http://www.unpri. 
org/areas-of-work/implementation-support/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
157 PRI ASS’N, ACADEMIC NETWORK, http://www.unpri.org/areas-of-work/ab 
out-an/?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=43&Itemid=100 
065 (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
158 PRI ASS’N, WHAT IS INCLUSIVE FINANCE? Available at  http://www.unpri. 
org/areas-of-work/piif/what-is-inclusive-finance/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
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provide the following opportunities for investors in those countries: 
“support implementation of the Principles in a local context; provide a 
platform for signatories to share ideas and best practices [as well as to 
create a networking and collaboration space]; consolidate understanding of 
common challenges with a focus on local/regional issues; encourage [more] 
signatories to get involved in global PRI activities; raise awareness about 
responsible investment and [to] recruit new signatories; engage with local 
companies and policy makers collectively on specific ESG issues; and 
provide [information] to the PRI Secretariat on the issues and challenges 
facing local signatories.”159 
Another noteworthy Work Stream is the Engagement 
Clearinghouse, which “provides signatories with a forum to share 
information about collaborative engagement activities they are conducting, 
or would like to conduct.” 160  The PRI, through the Engagement 
Clearinghouse, is able to combine the bargaining powers of its members in 
order to influence corporate performance on ESG issues, and “seek changes 
in company behaviour, policy or systematic conditions.”161 Through acting 
collectively, investors are also able to avoid the problem of the positive 
externalisation of the costs of monitoring individual companies – by 
pooling resources, signatories can share both the costs of monitoring, and 
the benefits of that monitoring.162   
Like ClimateWise, the PRI is an example of private enterprises 
acting where governments have failed to act. By joining together, 
companies have the opportunity to simulate regulated conditions – they 
                                                                                                                 
159 PRI ASS’N, NETWORKS, available at http://www.unpri.org/areas-of-work 
/networks/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
160  THE ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN PROMOTING GOOD 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 39 (2011). Examples of collaborative efforts include: 
The CEO Water Mandate (improving corporate practices in regards to water 
usage); the Engagement on UN Global Compact Reporting (highlighting both good 
and bad practice in compliance with the Global Compact); Engagements with 
companies on Carbon Disclosure Project data; an Investor Statement calling for a 
global arms trade agreement; an Investor Statement in support of human rights 
principles; a Pilot Project on responsible business in conflict-affected and high risk 
areas; the Sudan Engagement Group (to consider investments in companies with 
operations in Sudan); and an initiative in regards to sustainable stock exchanges 
(looking to improve stock exchange ESG disclosure requirements). 
161 Id. 
162  PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV. & UN ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. 
INITIATIVE, UNIVERSAL OWNERSHIP: WHY ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES 
MATTER TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 46 (2011), available at http://www.unepfi. 
org/fileadmin/documents/universal_ownership_full.pdf. 
162  THE INT’L INTEGRATED REPORTING COUNCIL, THE IIRC, available at 
http://www.theiirc.org/the-iirc/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
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create a level playing field out of mutual long-term interest. These self-
instigated actions are admirable; but they are also telling. To the extent that 
businesses, with pressure (if not mandates) to produce investor profits in 
the short-term, are willing to forego short-term profits in order to take into 
account longer-term sustainability considerations, they put our political 
systems to shame. That seems a strong statement, but unlike business 
enterprises, governmental systems in the West are representative 
governments with a duty, ultimately, to protect the interests of citizens 
against exploitation by others (assuming an accepted degree of exploitation 
necessarily exists in a free market system). Businesses have no duty to 
anyone (except their shareholders) beyond a general duty that if they break 
the law they must pay a penalty for the injury.  
The companies that have engaged themselves in these private 
schemes have done so willingly and ideally out of a sense of duty, or at the 
least out of economic intelligence in recognizing that thinking only of 
short-term profits is not a sustainable business model. But even this 
recognition must be said to involve a sense of duty – a duty to those who 
will come later, there is simply no other basis for the decision to forgo 
present returns for future returns when those future returns will very likely 
reward others long after current decision-makers have left their posts.  
 
6.  Integrated Reporting 
 
One final noteworthy effort currently underway is in the area of 
corporate reporting. The International Integrated Reporting Council is “a 
global coalition of regulators, investors, companies, standard setters, the 
accounting profession and NGOs.”163 The IIRC’s mission is to create “the 
globally accepted International <IR> Framework that elicits from 
organizations material information about their strategy, governance, 
performance and prospects in a clear, concise and comparable format. The 
Framework will underpin and accelerate the evolution of corporate 
reporting, reflecting developments in financial, governance, management 
commentary and sustainability reporting. . . . Our vision is . . . [to enable] 
informed decision-making that leads to efficient capital allocation and the 
creation and preservation of value . . . towards the advancement of a more 
sustainable global economy.” 164  Integrated reporting is a process that 
results in a periodic integrated report that constitutes “a concise 
communication about how an organization’s strategy, governance, 
performance and prospects lead to the creation of value over the short, 
medium and long term[ through enhancing] accountability and stewardship 
with respect to the broad base of capitals (financial, manufactured, human, 
                                                                                                                 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
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intellectual, natural, and social and relationship) and promote 
understanding of the interdependencies between them.”165   
The IIRC has recognized that the traditional factors taken into 
account in financial reports are insufficient to give a complete picture of an 
organization’s situation. Many factors that are not easily reported in 
traditional financial reports are taking on increasing importance, and a new 
structure of accounting, reporting, and comparison is required. IIRC is now 
working with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)166 to 
develop these concepts into an integrated corporate reporting framework.167 
 
B. OBSTACLES TO ACTION 
 
As alluded to above, the overall reluctance to face the issue of 
climate change through the establishment of effective and sufficient 
frameworks brings about litigation risk – the risk of the application of the 
legal system as a means of redressing issues that have not been resolved by 
legislative action.  
 
1.  Attribution Uncertainty 
 
The application of liability, even in well-established legal systems 
involving well-established areas of law, involves significant uncertainty. 
Where the law is immature (i.e. liability resulting from climate change) the 
risk for companies and insurers increases dramatically.  Climate change is a 
“risk-multiplier” – it has the potential to increase pre-existing risks by a 
factor determined by the severity of the change and the vulnerability of 
affected institutions. Liability risk is also a risk-multiplier in that it has the 
potential to significantly agitate an already unstable economic/social 
situation. In the absence of legislative frameworks, people and institutions 
turn to the courts to redress the wrongs they suffer.  The attribution 
structure of liability related to climate change is not only unsettled, it is 
largely undetermined at its base.  Companies and insurers both have reason 
to fear that climate liability could produce a similar magnitude of losses 
that asbestos and tobacco litigation brought about in the 1970s-1990s.  
                                                                                                                 
165  THE INT’L INTEGRATED REPORTING COUNCIL, ABOUT <IR> (2013), 
http://www.theiirc.org/about. (emphasis added). 
166  The IASB is the standard setting body of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation. PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION FOR 
BANKING STANDARDS, WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, available at http://www.publications.parliam 
ent.uk/pa/jt201314/jtselect/jtpcbs/27/27ix_we_h10.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
167 INT’L FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS, press release, IASB AND IIRC 
FORMALISE COOPERATION ON WORK TO DEVELOP INTEGRATED CORPORATE 
REPORTING FRAMEWORK, (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.ifrs.org/Alerts/PressRelease/ 
Documents/2013/IASB-IIRC-MoU-February-2013.pdf. 
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Ideally, liability should be determined in a controlled and 
considered manner so as to avoid unnecessary upset to the insurance 
industry. 168  To allow climate change liability to pass to the insurance 
industry in the absence of specific policy coverage would be to indulge a 
massive moral hazard problem in unsustainable industry while causing 
valuable insurance resources to be depleted. Risk-takers should bear the 
costs of the risks they take and should, if they choose to do so, pass those 
costs on to their shareholders and customers.  Economic efficiency of the 
sort required to tackle the massive complexities of the current and future 
economic environment will only be harnessed through a transparent and 
actualized true-cost model. The same principle holds for liability. 
Distortions in cost attribution through subsidies, whether those are apparent 
subsidies (e.g. tax breaks for certain industries or legislated incentives), or 
non-apparent subsidies (e.g. the externalization of the costs of 
environmental harm to the public commons), should only be made as a 
corrective of pre-existing market failure, and should only be made very 
carefully with long-term development repercussions foremost in mind. In 
light of this, to the extent that industries and their shareholders have 
profited by reaping the benefits of their business model while externalising 
the true costs, they should be required (whether through legislative or 
judicial action) to recompense those who have been harmed. Conceptually 
this is at the very least a matter of basic equity, but although it should 
hardly be controversial the application of the concept is highly 
complicated.  
The attribution of liability for climate change faces significant legal 
hurdles but steps are being made.  In the business sector, awareness of 
potential for climate change liability is increasing. Simultaneous to this is 
                                                                                                                 
168 “The courts may be waiting to see if federal and state legislatures take 
firm action to address climate change issues through new statutory laws…. If clear 
action is not taken soon, courts may be willing to open the door to private litigation 
claims that could cost corporate defendants many millions – if not billions – of 
dollars.”  Kevin Haroff, Climate Change Litigation in the United States, in 
LIABILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE?  EXPERTS’ VIEWS ON A POTENTIAL EMERGING 
RISK 6 (Munich Re 2010) available at www.munichre.com/publications/302-
05493_en.pdf .  By approaching the issue through legislative means, the possibility 
exists for the weight of liability for climate damages to fall where they should, on 
the companies that have produced the damages. If the issue is dealt with through 
the courts, insurers will at the least have to contribute significant funds to defense 
costs, and will potentially be subject to liability costs that they should not be 
required to bear unless the policies they wrote specifically covered those risks and 
the risks were factored into the premiums the insurance companies received for 
covering the risks.  This would unnecessarily and inequitably undermine the ability 
of insurers to insure future risks – increasing the ability for insurers to underwrite 
future climate risks must be established as a top public policy concern considering 
the threats society will face in the coming years. 
2013  INSURANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE  257 
 
 
an increase in awareness of the various mechanisms by which companies 
may be held to account for their climate change related risk management 
programs and responses. As general awareness among company 
shareholders grows, so will the potential for fiduciary suits for breaches of 
duties of care in cases where the management of the company carelessly 
disregards known risks regarding climate issues resulting in loss.169 Such 
losses may be actual losses in litigation, or losses due to a failure to 
mitigate company risk, or failure to adapt to a changing climate (business, 
regulatory, or environmental), or losses based on reputational damage 
arising as a result of company policy.  The SEC has moved to take risk 
management further into account and on this basis publicly-listed 
companies may be subject to liability for failure to adequately account for 
risk in securities filings under U.S. securities laws. 170   In addition, 
institutional investors have moved to pressure companies into making their 
climate risk exposure and management more apparent.171 
 
2.  Problems of Attribution 
 
The problems of attribution in the climate context start with the 
question of whether climate change is anthropogenic. Current scientific 
knowledge has put this question to rest and as time passes it will be 
increasingly difficult for defendants to successfully defend on this point. 
The next questions refer to issues of justiciability and standing. 
  Justiciability is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as, “The 
quality or state of being appropriate or suitable for adjudication by a 
court.” 172  Due to the complexity of climate change related issues, the 
special scientific knowledge required for a considered determination of the 
issues, and the public policy concerns involved, courts have considered 
climate change to be more appropriately handled by legislative action.173 
                                                                                                                 
169 See Christina Ross, Evan Mills, & Sean B. Hecht, Limiting Liability in the 
Greenhouse: Insurance Related Risk Management Strategies in the Context of 
Global Climate Change, 26 A STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 251, 263–273 (2007). 
170 See id. at 266–270. 
171 See CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, CDP INVESTOR INITIATIVES, available 
at https://www.cdproject.net/en-US/WhatWeDo/Pages/investors.aspx (last visited 
September 27, 2013). 
172 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 882 (8th ed. 2004). 
173 See Ina Ebert, Legal Aspects of U.S. Claims Based on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, in LIABILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE?  EXPERTS’ VIEWS ON A 
POTENTIAL EMERGING RISK 14 (Munich Re 2010) available at www.munichre.com 
/publications/302-05493_en.pdf (referring, for example, to the cases People of 
State of Cal. v. General Motors Corp. No. C06–05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 
(N.D. Cal. Sept.17, 2007), Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. 
Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009)). 
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Standing is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as, “A party’s right 
to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”174 
More particularly, the basic requirements that a plaintiff must demonstrate 
to satisfy the standing requirement are: (1) that an “injury-in-fact” has 
occurred that is “actual or imminent” and that is “concrete and 
particularized”; (2) that the alleged injury is fairly traceable to actions of 
the defendant; and (3) that a favourable decision will redress the alleged 
injury.175  
Causation is perhaps the most major hurdle in climate change 
litigation, both in terms of standing and in the context of common law tort 
claims such as negligence or public nuisance. Due to the long-standing 
diffusion of GHGs emitted over many years from all over the world, it is 
very difficult in most cases to demonstrate a sufficiently direct link 
between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s harm.  To argue that 
such a requirement is almost certainly impossible to satisfy would be in 
keeping with the state of the law as it stands,176 but not necessarily with the 
state of the law as it could stand in the context of an unprecedented 
situation of realized systemic harm. 
Negligence is “the failure to exercise the standard of care that a 
reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation; [it 
refers to] any conduct that falls below the legal standard established to 
protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is 
intentionally, wantonly, or wilfully disregardful of others rights.”177 The 
elements of a negligence claim are therefore: duty, breach, causation, and 
harm.  
The negligence standard is that of a “reasonably prudent person”.  
It is simply not reasonably disputable that if the evidence the IPCC had 
uncovered by the time of its Second Assessment Report in 1995 was 
presented to an unbiased and uncompromised “average person in the street” 
that that person would consider it highly unreasonable for heavy emitters of 
GHGs to continue to behave in a like manner in light of the risks presented.  
In other words, and to reinforce the point, a “reasonable person”, when 
faced with scientific evidence demonstrating massive environmental 
upheaval that promises to disrupt the lives of hundreds of millions of 
people and cause the decimation of entire ecosystems relied upon for 
                                                                                                                 
174 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (8th ed. 2004). 
175 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
176 See Ebert, supra note 173, at 15 (“Plaintiffs would have to prove that 
specific defendants caused specific damage. This is not yet possible and will not be 
possible in the foreseeable future . . . [A]ny approach that would overcome the 
causation issues connected with climate litigation would have to be so radical and 
far-reaching that it seem highly unlikely any court would ever be willing to go 
down that road.”).  
177 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (8th ed. 2004). 
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medical and other research that might at some point prove vital to human 
development, would not consider it “prudent” to continue without 
significant and immediate precautionary changes.  
Considering the above in the context of the demonstrable damage 
that climate change is already beginning to cause, heavy emitters of GHGs 
have been arguably guilty of negligence since the creation of the United 
Nations Environment Program 1972.  They have almost certainly been 
guilty of negligence since 1986 (the year of the Montreal Protocol, when 
we indisputably acknowledged our ability to cause massive damage to life-
sustaining natural systems).  But to take the notion further, and considering 
the supposed sophistication of people engaged as directors and officers of 
large-emitter enterprises, and that of elected representatives, it would in 
fact be entirely reasonable to suggest that as of 1996 (the year following the 
publication of the IPCC Second Assessment Report), those who failed to 
make the necessary changes to the systems of high-emitter industries (and 
instead fought for or allowed its subsidisation) are guilty of having 
committed repeated and on-going acts of gross negligence.  There can be 
little doubt that at some point in the future it will come to light that these 
segments of industry colluded with each other and with government to 
wilfully misinform the public as to the dangers of their actions.178 
Western law exists as a mechanism for the peaceful and 
coordinated redressing of wrongs done by one to another. The principle of 
precedent is integral to this notion of fairness, it upholds protection from 
arbitrary treatment.  Barring subsequent legislative acts, in a precedential 
system, those subject to the law may rest in the knowledge that it will be 
applied to them in a way that is consistent with how it was applied to others 
in the past. In the context of climate change liability the shortcomings of 
precedential system are apparent.  The courts wait for the legislature, but 
the legislature protects and strengthens that which should have been 
overhauled; and where the courts should thus act in the absence of 
legislative action, they are bound by precedent, which effectively bars them 
from applying basic principles of common law to rectify an on-going and 
                                                                                                                 
178  Because of the difficulties inherent in establishing common law cases 
alleging negligence or public nuisance, it seems likely that claims will in future 
focus on “non-compliance with regulations or professional duties – for instance, on 
failure to warn or inform; on conspiracy to mislead the public, legislation or the 
courts, e.g. by ‘greenwashing’ business activities (false claims of climate-
friendliness) or by promoting scientific reports denying global warming or its 
partly man-made origin against better knowledge; on the sale of products that are 
falsely or insufficiently labeled to indicate the greenhouse gas emissions they 
cause; on not sufficiently considering the consequences of global warming and 
rising sea levels in the construction business; or on non-compliance with other 
climate regulations the new U.S. administration is expected to introduce in coming 
months or years.” Ebert, supra note 173, at 15.  
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egregious systematic breach by entire industries of the duty to protect 
others from an unreasonable risk of harm. 
Professor Richard Stewart of the New York University Law School 
illustrates these issues quite clearly in his argument that these problems are 
“insurmountable” for plaintiffs bringing suits for storm damage or flooding 
linked to climate change: 179  
 
First, it can be argued that such an event is attributable to 
weather fluctuations rather than long-term climate change[, 
and s]econd, [that] climate change is connected to [carbon 
dioxide] and other greenhouse gases . . . emitted by a huge 
range of human activities, including deforestation and 
agriculture, throughout the world.  These emissions mix 
together on a global scale, making it impossible to fix 
individual responsibility.  Moreover, climate change is 
driven by current atmospheric GHG concentrations, which 
are due to emissions over decades.  Sorting out issues of 
causal responsibility and apportioning liability fairly 
among millions or billions of emitters pose nearly 
insuperable problems.180 
 
Even though Professor Stewart is quite right to point out the 
incredible complexity of ascertaining liability in cases like these, and even 
though his representation is correct as a representation of the difficulties 
courts have encountered, the problem is certainly not insurmountable.  
Viable methods are already being developed to overcome these obstacles. 
  
C. THE PROBLEM OF THE WORST EMITTERS 
 
One of the major reasons why material developments have been 
impossible is due to “the fact that the principle contributors to climate 
change, the [US] and China, do not perceive themselves as likely to be its 
principle victims.  As a result, the two leading contributors lack a strong 
incentive to help to solve the problem.”181   
                                                                                                                 
179  Professor Stewart rightly distinguishes these types of cases from toxic 
waste liability cases, for example, in which the locality of harm is more immediate 
and the causers of the harm more readily ascertainable. See Richard Stewart 
Interview, Climate Liability under the Obama Presidency, in LIABILITY FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE?  EXPERTS’ VIEWS ON A POTENTIAL EMERGING RISK 9 (Munich 
Re 2010) available at www.munichre.com/publications/302-05493_en.pdf .  
180 Id,  
181  Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The 
Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1675, 1676–77 (2008). 
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For example, the ultimate failure of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol was 
due to a lack of incentive, in the US and in China, to ratify it.  
 
On the numbers as they were generated at the time, the 
[US] would have to spend over $300 billion to comply 
with the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
monetized benefits, for the [US], would be about 4 percent 
of that amount. . . . In 1997, a unanimous Senate . . . asked 
[President Clinton] not to agree to limits on greenhouse gas 
emissions if the agreement would injure the economic 
interests of the [US]. . . . [T]he Senate concluded that any 
‘exemption for Developing Country Parties is inconsistent 
with the need for global action on climate change and is 
environmentally flawed’ and indicated that it ‘strongly 
believe[d]’ that the proposals under consideration ‘could 
result in serious harm to the [US] economy, including 
significant job loss, trade disadvantages, increased energy 
and consumer costs, or any combination thereof.’    
Because the developing nations were not going to agree to 
emissions limitations, this request effectively ensured that 
the [US] would not ratify the resulting agreement.. . . [The 
Senate] perception [was] that the [US] had far more to lose 
than to gain . . . There were large efforts, by the [US] 
above all, to convince China and other developing nations 
to agree to emissions limitations in the Kyoto Protocol.  
These efforts were unsuccessful.  China did indicate its 
willingness to ratify the agreement, but its own decision 
was essentially meaningless, because the protocol imposes 
no obligations on China at all.  In refusing to agree to 
emissions limitations, China made an array of equitable 
arguments, emphasizing its relative poverty, its relatively 
low per capita emissions, and the fact that the existing 
stock of greenhouse gas emissions is a product of the 
industrialized nations, which benefitted from those 
emissions.  But there is no question that China was greatly 
influenced by two perceptions: it would not greatly benefit 
from emissions reductions, and those reductions would 
cost a great deal. . . . China was affected by a purely 
domestic cost-benefit analysis, which argued strongly 
against acceptance of international requirements.182 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
182  Id. at 1680–82. 
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D. THE PROBLEM OF DEVELOPING VS. DEVELOPED ECONOMIES 
 
As the above quote demonstrates, one of the major problems that 
the development of international agreements on climate and on sustainable 
development faces is the problem of getting developing countries on board.  
China’s position in the Kyoto ratification context highlights that 
the problem is largely one of equity, even if in a certain sense it is a 
misguided notion of equity.  The argument made by developing economies 
to developed economies is essentially: “You got to burn coal and wreck the 
environment so that you could develop your economy, but now that you are 
developed and are reaping the rewards of your development, you want to 
stop us from doing the same – this has less to do with protecting the 
environment than it does with keeping us undeveloped.”  And indeed, we 
in the western developed nations might well ask – if no one stopped us 
from developing in the way we did, how is it our right to now tell others 
that they can’t do what we did, shouldn’t developing countries be able to 
assert the right to do as we did?   
The question is absurd – there is no right whatsoever for 
developing countries to pass through the same process developed countries 
passed through in order to arrive in their current state.183 The northern 
hemisphere’s industrialized powers began their industrial development in 
the 1750s.  They learned by trial and error in a natural environment that 
still maintained, at the macro-level at least, a massive ability to absorb the 
pollution produced.  We are not in the 18th century anymore and the natural 
life-sustaining systems we rely on are simply not in a position to handle the 
dirty industrialization of the so far unindustrialized human world.  
It is not the fault of the developing world that the developed world 
has done material damage to the planet’s ecosystems.  The developing 
world must now suffer due to the faults of the developed world because it 
has to, there is no choice – it is not fair and no one can reasonably state 
otherwise – the developed world has seriously mismanaged its 
development, and now people (and millions of other life-systems – known 
and unknown) the world over are suffering the consequences.  The answer 
to the issue is not for developing countries to demand to be able to commit 
the same errors that developed countries committed – errors of judgment 
                                                                                                                 
183 The idea is equivalent to another country pointing out that in the process of 
the development of the U.S. cotton industry, U.S. growers were able to use slaves, 
and therefore others should be allowed to do so now. Another example can be 
found in the nuclear weapon fuelled rivalry between India and Pakistan. Of course 
it is the case that the US and Russia went through a very similar process of 
development of arms and mutual threats – but this does not mean that others 
should seek to put themselves in the same position; rather, it means that others 
should learn from the US/USSR Cold War experience and realize that that is not a 
desirable path to walk down. 
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and action should be learned from and avoided, not knowingly repeated out 
of some misguided notion of equity. 
So what is to be done?  The first step is to comprehend that it is 
imperative that developing countries be given the opportunity to develop 
their economies, not by way of 18th century understanding, but by way of 
21st century understanding.  In other words, as an international community 
we must be imaginative and generous, we must think globally and with a 
long-term perspective. 
 
E. SOLUTIONS 
 
1. World Environment Organization 
 
First of all it must be stated that this paper cannot reasonably argue 
that there is any great possibility that anything resembling the following 
summary blueprint will be implemented in the near future.  However, this 
paper does argue that something consistent with this blueprint must be 
implemented if the material mitigation of climate change, and the creation 
of an internationally coherent system of sustainable development is to be 
accomplished. 
The general guise of the following blueprint is not new.184 What is 
new is the manner in which various aspects of the overall UN structure 
have been pieced together into a structure with increased potential for the 
production of a sustainable worldwide economic system that prudently acts 
immediately to mitigate the worst of any potential disruption, while 
retaining the capability to withstand the inevitable changes we will face in 
the coming century as a result of prior irreversible activity.  The structure 
of the international system of UN and other international agencies, 
programmes, and organizations related to trade, environment, human 
health, and financial support and oversight must be restructured and 
consolidated to better and more efficiently reflect the three pillars of the 
Brundtland Report (economic, environmental, and social), so as to achieve 
                                                                                                                 
184  See Daniel C. Esty & Maria H. Ivanova, Making International 
Environmental Efforts Work: The Case for a Global Environmental Organization, 
YALE CTR. FOR ENVTL. LAW AND POLICY 5–10 (2001), available at 
www.environmentalgovernance.org/cms/wpcontent/uploads/docs/riopaper1_esty_i
vanova.doc (discussing the rationale for a Global Environmental Organization, the 
necessary functions and features and design of such an organization, its benefits, 
and strategies for implementation); Frank Biermann, Reforming Global 
Environmental Governance: The Case for a United Nations Environment 
Organisation (UNEO), STAKEHOLDER FORUM 5 (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://www.stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/WEO%20Biermann%20FINAL 
.pdf (discussing the history of debate surrounding the creation of a World 
Environment Organization, three models of a WEO, and the case for a UN 
Environment Organization). 
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the maximal structural efficiency, and the maximum possible information 
exchange, in the pursuit of global sustainable development where global 
issues are concerned.  The resulting structure would look something like 
this: 
 
• UN General Assembly 
o World Security Council (WSC) 
o World Court of Justice (WCJ) 
? World Court for Human Health (WCHH) 
? World Court for the Environment (WCE) 
? World Court for Trade Disputes (WCTD) 
o World Development Council (WDC) 
? World Development Organization (WDO) 
• World Health Organization (WHO) 
• World Environment Organization (WEO) 
• World Trade Organization (WTO) 
? World Development Finance Organization (WDFO) 
• World Development Bank (WDB) 
• World Insurance Mechanism (WIM) 
o World Catastrophic Risk Organization (WCRO) 
o World Microinsurance Organization (WMO) 
o World Financial Stability Council (WFSC) 
? World Bank for International Settlements (WBIS) 
? World Financial Stability Board (WFSB) 
 
Three aspects of the above chart should be highlighted.  First, the 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) should be merged into a World 
Environment Organization (WEO) with a mandate to consolidate the 
bureaucratic burdens and reporting requirements of all international 
conventions related to the protection of the natural environment, to the 
mitigation of climate change, and where change is inevitable, to adaptation.  
Second, within the purview of a World Development Finance 
Organization (WDFO) there should be a World Development Bank (WDB) 
and a World Insurance Mechanism (WIM), which would itself consist of a 
World Catastrophic Risk Organization (WCRO) and a World 
Microinsurance Organization (WMO).  The WIM would be specifically 
designed to licence and supervise global (re)insurers so that they can more 
efficiently spread catastrophic risks and develop insurance markets (in 
developing countries) on a global and regional basis without the 
inefficiencies of being subject to local regulatory and legislative risk.185 
                                                                                                                 
185  The regulation in this context would be minimal and focused towards 
setting and managing entry and exit requirements, and regulation and supervision 
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The objective would be to streamline the ability for internationally active 
insurance groups to provide and develop insurance on a global basis.186 
Rather than institute mechanisms to force private insurers to provide 
coverage, the structure would be designed to incentivise insurers to take 
part so that mandatory provision of insurance would be unnecessary.  
Regulatory and legislative risk would be kept to a minimum through the 
close connection between the WDFO and the World Development 
Organization (WDO) (discussed further below) under the auspices of the 
World Development Council (WDC). 
Third, the World Financial Stability Council (WCFS) would bring 
into its fold two pre-existing organizations: the Bank for International 
Settlements, and the Financial Stability Board.  The Financial Stability 
Board was established “to coordinate at the international level the work of 
national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies and 
to develop and promote the implementation of effective regulatory, 
supervisory and other financial sector policies.  It brings together national 
authorities responsible for financial stability in significant international 
financial centers, international financial institutions, sector-specific 
international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of 
central bank experts.”187 For purposes of the WFSB, representation would 
                                                                                                                 
of company solvency. Form regulation requirements would be unnecessary where 
the policyholder is sophisticated; and where the policyholder is unsophisticated, 
the WCRO would act as an intermediary allowing form supervision where 
necessary. Rate regulation would also be kept to a minimum – the sole requirement 
being that the rates charged be demonstrated as actuarially accurate to the risk 
covered. The scheme would be designed to create a situation in which a more 
robust layer of private insurance (arranged on a bi-level regional/global basis with 
funds held in reserve by the WDB) would decrease the need for government 
backstops, in which subsidization by taxpayers or policyholders with unlike risks 
would cease to exist except in far more extreme situations than the market has yet 
suffered. By setting rates at actuarially sound levels, and by avoiding unnecessary 
compliance costs, the industry would be able to fully manifest its potential for 
establishing market incentives to minimize risk of loss, while expanding the base 
of worldwide insureds, thus decreasing the overall cost of insurance coverage. An 
important question, when considering the prospect of non-subsidized insurance 
premiums, is what happens to those who live in high-risk areas who cannot afford 
accurate insurance rates. Consider for example the people who work for low wages 
in coastal resorts in Florida, or the small support businesses in such communities. 
186 See The Implications of Financial Reform for the Insurance Industry, INST. 
OF INT’L FIN. 5 (2011) (“In many cases, catastrophic risk cannot be efficiently 
insured at the national level, but instead requires very large risk pools that spread 
beyond national borders. Large (re)insurance groups thus play a role in global risk 
pooling.”), available at http://www.oliverwyman.com/implications-of-financial-
regulatory-reform-for-the-insurance-industry.htm#.UfFpLRa_AfE. 
187 Overview, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboa 
rd.org/about/overview.htm (last visited September 29, 2013). 
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be focused in entities such as the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) in the US, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the EU, 
and equivalent organizations (which would be required for representation 
in the WFSB) from other regions.  In each case, national or regional 
financial stability organizations would have to be made up of senior 
regulators from the three branches of the financial services: investment 
banking, commercial banking, and insurance; as well as senior national 
finance ministers.  The jurisdictional oversight of the national/regional 
financial stability organizations would be required to employ a system of 
supervisory colleges to oversee cross-border/cross-sector financial services 
organizations on an enterprise-wide basis. 
 
2.  Assessment of Liability to Subsidize Innovation 
 
As a matter of sustainable development, the World Development 
Organization, through its three branches, the WHO, WEO, and WTO, must 
have the power to establish, coordinate, and enforce measures designed to 
ensure a balance of interests that will specifically contribute to sustainable 
development on a global scale.  Where current WTO agreements are 
contrary to, or not supportive of, measures required for the protection of the 
environment by the WEO, those agreements must be invalidated (or altered 
where possible) to take account of the conflicting requirements of 
environmental protection, consistent with the precautionary principle of 
international environmental law.188   
In consideration of the limited capabilities of developing states to 
apply the precautionary principle, the World Development Bank would 
have to establish a fund (through assessments discussed below), which 
                                                                                                                 
188 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janiero, Braz., Jun. 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 
1992) (“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”). See also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 745 (2006) (As this is a matter of the application of 
transnational law to sovereign states, it is necessary to consider why such law 
should be applied, and how it can be applied to sovereign states). But see Jon Kyl 
et al., The War of Law: How New International Law Undermines Democratic 
Sovereignty, 92 FOREIGN AFF., 115 (2013) (articulating the arguments against 
application of transnational law in which these authors do not find the overall 
argument against application of transnational law convincing in light of concerns 
of superseding importance, but it is necessary to comprehend the sovereign 
constitutional/democratic issues inherent in its development where it has domestic 
legal repercussions). 
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would be employed to help finance the ability of developing states to 
adhere to the precautionary principle. In such cases, the investment would 
be made in full communication and cooperation with the WEO. The WEO 
would then actively advise upon and oversee the actual implementation of 
the investment by the developing country.  The investment would have to 
be used to establish innovative systems of development rigorously focused 
towards the long-term establishment of domestically-sustainable industry. 
Such model systems would be designed and developed within the WEO 
(but would be supplemented by an established in-built competitive system 
in which new and innovative, cost-saving proposals from outside designers 
would be considered and rewarded); on this basis, the most advanced new 
technologies could be immediately implemented in developing countries 
where necessary.  This methodology would immediately spur a massive 
increase in investment and job creation in next-generation energy and 
development technology. 
A large portion of the funding for this system would come from the 
assessment of funds from high-emitter industries in return for relief from 
the prospect of uncontrolled liability – this controlled and regulated system 
would be the proverbial carrot.  The proverbial stick would be the actual 
threat of significant attribution of liability for past action on the basis of 
public-nuisance, gross negligence, and (probably) conspiracy. The 
attribution would be unmitigated by insurance coverage unless such 
coverage was specifically contracted. This correction of past externalised 
harm would not only finance the building of sustainable economies and 
mitigation measures in both developed and developing countries, it would 
also fund adaptation measures where mitigation measures are too late (and 
where affected vital infrastructure cannot be moved – such adaptation 
would consist of the building of sea walls, the replenishment of mangrove 
barriers, and the rejuvenation of coral reefs, to protect major cities and 
population centers from flooding, as well as the strengthening of structures 
vulnerable to earthquakes189  and wind zones), and adaptation measures 
where infrastructure can be moved (this would require the active and 
enforced prevention of further building in high-risk zones, and the 
establishment of population centers in lower risk zones linked, as 
necessary, to higher risk zones by appropriate weather-proof public 
transport systems190).  
                                                                                                                 
189 Note that earthquakes are not caused by anthropogenic climate change 
(though they may be caused by new methods of gas extraction). The reason to 
include adaptation to earthquake risks in this context is to ensure that insurance and 
public funds are saved to the greatest extent possible in circumstances where they 
are most needed, and where mitigation measures are insufficient. 
190 This pertains to a question previously raised.  See supra note 185. Highly 
developed communities in high-risk areas must be moved out of the major risk 
zone to the extent the global spreading of like risk does not bring actuarially 
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3.  Fractional Allocation 
 
It has been vehemently argued that it is not possible to adequately 
gauge the contribution to the climate change by any given entity.191 This is 
not necessarily the case.192 In a report by Trucost,193 jointly published by 
the UNEP Finance Initiative and the UN-backed Principles for Responsible 
Investment, it becomes quickly apparent that the calculation of such harms 
is not impossible.194 Trucost establishes in the report that:  
                                                                                                                 
accurate rates down to affordable levels. To the extent coastal businesses require 
on- or near-site employee living, they must pay for it – that is part of their business 
expense. Shifting the cost of poor community-planning to insurance companies 
through forcing coverage, under government-proscribed rate subsidization, in order 
to maintain the current structure is not economically viable when long-term costs 
are taken into account, nor is it equitable.  
191  “Many academic pundits have focused on the challenges facing the 
plaintiffs’ ability to demonstrate a causal link between a specific entity’s GHG 
emissions and a specific alleged damage. It is important to note, however, that both 
the activist and academic stakeholder communities have turned their focus and 
efforts to this matter. They seek to overcome the barriers to tort liability, creating a 
legal theory that would allow plaintiffs to attribute damages to a specific emission 
or sets of emissions by individual companies or industries.” Lindene E. Patton, 
Why Insurers Should Focus on Climate Risk Issues, in LIABILITY ISSUES RELATED 
TO CLIMATE RISK 1, 9 (Geneva Association 2011). 
192 See id. at 8–9 (describing recent trends in damages calculations and the use 
of fractional allocation as a means of establishing liability: “Development of law 
providing a broader base for retroactive liability for past resource damages, 
combined with a general erosion of legal theorem which would hold parties to be 
responsible for understanding obvious risks, and a multitude of types of claims 
filed, suggests a broad social change in expectation of what is required as a ‘social 
license to do business’ as respects natural resources – including impacts related to 
GHG emissions and climate change.”). 
193 “Trucost has been helping companies, investors, governments, academics 
and thought leaders to understand the economic consequences of natural capital 
dependency for over 12 years. Our industry leading data and insight enables our 
clients to identify natural capital dependency across companies, products, supply 
chains and investments; manage risk from volatile commodity prices and 
increasing environmental costs; and ultimately build more sustainable business 
models, products and brands. Key to our approach is that we not only quantify 
natural capital dependency, we also put a price on it, helping our clients understand 
environmental risk in business terms.” What We Do, TRUCOST, http://www.trucost. 
com/what-we-do (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). 
194 See Patton, supra note 191, at 9 (“[Trucost] appear[s] to be patterning their 
arguments to overcome the ‘causation’ barrier by modeling the successful market 
share theory applied in many product liability cases and combining that with an 
implied assertion of the ‘de minimis’ theory applied in hazardous waste cases to 
create a path for activist judges to find liability … attributable past, current and/or 
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Medium– to large-sized publicly listed companies cause 
over one-third (35%) of global externalities annually. 195  
The largest 3,000 public companies caused over US$ 2.15 
trillion of global environmental costs in 2008, which 
equates to nearly 7% of their combined revenues. Other 
actors in the global economy, such as small and private 
companies, governments, other organisations and 
individuals contribute the remaining US$ 4.45 trillion of 
external costs. Five sectors account for around 60% of all 
externalities from the largest 3,000 listed companies. 
Reducing emissions in the Electricity, Oil & Gas Producers, 
Industrial Metals and Mining and Construction & Materials 
sectors would have the greatest effect on reducing carbon 
costs. …  GHGs emitted by the listed companies and their 
suppliers account for over 30% (US$ 1.4 trillion) of total 
economy-wide carbon costs. Almost two-thirds of total 
costs from the 3000 companies are due to GHG 
emissions…. The materiality of externalities varies at a 
company and sector level. Assuming all environmental 
costs were internalised for each company, they would 
                                                                                                                 
present GHG emissions.”). See also PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV. & UNITED 
NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAM FIN. INITIATIVE, UNIVERSAL OWNERSHIP: WHY 
ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES MATTER TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 11–16 
(2011), available at http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/universal_owners 
hip_full.pdf (for Trucost’s methodology in evaluating the costs of greenhouse gas 
emission – Trucost notes the difficulties involved in evaluating these costs, but 
ultimately points out that “[t]he actual value of externalities is likely to be higher 
than in this study.”).  
195   
Business use of environmental goods and services generates 
environmental damage that carries significant costs. These are 
largely external to financial accounts. Without adequate 
information about environmental externalities, markets have 
failed to account accurately for the dependence of businesses on 
ecosystem services such as a stable climate and access to 
freshwater. . . . Environmental degradation that damages natural 
and human capital harms economic productivity. One way to 
measure business damage to the environment is to price natural 
resource use, waste and pollution. Damage costs from 
production are usually not paid in full by the companies 
generating them and are therefore known as “external costs” or 
“externalities”. 
 
PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV. & UN ENV’T PROGRAM FIN. INITIATIVE, supra 
note 162, at 4, 6. 
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equate to between 0.34% and over 100% of revenue. …  
Some 623 companies valued at US$ 7.8 trillion in the 
Electricity, Oil & Gas Producers, Industrial Metals and 
Mining, Food Producers, and Construction & Materials 
sectors are responsible for the majority of corporate 
externalities…. The five sectors account for over US$ 1.25 
trillion in externalities, or 58% of external costs caused by 
the 3,000 companies, and 26% of the combined market 
capitalisation of all 3,000 companies.196 
 
Serious and technically complex efforts are being made that have 
the potential to overcome the causation problem in attributing liability to 
companies for their contribution to damages resulting from climate change. 
Trucost went on to construct a hypothetical typical investment fund, valued 
at US$ 20 billion. On the basis of its models, Trucost found that “for every 
US$ 10 billion invested in equities in the [MSCI All Country World Index 
(ACWI) in 2008], an investor would be proportionally responsible for US$ 
560 million of the externalities caused by the listed companies annually.”197  
Hence, investment firms would also bear a very real incentive to support 
the restructuring effort. 
 
                                                                                                                 
196 Id. at 4, 25–27.  The report goes on to describe Trucost’s approach to 
calculating the environmental impacts of companies in the study:  
 
To calculate the environmental impacts of companies included in 
the study, disclosures were reviewed from sources including 
company annual reports, sustainability or corporate social 
responsibility reports, and websites. Calculations incorporate 
disclosed quantitative data on companies’ actual pollutant 
releases and resource use. . . . Where companies do not disclose 
adequate data, Trucost used its environmental profiling input-
output model to calculate the type and level of environmental 
resource use and non-product output. These calculations are 
based on the economic activity of any given company operating 
in 464 industries, using data on industry emissions derived from 
national and industry-compiled emissions registries. Detailed 
government census and survey data on resource use and pollutant 
releases, industry data and national economic accounts inform 
calculations. Trucost engages with companies, which are given 
the opportunity to verify their data and provide more 
information. Trucost’s comprehensive coverage ensures that all 
companies within the universe are included, not just those that 
disclose environmental information. 
 
Id. at 16. 
197 Id. at 28. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The inherent deficit of insurance and government adaptation and 
mitigation mechanisms in much of the world, factored into already unstable 
developed-world systems, intensifies the need to make sure that our 
developed world systems are as robust as possible in the coming decades. 
Many, but not all, of our developed-world systems are long-
established, and this is both an asset and a liability.  It is an asset in the 
sense that we have experienced individuals within organizations 
specifically focused on establishing and maintaining supervisory networks.  
These supervisory networks have existing relationships with the industries 
they oversee, and those industries are familiar with being regulated and 
themselves have, accordingly, established governance systems.  Funding 
mechanisms are in place that are geared towards analysing risk of loss, and 
replenishing the finances of enterprises in the event of actual loss.  We also 
have established building and support industries that carry out post-loss 
redevelopment.  These are systems that the developing world does not have 
to the same extent. 
But the liability of established systems is their entrenched state.  
Unless a system is designed to effectively manage evolution it will be 
unable to keep up with the dynamism of free markets, and regulatory 
systems will spend their time trying to catch-up.  The result of 
entrenchment is the incentive to maintain the status quo – innovation is 
harder work than maintenance, it is uncertain and it requires expensive 
investment of funds that could otherwise be used to enrich executives and 
shareholders.  This is a heavy temptation that generally is not overcome 
except when necessity dictates action.  The necessity that dictates action 
comes from the consuming public in the marketplace, or from the voting 
public pressuring government to make legislative choices that force 
change.  For that reason, enterprises that have the means will always seek 
to influence the mind-set of the consuming and voting public in what ways 
they can, and will in addition establish relationships with government not 
only to prevent the enactment of laws that they see as threatening to their 
short-term financial interests.198 
The development of international environment law remains in a 
state of adolescence, confused by the awkwardness of its growth, lacking 
any grace in the coordination of its many limbs.  Much has to be done in 
this area to provide a reliable structure according to which global industry 
                                                                                                                 
198 See The Century of Self (BBC TV 2002) (an award-winning documentary 
film by filmmaker Adam Curtis focused on how Edward Bernays, a pioneer in the 
field of public relations and propaganda, employed the psychological 
understanding of his uncle, Sigmund Freud, to influence the way corporations and 
governments analyse markets and populations; and, further, on how that 
knowledge has been used to influence consumers and voting populations). 
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can feel confident investing in next-generation infrastructure.  Until the 
environmental regulatory context has matured, insurers will be impeded in 
effectively analysing risks related to climate change. 
Considering the enormity of the losses that will accrue on the basis 
of climate change forces already set in motion, the insurance regulatory 
world needs to work together to harmonize law, to continue the push to 
match supervision to the cross-border enterprises in question so as to 
prevent the development of systemic risks, and to increase the efficiency of 
the global spreading of risk.  Without environmental-policy change, the 
risks we face will be unaffordable.  The insurance industry, and its 
regulators, should be pushing hard for as much certainty as can possibly be 
found – only by standing on relatively firm ground will the industry be able 
to digest the challenges that will come. 
Considering the extent of the deep pockets involved, the increasing 
social awareness of climate issues, the increasing value of money for the 
majority of people in light of the general and continuing economic slump, 
and the evolution of ingenious methodologies for overcoming legal 
hurdles, it is actually not unlikely at all that in the coming future we will 
see a shift towards accountability for those companies that have contributed 
the most to climate change.  To add grist to the mill, consider that “OECD 
countries in particular are implementing measures to internalise 
environmental costs.  Pollution costs are rising through: Regulations are 
being strengthened by governments worldwide to protect human health and 
the environment[; i]ncreasing levels of fines and penalties for breaching 
environmental legislation[; l]awsuits[; s]tricter environmental impact 
assessment requirements to obtain planning permission for developments 
and [for securing] a license to operate[; r]ising corporate taxation[; and 
market based instruments that enable cost-effective abatement….”199  
While optimistic in the sense that it highlights incremental changes 
where far larger shifts are needed, the above quote is right to highlight 
these changes – they suggest the way of things to come.  The upshot of 
these developments is that the ability to fund a massive overhaul of our 
economic and social systems is far more possible than it would at first 
seem.200  This cannot happen fast enough, but it will take intelligent and 
concerted efforts from all stakeholders, from government officials, and 
from industry, to make sure that it happens through a sufficiently 
considered structure as may lay an efficient foundation for a future 
economy.  
                                                                                                                 
199 PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV. & UN ENV’T PROGRAM FIN. INITIATIVE, 
supra note 162, at 34. 
200“The removal of environmentally damaging subsidies, such as over US 
$300 billion in fossil fuel subsidies in G20 countries, and the surge in 
environment-related subsidies, tax breaks and other financial incentives, will 
change competitive dynamics” Id. 
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